Boeing 727-100

Air Micronesia Flight 614 departed Saipan at 07:30 for a flight to Palau with intermediate stops in Guam and Yap, Western Caroline Islands. The aircraft departed Guam at 08:30 and climbed to FL350. An en route descent to Yap was made from the north through broken to scattered clouds and the captain, who was flying the aircraft, turned onto a downwind leg at the northeast portion of the airport. The downwind leg was flown at an altitude of 600 feet above the runway 07 elevation while the crew checked to see if the runway was clear, to see if the fire truck was in place, and to see the direction of the windsock. The flaps were set at 30° on the base leg. Abeam the approach end of runway 07, the captain began a right 90° and a left turn manoeuvre to align the aircraft with the final approach to runway 07. During a portion of the downwind leg, the captain relinquished control of the aircraft to the first officer while the captain took pictures of the airport. He then resumed control and passed the camera to the second officer and asked him to take pictures of the runway. As the aircraft passed through 90deg from the runway heading, it had descended to about 300 feet above the runway elevation of 52 feet msl. When the aircraft was aligned with the runway heading, it was about 480 feet above runway elevation at a point 1.5 miles from the approach end of the runway. At 09:52 the aircraft touched down 13 feet short of runway 07. The right main landing gear immediately separated from the aircraft. The aircraft gradually veered off the runway and came to rest in the jungle about 1,700 feet beyond the initial touchdown. A severe ground fire erupted immediately along the right side of the aircraft as it came to rest. All occupants had evacuated within about 1 minute after the aircraft came to rest.

On final approach to San José-Juan Santamaría Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions. In limited visibility due to rain falls, the airplane descended below the glide until the right main gear struck the ground 15 meters short of runway 07 threshold. On impact, the landing gear was torn off. Out of control, the airplane struck the ground, lost its undercarriage then slid on several dozen meters before coming to rest. All 73 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft christened 'Clipper Meteor' was damaged beyond repair.

Dan-Air flight 1008 took off from Manchester Airport (MAN) at 09:22 UTC en route for Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport (TFN). After an uneventful flight, the crew contacted Tenerife North Airport Approach Control at 13:14, informing them that they were at FL110 and at 14 nautical miles from the TFN VOR/DME. Approach Control replied, "Dan Air one zero zero eight, cleared to the Foxtrot Papa beacon via Tango Foxtrot November, flight level one one zero expect runway one two, no delay." The Dan Air crew repeated the clearance and requested meteorological information, which was given as: "OK runway in use one two, the wind one two zero zero five, visibility six from seven kilometres clouds, two oktas at one two zero metres, plus four oktas at two five zero metres, plus two oktas at three five zero metres, November Hotel one zero three, temperature one six, dew point one, and drizzle." Approximately one minute later Approach Control told the aircraft to descend and maintain FL60. Receipt of this message was acknowledged by the aircraft, whereupon the controller immediately requested it to indicate its distance from the TFN beacon. The crew replied that it was at 7 NM from TFN. At 13:18:48 UTC the aircraft notified Approach Control that it had just passed TFN and that it was heading for the 'FP' beacon. The controller then informed them of an unpublished hold over Foxtrot Papa: "Roger, the standard holding over Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Dan Air 1008 only replied "Roger" without repeating the information received, which was not compulsory under the ICAO regulations in force at the time of the accident. Almost one minute later, the aircraft the crew reported: "Dan Air one zero eight, Foxtrot Papa level at six zero, taking up the hold" and Tenerife APP replied: "Roger". Instead of passing overhead FP, the flight had passed this navaid at 1.59 NM to the South. Instead of entering the 255 radial, the Boeing 727 continued its trajectory in the direction of 263 degrees for a duration of more than 20 seconds, entering an area with a minimum safety altitude (MSA) of 14500 ft. The co-pilot at that point said: "Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" The captain remarked "Yes, doesn't isn't parallel with the runway or anything." The flight engineer then also made some remarks about the holding procedure. Approach control then cleared them down to 5000 feet. The captain then remarked: "Hey did he say it was one five zero inbound?". It appears that at this moment the information received on the holding flashed back to the Captain's mind, making him realize that his manoeuvre was taking him to magnetic course 150 degrees outbound from 'FP', whereas the information received was "inbound" on the holding, heading 150 degrees towards 'FP'. The copilot responded: "Inbound yeh". "I don't like that", the captain said. The GPWS alarm sounded. The captain interrupted his left hand turn and entered a right hand turn and ordered an overshoot. They overflew a valley, temporarily deactivating the GPWS warning. The copilot suggested: "I suggest a heading of one two two actually and er take us through the overshoot, ah." But the captain continued with the turn to the right, because he was convinced that the turn he had been making to the left was taking him to the mountains. The captain contacted Approach Control at 13:21: "Er ... Dan Air one zero zero eight, we've had a ground proximity Warning." About two seconds later the aircraft flew into the side of a mountain at an altitude of approximately 5450 ft (1662 m) and at 11.5 km off course.

On approach to Florianópolis-Hercílio Luz Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity and heavy rain falls. The approach was abandoned and the captain initiated a go-around. Few minutes later, while completing a second attempt to land, the crew failed to realize that the airplane was not properly aligned. At a higher speed than prescribed, the airplane struck the top of a hill and crashed in flames about 26 km from the airport. Three passengers were rescued while 55 other occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the airplane was approaching the airport below the glideslope and off course. It appears that an inspector pilot was at control at the time of the accident.

On the day of the accident, Iranian air traffic controllers went on strike, which led to hundreds of domestic flights being cancelled. At 1600LT the strike was interrupted and flights resumed. At 1740LT, the airplane departed Mashad Airport on schedule service IR291 to Tehran-Mehrabad Airport with 120 passengers and a crew of eight on board. At 1852LT, ATC based at Tehran-Mehrabad Airport cleared the crew for a direct approach to runway 29. At 1905LT, the dispatcher instructed the crew to take a 360° heading to reach the non-directional beacon of Varamin. On approach, the copilot informed the captain that the VORTAC was giving a wrong radial course but the captain failed to respond to this message. At 1911LT, while descending in limited visibility due to night, snow falls and foggy conditions, the airplane struck the slope of a mountain located in the Alborz Mountain Range. The wreckage was found few hours later in a snow covered terrain about 29 km north of Tehran Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and none of the 128 occupants survived the crash.

American Airlines Flight 625 was a scheduled flight from Providence Airport (PVD) to St.Thomas (STT) on the U.S Virgin Islands with an intermediate stop in New York (JFK). The Boeing 727 departed New York at 12:00 AST. On approach to St. Thomas, at 15:04, the flight crew cancelled their IFR flight plan and proceeded VFR. The captain elected to use the runway 09 ILS for vertical guidance. The glide slope was intercepted at 1500 feet msl (flaps 15° and at a 160 KIAS airspeed). The flaps were lowered to 25 and later to 30 degrees. The company prescribed 40 degrees was never selected. The speed was still 10 KIAS above Vref when the aircraft passed the threshold at an estimated altitude of 30-40 feet. At 1000 feet down the runway, while initiating the flare, turbulence caused the right wing to drop. The wings were leveled and the aircraft floated a while until touchdown 2200-2300 feet down the runway. The captain decided that the aircraft couldn't be stopped on the remaining runway. He immediately initiated a go-around. Because of the absence of any sensation either of power being applied or of aircraft acceleration, the throttles were closed again. The aircraft, in a 11 degree nose up attitude, ran off the runway and struck a localizer antenna. The right wingtip clipped a hillside just south of the antenna and the aircraft continued, hit an embankment, became airborne and contacted the ground on the opposite side of the perimeter road. The aircraft continued and came to rest 83 feet past the perimeter road, bursting into flames.

About 0738LT on April 5, 1976, Alaska Airlines, Inc., Flight 60, a B-727-81, N124AS, departed Juneau, Alaska, on a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Seattle, Washington; an en route stop was scheduled for Ketchikan International Airport, Ketchikan, Alaska. There were 43 passengers and a crew of 7 on board. Anchorage air route traffic control center (ARTCC) cleared Flight 60 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan to the Ketchikan International Airport; the flight was routine en route. At 0805, Anchorage ARTCC cleared Flight 60 for an approach to runway 11 at Ketchikan. At 0807, the flight was 30 DME miles from the airport. At 0811, Flight 60 reported out of 10,000 feet and was cleared to contact Ketchikan Flight Service Station (FSS); the FSS advised the flight that the 0805 weather was: ceiling 800 ft., obscured, visibility 2 mi, light snow, fog, wind 330° at 5 kt. The FSS also advised the flight that braking action on runway 11 was poor; this report was based on braking tests performed by the airport manager. The captain testified that he did not recall hearing the braking condition report. Upon receipt of the clearance, the crew of Flight 60 began an ILS approach to Ketchikan. Near the 17-mile DME fix, as the flight descended through 4,000 feet, the crew acquired visual contact with the ground and water. As the flight approached Guard Island, the captain had the Island in sight and decided to abandon the ILS approach and to continue the approach visually. The captain testified that he established a 'visual glide slope of my own' at an altitude of about 1,000 feet, and stated that his eyes were '... the most reliable thing I have.' Visual contact with the approach lights was established about 2 miles from the runway threshold. The airport was visible shortly thereafter. The captain did not recall the airspeed at touchdown, but estimated that he touched down about 1,500 feet past the threshold of runway 11. He also testified that he did not see the yellow, 1,000-foot markers on the runway; he further testified that the runway '... was just wet.' A passenger on Flight 60, who was seated in seat 5A (just forward of the wing's leading edge), stated that the yellow runway marks were visible to him. The first officer has no recollection of the sequence of events leading to the accident; however, the second officer testified that airspeeds and descent rates were called out during the last 1,000 feet. The captain could not recall the flap setting either on approach or at touchdown. However, the second officer testified that after the landing gear was extended the first officer remarked, 'We're high,' and lowered the flaps from 30° to 40°. None of the cockpit crew remembered the airspeeds, descent rates, or altitudes of the aircraft during the approach and touchdown. Reference speed was calculated to be 117 kns with 40° flaps and 121 kns with 30° flaps. The captain testified that after touchdown he deployed the ground spoilers, reversed the engines, and applied the wheel brakes. Upon discovering that the braking action was poor, he decided to execute a go-around. He retracted the ground spoilers, called for 25° flaps, and attempted to obtain takeoff thrust. The thrust reverser mechanism did not disengage fully and the forward thrust could not be obtained. He then applied full reversing and quickly moved the thrust levers to 'idle.' This attempt to obtain forward thrust also was not successful. The captain then reapplied reverse thrust and again deployed the ground spoilers in an attempt to slow the aircraft. When he realized that the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway, he turned the aircraft to the right, raised the nose, and passed over a gully and a service road beyond the departure end of the runway. The aircraft came to rest in a ravine, 700 feet past the departure end of runway 11 and 125 feet to the right of the runway centerline. Flight attendants reported nothing unusual about the approach and touchdown, except for the relatively short time between the illumination of the no-smoking sign and the touchdown. The two flight attendants assigned to the rear jumpseats and the attendant assigned to the forward jumpseat did not have sufficient time to reach their assigned seats and had to sit in passenger seats. None of the flight attendants felt the aircraft decelerate or heard normal reverse thrust. Many passengers anticipated the accident because of the high speed of the aircraft after touchdown and the lack of deceleration. Two ground witnesses, who are also pilots, saw the aircraft when it was at an altitude of 500 to 700 feet and in level flight. The witnesses were located about 7,000 feet northwest of the threshold of runway 11. They stated that the landing gear was up and that the aircraft seemed to be 'fast' for that portion of the approach. When the aircraft disappeared behind an obstruction, these witnesses moved to another location to continue watching the aircraft. They saw the nose gear in transit and stated that it appeared to be completely down as the aircraft crossed over the first two approach lights. The first two approach lights are located about 3,000 feet from the runway threshold. A witness, who was located on the fifth floor of the airport terminal, saw the aircraft when it was about 25 feet over the runway. The witness stated that the aircraft was in a level attitude, but that it appeared 'very fast.' He stated that the aircraft touched down about one-quarter way down the runway, that it bounced slightly, and that it landed again on the nose gear only. It then began a porpoising motion which continued until the aircraft was past midfield. Most witnesses placed the touchdown between one-quarter and one-half way down the runway and reported that the aircraft seemed faster-than-normal during the landing roll. Witnesses reported varying degrees of reverse thrust, but most reported only a short burst of reverse thrust as the aircraft passed the airport terminal, about 3,800 feet past the threshold of runway 11.

On approach to Barranquilla-Soledad Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions. Unable to locate the runway in below weather minima, the captain decided to make a go-around. Few minutes later, while on a second attempt to land, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck tree tops 1,000 meters short of runway 04 threshold. The aircraft lost height and crashed in flames 300 meters short of runway. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all four occupants have been killed.

En route from Đà Nẵng to Saigon, while cruising at an altitude of 26,000 feet, three guys entered the cockpit and ordered the pilot to divert to Hanoi. The captain tried to explain that this was not possible and that he should perform an intermediate stop at Phan Rang Airport. Shortly later, two hand grenades exploded in the front part of the cabin, causing major damages to the aircraft control systems. While approaching Phan Rang Airport, at a height of 1,000 feet, the airplane entered a nose-down attitude then crashed in a huge explosion in a rice paddy field located few km from the runway threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 75 occupants were killed.

Following an uneventful flight from Denver-Stapleton Airport, the crew started the descent to Mazatlán-General Rafael Buelna Airport. On short final, the airplane struck the ground, lost its undercarriage and came to rest about 1,500 meters short of runway threshold. All 123 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.