Presque Isle

The twin engine airplane departed Manchester-Boston Regional Airport Runway 06 at 0709LT on a cargo service (flight WIG1046) to Presque Isle. After takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn and climbed to 2,700 feet when the pilot reported problems to ATC. He followed several circuits over Manchester, Auburn and Merrimack with erratic courses and varying altitude and speed. Finally, the airplane entered a right turn and crashed in a forest located near Londonderry, about 8 km south of Manchester Airport. The accident occurred 17 minutes after departure. The pilot was seriously injured and the airplane was destroyed.

The first instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 1 appeared to be proceeding normally until the first officer (the pilot flying) transitioned from instrument references inside the flight deck to outside references. During a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that he expected to see the runway at that time but instead saw “white on white” and a structure with an antenna that was part of the runway environment but not the runway itself. The captain (the pilot monitoring) stated that she saw a tower and called for a go-around. (Both flight crewmembers were most likely seeing the automated weather observing system wind sensor pole, which was located about 325 ft to the right of the runway 1 centerline and about 870 ft beyond the runway threshold, and the damage to the lightning arrester at the top of the wind sensor pole was likely due to contact with the accident airplane as it flew over the pole.) According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), after the go-around, the first officer asked the captain if she saw the runway lights during the approach. The captain responded that she saw the lights but that “it’s really white down there that’s the problem.” Airport personnel stated that snow plowing operations on the runway had finished about 10 minutes before the first approach. The CVR recorded the flight crew’s discussion about turning on the pilot-controlled runway lights and sounds similar to microphone clicks before and after the discussion. However, the PQI maintenance foreman stated that, after the first approach, the runway lights were not on. Thus, the investigation could not determine, based on the available evidence, whether the flight crew had turned on the runway lights during the first approach. The captain thought that the airplane had drifted off course when the first officer transitioned from flight instruments to the outside, so she instructed the first officer to remain on the instruments during the second approach until the decision altitude (200 ft above ground level [agl]). The second approach proceeded normally with no problems capturing or maintaining the localizer and glideslope. During this approach, the captain asked airport maintenance personnel to ensure that the runway lighting was on, and the PQI maintenance foreman replied that the lights were on “bright”(the high-intensity setting). Thus, the flight crew had a means to identify the runway surface even with the reported snow cover at the time. As the airplane approached the decision altitude, the captain instructed the first officer to disconnect the autopilot, which he did. About nine seconds later, the airplane reached the decision altitude, and the captain called, “runway in sight twelve o’clock.” This callout was followed by the first officer’s statement, “I’m stayin’ on the flight director ‘cause I don’t see it yet.” A few seconds later, while the airplane was below 100 ft agl, the captain and the first officer expressed confusion, stating “what the [expletive]” and “I don’t know what I'm see in’,” respectively, but neither called for a go-around. The airplane subsequently impacted the snow-covered grassy area between runway 1 and a parallel taxiway. During a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that, when he transitioned from flight instruments to the outside during the second approach, he again saw “white on white” as well as blowing snow and that the airplane touched down before he could determine what he was seeing. The maintenance foreman estimated that, at the time of the accident, the runway had about 1/8 inch of snow with about 20% to 25% of the runway visible.

After takeoff, the commercial pilot saw flames coming from the left engine nacelle area. He retarded the throttle and turned off the fuel boost pump; however, the fire continued. He then feathered the propeller, shut down the engine, and maneuvered the airplane below the clouds to remain in the local traffic pattern. He attempted to keep the runway environment in sight while drifting in and out of clouds. He was unable to align the airplane for landing on the departure runway, so he attempted to land on another runway. When he realized that the airspeed was decreasing and that the airplane would not reach the runway, he landed it on an adjacent grass field. After touchdown, the landing gear separated, and the airplane came to a stop. The airframe sustained substantial damage to the wings and lower fuselage. Examination of the left engine revealed evidence of a fuel leak where the fuel mixture control shaft inserted into the fuel injector body, which likely resulted in fuel leaking onto the hot turbocharger in flight and the in-flight fire. A review of recent maintenance records did not reveal any entries regarding maintenance or repair of the fuel injection system. The pilot reported clouds as low as 500 ft with rain, snow, and reduced visibility at the time of the accident, which likely reduced his ability to see the runway and maneuver the airplane to land on it.

The twin-engine Aerostar departed on Runway 1. While on initial climb, after take-off, witnesses observed the airplane roll to the left until it became inverted, after which the nose dropped and the airplane impacted the ground in a near vertical nose down attitude. The fuselage was consumed with a post crash fire. On-site examination revealed the wing flaps and landing gear were retracted. No evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction was found relating to the airplane, engines, or propellers. The investigation revealed that both propellers were rotating and absorbing power at the time of impact. The winds were reported from 360 degrees at 17 knots, with gusts to 25 knots.

The pilot was performing a night VOR/DME approach during which instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was equipped with VOR, LORAN, and RNAV receivers. There were two step-downs fixes on the approach. At 13 DME the minimum altitude was 1,800 feet. At 10 DME the minimum altitude was 1,040 feet. The missed approach point was at 6 DME, and the VOR/DME transmitter was located 5.5 miles beyond the airport. Radar data revealed a descent profile based upon distances from the end of the runway, rather than DME from the VOR. The airplane reached an altitude of 1,000 feet when it was 13.52 miles from the VOR, and 7.58 miles from the approach end of the runway. It subsequently impacted rising terrain at an altitude of about 900 feet, about 11.5 miles from the VOR, and 5.5 miles from the approach end of the runway. Impact damage and a post-crash fire precluded a check of the radio set up at the time of the accident. According to FAR 135 a pilot-in-command was required to have 1,200 hours total time. The investigation documented the pilot's total time as about 1,057 hours.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in Serpentine River, northwest of New Brunswick while performing a flight from Ottawa to Presque Ile, Maine. All seven occupants were killed.
Crew:
Wg Cdr Beverly Beck,
Sq Ldr Frederick William Darnell,
Wg Cdr John Harry Drury.

The crew was engaged in a local training flight and left runway 19. During initial climb, while at a height of some 1,000 feet, the pilot made a 30° left turn when the control was lost. The aircraft stalled and crashed in a potatoes field located 4 km from the airfield. All three crew members were killed.

The aircraft left Bolling Field AFB (Washington DC) on May 23 bound for Houlton, Maine, with intermediate stops in Montreal and Presque Isle. The crew left Montreal at 0934LT on May 24 with a crew of two and four passengers, among them Lt Col Louis Gimbel. En route, while cruising at an altitude of 5,000 feet, the crew requested to climb to 7,000 feet and confirmed an ETA at 1134LT. In poor weather conditions, the crew was unable to locate the airport of Presque Isle and Houlton. Eventually, the aircraft hit tree tops and crashed in a dense wooded area located in the Howe Brook mountain range, between Presque Isle and Houlton. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all six occupants were killed.
Crew:
1st Lt Clarence Wright, pilot,
S/Sgt Frederick Taylor, flight engineer.
Passengers:
Lt Col Louis Gimbel,
Cpt John Franciscus,
Cpt Gilbert Herbach,
2nd Lt Earl Wilkinson.
Sources & photos: http://www.mewreckchasers.com/C40.html