New York

The crew was completing a flight from Griffiss AFB (Rome) to Turner AGB located in Albany. Enroute, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a field located in Georgetown, killing all three crew members.

After an uneventful instrument flight involving no Air Route Traffic Control routing and control, Flight 451 reported at 1122 to the Idlewild Approach Control as being aver the Mitchell Radio Range Station at 7,000 feet. The flight was then cleared to enter the Scotland holding pattern (located approximately 13 nautical miles southwest of the airport) and was subsequently "laddered down" to the number one position to approach. Between 1147 and 1159 weather conditions deteriorated below the ceiling minimum of 400 feet for landing on runway 22, the runway then in use. The flight continued to hold. At 1159 reported weather conditions improved and I-LINE was cleared for an approach to runway 22 using the back course of the ILS (Instrument Landing System). At 1218 the flight reported it had discontinued this approach. It was then issued missed-approach instructions and returned to the Scotland holding pattern. Shortly thereafter weather conditions were again reported below minimums for runway 22. They were then reported as: Ceiling 300 feet, broken, 2,500 feet, overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles, light rain and fog; wind south-southeast 20 knots. While holding, the flight was asked by Approach Control if it would be able to make an approach to runway 4, the ILS runway, considering the tailwind component. The flight accepted runway 4 and was cleared at 1307 for an ILS approach. At 1313 the tower was advised by 451 that the approach had been missed. The flight was next offered, and it accepted, a GCA (Ground Controlled Approach). This approach was abandoned at 1324, a missed-approach procedure was followed, and the flight returned to Scotland. At 1327 the Italian Airlines Station Manager, in a message relayed by the tower, asked the flight its remaining fuel, and received the reply that there was three hours of holding fuel. The Station Manager then suggested that the flight hold for 1-1/2 hours and if unable to land to proceed to Washington, D. C. At 1329 the flight acknowledged this message. At 1349 the flight was again cleared for an ILS approach, the third approach to runway 4 and its fourth to the airport. At approximately 1400 the aircraft struck the left pier. The impact was accompanied by a violent explosion and followed by an intense fire. Tower personnel immediately sounded the crash alarm and initiated emergency procedures. At the time of the accident weather conditions were reported as: Ceiling 200 overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles, light rain and fog; wind south-southeast 16 knots. Italian Airlines' minimums for ILS approaches to runway 4 are ceiling 200 feet and visibility 1/2 mile. The aircraft was destroyed and all 10 crew members and 16 passengers were killed, six others were injured.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a flight from Groton-New London Airport (CT) to White Plaines with a crew of two on board and one passenger, a daughter of the company's Executive Vice-President. At 1341LT, the flight reported to Westchester Tower that it was over the outer marker, inbound, at 2,500 feet. Approximately two minutes later it crashed between the outer and inner markers of the Westchester 115. The aircraft began clipping trees about 800 feet before it struck the ground on a 680-foot knoll located on the ILS approach path. Both crew members were killed. The passenger, who sustained only minor injuries, stayed with the aircraft until approximately 1630LT, then walked out and located help. She stated that she had flown quite a bit in this same airplane with the same crew and that the subject flight was the roughest she had ever encountered; that during the approach the weather was so “soupy” she could not see the numbers on the aircraft and that she heard the pilot say to the copilot, “Keep your eyes peeled.” Weather conditions, as reported by Westchester County Airport operations personnel, were: ceiling 300 feet and visibility 1 mile. The aircraft was owned and operated by Sangamo Electric Company, Springlfield, Illinois.

While taxiing to Runway 23 the flight received an IFR (Instrument Plight Rules) clearance from ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control). Normal pre-takeoff checks were performed and the takeoff roll was started at 1640. The aircraft became airborne after using approximately one-half of the 5.630-foot runway. Immediately after leaving the ground the gear was raised and the first officer saw the left feathering button light come on dimly which indicated that the left propeller was in the process of being feathered by the auto-feathering system. After definitely determining the light was on and visually checking the left propeller, the auto-feathering system was disarmed and the captain., in an effort to stop the feathering cycle, pulled the feathering button to neutral. This effort was unsuccessful. the left propeller feathered, and the engine stopped. During the climb an air speed of 140 m.p.h. was reached and maintained., the right engine remaining at full takeoff power. Approximately 250 feet above the ground a shallow left turn was started and the first officer was ordered to reinstate the left engine. the captain believing the aircraft would climb no farther. In the effort to restart the left engine by unfeathering the left propeller. only 600 r.p.m. could be obtained and the captain felt a buffeting through the control yoke. The aircraft at this time had progressed in the left turn approximately 180 degrees from the takeoff direction and the captain. fearing he would be unable to clear obstructions. Including high tension lines, decided to make a wheels-up landing. The landing was made in a field approximately one mile south of the airport. When the aircraft stopped, the passengers and crew evacuated it in an expeditious and orderly manner. The airplane was damaged beyond repair.

The crew of Flight 627 consisted of Captain C. C. Foxworth Captain E. M. Engle, (first officer), Flight Engineer L. P. Devries, Flight Attendant A. J. Folli, and Flight Attendant A. L., Krause. On departure from the ramp, the gross weight of the aircraft was 95,838 pounds; allowable gross takeoff weight was 105,530 pounds. The load was distributed so that the center of gravity of the aircraft was within the approved limits. Flight 627 initially taxied out at 2345, bar 18, for takeoff from Runway 7R. This flight and a preceding flight returned to the ramp because fog drifted in and reduced visibility below the approved minimum of one-fourth mile while they were awaiting clearance for takeoff. 2 Neither flight was issued off clearance, although according to Captain Foxworth, they held at Runway 7R about 15 minutes. The captains of flights reported that when they arrived at Runway 7R the existing visibility was well over the required one-quarter mile, as they could ace beyond the far end of the 8,200-foot runway, and so advised the control tower. About 15 minutes after returning to the ramp, Captain Foxworth was advised by Eastern Operations that visibility had improved, and the flight again taxied out, following another Eastern aircraft, Flight 623W. While they were taxing, the tower suggested that takeoff be made on Runway 22L and advised that visibility to the south-southeast, from tower location, was three miles. Since both flights had taxied beyond this runway at the time this information was conveyed to them, they turned around and Captain Foxworth, now in the lead, took position for takeoff near the end of Runway 22L. The tower advised Flight 627 that the weather was now being reported as thin obscuration, one and one-half miles visibility, fog, and smoke. 4 Captain Foxworth opened the left side "clear-view" window for maximum visibility. The runway lights were turned to full intensity, and the landing lights of the aircraft were on. Captain Foxworth observed that visibility appeared to be at least one-fourth mile, and stare could be seen. He could see the runway border lights and down the runway centerline for some distance. He said that he was unable to see past the intersection. The engines were run up, cockpit checks completed, and airways clearance via Long Beach, Sully, and Woolf intersections was received. Takeoff clearance was issued at 0055, October 19. Captain Foxworth, flying from the left, made the takeoff using the runway border lights and centerline as visual reference guides. The first officer also maintained visual reference except when he briefly directed his attention to retraction of the landing gear. In the takeoff run the captain noticed that visibility was variable due to fog and seemed to get progressively worse, but later stated that he had "expected to come out on top almost any second" after becoming airborne; he did not go on instruments. Takeoff seemed normal. Shortly after calling for retraction of the gear. Captain Foxworth observed that air speed was approaching 110 knots. He said that he lost all ground references at about the intersection of Runways 19L, 25L, and 22L, at or shortly after becoming airborne. A few seconds later he heard the first officer shout a warning and they struck the ground while at takeoff power. A second or two after the first officer moved the landing gear handle to retract position and again directed his attention outside, he saw they were quite low, grabbed for the control wheel to pull the nose up, and simultaneously shouted a warning. He did not recall whether he got his hands on the wheel before impact. The aircraft struck the ground to the left of Runway 22L at Taxiway F. It bounced, and following the second impact skidded to a stop in an undeveloped part of the airport south of Taxiway G. An intense fire immediately developed in the left wing at No. 2 engine position. The pilots, flight engineer, and one passenger left through the crew door, located just to the rear of the cockpit on the right side; all other occupants exited in orderly fashion through the main cabin door at the left rear side of the aircraft.

The pilot was killed when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in Highland Falls.

American Airlines' Flight 723 of September 16, 1953, was a scheduled operation between Boston Massachusetts, and Chicago, Illinois, with intermediate stops among which were Hartford, Connecticut, and Albany, New York. The crew consisted of Captain J. W. Stentz, First Officer W. J. Schanken, and Stewardess J. G. Thornquist, Prior to departing Boston the crew filed a company VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flight plan to Chicago following which the company issued a flight clearance to proceed to Albany INSTOP (Instrument or On Top of Clouds Authorize d) 2 with an intermediate landing at Bradley Field, the airport serving Hartford, Connecticut, and Springfield, Massachusetts. The alternate airport was Syracuse, New York. At the time this flight clearance was issued, the weather en route to Albany was good mid the conditions at Albany were above minimums. The portion of the flight to Bradley Field was without incident and the aircraft arrived there at 0657. At Bradley Field Captain Stentz reviewed the latest weather reports in the company's operations office and was advised that Bradley Field had been added to his flight clearance as a second alternate in addition to Syracuse because the weather at Albany at this time was below the company's landing minimums 3 was forecast to improve to within limits by the time the flight arrived there. The special Albany 0642 weather report available to the captain at this time was: ceiling indefinite zero, sky obscured, visibility zero, fog. The en route weather was clear. According to the company's records, the gross takeoff weight of the aircraft at Hartford was 37,889 pounds which was within the allowable gross take-off weight of 40,503 pounds; the load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity limits of the aircraft. Departure from Bradley Field was made at 0714 with 25 passengers. Immediately before departing, the flight advised the tower it was proceeding to Albany VFR. At 0737, a message from the company's dispatcher at New York was relayed to Captain Stentz through the company radio at Albany as follows: "If Albany still below limits on your arrival, if OK with you, suggest hold vicinity until at least 0830 EST. Expect Albany to have limits 0730-0800 EST. Advise fuel on board when over Albany." Flight 723 acknowledged and advised. "We will hold." At 0740, the flight reported to Albany Approach Control that it was over Montgomery Ward, an in-range visual check point, VFR, and requested a clearance of at least 500 feet on top of clouds to the Albany Range Station. This request was approved and the flight was cleared to maintain at least 500 feet on top and to hold north of the Range Station. The 0739 Albany special weather report was given the flight: "Ceiling indefinite, 100 feet, sky obscured, visibility 1/4 mile, fog, wind west-southwest one mile per hour." Flight 723 reported aver the Range Station at 0742. During the holding period the number of aircraft in this pattern varied from six to nine. The special Albany weather report issued at 0750 indicated thin obscurement, ceiling estimated 4,000, overcast, fog, visibility 3/4 miles. At 0753, the first of the aircraft in the holding pattern, American Airlines' Flight 750, was cleared for an instrument approach to Runway 19. At 0800, this aircraft missed its approach and was immediately cleared to climb toward the south and to again remain at least 500 feet on top of clouds. A second aircraft which was holding was then cleared to make a similar approach and it too was forced to execute a missed approach procedure. At 08163 an instrument approach mid a landing on Runway 19 were successfully completed by one of the holding aircraft. Immediately following this landing. Flight 723 was cleared to make an instrument approach to Runway 19. Three minutes later the flight advised the tower that its approach was being abandoned because the aircraft's flaps could not be lowered. It was then still at least 500 feet on top of clouds and was advised by the tower to remain there until further advised. At approximately 0830, the following message was transmitted from the Albany Tower: "All aircraft holding Albany. It now appears to be pretty good for a contact approach from the west. It looks much better than to the north." Immediately following this message, Flight 723 was asked by the tower if it would accept a contact approach from the west for a landing on Runway 10. After requesting and receiving current weather including altimeter setting (29.74) and the length of Runway 10 (4,500 feet). the flight stated it would accept a contact approach. Clearance was then issued the flight to make a contact approach to Runway 10. Acknowledgement of this clearance was the last radio contact with the flight. At approximately 0834, Flight 723 struck the radio towers and crashed. The weather reported at the time of the accident was thin scattered clouds at 500 feet, ceiling estimated 4,500 feet, broken clouds, visibility 1-1/2 miles, fog.

A coupling and fully-towed flight was accomplished using the right-handed EF-84B, but no electrical power was received from the B-29. The right hand fighter uncoupled and the left hand fighter coupled with the B-29 and was retracted in the fully-locked towing position. The cockpit panel light indicated that electrical power was available from the B-29, and as soon as everything was trimmed and stabilized and the automatic flight control system was activated momentarily from the fighter. This resulted in a violent pitching motion of the EF-84B causing it to flip up and inward into the B-29. The B-29 outer wing panel crumpled and struck the main B-29 wing spar, shearing off the F-84 nose section before the two aircraft separated. As Bud Anderson flew in formation on the right side of the Superfortress, John Davis brought the left-hand EF-84D into position and linked wingtips with the EB-29A. He transmitted, "Autopilot coming on" and then switched the autopilot on. It commanded hard nose-up elevator. Davis' Thunderjet rolled rapidly to the right onto the outer wing panel of the Superfortress. As the fighter rotated about the wing tip of the bomber, the explosive bolts fired to jettison the Thunderjet, but not in time to prevent the collision between the planes. The left wing of the EB-29A failed outboard of the engines. The nose of the EF-84D broke away from the rest of the airplane.
B-29 went into steep spiral and crashed into Peconic Bay, Long Island and the F-84 crashed shortly thereafter. John Davis and five crew members aboard the EB-29A were killed in the accident. The other fighter, having unhooked, presumably landed safely. The project 'Tip Tow' was immediately cancelled.
Source:
http://www.air-and-space.com/Wing Tip Coupling B-29 F-84.htm
http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1944_4.html

The crew was conducting a demonstration flight at Staten Island Airfield. On final approach with one engine voluntarily inoperative, the airplane stalled and crashed in a field. Both pilots were killed while both passengers were injured.

While approaching Newburgh-Stewart Airport, the aircraft suffered an engine failure. The pilot-in-command elected to make an emergency landing in the Hudson River. The airplane sank rapidly and three occupants were killed while three others were rescued.