Crash of a Cessna 414 Chancellor in Tenerife: 2 killed

Date & Time: May 9, 1998 at 1240 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EC-CVV
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Tenerife-Sur - Tenerife-Norte
MSN:
414-0631
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1000
Captain / Total hours on type:
20.00
Aircraft flight hours:
750
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Tenerife-Sur-Reina Sofia Airport on a taxi flight to Tenerife-Norte-Los Rodeos Airport, carrying one passenger and one pilot. While descending to Los Rodeos Airport runway 12, weather conditions worsened and the pilot was instructed by ATC to make an approach to runway 30 via a special VFR clearance. Few minutes later, while approaching at an insufficient altitude, the aircraft collided with a house under construction and crashed in a garden. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed. The accident occurred in IMC conditions.
Probable cause:
Collision with obstacle while approaching under VFR mode in IMC conditions. The following factors were identified:
- The pilot did not have sufficient experience,
- Marginal weather conditions,
- The pilot failed to see and avoid the obstacles and may have suffered a spatial disorientation,
- Excessive workload in the cockpit during the approach associated with lack of visibility, low experience and too many radio communications on the frequency.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130H Hercules near Las Palmas: 10 killed

Date & Time: May 28, 1980 at 1025 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
T.10-1
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Madrid – Tenerife – Las Palmas
MSN:
4520
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a flight from Tenerife to Las Palmas where 70 soldiers should embark. The descent to Gando Airport was initiated from the west in marginal weather conditions. In limited visibility due to clouds, the four engine airplane struck the slope of Mt Hoya del Gamonal located about 17 km northwest of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all 10 occupants were killed. For unknown reasons, the crew initiated the approach from the west over the island instead of flying along the northern coast of the island.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain.

Crash of a Boeing 727-64 in Tenerife: 146 killed

Date & Time: Apr 25, 1980 at 1321 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-BDAN
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Manchester - Tenerife
MSN:
19279
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
DA1008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
138
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
146
Captain / Total flying hours:
15299
Captain / Total hours on type:
1912.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3492
Copilot / Total hours on type:
618
Aircraft flight hours:
30622
Circumstances:
Dan-Air flight 1008 took off from Manchester Airport (MAN) at 09:22 UTC en route for Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport (TFN). After an uneventful flight, the crew contacted Tenerife North Airport Approach Control at 13:14, informing them that they were at FL110 and at 14 nautical miles from the TFN VOR/DME. Approach Control replied, "Dan Air one zero zero eight, cleared to the Foxtrot Papa beacon via Tango Foxtrot November, flight level one one zero expect runway one two, no delay." The Dan Air crew repeated the clearance and requested meteorological information, which was given as: "OK runway in use one two, the wind one two zero zero five, visibility six from seven kilometres clouds, two oktas at one two zero metres, plus four oktas at two five zero metres, plus two oktas at three five zero metres, November Hotel one zero three, temperature one six, dew point one, and drizzle." Approximately one minute later Approach Control told the aircraft to descend and maintain FL60. Receipt of this message was acknowledged by the aircraft, whereupon the controller immediately requested it to indicate its distance from the TFN beacon. The crew replied that it was at 7 NM from TFN. At 13:18:48 UTC the aircraft notified Approach Control that it had just passed TFN and that it was heading for the 'FP' beacon. The controller then informed them of an unpublished hold over Foxtrot Papa: "Roger, the standard holding over Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Dan Air 1008 only replied "Roger" without repeating the information received, which was not compulsory under the ICAO regulations in force at the time of the accident. Almost one minute later, the aircraft the crew reported: "Dan Air one zero eight, Foxtrot Papa level at six zero, taking up the hold" and Tenerife APP replied: "Roger". Instead of passing overhead FP, the flight had passed this navaid at 1.59 NM to the South. Instead of entering the 255 radial, the Boeing 727 continued its trajectory in the direction of 263 degrees for a duration of more than 20 seconds, entering an area with a minimum safety altitude (MSA) of 14500 ft. The co-pilot at that point said: "Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" The captain remarked "Yes, doesn't isn't parallel with the runway or anything." The flight engineer then also made some remarks about the holding procedure. Approach control then cleared them down to 5000 feet. The captain then remarked: "Hey did he say it was one five zero inbound?". It appears that at this moment the information received on the holding flashed back to the Captain's mind, making him realize that his manoeuvre was taking him to magnetic course 150 degrees outbound from 'FP', whereas the information received was "inbound" on the holding, heading 150 degrees towards 'FP'. The copilot responded: "Inbound yeh". "I don't like that", the captain said. The GPWS alarm sounded. The captain interrupted his left hand turn and entered a right hand turn and ordered an overshoot. They overflew a valley, temporarily deactivating the GPWS warning. The copilot suggested: "I suggest a heading of one two two actually and er take us through the overshoot, ah." But the captain continued with the turn to the right, because he was convinced that the turn he had been making to the left was taking him to the mountains. The captain contacted Approach Control at 13:21: "Er ... Dan Air one zero zero eight, we've had a ground proximity Warning." About two seconds later the aircraft flew into the side of a mountain at an altitude of approximately 5450 ft (1662 m) and at 11.5 km off course.
Probable cause:
The captain, without taking into account the altitude at which he was flying, took the aircraft into an area of very high ground, and for this reason he did not maintain the correct safety distance above the ground, as was his obligation. Contributing factors were:
a) the performance of a manoeuvre without having clearly defined it;
b) imprecise navigation on the part of the captain, showing his loss of bearings;
c) lack of teamwork between captain and co-pilot;
d) the short space of time between the information given and the arrival at 'FP';
e) the fact that the holding was not published" (Spanish report)
UK authorities agreed in general with the report, but added some comments to give the report 'a proper balance':
1. the information concerning the holding pattern at FP, which was transmitted by ATC, was ambiguous and contributed directly to the disorientation of the crew;
2. no minimum safe altitude computed for holding pattern;
3. track for holding pattern at 'FP' is unrealistic.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 707-329 in Tenerife

Date & Time: Feb 15, 1978 at 1313 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OO-SJE
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Brussels - Tenerife
MSN:
17627
YOM:
1960
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
189
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
56787
Circumstances:
The airplane was completing a charter flight from Brussels to Tenerife, carrying 189 passengers and a crew of nine on behalf of Sebelair. On approach to Tenerife-Norte-Los Rodeos Airport, the crew informed ATC about technical problems as he was unable to lower the nose gear. The landing was completed on runway 12/30 with the nose gear retracted and the airplane slid for a distance of 1,200 meters before coming to rest in flames. All 198 occupants were evacuated, four passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Crash of a Boeing 747-121 in Tenerife: 335 killed

Date & Time: Mar 27, 1977 at 1706 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N736PA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Los Angeles – New York – Las Palmas
MSN:
19643
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
PA1736
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
380
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
335
Captain / Total flying hours:
21043
Captain / Total hours on type:
564.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10800
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2796
Aircraft flight hours:
25725
Aircraft flight cycles:
7195
Circumstances:
The KLM Boeing 747, registration PH-BUF, took off from Schipol Airport (Amsterdam) at 0900 hours on 27 March 1977, en route to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. This flight was part of the Charter Series KL4805/4806 Amsterdam-Las Palmas (Canary Islands) - Amsterdam operated by KLM on behalf of the Holland International Travel Group (H.I.N.T.), Rijswijk-Z.H. The Boeing 747 registration N736PA, flight number 1736, left Los Angeles International Airport, California, United States, on 26 March 1977, local date, at 0129Z hours, arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport at 0617Z hours. After the aeroplane was refuelled and a crew change effected, it took off for Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain) at 0742Z. While the aeroplanes were en route to Las Palmas, a bomb exploded in the airport passenger terminal. On account of this incident and of a warning regarding a possible second bomb, the airport was closed. Therefore, KLM 4805 was diverted to Los Rodeos (Tenerife) Airport, arriving at 1338Z on 27 March 1977. For the same reason, PAA1736 proceeded to the same airport, which was its alternate, landing at 1415. At first the KLM passengers were not allowed to leave the aeroplane, but after about twenty minutes they were all transported to the terminal building by bus. On alighting from the bus, they received cards identifying them as passengers in transit on Flight KL 4805. Later, all the passengers boarded KLM 4805 expect the H.I.N.T. Company guide, who remained in Tenerife. When Las Palmas Airport was opened to traffic once more, the PAA 1736 crew prepared to proceed to Las Palmas, which was the flight's planned destination. When they attempted to taxi on the taxiway leading to runway 12, where they had been parked with four other aeroplanes on account of the congestion caused by the number of flights diverted to Tenerife, they discovered that it was blocked by KLM Boeing 747, Flight 4805, which was located between PAA 1736 and the entrance to the active runway. The first officer and the flight engineer left the aeroplane and measured the clearance left by the KLM aircraft, reaching the conclusion that it was insufficient to allow PAA 1736 to pass by, obliging them to writ until the former had started to taxi. The passengers of PAA 1736 did not leave the aeroplane during the whole time that it remained in the airport. KLM 4805 called the tower at 1656 requesting permission to taxi. It was authorized to do so and at 1658 requested to backtrack on runway 12 for take-off on runway 30. The tower controller first cleared the KLM flight to taxi to the holding position for runway 30 by taxiing down the main runway and leaving it by the (third) taxiway to its left. KLM 4805 acknowledged receipt of this message from the tower, stating that it was at that moment taxiing on the runway, which it would leave by the first taxiway in order to proceed to the approach end of runway 30. The tower controller immediately issued an amended clearance, instructing it to continue to taxi to the end of the runway, where it should proceed to backtrack. The KLM flight confirmed that it had received the message, that it would backtrack, and that it was taxiing down tile main runway. The tower signalled its approval, whereupon KLM 4805 immediately asked the tower again if what they had asked it to do was to turn left on taxiway one. The tower replied in the negative and repeated that it should continue on to the end of the runway and there backtrack. Finally, at 1659, KLM 4805 replied, "O.K., sir." At 1702, the PAA aeroplane called the tower to request confirmation that it should taxi down the runway. The tower controller confirmed this, also adding that they should leave the runway by the third taxiway to their left. At 1703:00, in reply to the tower controller's query to KLM 4805 as to how many runway exits they had passed, the latter confirmed that at that moment they were passing by taxiway C4. The tower controller told KLM 4805, "O.K., at the end of the runway make one eighty and report ready for ATC clearance ." In response to a query from KLM 4805, the tower controller advised both aeroplanes - KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 - that the runway centre line lights were out of service. The controller also reiterated to PAA 1736 that they were to leave the main runway via the third taxiway to their left and that they should report leaving the runway. At the times indicated, the following conversations took place between the tower and the KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 aeroplanes. Times taken from KLM CVR.
1705:44.6 KLM 4805: The KLM four eight zero five is now ready for take-off and we are waiting for our ATC clearance. (1705:50.77).
1705:53.41 Tower: KLM eight seven zero five you are cleared to the Papa Beacon, climb to and maintain flight level nine zero, right turn after take-off, proceed with heading four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR. (1706 :08.09).
1706:09.61 KLM 4805: Ah - Roger, sir, we are cleared to the Papa Beacon, flight level nine zero until intercepting the three two five. We are now (at take-off). (1706:17.79).
1706:18.19 Tower : O.K..... Stand by for take-off, I will call you. (1706: 21.79).
Note: A squeal starts at: 1706:19.39 The squeal ends at: 1706:22.06
1706:21.92 PAA 1736: Clipper one seven three six. (1706 : 23.39).
1706:25.47 Tower: Ah - Papa Alpha one seven three six report the runway clear. (1706: 28.89).
1706:29.59 PAA 1736: O.K., will report when we're clear. (1706:30.69).
1706:31.69 Tower: Thank you.
Subsequently, KLM 4805, which had released its brakes to start take-off run 20 seconds before this communication took place, collided with the PAA aeroplane. The control tower received no further communications from PAA 1736, nor from KLM 4805. There were no eyewitnesses to the collision. All 248 occupants on board the KLM 747 were killed. Among the 396 people on board the Pan Am 747, 335 were killed (among them nine crew members) and 61 others were injured.
Probable cause:
The KLM aircraft had taken off without take-off clearance, in the absolute conviction that this clearance had been obtained, which was the result of a misunderstanding between the tower and the KLM aircraft. This misunderstanding had arisen from the mutual use of usual terminology which, however, gave rise to misinterpretation. In combination with a number of other coinciding circumstances, the premature take-off of the KLM aircraft resulted in a collision with the Pan Am aircraft, because the latter was still on the runway since it had missed the correct intersection.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-206B in Tenerife: 248 killed

Date & Time: Mar 27, 1977 at 1706 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PH-BUF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tenerife - Las Palmas
MSN:
20400
YOM:
1971
Flight number:
KL4805
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
234
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
248
Captain / Total flying hours:
11700
Captain / Total hours on type:
1545.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9200
Copilot / Total hours on type:
95
Aircraft flight hours:
21195
Aircraft flight cycles:
5202
Circumstances:
The KLM Boeing 747, registration PH-BUF, took off from Schipol Airport (Amsterdam) at 0900 hours on 27 March 1977, en route to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. This flight was part of the Charter Series KL4805/4806 Amsterdam-Las Palmas (Canary Islands) - Amsterdam operated by KLM on behalf of the Holland International Travel Group (H.I.N.T.), Rijswijk-Z.H. The Boeing 747 registration N736PA, flight number 1736, left Los Angeles International Airport, California, United States, on 26 March 1977, local date, at 0129Z hours, arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport at 0617Z hours. After the aeroplane was refuelled and a crew change effected, it took off for Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain) at 0742Z. While the aeroplanes were en route to Las Palmas, a bomb exploded in the airport passenger terminal. On account of this incident and of a warning regarding a possible second bomb, the airport was closed. Therefore, KLM 4805 was diverted to Los Rodeos (Tenerife) Airport, arriving at 1338Z on 27 March 1977. For the same reason, PAA1736 proceeded to the same airport, which was its alternate, landing at 1415. At first the KLM passengers were not allowed to leave the aeroplane, but after about twenty minutes they were all transported to the terminal building by bus. On alighting from the bus, they received cards identifying them as passengers in transit on Flight KL 4805. Later, all the passengers boarded KLM 4805 expect the H.I.N.T. Company guide, who remained in Tenerife. When Las Palmas Airport was opened to traffic once more, the PAA 1736 crew prepared to proceed to Las Palmas, which was the flight's planned destination. When they attempted to taxi on the taxiway leading to runway 12, where they had been parked with four other aeroplanes on account of the congestion caused by the number of flights diverted to Tenerife, they discovered that it was blocked by KLM Boeing 747, Flight 4805, which was located between PAA 1736 and the entrance to the active runway. The first officer and the flight engineer left the aeroplane and measured the clearance left by the KLM aircraft, reaching the conclusion that it was insufficient to allow PAA 1736 to pass by, obliging them to writ until the former had started to taxi. The passengers of PAA 1736 did not leave the aeroplane during the whole time that it remained in the airport. KLM 4805 called the tower at 1656 requesting permission to taxi. It was authorized to do so and at 1658 requested to backtrack on runway 12 for take-off on runway 30. The tower controller first cleared the KLM flight to taxi to the holding position for runway 30 by taxiing down the main runway and leaving it by the (third) taxiway to its left. KLM 4805 acknowledged receipt of this message from the tower, stating that it was at that moment taxiing on the runway, which it would leave by the first taxiway in order to proceed to the approach end of runway 30. The tower controller immediately issued an amended clearance, instructing it to continue to taxi to the end of the runway, where it should proceed to backtrack. The KLM flight confirmed that it had received the message, that it would backtrack, and that it was taxiing down tile main runway. The tower signalled its approval, whereupon KLM 4805 immediately asked the tower again if what they had asked it to do was to turn left on taxiway one. The tower replied in the negative and repeated that it should continue on to the end of the runway and there backtrack. Finally, at 1659, KLM 4805 replied, "O.K., sir." At 1702, the PAA aeroplane called the tower to request confirmation that it should taxi down the runway. The tower controller confirmed this, also adding that they should leave the runway by the third taxiway to their left. At 1703:00, in reply to the tower controller's query to KLM 4805 as to how many runway exits they had passed, the latter confirmed that at that moment they were passing by taxiway C4. The tower controller told KLM 4805, "O.K., at the end of the runway make one eighty and report ready for ATC clearance ." In response to a query from KLM 4805, the tower controller advised both aeroplanes - KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 - that the runway centre line lights were out of service. The controller also reiterated to PAA 1736 that they were to leave the main runway via the third taxiway to their left and that they should report leaving the runway. At the times indicated, the following conversations took place between the tower and the KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 aeroplanes. Times taken from KLM CVR.
1705:44.6 KLM 4805: The KLM four eight zero five is now ready for take-off and we are waiting for our ATC clearance. (1705:50.77).
1705:53.41 Tower: KLM eight seven zero five you are cleared to the Papa Beacon, climb to and maintain flight level nine zero, right turn after take-off, proceed with heading four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR. (1706 :08.09).
1706:09.61 KLM 4805: Ah - Roger, sir, we are cleared to the Papa Beacon, flight level nine zero until intercepting the three two five. We are now (at take-off). (1706:17.79).
1706:18.19 Tower : O.K..... Stand by for take-off, I will call you. (1706: 21.79).
Note: A squeal starts at: 1706:19.39 The squeal ends at: 1706:22.06
1706:21.92 PAA 1736: Clipper one seven three six. (1706 : 23.39).
1706:25.47 Tower: Ah - Papa Alpha one seven three six report the runway clear. (1706: 28.89).
1706:29.59 PAA 1736: O.K., will report when we're clear. (1706:30.69).
1706:31.69 Tower: Thank you.
Subsequently, KLM 4805, which had released its brakes to start take-off run 20 seconds before this communication took place, collided with the PAA aeroplane. The control tower received no further communications from PAA 1736, nor from KLM 4805. There were no eyewitnesses to the collision. All 248 occupants on board the KLM 747 were killed. Among the 396 people on board the Pan Am 747, 335 were killed (among them nine crew members) and 61 others were injured.
Probable cause:
The KLM aircraft had taken off without take-off clearance, in the absolute conviction that this clearance had been obtained, which was the result of a misunderstanding between the tower and the KLM aircraft. This misunderstanding had arisen from the mutual use of usual terminology which, however, gave rise to misinterpretation. In combination with a number of other coinciding circumstances, the premature take-off of the KLM aircraft resulted in a collision with the Pan Am aircraft, because the latter was still on the runway since it had missed the correct intersection.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-990-30A-5 in Tenerife: 155 killed

Date & Time: Dec 3, 1972 at 0733 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EC-BZR
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tenerife - Munich
MSN:
30-10-25
YOM:
1962
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
148
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
155
Circumstances:
After liftoff at Tenerife-Norte-Los Rodeos Airport, while climbing to a height of 100 meters, the airplane went out of control, plunged into the earth and crashed in a huge explosion about 325 meters past the runway end. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 155 occupants, 148 West German tourists and 7 Spanish crew members were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was near zero due to low ceiling and fog.
Probable cause:
It is believed that the accident was caused by inadapted reaction and manoeuvres on part of the pilot-in-command who probably suffered a spatial disorientation immediately after takeoff in an almost zero visibility configuration.

Crash of a Douglas C-47A-75-DL off Tenerife: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 16, 1966 at 0825 LT
Operator:
Registration:
EC-ACX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tenerife – Santa Cruz de La Palma
MSN:
19410
YOM:
1944
Flight number:
IB261
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
24
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Captain / Total hours on type:
3500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1400
Copilot / Total hours on type:
350
Aircraft flight hours:
25134
Circumstances:
The aircraft took off from Tenerife airport at 0821. After two minutes of flight the propeller of the left engine began overspeeding. The pilot-in-command applied the normal overspeed procedures, but obtained no response to the manoeuvre. He then actuated the feathering mechanism but this also was ineffective and as the aircraft was losing height he was obliged to ditch it approximately one mile from the coast, since the orography of the locality made a landing impossible. The ditching took place normally. The aircraft remained afloat approximately five minutes and then sank carrying with it one of the passengers who refused to abandon it and who had impeded the evacuation of the other passengers and resisted the efforts of the pilot-in-command and hostess to get him to safety.
Probable cause:
The accident resulted as a consequence of propeller overspeed on the left side, the cause of which could not be determined owing to the fact that the aircraft was not recovered.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-47A-25-DK in Tenerife: 32 killed

Date & Time: Dec 7, 1965 at 1840 LT
Operator:
Registration:
EC-ARZ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tenerife – Las Palmas
MSN:
13474
YOM:
1944
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
28
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
32
Aircraft flight hours:
19245
Circumstances:
The flight was a non-scheduled domestic flight from Tenerife to Las Palmas. It took off from runway 30 at Tenerife Airport with an IFR flight plan at 1830 hours and disappeared from the view of the tower controller in low cloud about 500 m before the end of the runway. According to the tower controller, the pilot acknowledged the last instructions from the tower two minutes after takeoff and did not re-establish contact afterwards. The aircraft was not seen again until a few moments before the accident which was presumed to have occurred between 1834 and 1840 hours according to witnesses. It was later determined that the airplane went into a dive and crashed few km from the airfield, killing all 32 occupants, most of them Scandinavian tourists.
Probable cause:
In the light of the investigation, the cause of this accident was considered to be unknown, and was, therefore, classified as "undetermined". However, the reasons which may have caused the aircraft to enter a spin are listed hereunder: One probable cause was a failure of the suction pump or the vacuum system. If the vacuum system had failed the artificial horizon, directional gyro and turn-and-bank indicator would have become inoperative. A failure of this sort, aggravated by turbulence, would deprive the pilot of the means to control the aircraft which, in these conditions, might have stalled one or more times. Another cause which might have produced a spin was flying into very severe turbulence with loss of control leading to a stall. Engine failure was not considered probable, although a malfunctioning of one of the propellers was not ruled out. It was considered that the pilot would have alerted the tower if an emergency has occurred, whereas it was considered unlikely that he would have done so if the instruments failed or if he encountered severe turbulence, as in these circumstances his entire attention would have been concentrated on trying to restore the aircraft to a normal attitude.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed L-1049G-55 Super Constellation in Tenerife: 30 killed

Date & Time: May 5, 1965 at 2117 LT
Operator:
Registration:
EC-AIN
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Madrid – Tenerife
MSN:
4550
YOM:
1954
Flight number:
IB401
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
40
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
30
Captain / Total flying hours:
12947
Captain / Total hours on type:
4110.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7802
Copilot / Total hours on type:
350
Circumstances:
Flight 401 was a scheduled domestic flight between Madrid, Spain and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Canary Islands. At 2053 hours the aircraft was cleared for approach to runway 30 at the Santa Cruz de Tenerife/Los Rodeos Airport. At this time it was informed by the approach controller that the airport was below meteorological minima and that the following weather conditions prevailed:
Wind : 330/variable 10 to 12 kt, gust to 14 kt
Visibility: 100 to 500 m, reduced to zero over the runway by a bar of stratus
Present weather: distant fog, intermittent fog banks
Clouds: 6/8 stratus from 0 to 30 m
QNH: 30.03 in of Hg
QFE: 942.9 mb
Temperature: 14°
Dew-point : 14°.
This was acknowledged by the flight. The pilot, who saw the beginning of runway 30 clearly but not the rest of it, decided to make a very low run after which he re-applied power for a go-around at 2106 hours. He circled the aerodrome, apparently intending to land, and at 2115 hours reported on final. At 2117 hours he reported to the tower: "401 pulling up to go around", and this was the last communication received from the aircraft. It was subsequently found that, when starting its go-around, the aircraft struck a scraper and tractor located 50 m from the runway edge, with one leg of the undercarriage and the lower aft part of the fuselage. It left various debris scattered about and finally crashed on the western edge of the diversion canal of the Rodeo gorge. From there, it slid about 100 m across private farmland and finally burst into flames. The accident occurred at 2117 hours.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command should have proceeded in view of the adverse weather conditions prevailing at the airport, which he should have appreciated during his first fly-past. His partial view of the airport and the glow of lights must have induced him to make a new attempt with the consequences described above.
Final Report: