Las Vegas

Witnesses said that it appeared that the left engine sustained a loss of power just after rotation and liftoff. The airplane initially had a positive rate of climb, but then immediately yawed to the left as it cleared 30-foot-high power lines that were perpendicular across the flight path. The airport is at the east end of a lake in a mountain valley; the airplane departed to the west and was flying over the lake. The airplane was about 2 miles from the runway when witnesses observed dark smoke coming from the left engine, and the smoke increased significantly as the flight continued. The airplane banked hard left with the wings perpendicular to the ground, and then nosed in vertically. The landing gear remained down throughout the accident sequence. On site examination revealed that the top spark plugs for the left engine were black and sooty. A detailed examination revealed that the left turbocharger turbine wheel shaft fractured and separated. Extreme oxidation of the fracture surfaces prevented identification of the failure mode; however, the oxidation was the result of high temperature exposure indicating that the fracture occurred while the turbocharger was at elevated temperature during operation. The multiple planes exhibited by the fracture also were not consistent with a ductile torsional failure as would be expected from a sudden stoppage of either rotor. No evidence of a mechanical malfunction was noted to the right engine. The Cessna Owners Manual for the airplane notes that the most critical time for an engine failure is a 2-3 second period late in the takeoff while the airplane is accelerating from the minimum single-engine control speed of 87 KIAS to a safe single-engine speed of 106 KIAS. Although the airplane is controllable at the minimum control speed, the airplane's performance is so far below optimum that continued flight near the ground is improbable. Once 106 KIAS is achieved, altitude can more easily be maintained while the pilot retracts the landing gear and feathers the propeller. The best single-engine rate-of-climb is 108 KIAS with flaps up below 18,000 feet msl. Section VI of the manual provides operational data for single-engine climb capability. The data was only valid for the following conditions: gear and flaps retracted, inoperative propeller feathered, wing banked 5 degrees toward the operating engine, 39.5 inches of manifold pressure if below 18,000 feet, and mixture at recommended fuel flow.

The airplane departed Las Vegas, Nevada, approximately 0919, on an IFR flight plan to Midland, Texas. The pilot climbed to an initial cruising altitude of 13,000 feet. At 1005, the pilot contacted Albuquerque ARTCC (ZAB) and reported that he was level at 13,000 feet. At 1009, the pilot requested to climb to 15,000 and the ZAB controller approved the request. At 1013:55, the pilot contacted Albuquerque Flight Watch and reported that he was approximately 23 miles west of Flagstaff, Arizona at 15,000 feet, and that about 20 miles west of his position, at 13,000 feet, he encountered "light mixed icing." The pilot requested any PIREP's. Flight Watch reported that a PIREP for "a trace of rime icing at 12,000," was reported by an airplane climbing westbound out of Albuquerque. The pilot acknowledged and asked for the weather across New Mexico. Flight Watch advised the pilot to stand by while he gathered the reports. At 1015:15, the pilot contacted ZAB. He reported, "getting...mixed...right...now," and requested to climb to 17,000 feet. At 1015:57 the controller cleared the airplane to 17,000 feet. At 1016:35, the FW specialist repeated the report of trace icing near Albuquerque. The pilot did not reply. ZAB radar indicated the airplane climbed to 15,200 feet then entered a rapid descent. At 1017:08, a broken transmission was received. No further communications were received from the airplane. Radar contact was lost with the airplane at 1017:20. An examination of the airplane wreckage showed no anomalies.

On a final approach to runway 26 the flight crew was advised by a flight instructor in the traffic pattern that a wind shear condition existed about one-quarter of the way down the approach end of the runway, which the flight crew acknowledged. On a three mile final approach the flight crew was advised by the instructor that the automated weather observation system (AWOS) was reporting the winds were 060 degrees at 8 knots, and that he was changing runways to runway 08. The flight crew did not acknowledge this transmission. The captain said that after landing smoothly in the touchdown zone on Runway 26, he applied normal braking without any response. He maintained brake pedal pressure and activated the engine thrust reversers without any response. The copilot said he considered the approach normal and that the captain did all he could to stop the airplane, first applying the brakes and then pulling up on the thrust reversers twice, with no sensation of slowing at all. Considering the double malfunction and the mountainous terrain surrounding the airport, the captain elected not to go around. The aircraft subsequently overran the end of the 5,860 foot runway (5,260 feet usable due to the 600 displaced threshold), went through the airport boundary fence, across the perimeter road, and came to rest upright in a dry lakebed approximately 400 feet from the departure end of the runway. With the aircraft on fire, the five passengers and two crew members safely egressed the aircraft without injuries before it was consumed. Witnesses to the landing reported the aircraft touched down at midfield, was too fast, porpoised, and was bouncing trying to get the gear on the runway. Passengers recalled a very hard landing, being thrown about the cabin, and that the speed was excessive. One passenger stated there was a hard bang and a series of smaller bangs during the landing. Federal Aviation Regulations allowed 3,150 feet of runway for a full stop landing. Under the weather conditions reported just after the mishap, and using the anticipated landing weight from the load manifest (12,172.5 pounds), the FAA approved Cessna Flight Manual does not provide landing distance information. Post-accident examination and testing of various wheel brake and antiskid/power brake components revealed no anomalies which would have precluded normal operations.

At the conclusion of a dark night IMC cross-country flight, the pilot was being vectored onto the ILS approach. After stabilizing, the approach "was normal." At decision altitude, the pilot indicated that he could see the approach lights and the runway, but was not in a position to land so he executed a missed approach. After being vectored around for another approach, he stated that he was on the localizer but was "high" on the glide slope. After giving "a little" nose down pitch, he became distracted when the autopilot became "accidentally disengaged." The pilot stated that he "inadvertently descended through the glide slope and impacted the ground short of the runway." He further stated that the "first indication" that he was low was when the aircraft "struck the ground." The aircraft was destroyed on impact. A facility check conducted by the FAA of the ILS found all parameters within normal specifications.