United States of America

At 0716, the pilot received a weather brief for a proposed takeoff of 1130. The FSS briefer provided info on thunderstorms forecast in GA and FL. No info was provided about forecast lines and clusters of thunderstorms in SC coastal plains and sern GA. En route, the pilot was given info about level III thunderstorms across the projected flight path by Beaufort and Savannah approach control. ATC radar data revealed that the aircraft flew the route contained in the flight plan clearance. Radio transmissions from the aircraft indicated that onboard weather radar was being used. ATC radar data and radio communications indicated that the aircraft entered a thunderstorm, then made a 180° turn to exit the storm. Examination of the wreckage revealed plastic deformation of the wings inboard of the engines in an upward direction. Also, both wings broke off outboard of the engines in a downward direction. The horizontal stab and elevator were not recovered. There was fuselage damage which indicated that the horizontal stab separated aft and down. All five occupants were killed.

No record could be found showing the pilot received a weather briefing prior to takeoff. Unfavorable weather was in the vicinity. Several times the pilot had difficulties understanding and complying with instructions from clearance delivery, ground control, and departure control. After takeoff the pilot requested and received an IFR clearance. During the last five minutes of flight radar returns showed the airplane changing heading from 45° to as much as 180° about 10 times and descending or ascending several times from altitudes ranging from 4,500 feet msl to 11,500 feet msl. The altitude and heading changes were not directed by controllers. About 3 minutes before the accident departure control asked the pilot if he had a problem. The pilot indicated that he did and 'we're trying to get straight.' One minute later, the pilot said 'we're all right.' Shortly afterwards, radar data showed a loss of control. Radar and communications were lost and an on ground explosion was observed as the accident occurred. An FAA flight surgeon reviewed the pilot's medical records. Within one year of the accident the pilot had 3 physical conditions and was taking 3 separate prescriptions which would have prevented him from being medically qualified to pilot an aircraft. All seven occupants were killed.

Flight departed and upon reaching a point approx 35 miles north of airport pilot requested return to airport from ATC. Pilot did not declare emergency or report an engine problem. Upon entering traffic pattern at uncontrolled airport pilot stated he would follow a Cessna 152 for landing. On short final aircraft was seen making s turns to maintain spacing behind 152. Pilot then declared he had an engine shutdown and needed to land. 152 was in landing flare and landed. With 152 on runway pilot attempted a go around with full flaps extended, gear down, left engine shutdown, and at a slow airspeed. Aircraft rolled to left upon application of right engine power and nosed down from which it crashed. The number two cylinder of the left engine had suffered separation of the head from the barrel. Pilot logbook did not reflect pilot having current biennial flight review. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Due to the impending arrival of a snow storm, the certificated commercial pilot and 5 passengers departed one day earlier than planned, from an uncontrolled airport located in mountainous terrain to begin a night, cross country flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. Prior to departure, the pilot was given an ifr clearance void time from an ARTCC. The pilot was climbing toward a VOR located about 27 miles southeast of the departure airport while attempting to contact the ARTCC to open his instrument flight plan. The pilot failed to maintain terrain clearance, and became lost/disoriented. The airplane struck trees and snow covered terrain at 10,200 feet msl, 7 nautical miles and about 22° to the right of the intended course. Four passengers were killed while two other occupants, among them the pilot, were injured.

While initiating a cross country flight, the eight place aircraft with nine persons aboard, impacted terrain shortly after takeoff. Ice had been seen on the wings and horizontal stabilizer, and icing conditions were present. The aircraft was over maximum gross weight by a minimum of 258 pounds, and the pilot held an expired student pilot certificate dated august 17, 1984. A copy of a private pilot certificate designating multiengine land and instrument was found in the pilot's personal belongings. Faa officials concluded that it was not a valid certificate. An application for a medical certificate dated may 30, 1991, indicated the pilot had 4,000 hours of flight time. This figure could not be verified. Just prior to takeoff the pilot was observed brushing snow off the wings. Following the accident granular ice was found on the aerodynamic surfaces. The pilot and two passengers were killed while six other occupants were injured.

On IFR arrival, flight 4821 was cleared to intersection 17 northeast of airport at 6,000 feet, then for ILS runway 23 approach. Radar service was terminated 6.5 east of intersection. Radar data showed that flight crossed and then bracketed localizer. Flight intercepted glide slope from below about 7 miles outside of outer marker and thence deviated above glide slope. About 2 miles outside of marker, flight was at a full fly down deflection when it entered a descent varying from 1,200 to 2,000 fpm. Aircraft struck wooded mountain top 2.0 miles inside of outer marker (3.9 miles from runway) at elevation of 2,280 feet. Minimum altitude at marker was 3,600 feet. Glide slope elevation at point of impact was approximately 2,900 feet. Evidence was found of inadequate electrical ground path between radome and fuselage which, when combined with existing weather conditions, may have produced electrostatic discharge (precipitation static). Although post-accident tests were not conclusive, the safety board believes that the glide slope indications might have been unreliable due to precipitation static interference. Two occupants survived while two others (one pilot and one passenger) were killed.

Pilot was cleared for an ILS approach at his destination, and requested to report altitude of 3,000 feet on the approach. This was the last radio transmission received from the pilot. Aircraft was found in soft field six miles from the airport. Landing gear was up, flaps were down. Fisherman nearby reported hearing the aircraft maneuvering at low altitude. He reported that the engines sounded fine, but the sound was changing in pitch and intensity. He reported that got quiet just a few seconds before he heard the impact. The investigation revealed that there was evidence of a fire in the nose baggage compartment. The cabin heater is located in the nose baggage compartment, and had a recent history of discrepancies. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot was on a personal trip that he had flown many times. On the day of the accident, additional fuel was not available at the departure airport. As he neared his destination, the pilot left one of his engines in a fuel crossfeed configuration causing a partial power loss. The airplane has the capability to climb at more than 500 feet per minute using only one engine. After declaring his emergency to the control tower, radio contact was lost. The aircraft was observed flying 90° to the ILS final approach course at very low altitude banking side to side. The airplane crashed in a 70° nose down position. Heavy snow had started falling just before the accident. A post crash fire destroyed much of the airplane. Both occupants were killed.

The purpose of the flight was to prepare two first officers for a captain upgrade flight. The instructor pilot disabled the student's attitude indicator during flight, and the student had difficulty maintaining airplane control. During a simulated instrument approach, while in the procedure turn, the instructor simulated an engine failure in addition to the attitude indicator failure. The student asked the instructor to take control of the airplane because he became disoriented, however, the instructor refused. The investigation revealed that the instructor would turn his own flight instrument lights to the 'dim' position when the student was flying so that he could not 'peek' at the operable attitude indicator. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the instructor's light rheostat was in the dim position. The accident occurred over the ocean, on a moonless night. Neither the operator, nor the FAA were aware that this instructor was using Block Island for training, or what training methods he was employing.

The pilot and copilot reported in their written statements that the airplane was above glideslope on the final approach. They said the airplane touched down about 1,500 feet from the approach end of the 4,700 feet long runway. The pilot said he applied the brakes but could not stop the airplane on the runway. The airplane departed the end of the runway and continued forward over rough and uneven terrain. The main landing gear sheared off and penetrated both wings. The airplane came to a stop in a gully. Other witnesses located on the ground and in the air traffic control tower reported the airplane was 'high and fast' and touched down at about midfield or after.