Buffalo

The airplane was in cruise flight at FL280 when the instrument-rated pilot failed to contact air traffic control (ATC) following a frequency change assignment. After about 25 minutes, and when 30 miles east of the destination airport, the pilot contacted ATC on a frequency other than the one that was assigned. He requested the instrument landing system (ILS) approach at his intended destination, and the controller instructed the pilot to descend to 8,000 ft and to expect vectors for the ILS approach at the destination airport. The controller asked the pilot if everything was “okay,” to which the pilot replied, “yes sir, everything is fine.” The controller then observed the airplane initiate a descent. About 2 minutes later, the controller asked the pilot where he was headed, and the pilot provided a garbled response. The controller instructed the pilot to stop his descent at 10,000 ft, followed by an instruction to stop the descent at any altitude. The pilot did not respond, and additional attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful. The airplane impacted terrain in a heavily wooded area 17 miles from the destination airport. Rhe aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were fatally injured.

On February 12, 2009, about 2217 eastern standard time, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The cargo flight was departing on its fourth flight leg of a five-leg flight in night instrument conditions, which included a surface observation of light snow and a broken ceiling at 500 feet above ground level (agl). One pilot who departed just prior to the accident flight indicated that moderate snow was falling and that he entered the clouds about 200 feet agl. The accident airplane's wings and tail were de-iced prior to departure. Radar track data indicated the accident flight was about 45 seconds in duration. An aircraft performance radar study indicated that the airplane reached an altitude of about 1,130 feet mean sea level (msl), or about 400 feet above ground level, about 114 knots with a left bank angle of about 29 degrees. The airplane descended and impacted the terrain at an airspeed of about 155 knots, a pitch angle of -16 degrees, a left roll angle of 22 degrees, and a descent rate of 4,600 feet per minute. The study indicated that the engine power produced by the airplane approximately matched the engine power values represented in the pilot's operating handbook. The study indicated that the required elevator deflections were within the available elevator deflection range, and that the center-of-gravity (CG) position did not adversely affect the controllability of the airplane. The study indicated that the load factor vectors, the forces felt by the pilot, could have produced the illusion of a climb, even when the airplane was in a descent. The inspection of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

On June 28, 2007, about 0815 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-500TP, N477MD, was destroyed on impact with terrain following an in-flight breakup near Wellsville, Missouri. The personal flight was operating under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological surface conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was on file and was activated. The pilot and two passengers sustained fatal injuries. The flight originated from the Spirit of St Louis Airport, near Chesterfield, Missouri, about 0750, and was destined for the Buffalo Municipal Airport, near Buffalo, Minnesota. About 0711, a person representing N477MD contacted Kankakee Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) to file an IFR flight plan and obtain an abbreviated weather update. During the abbreviated weather update, the AFSS briefer advised the pilot that there was heavy rain and thunderstorm activity in Missouri along the aircraft's planned route of flight. The pilot stated that he had onboard radar for weather avoidance. About 0750, N477MD departed SUS, contacted Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controller (ATC) on the St. Louis (Gateway) Departure frequency about 0752, and was initially cleared to climb to 4,000 feet. The Gateway controller advised of light to moderate precipitation three miles ahead of the aircraft. The pilot requested a northerly course deviation for weather avoidance, which was approved. About 0753, N477MD was cleared to climb to 10,000 feet. The controller then advised of additional areas of moderate and heavy precipitation ahead of the airplane, gave the pilot information on the location and extent of the weather areas, and suggested a track that would avoid it. The pilot responded that he saw the same areas on his onboard radar and concurred with the controller's assessment. Radar data showed that the airplane flew northwest bound, and then turned toward the west. About 0757, N477MD was instructed to resume the Ozark 3 departure procedure, and the pilot acknowledged. About 0758, the pilot was cleared again to proceed direct to Macon, Missouri (MCM) VHF omnidirectional range distance measuring equipment (VOR/DME), and two minutes later, was instructed to contact Kansas City Center (ZKC). The pilot contacted the ZKC R53 controller at 0800:47, and, after a discussion about the final requested altitude, was cleared to climb and maintain flight level 230. At 0801:42, a position relief briefing occurred and the R53 controller was replaced. The new R53 controller made no transmissions to N477MD, and was replaced by a third controller at 0806:27. The next transmission to N477MD occurred at 0812:26, when the R53 controller asked the pilot if he had been given a clearance to deviate. The flight's radar track showed that the airplane turned to the left. The pilot responded, "mike delta we've got problems uh..." The controller responded by asking the pilot if he was declaring an emergency, and made several other attempts to contact N477MD. The pilot did not respond to any of these calls, and radar contact was lost. None of the three ZKC controllers had given the pilot any weather information during the time he was controlled by ZKC. The plane crashed in an open field near Wellsville and was destroyed upon impact. All three occupants have been killed.

During the initial climb, a "throbbing or surging" sound was heard as the airplane departed in gusting wind conditions with a 600-foot ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility in snow. Moments later the airplane came "straight down" and impacted the ground. During examination of the wreckage, it was discovered that that the fuel selector switch for the right engine had been in the "X-FEED" position during the accident. Examination of documents discovered in the wreckage revealed, three documents pertaining to operation of an Aerostar. These documents consisted of two airplane flight manuals (AFMs) from two different manufacturers, and a checklist. Examination of the first of the AFMs revealed, that it had the name of both the pilot and the operator on the cover of the document. Further examination revealed that it had been published 4 years prior to the manufacture of the accident airplane, and contained information for a Ted Smith Aerostar Model 601P, which the operator had previously owned. This document contained no warnings regarding the use of the crossfeed system during takeoff. Examination of the second of the two AFMs found in the wreckage revealed that it was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved AFM for the accident airplane. Unlike the first AFM, the second AFM advised that the fuel selector "X-FEED" position should be used in "level coordinated flight only." It also advised that each engine fuel selector "must be in the ON position for takeoff, climb, descent, approach, and landing." It also warned that, if the airplane was not in a level coordinated flight attitude, "engine power interruptions may occur on one or both engines" when "X-FEED" is selected "due to unporting of the respective engine's fuel supply intake port." Review of the checklist contained in the FAA approved AFM for the Piper Aircraft Model 601P under "STARTING ENGINES," required a check of the crossfeed system prior to engine start by selecting each fuel selector to "ON," then selecting "X-FEED," and after verifying valve actuation and annunciator light illumination, returning the fuel selector to "ON." Additionally, under "BEFORE TAKEOFF" It also required that the fuel selectors be checked in the "ON" position, and that the "X-FEED" annunciator light was out, prior to takeoff. Examination of the pilot's checklist revealed that, it consisted of multiple pages inserted into plastic protective sleeves and included both typed, and hand written information. A review of the section titled "BEFORE TAKEOFF" revealed that the checklist item "Fuel Selectors - ON Position," which was listed in the AFM, had been omitted.

The airplane was on a positioning flight at night, cruising at 6,000 feet. Also, the pilot was operating on an IFR flight plan and was on his 6th flight after reporting for duty at 1530 est. During a frequency change and radio check at 0207 est, the pilot's response was normal. Radar data revealed that about 16 minutes later, the airplane entered a right turn, then disappeared from radar at about 0222 est after about 255° of turn. It impacted the ground in a steep nose down descent; debris from the airplane was found down to 6 feet below the surface. During the final 15 minutes of flight, there were no radio transmissions on the assigned frequency. No preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction was found. The propeller blades had s-curves or were bent forward; they also had leading edge impact damage and Rotational scoring. The pilot had flown in excess of 120 hours (110 hrs at night) in the preceding 30 days. There was evidence that he may have lacked crew rest during the day(s) before the accident.

Diverted to Augusta after encountering deteriorating weather. Lost inverters, compass system during ILS, executed go-around. Second approach made visual to landing. Props would not enter fine pitch, braking not effective. Pilot steered airplane off runway down embankment. All three occupants escaped uninjured.

The flight departed Buffalo under IFR conditions to Jamestown, New York. Several approaches were made to land but due to the weather conditions, the pilot elected to return to Buffalo still under IFR. During initial contact with control tower, the pilot advised them that he was low on fuel and requested direct flight to Buffalo. About 5 miles south-southwest of Buffalo both engines quit and the pilot advised that he was not going to make it. At this time the flight was issued emergency vector to Buffalo, but the aircraft crashed adjacent to route 400 in West Seneca, New York.

After takeoff from Buffalo Airport in blowing snow, the twin engine airplane encountered difficulties to maintain a positive rate of climb. It collided with ground and subsequently crashed. All four occupants were killed.

En route from Oshawa to Buffalo on a cargo flight, the twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances into Lake Ontario off Olcott, New York. Few debris were sighted in heavy seas but no trace of the pilot.