New York

The crew was performing a flight from Bedford, Massachusetts, to the Griffiss AFB in Rome, New York. En route, an engine failed, forcing all five occupants to abandon the aircraft and to bail out. On automatic pilot, the airplane continued to fly for about an hour before crashing into the Lake Ontario off Oswego. All five occupants were unhurt while the aircraft was written off and later recovered in 2014.
Crew:
Lt Col Charles A. Callahan, pilot,
Lt Sam Sharff.
Passengers:
Lt Col G. S. Lambert,
William P. Bethke,
Joseph M. Eannario.

The flight was designated as No. 4-2 because it was being operated as the second section of a regularly scheduled cargo flight that left Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on April 4. Flight 4-2 departed Fort Lauderdale April 5, 1952, at 0055, with a crew consisting of Captain William B. Crockett, Jr., and Copilot Jack L. Woerderhoff. The destination was Teterboro, New Jersey, with intermediate stops at Charleston. South Carolina, and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina. The gross weight of the aircraft upon departure was less than the maximum of 48,000 pounds permitted in cargo operations, and the load was placed so that the aircraft's center of gravity was within prescribed limits. This first segment of the flight was conducted according to visual flight rules. It was entirely routine with a landing at Charleston at 0328. Fuel was added but no cargo was loaded or discharged at Charleston. Takeoff from Charleston was at 0410, with a flight plan calling for instrument flight rules. Again the gross weight was less than the allowable and the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. This segment of the flight was also routine, with a landing at Raleigh-Durham at 0524. Again the cargo remained unchanged although 284 gallons of fuel were added. At Rale-gh-Durhan the pilots were briefed at the office of the U. S. Weather Bureau on current and forecast weather conditions over the route. It was indicated that no difficulty should be encountered en route to the New York area, but the ceilings and visibilities there and at Philadelphia, the alternate, would be 800 feet and live miles with heavy rain upon arrival. At 0554 the crew filed a flight plan according to instrument flight rules to cruise from Raleigh-Durham to new York International Airport (Idlewild) at 3,000 feet. The original destination, Teterboro, was changed because of worsening weather there, and the alternate was Philadelphia International Airport. The estimated time en route was two hours and ten minutes. The aircraft carried fuel for four hours' flight. The 0528 weather sequence reported Idlewild, the destination, as 2,100 feet ceiling and 4-mile visibility, and Philadelphia, the alternate, as also above minimums. Upon departure from Raleigh-Durham at 0608 the aircraft's gross weight was about 172 pounds less than its maximum allowable of 48,000 pounds, and its center of gravity was within prescribed limits. The flight proceeded uneventfully at its planned altitude of 3,000 feet. Routine position reports were made through Air Route Traffic Control and arrival over the Idlewild range station was estimated at 0810. At 0809 the flight was instructed by ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control) to climb to 3,500 feet and to contact Idlewild Approach Control when over Scotland Intersection (where the south-west leg of the Idlewild range intersects the southeast leg of the Newark range). The next instruction to the flight was from Idlewild Approach Control and directed it to hold at Scotland at 3,500 feet, and to expect approach clearance at 0828. The flight reported over Scotland at 3,500 feet at 0817. Immediately following the flight was given Idlewild weather as follows: "Weather 0804 time now 0817, measured 500 broken, 1800 overcast, visibility 1 1/2 miles in heavy rain, the altimeter 29.82." The approach controller first saw the flight on the airport surveillance radar (ASR) when it was approaching Scotland. He asked the flight if it could make a straight-in approach from its present position and the flight replied affirmatively. It was then cleared for a straight-in approach, instructed to descend immediately, and to report passing through 2,500 feet. The flight acknowledged and subsequently reported leaving 2,500 feet, and then leaving 2,000 feet. The controller then cleared the flight to continue descent, to advise upon reaching 1,500 feet, and then cleared it to "pass over Runway 4 and make left turn into Runway 13 left." The next contact with the flight was at 0825, when it reported "contact" over the outer marker, located at the Idlewild range station, 2.9 miles from the approach end of Runway No. 4. The local controller then took over control of the flight and advised it to "bear left and make a right turn into Runway 13L, that's the big runway on the north side of the airport, and call base leg coming up on the Federal Building. Go ahead and you'll probably De west of the Federal Building when you call." This was acknowledged by the flight, which presumably intended to comply because the message was not questioned. At 0827 the local controller saw the aircraft below the overcast and at an estimated altitude of 500 feet, between the tower and Runway 4. 2 He at once transmitted, "Just saw you pass over the airport. You should be passing those hangars now. If you start your left turn and watch the hangers on your left wing, you'll be able to make a left turn into Runway One Three. Go ahead, sir." The landing gear appeared to be fully extended, but the flap position was not noticed. A few seconds later the aircraft disappeared from view on a northerly heading and still at an estimated altitude of 500 feet. The local controller at once asked the flight if it had started the left turn, and the flight replied that it was pilling up to execute a missed approach. The tower gave immediate instruction to turn right and proceed to Long Beach intersection (the SE leg of the Idlewild Range and the SW leg of the Hempstead Range, about 10 miles SE of Idlewild) at 1,500 feet altitude. This transmission was acknowledged. This was the last communication from the flight. A very short time later the aircraft crashed at the intersection of 169th Street and 89th Avenue, Jamaica, New York, about 4.4 miles north of the Idlewild control tower.

The aircraft and its crew were taking part to a combined training mission out of Wheeler-Sack AAF and was the ninth airplane to depart in a formation of 17 similar aircraft. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the aircraft went out of control and crashed on the apron, damaging two other aircraft, a Fairchild C-82A Packet registered 44-23017 and a Ryan L-17B Navion registered 48-1064. The C-46 was destroyed and all four crew members were killed while the other occupants were injured.

Flight 801 originated at Boston, Massachusetts, for LaGuardia Field, nonstop, with a crew of Captain A. V. R. Marsh, First Officer Austin Officer Austin E. Briggs, and Stewardess Carolyn Mc Hull. It departed Boston at 0745, as schedules, in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules, via Airways Amber 7 and Red 3 to LaGuardia, Idlewild (New York International) Airport was the specified alternate. Upon departure from Boston the aircraft's gross weight was 38, 23 pounds, with a maximum allowable weight of 39,650 pounds, and the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. The flight proceeded uneventfully at its assigned altitude of 6,000 feet MSL in instrument weather with almost continuous rain. No actual icing occurred although the aircraft's de-icing equipment was used as a precaution because of the near freezing air temperatures. All required position reports were routine. At approximately 0845, the flight contacted LaGuardia approach control and advised, "Northeast 801 over New Canaan - cleared to New Rochelle." (The flight had been cleared to New Rochelle by ARTC.) Approach control then requested the flight to report over the Port Chester, New York, fan marker, and gave it an expected approach clearance time of an the hour (0900), Runway 22, and the 0828 LaGuardia weather, as follows: "estimated 3,000 overcast, one end one-half miles, rain and smoke, Wind southeast six, altimeter zero-zero-zero" (30.00). The light reported over Port Chester at 0849 and was successively cleared to descend to 4,500 foot, to 3,500 foot, and to 2,500 foot altitudes. At 0855 it was cleared to leave New Rochelle, inbound, and shortly was instructed to make a 360-degree turn to assure separation from a preceding aircraft. The flight acknowledged and complied. At 0858 it reported leaving New Rochelle and was cleared for an approach to Runway 22, and at 0859, was told that Ground Control Approach advisories were available on a frequency of 109.9 megacycles. The flight acknowledged, and then was given the 0900 LaGuardia weather, ceiling 1,700 feet and visibility 1 1/2 miles. Flight 801 reported leaving the LaGuardia range at 0900 and was cleared to land on Runway 22. There was no further message from the flight. At 0903 it struck the water of Flushing Bay some 3,600 feet from the approach end of Runway 22. A motorboat operated by the Edo Corporation, docked about one-half mile away, reached the site approximately four minutes later. Passengers and crew, who had climbed out through the emergency exits and who were standing on and holding to the fat sinking aircraft, were taken aboard and then transferred to a tugboat that arrived shortly. All occupants were taken ashore and hospitalized.

Flight 44-2 originated at Miami, Florida, and was scheduled to depart there for Buffalo, New York, via Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, at 1000, December 29, 1951. Because of a mechanical delay actual takeoff was not made until 1540. The crew consisted of Captain Victor A. Harris, Copilot Hans E. Rutzebeck, and Stewardesses Pearl Moon and Dolores Harvey. On board were 24 passengers for Pittsburgh, four passengers for Buffalo, and three extra crew members who were to fly the return trip to Miami. The flight arrived at Pittsburgh without incident at 2115 and 24 passengers deplaned. At Pittsburgh 29 Miami-hound passengers, including an infant, boarded the aircraft. It was originally planned that these passengers would be picked up on the southbound flight Buffalo to Miami, however, due to the fact that the flight was 5 hours 40 minutes late arriving Pittsburgh, the passengers were enplaned northbound in order that, after servicing, the flight could proceed nonstop Buffalo to Miami. No fuel was added at Pittsburgh and Flight 44-2 departed there for Buffalo at 2147 on a VFR flight plan. The takeoff weight was 40,263 pounds, which was 4 737 pounds less than the aircraft's certificated gross of 45,000 pounds, and the disposable load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity. At 2152 the flight called Pittsburgh Tower and reported its time off was 2147, this was the last radio contact. When the flight failed to arrive at Buffalo within a reasonable time after its ETA (2247), a search was initiated. It was not until 1433, December 31, however, chat a report was confirmed to the Sheriff's office, Cattaraugus County, New York, that the aircraft wreckage had been located in a heavily wooded area near Little Valley, New York. A survivor, who had made his way from the wreckage to a farmhouse to obtain help, reported that the crash occurred at 2225 December 29, approximately 38 minutes after the flight departed Pittsburgh.

While completing a training sortie, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and was later forced to abandon the aircraft that ran out of fuel. All occupants were able to bail out and were later rescued while the aircraft dove into the ground and crashed in a field located seven miles northwest of Griffiss AFB, NY.

Prior to takeoff, the engines were given a pre-flight check, following which the takeoff roll was commended. The flaps were in the "full up" position for the takeoff. The aircraft became airborne in a normal manner approximately 1,500 feet down the runway and climbed to an altitude of approximately 50 feet and leveled off. At this time, the landing gear was retracted and the air speed was estimated to be 105 to 110 miles per hour by qualified observers. Approximately 3,000 feet from the point of take-off parts were observed falling from the left engine and the aircraft made a shallow turn to the left. At this time, the left propeller appeared to be fully feathered. The flight continued in a left turn, slowly losing altitude until it struck a grove of trees 1.5 miles southeast of the airport. The elevation of the terrain at this point was 480 feet which is 256 feet below the elevation of the airport. The tree tops were 80 feet above the ground. First impact with the trees was made on a heading of approximately 60 degrees and as the aircraft descended through the trees, it turned anti-clockwise 180 degrees to the original heading. Following impact with the trees, the fuel tanks ruptured causing a fire which consumed the fuselage. Sixteen of the occupants were fatally injured and seven seriously injured. The survivors escaped either through broken windows on the right side, or the right rear escape hatch.

The flight was attempted in heavy snow falls. Shortly after takeoff from Griffiss AFB, while climbing, the aircraft went out of control and crashed. Two crew members were killed while three others were injured.

Pan American's Flight 131 departed from Bermuda at 1358, September 20, 1947, with 36 passengers and a crew of 5. The take-off and climb to the cruising altitude of 8,000 feet were normal, and the flight proceeded on course to La Guardia Field, New York, for a period of 3 hours without incident Between 1650 and 1655, about 225 statute miles from destination, Warren Robinson, the first officer, noticed a fluctuation in fuel pressure for engines 1 and 2 Seconds later, the left auxiliary fuel tank quantity gauge dropped to zero, the fuel pressure warning light flashed on, and the No 1 engine faltered To insure a positive fuel supply for all engines Mr Robinson immediately turned the fuel selector valves for all engines to their respective main tanks, 2 following which all engines operated normally. Mr Robinson then transferred fuel from the right auxiliary tank to the left auxiliary tank so that they would contain equal amounts, which was 40 gallons each according to the fuel quantity gauges after completion of the operation A few minutes later Mr Robinson noticed that the right auxiliary fuel gauge indicated not 40 gallons, but 100, and that it was visibly increasing even though no fuel was at that time being transferred The No. 3 main fuel tank gauge then dropped to zero, and the fuel pressure for the No 4 engine started to fluctuate. Alarmed by what now appeared to be a serious malfunction in the right side of the fuel system, Mr Robinson operated all engines from the left main tanks (1 and 2), turning on all the cross feed valves, and the booster pumps for main tanks 1 and 2. The flight had by this time reached position "Baker," a point on course and a distance of 212 statue miles from La Guardia This check point was regularly used by Pan American on the route from Bermuda to La Guardia, and was established by reference to precomputed radio bearings Flight Radio Officer Rea was instructed to call Captain Carl Gregg, who was eating lunch in the passengers cabin, to the cockpit. The captain, unable to account for what appeared to be a total loss of fuel in the right main tanks, tried to operate engines 3 and 4 from their respective mains. Shortly after, the fuel pressure for both these engines dropped, the fuel pressure warning lights came on, and engines 3 and 4 lost power. Other combinations of fuel valve settings were tried during the next few minutes, but power could not be restored to engines 3 and 4 The "fasten seat belt" sign was turned on, rated power was applied to engines 1 and 2, and a descent of 200 to 300 feet per minute started. Two minutes later the fire warning light flashed on for engine 4 The flight radio officer was sent to the passengers cabin to see if any signs of fire from this engine were visible He saw none from engine 4, but he did see smoke trailing from engine 3. By the time Mr Rea returned to the cockpit, Captain Gregg noticed the smell of burning rubber, and furthermore, that the fire warning light for engine 3 was also on. No flames from either engine, however, were visible. Standard fire fighting methods were followed to control the fire in the No. 3 nacelle. The propeller was feathered, all fluids into the engine were closed at the emergency shutoff valves, and the C02 gas bottle was discharged. The fire warning light then went out. Since there was no visible indication of fire in engine 4, the C02 gas bottle was not discharged. As a precautionary measure, however, the shutoff valves for all fluids into the engine were closed, and an attempt made to feather the propeller But, the propeller would not feather, and continued to windmill. At 1712, shortly after Mr. Rea transmitted to the company the flight's position as "Baker", a loud noise from the right side of the airplane was heard, and simultaneously the green right landing gear light came on. Through the drift sight the crew could see the right outboard tire burning, and a landing gear bungee cable hanging slack. All attempts to raise the right gear were unsuccessful, and it was found that with the right gear down, and with both right engines "out" that an air speed of 125 miles per hour was required to maintain directional control. At 1730, engine 4 stopped windmilling, having seized from lack of lubrication By 1745, altitude had been lost to about 1,000 feet, and over 100 statute miles remained to destination. Full take-off power was applied to engines 1 and 2 in an attempt to hold the remaining altitude. A report had been transmitted to the company at 1729 that the fires in engines 3 and 4 were believed to be out, and at 1740, the company had been advised that the flight was at 2,000 feet still descending All radio contacts with Pan American at La Guardia throughout the course of this emergency were accomplished through Eastern Air Lines' radio on the frequency 8565 kcs. Mr. Rea attempted to secure a fix on "CW" 3 from the U. S. Coast Guard, using the distress frequency of 8280 kcs. Because of an extreme amount of "CW" interference on this frequency only one station was actually contacted. This was NMR, the Coast Guard station in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Even this contact was not entirely satisfactory, and no radio bearing from it was ever received. The radio equipment was accordingly returned to the frequency of 8565 kcs, the established channel of communication, for further radiophone contact with New York. No call was ever made on the international distress frequency of 500 kcs., or over any of the "VHF" equipment on board. By 1800, altitude had been lost to 800 feet, and still over 50 statute miles remained to destination. Preparations were made for "ditching". The passengers were instructed in the use of life jackets, and in emergency water landing procedures. The life rafts were moved so as to be easily accessible from the main cabin door. Celluloid protective coverings were removed from all the emergency exit handles Clothing was loosened, and seat belts tightened. Flight Radio Officer Rea broadcasted "blind" on the frequency 8280 kcs., reporting the position of the flight to be 40-00 degrees north and 73-10 degrees west. From this point on only a small gradual loss of altitude was experienced. Captain Gregg decided to attempt to reach and land at Floyd Bennett Field, and was advised through Eastern Air Lines' radio that runway one would be available. New York Air Traffic Control had been alerted through Eastern Air Lines' radio of the emergency, and they in turn had called Coast Guard search and rescue. Coast Guard, Army, and Navy rescue equipment was dispatched, and as Flight 131 approached the coast, the crew observed other aircraft and surface vessels proceeding out to meet them. At 1815, approximately 15 statute miles from Floyd Bennett Field, the flight had descended to an altitude of 400 feet. Full available power was now applied to engines 1 and 2, and the flight was able to not only hold, but even gain a slight amount of altitude, Four to five minutes later, 1820, throttles were retarded to take-off power and the aircraft maneuvered into a position for a straight-in landing approach on runway one. The aircraft was set down 775 feet from the south end of runway one, wheels up. During the course of the crash landing the No. 1 propeller was torn from the engine, the propeller dome becoming embedded in the No. 2 main fuel tank. The spilled gasoline was ignited by sparks generated as the aircraft skidded 2,167 feet on the concrete runway to a stop U. S. Navy fire and crash equipment had been previously deployed along runway one which allowed the Navy's crash personnel to bring the fire quickly under control, and to assist the passengers and crew to deplane without injury.

The aircraft took off on runway 13 of La Guardia Airport at 1843LT, having been cleared on an instrument flight plan to Rochester, New York, with Toronto, Ontario, as an alternate. Approximately 2 minutes after take-off the flight called La Guardia Tower and reported that it was in the vicinity of the south end of Whitestone Bridge, approximately 2 1/2 miles northeast of La Guardia Airport. The flight advised that the oil pressure was low on one engine, and requested clearance to land on runway 22. The request was approved, and the tower informed the crew that the wind was calm. When asked if emergency equipment was desired to stand by, the flight replied in the negative. Shortly thereafter, NX88787 reported that it was on the final approach, and that it was over the sand barges, located approximately one-half mile off the approach end of runway 22. In reply the flight was again given clearance to land. The aircraft was first seen at an altitude of approximately 800 feet, and about 1,300 feet off the approach end of runway 22 with the landing gear extended. The flaps were lowered, and the aircraft started a steep descent to runway 22,but it passed over the approach end of the runway at an altitude of approximately 300 feet. The flight then requested and was granted permission by the tower to make a right turn, however, the aircraft continued straight ahead over the runway, gradually losing altitude. When one-third of the way down the runway, the right propeller was feathered. When over the intersection of runways 22 and 18 and at an altitude of 200 feet the flaps were raised, which resulted in an additional loss of altitude. During or directly after raising the flaps, a right turn was initiated, and the landing gear was observed to retract slowly. Competent witnesses stated that the right turn was made at a very slow speed, at a high angle of attack, and at an altitude appearing never to have exceeded 200 feet. Over Bowery Bay the aircraft on two occasions almost settled into the water. When in a flat right turn toward runway 13 it lost altitude to about 50 feet. Approximately 2,000 feet from the end of the runway, the landing gear started to extend, and became fully extended when the aircraft was aligned with runway 13. At this time the airplane attitude appeared to be that of a steep climb. The wings were seen to wobble slightly, then the left wing and nose dropped, and the airplane struck the water at an angle of approximately 20 degrees. The forward movement of the aircraft continued on the surface of the water for 40 to 50 feet, throwing up a great spray as the tail rose to a vertical position, after which the aircraft continued over on its back and sank in about 5 minutes.