United States of America

The wreckage was located on the northeast side of halfway mountain heading approximately 270° at the 1,600 foot level. The accident site is located within two miles of the initial approach fix for the localizer/dme runway 16 approach at McGrath. The mea for the dme arc is listed as 3,600 feet above mean sea level. The sector obstruction clearance altitude is listed as 3,100 feet above mean sea level. Weather for the area, airmet sierra, indicated that mountain tops would be obscured and that ceilings would occasionally be 1,500 feet broken. There were reports of snow showers in the area of sufficient intensity that would not allow the search aircraft to fly through the snow showers. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The flight was level at 10,000 feet msl in IMC conditions when the controller noticed the airplane take a sharp right turn and descend rapidly. Attempts to contact the flight were negative. Examination of the accident showed all the major components present, however, impact damage precluded any flight control continuity check. The engines could not be recovered from the impact crater. The accident site was not accessible with specialized equipment. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Before takeoff, an IFR flight plan was filed for a 15 minutes flight from Rome, GA, to Huntsville, AL. Takeoff was commenced at 0937 est with the copilot flying the aircraft. After a VFR takeoff, the captain contacted Atlanta Center to obtain an IFR clearance. The controller advised that other traffic was in the area and instructed the flight to remain VFR (while an IFR clearance was being arranged). At that time, the flight reported at 1,300 feet in VFR conditions. While waiting for an IFR clearance, the crew became concerned about higher terrain and low ceilings. At about 0940, the captain directed the copilot to fly 'back to the right.' Approximately one minute later, the CVR stopped recording and radio contact was lost with the aircraft. Later, the aircraft was found where it had collided with the top of Mt Lavender. Elevation of the crash site was approximately 1,580 feet msl. The aircraft was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system. All nine occupants were killed, among them Angelo J. Bruno, the chairman of Bruno's Inc. company; his brother, Lee J. Bruno, vice chairman; Sam A. Vacarella, senior vice president for merchandising; Edward C. Hyde, vice president for store operations, and R. Randolph Page Jr., vice president for personnel.

The commuter flight was enroute to its home airport and over mountainous terrain when it encountered low ceilings and rain showers. The airplane was not certificated for ifr commuter flights. Instead of going to an alternate airport the pilot attempted to maintain visual conditions and requested and received a visual clearance into the tca and advised the controller that his altitude was 5,100 feet msl. His radio transmission became garbled during the clearance read back and shortly thereafter the controller observed the airplane's radar target turn left from its westerly track and disappear from his scope. There were no further communications between the pilot and the controller. When the aircraft failed to arrive at its destination an alnot was issued. Early the next morning the aircraft's wreckage was found impacted in a mountain approximately 10 miles south of course at an elevation of 4100 feet msl. The investigation revealed that the pilot had previously and successfully flown the accident airplane in ifr conditions.

The pilot stated she felt the twin engined tailwheel cargo airplane yaw to the right during takeoff. The pilot stated she applied left rudder and set differential power to correct for the perceived right hand crosswind. As the airplane lifted off, it made a sharp right turn and performed left and right banks leveling off prior to colliding with the ground. The airplane slid through security fences and a fuel supply depot before stopping. The newspaper bundle cargo moved from the two forward bays to the aft end of the cargo compartment. The newspapers were covered with plastic wrapper. The cargo compartment floor was slippery when walked upon and had traces of snow on it. According to the pilot the cargo was covered by a cargo net secured at the forward end but not at the aft end. Two cargo straps were crisscrossed over the net and secured at the aft end of the cargo load. The left throttle was found in the full forward position. The right throttle was found one inch aft of the full forward position.

During daylight flight, the airplane lost its right engine due to failed piston assembly because of engine overheating. The overheating was due to the engine air cooling baffle not being installed and the improper oil filter being installed. The airplane would not sustain flight due to the inoperative main landing gear which was locked in the down position and the propeller that could not feather due to corrosion. The pilot and his passenger were seriously injured in the landing due to the lack of seat belts. The airplane was operated with 137 known deficiencies.

Shortly after departure the airplane was seen climbing to an altitude of about 200 feet agl. Witnesses saw smoke coming from one of the engines and heard a 'popping noise.' The pilot executed a forced landing in a field. The airplane struck electrical wires and fence then burst into flames. The airplane had refueled just prior to take off, and the fuel receipt showed that 300 gallons of jet (A) fuel was put into the tanks. The normal fuel used in the airplane was 100LL.

The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff, the right engine lost power. An aborted takeoff was performed, but the pilot was unable to maintain directional control, or stop the airplane before it swerved off the remaining runway. The airplane traveled down a 40 foot embankment then slid into a frozen swamp. Post accident inspection revealed a seized fuel pump rotor shaft and a broken coupling on the right engine's fuel pump.

The accident airplane collided with trees and terrain after being cleared for a non precision instrument approach. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The minimum descent altitude for the approach profile from an intermediate intersection to the missed approach point is 1,460 feet. The elevation of destination airport is 745 feet. The elevation of the accident site is 880 feet. Two persons witnessed the accident sequence. Both persons saw the airplane in level, low altitude flight with the landing gear down before it struck the tree tops. They described how the airplane pulled up and then rolled before it struck the ground. One witness described how the airplane was flying at the base of the clouds. All three occupants were killed.

The pilot contacted approach control and was given the weather as sky partly obscured, ceiling 100 feet, visibility 1/16 mile with fog, wind calm. The pilot then requested a surveillance radar approach to runway 14, to be followed by a surveillance approach to runway 32, in the event of a missed approach from runway 14. The published approach minimums were 1-1/4 mile visibility, ceiling 460 feet msl (438 feet agl). The radar control observed an altitude readout that was below the published minimums and advised the pilot to execute a missed approach. No response was received from the pilot. The aircraft was found floating in the bay approximately 2 miles from the end of the runway. Another pilot (based at the same facility) stated that the two pilots had, on numerous occasions, attempted the approach at times when the weather was reported to be less than that required for the approach. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.