Big Bear Lake

Witnesses said that it appeared that the left engine sustained a loss of power just after rotation and liftoff. The airplane initially had a positive rate of climb, but then immediately yawed to the left as it cleared 30-foot-high power lines that were perpendicular across the flight path. The airport is at the east end of a lake in a mountain valley; the airplane departed to the west and was flying over the lake. The airplane was about 2 miles from the runway when witnesses observed dark smoke coming from the left engine, and the smoke increased significantly as the flight continued. The airplane banked hard left with the wings perpendicular to the ground, and then nosed in vertically. The landing gear remained down throughout the accident sequence. On site examination revealed that the top spark plugs for the left engine were black and sooty. A detailed examination revealed that the left turbocharger turbine wheel shaft fractured and separated. Extreme oxidation of the fracture surfaces prevented identification of the failure mode; however, the oxidation was the result of high temperature exposure indicating that the fracture occurred while the turbocharger was at elevated temperature during operation. The multiple planes exhibited by the fracture also were not consistent with a ductile torsional failure as would be expected from a sudden stoppage of either rotor. No evidence of a mechanical malfunction was noted to the right engine. The Cessna Owners Manual for the airplane notes that the most critical time for an engine failure is a 2-3 second period late in the takeoff while the airplane is accelerating from the minimum single-engine control speed of 87 KIAS to a safe single-engine speed of 106 KIAS. Although the airplane is controllable at the minimum control speed, the airplane's performance is so far below optimum that continued flight near the ground is improbable. Once 106 KIAS is achieved, altitude can more easily be maintained while the pilot retracts the landing gear and feathers the propeller. The best single-engine rate-of-climb is 108 KIAS with flaps up below 18,000 feet msl. Section VI of the manual provides operational data for single-engine climb capability. The data was only valid for the following conditions: gear and flaps retracted, inoperative propeller feathered, wing banked 5 degrees toward the operating engine, 39.5 inches of manifold pressure if below 18,000 feet, and mixture at recommended fuel flow.

On a final approach to runway 26 the flight crew was advised by a flight instructor in the traffic pattern that a wind shear condition existed about one-quarter of the way down the approach end of the runway, which the flight crew acknowledged. On a three mile final approach the flight crew was advised by the instructor that the automated weather observation system (AWOS) was reporting the winds were 060 degrees at 8 knots, and that he was changing runways to runway 08. The flight crew did not acknowledge this transmission. The captain said that after landing smoothly in the touchdown zone on Runway 26, he applied normal braking without any response. He maintained brake pedal pressure and activated the engine thrust reversers without any response. The copilot said he considered the approach normal and that the captain did all he could to stop the airplane, first applying the brakes and then pulling up on the thrust reversers twice, with no sensation of slowing at all. Considering the double malfunction and the mountainous terrain surrounding the airport, the captain elected not to go around. The aircraft subsequently overran the end of the 5,860 foot runway (5,260 feet usable due to the 600 displaced threshold), went through the airport boundary fence, across the perimeter road, and came to rest upright in a dry lakebed approximately 400 feet from the departure end of the runway. With the aircraft on fire, the five passengers and two crew members safely egressed the aircraft without injuries before it was consumed. Witnesses to the landing reported the aircraft touched down at midfield, was too fast, porpoised, and was bouncing trying to get the gear on the runway. Passengers recalled a very hard landing, being thrown about the cabin, and that the speed was excessive. One passenger stated there was a hard bang and a series of smaller bangs during the landing. Federal Aviation Regulations allowed 3,150 feet of runway for a full stop landing. Under the weather conditions reported just after the mishap, and using the anticipated landing weight from the load manifest (12,172.5 pounds), the FAA approved Cessna Flight Manual does not provide landing distance information. Post-accident examination and testing of various wheel brake and antiskid/power brake components revealed no anomalies which would have precluded normal operations.

The pilot departed his home base in VFR conditions without filing a flight plan and did not request or receive a preflight or en route weather briefing from the FAA. While en route, he contacted Southern California TRACON (SOCAL) and requested an ILS runway 26 approach to the destination airport. SOCAL cleared the pilot for the approach and to change to an advisory frequency. There was no current weather report available at the airport because the tower was closed, but another pilot who was on the same frequency stated that the airport weather was 'zero zero.' (An automated weather observation system at the airport recorded 'zero zero' conditions near the time of the accident.) Ground witnesses heard the airplane as the pilot began a missed approach. However, the airplane collided with trees and a snack bar building about 1/4 mile northwest of the departure end of the runway. Impact occurred as the airplane was in a right turn through a heading of 345 degrees, which was the opposite direction of turn for the missed approach procedure. Toxicology test of the pilot's blood showed 1.518 mcg/ml Fenfluramine and 0.678 mcg/ml Phentermine; these are appetite suppressant drugs that are chemically related to amphetamines and have a high incidence of abuse. Neither of these drugs was approved by the FAA for use while flying aircraft. The amount of Fenfluramine in the pilot's blood was above a normal level for control of appetite.

The pilots had entered into an agreement with the 5 pax to fly them to a ski resort. The airplane owner stated that the pic, who was the company pilot, did not have permission to use the airplane, nor did the owner know the pax. The airport at the ski resort is located in mountainous terrain at 6,750 feet msl. There is no instrument approach. There is no record of any weather briefings. The airplane collided with terrain (Mt Clark) at about 6,580 feet msl approximately 7.5 miles southwest of the destination airport. Weather for the area was: mountains locally obscured 3,000 to 5,000 feet scattered to broken with tops to 9,000, and widely scattered visibilities below 3 miles with snow and rain showers. Examination of the wreckage and impact site revealed the aircraft collided with the brush and snow covered 45° slope in a level left turn. All seven occupants were killed.

After takeoff from Hesperia, the pilot encountered technical problems and elected to make an emergency landing on a hill side when the airplane crashed. The pilot and a passenger were seriously injured while four other occupants were slightly injured. The aircraft was written off.

Harry Sweet departed Glendale on a flight to Big Bear Lake to scout filming locations. At Big Bear Lake, he was supposed to meet a friend who failed to show up, so he took off at dusk to return to Glendale. After takeoff, he made a low pass over the lake at a height of about 40 feet when the engine failed. The airplane nosed down and crashed into the lake. All three occupants were killed.
Crew:
Harry Sweet, pilot and actor.
Passengers:
Vera Williams, aka Claudette Ford, actress,
Howard Davitt, writer.