Akron-Canton

The twin engine airplane departed Detroit-Willow Run (Ypsilanti) Airport at 2337LT on March 6 on a cargo service to Akron-Canton Airport, carrying two pilots and a load of various goods. After takeoff, the crew encountered technical problems and declared an emergency. He completed two low passes in front of the tower, apparently due to gear problems. Eventually, the aircraft belly landed at 0008LT and came to rest on runway 05R. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was in cruise flight at an altitude of 19,000 feet mean sea level (msl) for about 1 hour and 10 minutes on an easterly heading when he requested a diversion from his filed destination to an airport along his route of flight to utilize a restroom. Two miles west of his amended destination at 12,000 ft msl, the pilot advised the controller that he had a “fuel emergency light" and wanted to expedite the approach. The controller acknowledged the low fuel warning and cleared the airplane to descend from its assigned altitude. Instead of conducting the descent over the airport, the airplane continued its easterly heading past the airport for nearly 8 miles before reversing course. After reversing course, instead of assuming a direct heading back to the airport, the pilot assumed a parallel reciprocal track and didn’t turn for the airport until the airplane intercepted the extended centerline of the landing runway. The pilot informed the controller that he was unable to make it to the airport and performed a forced landing less than 1 mile from the landing runway. Both fuel tanks were breached during the accident sequence, and detailed postaccident inspections of the airplane’s fuel system revealed no leaks in either the supply or return sides of the system. A computer tomography scan and flow-testing of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed no leaks or evidence of fuel leakage. The engine ran successfully in a test cell. Data recovered from an engine and fuel monitoring system revealed that, during the two flights before the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the fuel consumption rates depicted at the respective power settings (climb, cruise, etc). During the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the indicated fuel flow throughout the climb; however, the fuel quantity continued to reduce at a rate consistent with a climb power setting even after engine power was reduced, and the fuel flow indicated a rate consistent with a cruise engine power setting. The data also showed that the indicated fuel quantity in the left and right tanks reached 0 gallons within about 10 minutes of each other, and shortly before the accident. Given this information, it is likely that the engine lost power due to an exhaustion of the available fuel supply; however, based on available data and findings of the fuel system and component examinations, the disparate rates of indicated fuel flow and fuel quantity reduction could not be explained.

The two pilots departed in a turbine powered DC-3C at maximum gross weight for a repositioning flight. The airplane was part of a test program for new, higher horsepower engine installation. Soon after liftoff and about 3 seconds after decision speed (V1), the left engine lost total power. The propeller began to auto-feather but stopped feathering about 3 seconds after the power loss. The airplane yawed and banked to the left, descended, and impacted terrain. Recorded engine data indicated the power loss was due to an engine flameout; however, examination of the engine did not determine a reason for the flameout or the auto-feather system interruption. While it is plausible that an air pocket developed in the fuel system during the refueling just before the flight, this scenario was not able to be tested or confirmed. It is possible that the auto-feather system interruption would have occurred if the left power lever was manually retarded during the auto-feather sequence. The power loss and auto-feather system interruption occurred during a critical, time-sensitive phase of flight since the airplane was at low altitude and below minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc). The acutely transitional phase of flight would have challenged the pilots' ability to manually feather the propeller quickly and accurately. The time available for the crew to respond to the unexpected event was likely less than needed to recognize the problem and take this necessary action – even as an immediate action checklist/memory item.

The aircraft departed controlled flight while on a non precision localizer approach to runway 25 at Akron Fulton International Airport (AKR) and impacted a four-unit apartment building in Akron, Ohio. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The airplane was registered to Rais Group International NC LLC and operated by Execuflight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Dayton-Wright Brothers Airport, Dayton, Ohio, about 1413 and was destined for AKR. Contrary to Execuflight’s informal practice of the captain acting as pilot flying on flights carrying revenue passengers, the first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. While en route, the flight crew began preparing for the approach into AKR. Although company standard operating procedures (SOPs) specified that the pilot flying was to brief the approach, the captain agreed to the first officer’s request that the captain brief the approach. The ensuing approach briefing was unstructured, inconsistent, and incomplete, and the approach checklist was not completed. As a result, the captain and first officer did not have a shared understanding of how the approach was to be conducted. As the airplane neared AKR, the approach controller instructed the flight to reduce speed because it was following a slower airplane on the approach. To reduce speed, the first officer began configuring the airplane for landing, lowering the landing gear and likely extending the flaps to 25° (the airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be). When the flight was about 4 nautical miles from the final approach fix (FAF), the approach controller cleared the flight for the localizer 25 approach and instructed the flight to maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) until established on the localizer. The airplane was already established on the localizer when the approach clearance was issued and could have descended to the FAF minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft msl. However, the first officer did not initiate a descent, the captain failed to notice, and the airplane remained level at 3,000 ft msl. As the first officer continued to slow the airplane from about 150 to 125 knots, the captain made several comments about the decaying speed, which was well below the proper approach speed with 25° flaps of 144 knots. The first officer’s speed reduction placed the airplane in danger of an aerodynamic stall if the speed continued to decay, but the first officer apparently did not realize it. The first officer’s lack of awareness and his difficulty flying the airplane to standards should have prompted the captain to take control of the airplane or call for a missed approach, but he did not do so. Before the airplane reached the FAF, the first officer requested 45° flaps and reduced power, and the airplane began to descend. The first officer’s use of flaps 45° was contrary to Execuflight’s Hawker 700A non precision approach profile, which required the airplane to be flown at flaps 25° until after descending to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and landing was assured; however, the captain did not question the first officer’s decision to conduct the approach with flaps 45°. The airplane crossed the FAF at an altitude of about 2,700 ft msl, which was 400 ft higher than the published minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft msl. Because the airplane was high on the approach, it was out of position to use a normal descent rate of 1,000 feet per minute (fpm) to the MDA. The airplane’s rate of descent quickly increased to 2,000 fpm, likely due to the first officer attempting to salvage the approach by increasing the rate of descent, exacerbated by the increased drag resulting from the improper flaps 45° configuration. The captain instructed the first officer not to descend so rapidly but did not attempt to take control of the airplane even though he was responsible for safety of the flight. As the airplane continued to descend on the approach, the captain did not make the required callouts regarding approaching and reaching the MDA, and the first officer did not arrest the descent at the MDA. When the airplane reached the MDA, which was about 500 ft above the touchdown zone elevation, the point at which Execuflight’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the airspeed was 11 knots below the minimum required airspeed of 124 knots, and the airplane was improperly configured with 45° flaps. The captain should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a missed approach, but he did not do so. About 14 seconds after the airplane descended below the MDA, the captain instructed the first officer to level off. As a result of the increased drag due to the improper flaps 45° configuration and the low airspeed, the airplane entered a stalled condition when the first officer attempted to arrest the descent. About 7 seconds after the captain’s instruction to level off, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the first sounds of impact.

The pilot stated that he and his wife were en route to a medical conference which was to be held aboard a cruise ship that was departing from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, at 1700. He stated that both tanks were full of fuel when he departed the Canton Regional Airport, Canton, Ohio, en route to Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport. According to the pilot, the inboard tanks had been selected for the first hour and a half and the outboard tanks for the following two hours. He said the flight was vectored around thunderstorms, and during the descent, when about 12 miles to the north of Palm Beach International Airport, Palm Beach, Florida, the left engine ceased operating. He said that at this time he noticed that both inboard fuel indicators showed the tanks to be empty, and he switched to the outboard tanks, both of which were shown to be a quarter full. The pilot stated that two minutes later both engines began to surge, and after making an emergency radio communications call, he was advised by the FAA Air Traffic Controller that Tailwinds Airport was located 4 miles to the west. Unable to reach the runway at Tailwinds Airport, the pilot said he made a forced landing in an orange grove. the pilot also said that prior to the accident, there had not been any mechanical failure or malfunctions to the airplane or any of its systems. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane had incurred substantial damage, and there was little or no fuel present at the scene. Follow-on examination of the airplane, its fuel system and both engines revealed no anomalies.

Shortly after takeoff, the airplane experienced electrical problems, including numerous tripped circuit breakers. The flight crew requested a return to airport. During the landing rollout, the lead flight attendant and air traffic control personnel reported to the flight crew that smoke was coming from the left side of the airplane; subsequently, the flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation on one of the taxiways. Examination of the airplane revealed fire damage to the left, forward areas of the fuselage, cabin, and forward cargo compartment. The greatest amount of fire damage was found just aft of the electrical disconnect panel located at fuselage station 237. There was no evidence that the drip shield normally installed over the disconnect panel was present at the time of the accident. Bluish stains caused by lavatory rinse fluid were observed on surfaces near the disconnect panel on the accident airplane and in the same areas on another of AirTran's DC-9 airplanes. Examination of one of the connectors from the disconnect panel on the accident airplane revealed light-blue and turquoise-green deposits on its internal surfaces and evidence of shorting between the connector pins. It could not be determined when the drip shield over the disconnect panel was removed; however, this likely contributed to the lavatory fluid contamination of the connectors. Following the accident, AirTran revised its lavatory servicing procedures to emphasize the importance of completely draining the waste tank to avoid overflows. Boeing issued an alert service bulletin recommending that operators of DC-9 airplanes visually inspect the connectors at the FS 237 disconnect panel for evidence of lavatory rinse fluid contamination and that they install a drip shield over the disconnect panel. Boeing also issued a service letter to operators to stress the importance of properly sealing floor panels and adhering to lavatory servicing procedures specified in its DC-9 Maintenance Manual. The Safety Board is aware of two incidents involving the military equivalent of the DC-9 that involved circumstances similar to the accident involving N826AT. Drip shields were installed above the FS 237 disconnect panels on both airplanes.

The pilot initiated an ILS approach with rain and fog. Approach flaps were maintained until the runway was sighted, and then landing flaps were set. The airplane landed long, overran the runway, struck the ILS localizer antenna on the departure end of the runway, and came to rest at the edge of a mobile home park. The airplane and two mobile homes were destroyed by fire. Vref had been computed at 110 Kts. The PIC reported a speed on final of 130 Kts, while the SIC said it was 140 Kts. Radar data revealed a 160 knots ground speed from the outer marker until 1.8 miles from touchdown. The airplane passed the control tower, airborne, with 2,500 feet of runway remaining on the 6,500 foot long runway. Performance data revealed that the airplane would require about 2,509 feet on a dry runway, and 5,520 feet on a wet runway. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or anti-skid brakes. The PIC was the company president, and the SIC was a recent hire who had flown with the PIC three previous times. The PIC was qualified for single-pilot operations in the airplane, and had been trained to fly stabilized approaches.

Shortly after departure the airplane was seen climbing to an altitude of about 200 feet agl. Witnesses saw smoke coming from one of the engines and heard a 'popping noise.' The pilot executed a forced landing in a field. The airplane struck electrical wires and fence then burst into flames. The airplane had refueled just prior to take off, and the fuel receipt showed that 300 gallons of jet (A) fuel was put into the tanks. The normal fuel used in the airplane was 100LL.

During IFR departure, pilot received progressive altitude clearances to climb to 15,000 feet. At 1607 edt, he was vectored for 'a good rate of climb' thru 14,000 feet with clearance to proceed on course after leveling 14,000 feet for 15,000 feet. Radar data indicated a steady climb til aircraft was above 13,000 feet. As it climbed from 13,300 feet to 13,900 fet (max recorded altitude), its speed slowed from about 115 knots to below 80 knots. At 1613 edt, pilot was cleared to proceed direct and change frequency. Radar data showed that after reaching 13,900 feet, aircraft deviated from course and entered steep descent. Radar contact was lost and inflight breakup occurred. Pieces of wings and stabilizers were found up to 1.5 mile from fuselage. Trajectory study disclosed breakup occurred between 6,000 feet and 9,000 feet msl. Exam of fractures on major components revealed characteristics typical of overstress; no preexisting cracks were found. No autopilot failure or bird strike was found. Clouds were layered to 20,000 feet; freezing level was about 12,500 feet. There was evidence aircraft was in or near convective precipitation above freezing level for about 1.5 minute before rapid descent. Found Pitot heat switch 'off' and induction air door in its primary position. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft landed after an ILS approach to runway 03. According to the pilot shortly after touchdown he saw deer ahead on the runway. Before he could take evasive action the aircraft struck two deer. Afterwards brake pressure was lost. The pilot steered the aircraft onto grass off the right side of the runway to avoid going past the runway end and down a hill. Examination of the aircraft revealed that the deer were struck with the left main gear, fracturing a hydraulic brake line. All nine occupants escaped uninjured.