Salina

Radar and air traffic control communications indicated that the Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 was operating normally and flew a nominal flightpath from takeoff through the beginning of the approach until the airplane overshot the extended centerline of the landing runway, tracking to the east and left of course by about 0.2 nautical mile then briefly tracking back toward the centerline. The airplane then entered a 360-degree turn to the left, east of the centerline and at an altitude far below what would be expected for a nominal flightpath and intentional maneuvering flight given the airplane's distance from the airport, which was about 5 miles. As the airplane was in its sustained left turn tracking away from the airport, the controller queried the pilot, who stated that he had a "control problem" and subsequently stated he had a "left engine shutdown." This was the last communication received from the pilot. Witnesses saw the airplane spiral toward the ground and disappear from view. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was in the extended position, the flaps were extended 20 degrees, and the left engine propeller blades were in the feathered position. Examination of the left engine showed the fuel shutoff valve was in the closed position, consistent with the engine being in an inoperative condition. As examined, the airplane was not configured in accordance with the airplane flight manual engine shutdown and single-engine landing procedures, which state that the airplane should remain in a clean configuration with flaps set to 5 degrees at the beginning of the final approach descent and the landing gear retracted until landing is assured. Thermal damage to the cockpit instrumentation precluded determining the preimpact position of fuel control and engine switches. The investigation found that the airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with federal regulations and that the recovered airplane components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures. The investigation also determined that the pilot was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable federal regulations, including Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 108, which is required for MU-2B pilots and adequate for the operation of MU-2B series airplanes. The pilot had recently completed the SFAR No. 108 training in Kansas and was returning to Tulsa. At the time of the accident, he had about 12 hours total time in the airplane make and model, and the flight was the first time he operated the airplane as a solo pilot. The investigation found no evidence indicating any preexisting medical or behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected the pilot's performance on the day of the accident. Based on aircraft performance calculations, the airplane should have been flyable in a one engine-inoperative condition; the day visual meteorological conditions at the time of the accident do not support a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Therefore, the available evidence indicates that the pilot did not appropriately manage a one-engine-inoperative condition, leading to a loss of control from which he did not recover. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with any type of crash resistant recorder. Although radar data and air traffic control voice communications were available during the investigation to determine the airplane's altitude and flight path and estimate its motions (pitch, bank, yaw attitudes), the exact movements and trim state of the airplane are unknown, and other details of the airplane's performance (such as power settings) can only be estimated. In addition, because the airplane was not equipped with any type of recording device, the pilot's control and system inputs and other actions are unknown. The lack of available data significantly increased the difficulty of determining the specific causes that led to this accident, and it was not possible to determine the reasons for the left engine shutdown or evaluate the pilot's recognition of and response to an engine problem. Recorded video images from the accident flight would possibly have shown where the pilot's attention was directed during the reported problems, his interaction with the airplane controls and systems, and the status of many cockpit switches and instruments. Recorded flight data would have provided information about the engines' operating parameters and the airplane's motions. Previous NTSB recommendations have addressed the need for recording information on airplane types such as the one involved in this accident. Recorders can help investigators identify safety issues that might otherwise be undetectable, which is critical to the prevention of future accidents.

During a test flight, the airplane encountered an elevator system oscillation while in a high speed dive outside the normal operating envelope. The 17 second oscillation was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder and had an average frequency of 28 Hz. The aft elevator sector clevis (p/n 2331510-32) fractured due to reverse bending fatigue caused by vibration, resulting in a complete loss of elevator control. The flight crew reported that pitch control was established by using horizontal stabilizer pitch trim. The flightcrew stated that during final approach to runway 17 (13,337 feet by 200 feet, dry/asphalt) the aircraft's nose began to drop and that the flying pilot was unable to raise the nose using a combination of horizontal stabilizer trim and engine power. The aircraft landed short of the runway, striking an airport perimeter fence and a berm. The surface winds were from the south at 23 knots, gusting to 32 knots.

The pilot landed with the landing gear in the retracted position, when both the main and auxiliary hydraulic systems failed to extend the gear. The airplane caught fire as it skidded down the runway. The left inboard main tire had blown on takeoff and a 30-inch section of tread was loose. Black marks were along the length of the landing gear strut and up into the wheel well directly above the left inboard wheel. The normal and emergency hydraulic systems both connect to a common valve body on the landing gear actuator. This valve body also had black marks on it. A gap of 0.035 inch was measured between the valve body and actuator. When either the normal or auxiliary hydraulic system was pressurized, red fluid leaked from this gap. Examination revealed that one of two bolts holding the hydraulic control valve in place had fractured and separated. The fractured bolt experienced a shear load that was oriented along the longitudinal axis of the actuator in a plane consistent with impact forces from the flapping tire tread section.. Separation of only one bolt allowed the control valve to twist about the remaining bolt in response to the load along the actuator's longitudinal axis. This led to a loss of clamping force on that side of the actuator. Hydraulic line pressure lifted the control valve, which resulted in rupture of an o-ring that sealed the hydraulic fluid passage. 14 CFR 25.739 describes the requirement for protection of equipment in wheel wheels from the effects of tire debris. The revision of this regulation in effect at the time the airplane's type design was approved by the FAA requires that equipment and systems essential to safe operation of the airplane that is located in wheel wells must be protected by shields or other means from the damaging effects of a loose tire tread, unless it is shown that a loose tire tread cannot cause damage. Examination of the airplane and the FAA approved production drawings disclosed that no shields were installed to protect the hydraulic system components in the wheel well.

Upon landing at the completion of a cross country flight, the captain of the turbojet aircraft employed aerodynamic braking and thrust reverse to slow the airplane to about 60 knots. The captain was allowing the airplane to roll toward the end of the runway where the owner/copilot's hanger was located. With about 4,000 feet of runway remaining, the captain applied the brakes. No braking action was noted. The airplane continued off the end of the runway, through a fence and block wall into a parking lot where the left wing of the airplane was severed. A post crash fire consumed about half of the airplane. Emergency braking procedures were not employed. The crew reported that the were unable to shut down the engines. The copilot lacked experience in the aircraft and crew coordination during the approach, landing, and emergency was ineffective. The airplane traveled about 11,000 feet from point of touchdown to point of rest. Examination of the braking and hydraulic systems failed to pinpoint a malfunction.

Shortly after a night takeoff from Cincinnati-Lunken Field Airport, while in initial climb in foggy conditions, the airplane rolled to the left. The pilot elected to regain control when the airplane struck trees and crashed in the Miami River. The pilot and a passenger were killed while a second passenger was seriously injured.

After takeoff from Goodland Airport, while climbing to a height of about 2,000 feet, the aircraft caught fire for unknown reasons. The pilot reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing when the airplane crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. All five occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed.

The pilot was approaching Goodland when he encountered poor weather conditions with a sandstorm. The airplane landed hard, overturned and came to rest upside down. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.