United States of America

The flight was in radio contact with air traffic controllers at the FAA Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), and was level at 9,000 feet, when the pilot checked in on frequency. The last radio contact with the flight was at 0447. At 0520, radar contact was lost. The airplane impacted in rough terrain, at a steep angle of impact. Two other company pilots flying in trail of the accident aircraft said, they had radio contact with the pilot of N840FE about 5 minutes before the accident. They said he sounded fine and did not say anything about any problems. Radar data showing the flight's ground speed indicated that at 0512, the ground speed was 158 knots (182 mph). The ground speed then decreased to 153 (176 mph), 143 (165 mph), 138 (159 mph), and 132 (152 mph), until at 0519:40, when the ground speed of the flight was 125 knots (144 mph). After the radar read out at 0519:40, the next radar hit was coast (no information), and then the flight disappeared from the radar scope. The airplane's heading and altitude did not change during the decrease in ground speed. According to the NTSB Radar Data Study, calculated flight parameters indicated the airplane "...experienced a slow reduction of airspeed in the final 8 minutes of flight at altitude, and then abruptly exhibited a sharp nose down pitch attitude with a rapid increase in airspeed." About the time of the reduction in airspeed, pitch angle began to slowly increase also. When radar contact was lost, the calculated airspeed had reduced to less then 102 knots [118 mph], and calculated body angle of attack [AOA] had increased to 8.8 degrees. A large reduction in pitch angle, angle of attack, and flight path angle as the airspeed increases after peak AOA was reached. Examination of the engine Power Analyzer and Recorder (PAR) revealed that no exceedences were in progress at the time power was removed from the PAR. It was determined that no caution timing events were in progress. The PAR computer appeared to be operating correctly until power was removed at impact. Examination of the airplane's autopilot were not conclusive due to impact damage. Determination of whether the autopilot was engaged or not engaged at the time of the accident could not be determined. The NTSB Meteorological Factual Report revealed that at 0515, about 7 minutes before the flight was lost on radar, the radiative temperature in an area centered at Clarksville (4 kilometer resolution data), showed that the Mean Radiative Temperature was -6.26 degrees C (21F). The Minimum Radiative Temperature was -6.66 degrees C (19F). The Maximum Radiative Temperature was -6.06 degrees C (21F). According to the Archive Level II Doppler weather radar tape for a beginning sweep time of 0508:10, showed that N840FE had tracked into a weather echo from 0510:34, to 0516:28. The Doppler Weather Radar data, revealed that N840FE, had entered a weak weather echo about the same time that the airspeed of the airplane started to decrease, at an altitude of about 9,000 feet, and the airplane was in the weak weather echo for a few minutes. Based on the weather data, it was determined that in-flight airplane icing conditions were encountered by N840FE. Cessna Aircraft Company Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-09-15; Amendment 39-9591; Docket No. 96-CE-05-AD, applicable to this airplane and complied with by the company, on December 12, 1996, stated: "...to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions... operators must initiate action to notify and ensure that flight crewmembers are apprised of this change...revise the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) by incorporating the following into the Limitation Section of the AFM. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM...." The airplane was equipped with leading edge deicing boots on the wings, elevators, struts, and had a cargo pod deicing capability. Lights were installed to illuminate the leading edge of the wings, to aid the pilot in detecting ice on the leading edges of the wings during night operations. The airplane was not equipped with an ice detection device.

On March 4, 1998, at 1350 hours Pacific standard time, a Learjet 23, N37BL, was substantially damaged when it landed gear up at the Oakdale, California, airport. The airline transport pilot and check pilot, the sole occupants, were not injured and no property damage occurred. The flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 on a familiarization and training flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The pilot stated in his report "the landing gear was never extended and the aircraft was landed with the gear retracted."

Radar data indicated that the aircraft completed a figure-eight maneuver at about 3,000 feet AGL, with an estimated airspeed of 140 knots and approximate 40 degree bank angle before leveling out at the completion of the maneuver. The radar data then indicated level flight before a rapid descent. A witness reported observing the aircraft in visual conditions and flying at a high altitude and that it 'appeared fast.' The witness stated that he observed the aircraft make a wide, shallow left turn, then turn back the other way. The nose of the aircraft then started to gradually lower, and the airplane eventually came straight down and started to spin. The witness lost sight of the airplane behind hilly terrain and he did not see the impact. Postaccident examination of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft collided with the terrain in a slight nose-down attitude, located in a gully with approximate 30 degree bank angle. The aircraft then slid downhill to the right and came to rest with the fuselage upright and the empennage was twisted to the right and inverted. No evidence was found to indicate a mechanical failure or malfunction.

The pilot was performing a night VOR/DME approach during which instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was equipped with VOR, LORAN, and RNAV receivers. There were two step-downs fixes on the approach. At 13 DME the minimum altitude was 1,800 feet. At 10 DME the minimum altitude was 1,040 feet. The missed approach point was at 6 DME, and the VOR/DME transmitter was located 5.5 miles beyond the airport. Radar data revealed a descent profile based upon distances from the end of the runway, rather than DME from the VOR. The airplane reached an altitude of 1,000 feet when it was 13.52 miles from the VOR, and 7.58 miles from the approach end of the runway. It subsequently impacted rising terrain at an altitude of about 900 feet, about 11.5 miles from the VOR, and 5.5 miles from the approach end of the runway. Impact damage and a post-crash fire precluded a check of the radio set up at the time of the accident. According to FAR 135 a pilot-in-command was required to have 1,200 hours total time. The investigation documented the pilot's total time as about 1,057 hours.

The airplane was flown from Morgantown to Charleston to drop off passengers. Once there, the pilot called the mechanic who was scheduled to replace the right transfer pump, and told him the right boost pump was also inoperative. The mechanic told the pilot, he would replace both pumps the next morning in Charleston. Adding that de-fueling the airplane would take longer than changing the pumps. The mechanic recalled that the pilot was concerned about the amount of time necessary for the repair. The airplane was then repositioned back to Morgantown for another flight the next day to Charleston. The morning of the accident, the airplane departed Morgantown, and was being vectored for the ILS approach to Charleston when the copilot declared an emergency. He then announced that they had 'a dual engine failure, two souls onboard and zero fuel.' Examination of the wreckage and both engines revealed no pre-impact failures or malfunctions. With the right transfer pump inoperative. 28 gallons of fuel in the right wing would be unusable. In addition, the flight manual states that 'both boost pumps must be operable prior to take-off.'

The pilot-in-command (PIC) was administering a proficiency check flight to the first officer (FO) in a regional jet. One of the required check items was the loss of an engine at "V1" speed. While on takeoff roll with the FO at the controls, the PIC retarded the left engine throttle to idle when "V1" speed was attained. The FO called, "check max thrust," and then called, "positive rate gear up." As the PIC reached for the gear lever, he noticed the airplane roll to the left at a rate which he felt was "excessive and dangerous." He then reached for the flight controls and felt the left rudder "go all the way to the floor." As the PIC took control of the airplane, he applied full right rudder and right aileron. The airplane began recovering from the bank and impacted the ground. Flight recorder data revealed that the time interval between the throttle retarded to idle and ground impact was about 8 seconds. The data showed that the airplane became airborne about 2 seconds after the throttle was retarded, and that the airplane had rolled to a 71 degree left bank within 6 seconds from the throttle reduction. Ground scars and wreckage distribution revealed that the left wing had contacted the ground first and then the right wing prior to the airplane coming to rest. The FO had a total of 15 hours in the type aircraft in the last 90 days. Examinations of the airframe, engines, and flight control system did not reveal any anomalies that could have contributed to the accident. Company flight training policy stated that all check airmen should be ready to take control of the airplane while practicing these types of training maneuvers.

On February 9, 1998, about 0954 central standard time (CST), a Boeing 727-223 (727), N845AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1340, impacted the ground short of the runway 14R threshold at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) while conducting a Category II (CAT II) instrument landing system (ILS) coupled approach. Twenty-two passengers and one flight attendant received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane, being operated by American Airlines as a scheduled domestic passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, with 116 passengers, 3 flight crewmembers, and 3 flight attendants on board, was destined for Chicago, Illinois, from Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Kansas City, Missouri. Daylight instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The certificated commercial pilot was departing on a 14 CFR 135 cargo flight. The airplane lifted off and climbed to about 200 feet. Instead of turning right toward the intended destination, the airplane began a left turn toward the runway. The angle of bank increased to about 45 degrees. The airplane then nosed down, and descended into snow covered terrain, about 200 yards north of the runway. Examination of the engine revealed the number six cylinder head was fractured, and slightly separated from the cylinder barrel. The area around the point of separation was blackened and oily. Similar discoloration was noted on the inside of the engine cowl. A metallurgical examination of the cylinder head revealed a fatigue fracture along a large segment of the thread root radius between the 5th and 6th threads. The engine's cylinder compression is part of the operator's approved airworthiness inspection program. The number six cylinder compression, recorded 121 hours before the accident, was noted as 60 PSI. The last engine inspection, 27 hours before the accident, did not include a record of the engine compression.

The pilot departed in visual meteorological conditions of three to four miles visibility with high ceilings. He stated the airplane encountered freezing rain about five miles south of the airport while in cruise flight at 1,200 feet msl, and rapidly accumulated ice on the airframe, wings, and windshield. The pilot said he initially changed altitude in an attempt to exit the icing conditions. Ice accumulation continued, so he elected to return. While maneuvering to land at the airport, the airplane was unable to maintain altitude at full engine power. He said that any angle of bank resulted in the onset of pre stall buffet, so he decided to land on a frozen lake south of the airport. He said that the airplane did not reach the lake, 'mushed into the ground,' and during the flare/touchdown, the left wing stalled. The pilot did not have access to the official weather prior to departure. The National Weather Service contracted observer, made his observation from a location about five miles south of the official weather station at the airport. The FAA AWOS-3 was inoperative. Examination of the airplane after the accident revealed a 1/2 inch layer of clear ice covering all the upper and lower airfoil surfaces of the airplane, from leading edges to between 1/3 and 1/2 of the chords. All antennas were coated with approximately 1/2 inch of clear ice. The airplane was not equipped with ice protection equipment except for pitot heat and windshield heat.

According to the pilot, upon landing in heavy rain, the airplane began hydroplaning. He said the airplane departed the left side of the runway, striking trees, which damaged both wings and collapsed the landing gear. A witness stated the airplane touched down in moderate rain.