Detroit-Willow Run (Ypsilanti)

According to a preliminary review of airplane track data and pilot statements provided to law enforcement and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the purpose of the flight was to pick up a sixth passenger at Willow Run Airport (KYIP), Detroit, Michigan, before continuing to Minneapolis, Minnesota. As the airplane climbed through about 6,000 feet mean sea level (msl) in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the pilot observed oil leaking from the right engine nacelle. About the time the airplane reached about 7,400 feet msl, the pilot noted a loss of right engine power. He secured the engine, declared an emergency, requested to divert to the closest airport, and the air traffic controller vectored the airplane for the RNAV RWY 11 approach at 7GA. The pilot successfully completed the approach and reported that the airplane touched down in the “first one-third” of the landing runway “about 120 knots with zero flaps.” The pilot determined that he would not stop the airplane before it reached the departure end of the 3,500-ft-long runway, but chose to continue on the ground rather than abort the landing with one engine inoperative and climb the airplane back into IMC for another instrument approach. The airplane overran the departure end of the runway, continued through the grass overrun, and impacted a hill and a fence before coming to rest upright about 600 feet beyond the runway end. All three landing gear collapsed and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage.

The twin engine airplane departed Detroit-Willow Run (Ypsilanti) Airport at 2337LT on March 6 on a cargo service to Akron-Canton Airport, carrying two pilots and a load of various goods. After takeoff, the crew encountered technical problems and declared an emergency. He completed two low passes in front of the tower, apparently due to gear problems. Eventually, the aircraft belly landed at 0008LT and came to rest on runway 05R. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airline transport pilot of the multiengine airplane was cleared for the VOR approach. The weather at the airport was reported as 400 ft overcast with 4 miles visibility in drizzle. When the airplane failed to arrive at the airport as scheduled, a search was initiated, and the wreckage was located soon thereafter. Radar data indicated that the pilot was provided vectors to intercept the final approach course. The last radar return indicated that the airplane was at 2,200 ft and 8.1 miles from the runway threshold. It impacted terrain 3.5 miles from the runway threshold and left of the final approach course. According to the published approach procedure, the minimum descent altitude was 1,100 feet, which was 466 ft above airport elevation. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane had impacted the tops of trees and descended at a 45° angle to ground contact; the airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire, thus limiting the examination; however, no anomalies were observed that would have precluded normal operation. The landing gear was extended, and approach flaps had been set. Impact and fire damage precluded an examination of the flight and navigation instruments. Autopsy and toxicology of the pilot were not performed; therefore, whether a physiological issue may have contributed to the accident could not be determined. The location of the wreckage indicates that the pilot descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach; however, the reason for the pilot's descent below MDA could not be determined based on the available information.

A McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration N786TW, suffered a runway excursion following an aborted takeoff from runway 23L at Detroit-Willow Run Airport, Michigan, USA. The aircraft had been chartered by the University of Michigan Basketball team for a flight to a game in Washington, DC. The flight crew prepared for take-off and calculated V-speeds (V1, VR, V2) using "Normal Thrust Takeoff", a 10 kts headwind, and a take-off weight of 146,600 lbs. The V-speeds for this configuration were 139 kts, 142 kts, and 150 kts, respectively. However, the flight crew chose to increase VR to 150 kts to allow for more control during take-off in the presence of windshear. During takeoff roll, at 14:51:56 (about 3,000 ft down the runway) and about 138 kts of airspeed, the control column was pulled back slightly from a non-dimensional value of -7 to -5.52. The airplane’s left elevator followed the control input and moved from a position of -15° trailing edge down to -13° trailing edge down. The right elevator did not change and stayed at approximately -16° trailing edge down. At 14:52:01 a large control column input was made (151 kts and 4100 ft down the runway) to a non-dimensional 18.5 and the left elevator moves to a position near 15° trailing edge up. After 14:52:05 the right elevator moves to -13° trailing edge down, but no more. The airplane does not respond in pitch and does not rotate. The captain decided to abort the takeoff. The maximum ground speed was 163 kts (173 kts airspeed) and the airplane began to decelerate as soon as the brakes were applied at 14:52:08. Spoilers were deployed at 14:52:10 and thrust reversers were deployed between 14:52:13 and 14:52:15. The aircraft could not be stopped on the runway. The airplane’s ground speed was 100 kts when it left the paved surface. The aircraft overran the end of the runway, damaged approach lights, went through the perimeter fence and crossed Tyler Road. It came to rest on grassy terrain, 345 meters past the end of the runway, with the rear fuselage across a ditch. The nose landing gear had collapsed. Runway 23L is a 7543 ft long runway.

The accident occurred during the Experimental Aircraft Association’s Airventure 2010 fly-in convention. Because of the high density of aircraft operations during the fly-in, the Federal Aviation Administration implemented special air traffic control procedures to accommodate traffic demand and maximize runway capacity. Arriving aircraft were issued landing instructions and clearances by a tower controller using a specified tower radio frequency. Departing aircraft were handled by another team of controllers operating on a separate radio frequency that was associated with a mobile operations unit located near the runway. Air traffic control data indicated that the accident airplane established contact with the tower controller and entered a left traffic pattern for runway 18R. As the accident airplane was turning from downwind to base leg, the controller handling departures cleared a Piper Cub for an immediate takeoff and angled departure (a procedure used by slower aircraft to clear the runway immediately after liftoff by turning across the runway edge). The accident pilot was not monitoring the departure frequency, and, therefore, he did not hear the radio transmissions indicating that the departing Piper Cub was going to offset to the left of the runway after liftoff. The accident pilot reported that, while on base leg, he became concerned that his descent path to the runway would conflict with the Piper Cub that was on takeoff roll. He stated that he overshot the runway centerline during his turn from base to final, and, when he completed the turn, his airplane was offset to the right of the runway. The pilot stated that, at this point, he decided not to land because of a perceived conflict with the departing Piper Cub that was ahead and to the left of his position. The pilot reported that he initiated a go-around, increasing engine power slightly, but not to takeoff power, as he looked for additional traffic to avoid. He estimated that he advanced the throttle levers "probably a third of the way to the stop," and, as he looked for traffic, the stall warning stick-shaker and stick-pusher systems activated almost simultaneously as the right wing stalled. The airplane subsequently collided with terrain in a nose down, right wing low attitude. A postaccident review of available air traffic control communications, amateur video of the accident sequence, controller and witness statements, and position data recovered from the accident airplane indicated that the Piper Cub was already airborne, had turned left, and was clear of runway 18R when the accident airplane turned from base to final. The postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The airplane flight manual states that, in the event of a go-around, the pilot should first advance engine thrust to takeoff power and then establish Vref (reference landing approach speed). The pilot's decision not to select takeoff power during the go-around directly contributed to the development of the aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.

On June 4, 2007, about 1600 central daylight time, a Cessna Citation 550, N550BP, impacted Lake Michigan shortly after departure from General Mitchell International Airport, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (MKE). The two pilots and four passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was being operated by Marlin Air under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 and departed MKE about 1557 with an intended destination of Willow Run Airport, near Ypsilanti, Michigan. At the time of the accident flight, marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the surface, and instrument meteorological conditions prevailed aloft; the flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The pilot departed with the airplane contaminated with ice, into known severe icing conditions, and was unable to maintain altitude, subsequently impacting trees and terrain. Witnesses reported the accident airplane arrived at the departure airport contaminated with ice. Several witnesses stated they asked the pilot if he needed the airplane deiced prior to his next departure and the pilot stated he did not need any deice service. Several witnesses said they noticed the pilot chipping-off ice from the airplane prior to his departure. While en route the pilot reported the airplane had encountered icing conditions and he was unable to maintain altitude. Several thick pieces of ice were recovered around the accident site and one of the recovered ice pieces had a semicircular shaped edge that was consistent with a leading edge of an airfoil. No pre-impact anomalies were found with the leading edge de-ice boots that were installed on both wings, vertical and horizontal stabilizers, and wing struts. Federal Aviation Regulations state that all ice contamination shall be removed prior to flight. The Cessna 208B Pilot Operating Handbook indicates that continued flight into known icing conditions must be avoided.

The captain said that he flew the VOR approach to runway 32. At 2,500 feet, the captain said that they were out of the clouds and initiated a visual straight-in approach. After aligning the airplane with the runway, the captain said he noticed that there was contamination on the runway, "maybe compacted snow or maybe ice with fresh snow over it." The captain briefed that they would perform a go-around if by midfield they were not decelerating adequately. The captain said that they touched down within the first third of the runway. Close to midfield the airplane fishtailed. Past midfield, the captain called a go-around. The first officer said that the captain added power and he retracted the airbrakes. The first officer exclaimed, "There is not enough runway! I braced myself as the aircraft went into the snow." The first officer said that at about 2 miles out from the runway, the unicom called and said that braking action was nil. A Notice to Airman, in effect at the time of the accident for the airport stated, "icy runway, nil braking."

The Dassault-Breguet Falcon 20E aircraft was on an unscheduled charter cargo flight from Detroit Willow Run, Michigan, USA, to Peterborough, Ontario. The flight was being conducted at night and under instrument flight rules in instrument meteorological conditions. Nearing the destination, the flight crew received a clearance to conduct a non-directional beacon runway 09 approach at Peterborough Airport. The flight crew did not acquire the runway environment during this approach and conducted a missed approach procedure. They obtained another clearance for the same approach from Toronto Area Control Centre. During this approach, the flight crew acquired the runway environment and manoeuvred the aircraft for landing on runway 09. The aircraft touched down near the runway midpoint, and the captain, who was the pilot flying, elected to abort the landing. The captain then conducted a left visual circuit to attempt another landing. As the aircraft was turning onto the final leg, the approach became unstabilized, and the flight crew elected to overshoot; however, the aircraft pitched nose-down, banked left, and struck terrain. As it travelled 400 feet through a ploughed farm field, the aircraft struck a tree line and came to rest about 2000 feet before the threshold of runway 09, facing the opposite direction. The aircraft was substantially damaged. No serious injuries occurred.