United States of America

The aircraft disappeared from ATC radar immediately after being cleared to descend from 12,000 feet to 10,000 feet. ATC radar data showed the aircraft at 11,900 to 12,000 feet for approximately the last 6 minutes prior to the disappearance, with the last Mode C altitude and discrete transponder code 2402 (at 0221:03) reported as 11,800 feet. The last three returns, 12,000, 11,900, and 11,800, are consistent with the start of a descent from 12,000 feet. Due to construction at the radar antenna site, the area where the aircraft disappeared was blocked from radar coverage. Subsequent attempts by the controller to contact the aircraft were unsuccessful. A 7,000- to 7,500-foot overcast was reported at the destination, along with lower clouds and precipitation. Documentation at the accident site indicated an approximate level flight path from the broken treetops to the area of ground impact into a northwest-facing 60-degree mountain slope at approximately the 5,600-foot level. The wreckage was not located for approximately two months. Post-accident examinations of the aircraft's Bendix/King KEA130A (United Instruments 5035PB-P57) encoding altimeter revealed needle impressions on the indicator face and pointers consistent with an altitude indication of 12,620 feet. The internal components of the unit were severely damaged and a functional test was not possible. The aircraft was equipped with a copilot's altimeter. Only the faceplate was recovered and examined. One impression on the main faceplate revealed a needle impression by the 100-foot pointer consistent with 560 feet. The position of the 1,000-foot pointer could not be determined. The pilot's 4-day activity history showed that he was returning from a demanding 3-day work assignment, that his recent sleeping schedule was irregular, and that he had been awake about 20 hours at the time of the accident. There was no evidence found of a mechanical failure or malfunction at the time of the accident.

The twin-engine Aerostar departed on Runway 1. While on initial climb, after take-off, witnesses observed the airplane roll to the left until it became inverted, after which the nose dropped and the airplane impacted the ground in a near vertical nose down attitude. The fuselage was consumed with a post crash fire. On-site examination revealed the wing flaps and landing gear were retracted. No evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction was found relating to the airplane, engines, or propellers. The investigation revealed that both propellers were rotating and absorbing power at the time of impact. The winds were reported from 360 degrees at 17 knots, with gusts to 25 knots.

The pilot lost control of the airplane following the loss of engine power from the right engine during takeoff. The pilot stated that the engine power loss was not sudden, but rather a slow continued reduction of power. The pilot further stated that the loss of power occurred after he placed the landing gear selector in the retract position. He added that his airspeed at the time of the power loss was between Vmc (86 mph) and Vy (120 mph). The airplane started to roll towards the right (dead) engine as the pilot reduced the power on the left engine. The outboard portion of the right wing impacted the ground short of a taxiway. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the left engine was torn from the airframe. The reason for the loss of engine power was not determined.

The airplane was making an instrument landing system approach in instrument meteorological icing conditions when control was lost. The airplane impacted the terrain 1.6 miles from the approach end on the runway. The airplane contacted the terrain with the left wing first prior to cartwheeling and coming to rest approximately 120 feet from the point of first impact. The pilot had 19 hours total flight time in Cessna 208's of which 1.9 hours were in actual instrument meteorological conditions.

A Cessna 525 and a Cessna 172 collided in flight about 3,400 feet mean sea level on converging courses, with the 525 heading north and the 172 heading southwest. The converging speed was about 300 knots. The 525 departed under instrument flight rules, received vectors, and was initiating a climb on course. Training in the 525 emphasizes maximum use of the autopilot to afford greater outside scanning by the single pilot. The 525 was in radio contact with terminal approach control and the pilot's acknowledgement of the climb clearance was interrupted by the collision. The 172 had departed a local airfield, located just outside the 30 mile Mode C veil airspace of a terminal airport, and proceeded southwest. The collision occurred as the 172 was approaching Class D airspace of a military tower, and the pilot was initiating radio contact with the military tower. The terminal approach controller in contact with the 525 stated he did not observe the primary target of the 172, and conflict alert software was not installed. The 172 did not display a transponder signal and the transponder switch was subsequently found in the 'off' position. A cockpit visibility study indicated that from a fixed eye position the 172 was essentially hidden behind aircraft structure of the 525 for the 125 seconds before impact. The 172 could be seen by shifting the pilot's eye position. The 525 was viewable in the left lower section of the 172's windscreen. Both airplanes were operating in visual flight conditions.

According to the passengers, they departed about 30 or 40 minutes late because of the late arrival of the airplane. When the pilot arrived, he 'seemed to...be in a hurry...there was no safety instructions or any attempt to show us or the kids the operation of the door.' After takeoff, the flight climbed to an altitude of 6,700 feet. The pilot attempted to make radio contact with an unknown station, was unsuccessful in making radio contact, and according to a passenger, 'seemed agitated.' The passengers noticed that the left alternator light was illuminated, and questioned the pilot. The pilot told the passengers, '...it's nothing it always comes on.' About 15 minutes after departure, the flight descended to 3,000 feet and the pilot attempted to make radio contact with someone again. The flight continued at 3,000 feet until the pilot saw a ship in the ocean. He descended to around 1,000 feet over the ship, and was still working with the radio. The flight continued onto the coast. The passengers told EMS personnel that the airplane made an 'abrupt' left turn to line up with the runway, and when the airplane touched down, they felt the right side of the aircraft collapse. After touchdown on runway 27L, the airplane's right main landing gear collapsed, then the left gear collapsed. The airplane slid off the right side of the runway and struck RVR (runway visual range) equipment. According to the pilot's statement he, '...made [a] normal approach to runway 27 left. All system indicated normal. Upon touchdown and roll out all was ok for 3-4 hundred feet- [right] gear collapsed...unable to hold aircraft on runway...nose hit RVR antenna swinging aircraft more right to catch right wing and remove tip tank. Left gear collapsed as aircraft came to rest.' According to the FAA Inspector's statement, it was his opinion, on the day of the accident the aircraft was 'over gross weight on departure from Marsh Harbor...the pilot was experiencing radio problems... and I [FAA Inspector] believe he was flustered and annoyed...in the pattern he made an abrupt left turn to lineup with [runway] 27, and when he touched down on the runway the right gear immediately collapsed due to [side] overload.' In addition, both landing gear trunnions, where the retract mechanisms attached, were broken as if 'overloaded.'

The pilot stated he checked the fuel quantity in the inboard fuel tanks, but may have omitted the outboard tanks. He departed and climbed to 100 feet where the airplane yawed right. He believed it was a gust of wind which he attempted to correct. At 200 feet, the pilot stated the airplane rolled hard right and impacted trees in a 60 degree nose down attitude. There was no indication of a left engine discrepancy prior to impact. The right engine was examined with no fuel found in the fuel lines, and trace fuel was found in the fuel servo. According to the accident pilot, he regularly flew between Washington-Dulles and Southport, North Carolina using only the inboard tanks. Because of this, he did not check the location of the fuel selector, nor did he necessarily check the fuel quantity in the outboard fuel tanks. The cockpit fuel selector for the right engine was found in the outboard tank location. The right outboard tank on this airplane was not breached, and contained no fuel. The takeoff checklist states the fuel selector should be on the inboard fuel tank prior to takeoff.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording indicated that the pilot was unable to start the right engine before takeoff, and elected to attempt takeoff with the right engine inoperative. Witnesses reported that the airplane's nose lifted off about 4,100 feet down the runway and that it then became airborne with its wings rocking, attaining a maximum altitude of 5 to 10 feet above the ground before settling back to the ground, departing the right side of the runway and entering an upright slide for about 1/2 mile. Investigators removed the right engine starter-generator from the engine after the accident and found the starter-generator drive shaft to be fractured. The aircraft has a minimum crew requirement of two, consisting of pilot and copilot; the copilot's seat occupant, a private pilot-rated passenger, did not hold a multiengine rating and thus was not qualified to act as second-in-command of the aircraft.

The pilot was cleared for a GPS approach. He stated that he was too high to make a good landing, so he opted for a circling approach to another runway. As he turned for the base leg, he lost visual contact and became disoriented. It was a dark night with no moon. The pilot realized that he was in a 70- to 80-degree left bank and returned the airplane to a level attitude, then noticed the ground directly in front of him. The aircraft ran through a barbed wire fence, collided with trees, and slid rearward to a stop in a high altitude meadow east of the airport. The FAA completed an evaluation of the circling approach procedures and night operations for that airport and did not find any problems.

The airplane was on a VFR dusk cross-country flight when it collided with the 1,500-foot level of a hill. Radar data showed the aircraft in a descent from 2,000 feet until radar contact was lost about 1,500 feet msl, with a final ground speed of 194 knots. The route taken by the pilot was about 5 miles west of the route that the company pilots routinely flew, but while crossing higher terrain, it was a more direct route to the destination. A company pilot flying a few minutes ahead of the accident flight reported it was necessary to descend to between 1,200 and 1,500 feet msl in order to maintain VFR. A low-pressure system approaching the area from the west had resulted in low stratus, rain, and fog. At the time of the accident, a nearby weather reporting facility reported a 1,300-foot broken ceiling with 5- to 6-mile visibility in light rain and mist. On the evening of the accident, the pilot was scheduled to give a speech as her final examination in an evening college course. She had informed the instructor that she might be late, but had been told that he could not hold the class past its scheduled dismissal time to accommodate her late arrival.