United States of America

The flight departed Anchorage, Alaska, and was en route to Saint George, Alaska, to pick up passengers for a return flight to Anchorage. The pilot-in-command (PIC) was seated in the right seat, and the copilot was seated in the left seat. This was the copilot's third flight in this make and model airplane, and he was not qualified as a crewman in it under 14 CFR Part 135. There was no record of when the copilot last performed a non directional beacon (NDB) approach. The NDB indicator in the cockpit was on the left side of the left control column, partially blocked from the view of the PIC. The minimum altitude for the segment of the approach prior to the final approach fix (FAF) was 1,700 feet. The Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) for the final segment of the approach was 880 feet. The reported ceiling was 100 feet overcast. The Air Route Traffic Control Center radar altitude readout for the airplane revealed that the airplane descended below 600 feet prior to reaching the FAF. The radar ground track revealed the airplane on course prior to the course reversal procedure turn on the published approach. The radar ground track showed that after the course reversal, the airplane continued through the published final approach course, and turned to parallel the inbound track three miles north of course. The radar plot terminates about the location of the 550 feet high cliffs where the airplane was located. Weather at the time of the accident was reported as 100 foot overcast. This location was 5.5 miles (DME) from the airport. A review of radar tapes from the day prior to the accident, show the same airplane and PIC tracking the published course outbound and inbound, and descending below the published approach minima to below 500 feet. This flight successfully landed at the airport. An interview with the copilot from the successful flight revealed that the PIC intentionally descended to 300 feet on the approach until he acquired visual contact with the ocean, then flew to the airport to land. An aircraft flying on the published inbound final approach course at 5.5 DME is over water, approximately three miles from the nearest terrain.

The airplane had made a dry pass on the fire zone, then circled around to make a second pass and release its load of 2,450 gallons of retardant. According to witnesses, the airplane struck trees while in a nose low, right wing low attitude. Upon ground impact, the airplane exploded and burned. Investigation revealed no evidence of preimpact airframe, engine, propeller, or flight control failure/malfunction. The first officer, an initial attack trainee pilot, was in the left seat and the captain was in the right seat. Toxicology tests of the first officer indicated 0.031 ug/ml brompheniramine, 0.011 ug/ml chlorpheniramine in kidney fluid, and 0.142 brompheniramine, 0.072 chlorpheniramine in liver fluid. Both medications are over-the-counter antihistamines with sedative effects.

The pilot of the Part 135 cargo flight was executing the 'full' ILS runway 27 approach at Helena Regional Airport in a non-radar environment. Although the approach calls for the pilot to maintain 7,000 feet until intercepting the glideslope, the aircraft impacted the terrain at 5,300 about 1.5 miles prior to reaching the point where the pilot should have crossed the Hauser NDB at an altitude of 6,741 feet. According to the approach plate, the aircraft should not have descended to an altitude below 5,400 feet until reaching the outer marker, which is located about five and one-half miles west of the impact site.

Shortly after the airplane took off, a witness about 1 mile from the airport observed the airplane about 150 feet above the ground in a left turn, before it disappeared into the clouds. A witness across from where the airplane crashed stated he was in his shed when he heard the sound of an airplane overhead. When the sound faded and returned, like the airplane had circled above the shed, he stepped outside and looked for the airplane. He saw the airplane exit the clouds in a near vertical position and impact the ground. He described the engine noise as loud and smooth. The airplane impacted in a field about 3/4 miles from the departure airport and was consumed by a post crash fire. Streaks of oil were observed on the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer extending to its upper and lower surfaces. Disassembly of both engines did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. A weather observation taken after the accident reported included a visibility of 2 miles with light drizzle and mist, and the ceiling was 400 foot overcast. Witnesses described the weather at the accident site as '...pretty foggy,' and worse than the conditions reported at the airport.

After a 4.7 hour flight, while turning onto final, the airplane landed short. The pilot did not mention engine problems during a police interview. He subsequently told an FAA Inspector that the left engine failed, then later, that the right engine failed. He told the Safety Board that both engines failed. Adequate fuel was confirmed. The previous day, the right engine failed approaching another airport. The pilot performed a single-engine go-around, with landing gear and flaps down. He refused assistance and performed his own maintenance. He cleaned the fuel filters of both engines. During a ground runup, the right engine was hard to start, and required a high fuel flow to remain running. After the pilot re-cleaned the right fuel filter the engine ran fine. The flight was uneventful until the accident. Post-flight examination revealed all propeller blades bent back 90 degrees, with significant chordwise scoring on one blade per engine. The left engine fuel filter was relatively clean, with some brown residue which contained ferrous material. The right engine fuel filter was heavily coated with a white residue which contained aluminum, and brown material which contained ferrous material. The pilot received his multi-engine rating on April 22, 1998.

A witness reported the airplane did not climb above 200 feet and reported seeing the airplane 'wobbling up and down' as it attempted to climb. He reported the airplane went into a sharp left bank and nose dived down. The airplane burned upon impact. The wreckage was located in a wooded area about 3/4 mile from the approach end of runway 30. Numerous open farm fields were located near the airplane's flight path. The winds were reported at 240 degrees at 22 knots gusting to 29 knots. The wreckage path was on a 040 heading and covered about 190 feet from initial tree impact to the location of the main wreckage. The engine inspection did not reveal any anomalies to either engine. The flight was the first maintenance check flight after the airplane had not been flown for 14 months. During maintenance the pilot had put about 100 gallons of water in the left main and left auxiliary fuel tanks to locate a fuel leak. A plug was installed in the left auxiliary fuel drain valve and the fuel tank could not be checked during preflight for fuel contamination without removing the plug.

The airplane had just taken off and was at approximately 300 agl when the right engine 'had a sudden and catastrophic failure.' The right propeller stopped spinning with the blades in the low-pitch position. The pilot initiated a right turn back toward the airport, but the airplane would not maintain altitude. The pilot rolled out of the turn, but the descent continued until the airplane struck the trees. Examination of the airplane's right engine revealed that the crankshaft was broken at the number 3 short cheek, just forward of the number two cylinder piston rod. The number two crankshaft bearing was broken and melted. The oil feed line to the number two bearing was blocked by a piece of the broken bearing. The Single Engine Climb Data table in the Cessna 414 Pilot's Operating Handbook indicates that an airplane weighing 5,680 pounds, with gear and flaps retracted and the inoperative propeller in feather, operating at a density altitude of 5,055 feet, will have a best climb indicated airspeed of 115 knots. The rate of climb will be 308 feet per minute.

The captain/operator, the first officer and one passenger, departed on a cross-country positioning flight. The airplane contained about 300 gallons of fuel. After 3.9 hours en route, the flight was cleared for a visual approach to the destination airport. During the approach, both engines lost power about 2,000 feet mean sea level. The pilot stated the right fuel tank was empty. He estimated that 50 to 60 gallons of fuel remained in the left fuel tank. While the airplane was descending toward an area of open water, he attempted to restart the engines without success. He then lowered the landing gear, and made a right turn toward a small airstrip, located about 5 miles northwest of the destination airport. The airplane touched down in an area of soft, marsh covered, terrain. During the landing roll, the airplane nosed down and received damage to the forward, lower portion of the fuselage. An inspection of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed the left fuel tank contained about 1 inch of fuel. The right fuel selector was positioned on the right auxiliary fuel tank. The left fuel selector was positioned between the left main, and the left auxiliary fuel tanks.

During landing roll, the airplanes normal braking system failed as a result of hydraulic fluid leak(s). At the pilot's request, deployment of the drag chute and application of the emergency braking system was performed by the first officer. According to the first officer, application of the emergency brakes caused the airplane to yaw. The first officer then pulled up on the emergency brakes handle followed by re-application of braking pressure. This action took place several times during the landing roll. Gates' Learjet Flight Training Manual (Page 105) states, 'In using the emergency brake lever, slow steady downward pressure is required. Each time the lever is allowed to return upward to the normal position, nitrogen is evacuated overboard. Brace your hand so you will not allow the lever to move up and down inadvertently on a bumpy runway.' The airplane overran the end of the runway and collided with the Instrument Landing System back course antennae.

The flight was on a practice nondirectional beacon (NDB) approach to Great Falls runway 34 in visual conditions. Abeam the final approach fix, the aircraft was 4 miles right of course. Upon being advised of this by ATC, the pilot corrected back to final with a 60-degree intercept angle, rolling out on course 3 miles from the runway. When the pilot called missed approach, the local controller (a trainee) instructed the pilot to make a 360-degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 3, and the pilot acknowledged. The controller trainee then amended this instruction to a 180-degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 21, then to a 180- degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 3. The crew did not acknowledge the amended instruction. Controllers then observed the airplane had crashed. Witnesses reported the airplane entered a steep descent from a right turn and impacted the ground at a steep angle. The flight was described as recurrent training required by the owner's insurance; however, the second aircraft occupant's airline transport pilot and flight instructor certificates had been revoked, and he held only a private pilot certificate. Investigators found no evidence of aircraft malfunctions.