Maine

According to the pilot, he was conducting a GPS approach during occasional low ceilings, reduced visibility and rain. At the minimum descent altitude, the ground was 'occasionally' visible through fog and rain. Near the missed approach point, the runway lights were visible, so he continued the descent. He lost visual contact with the runway, and began a missed approach, but collided with trees. The accident site was 2 miles prior to the runway, on rising terrain, 200 feet below the runway elevation. The missed approach point was over the approach end of the runway.

The airplane was in cruise flight at 16,000 feet, in instrument meteorological conditions. About two minutes after the crew ceased cross-feeding due to a fuel imbalance, the left engine experienced a total loss of power. About one minute later, the co-pilot indicated to the pilot-in-command (PIC) that the airplane was losing airspeed, and about 15 seconds later, the co-pilot remarked "keep it up, keep it up." Shortly thereafter, the airplane departed controlled flight and impacted terrain. The airplane was destroyed by fire and impact forces. Examination of the left engine revealed no evidence of any pre-impact failures that would have accounted for an uncommanded in-flight shut-down. A SIGMET for potential severe clear icing was effective for airplane's flight path; however, the flight crew did not report or discuss any weather related problems around the time of the accident. At the time of the accident, the airplane was above its single-engine service ceiling. The PIC had accumulated approximately 6,000 hours of total flight experience, of which, about 500 hours were as PIC in make and model. The co-pilot had approximately 600 hours of total fight experience, of which, 300 hours were in make and model.

The twin-engine Aerostar departed on Runway 1. While on initial climb, after take-off, witnesses observed the airplane roll to the left until it became inverted, after which the nose dropped and the airplane impacted the ground in a near vertical nose down attitude. The fuselage was consumed with a post crash fire. On-site examination revealed the wing flaps and landing gear were retracted. No evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction was found relating to the airplane, engines, or propellers. The investigation revealed that both propellers were rotating and absorbing power at the time of impact. The winds were reported from 360 degrees at 17 knots, with gusts to 25 knots.

The pilot was performing a night VOR/DME approach during which instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was equipped with VOR, LORAN, and RNAV receivers. There were two step-downs fixes on the approach. At 13 DME the minimum altitude was 1,800 feet. At 10 DME the minimum altitude was 1,040 feet. The missed approach point was at 6 DME, and the VOR/DME transmitter was located 5.5 miles beyond the airport. Radar data revealed a descent profile based upon distances from the end of the runway, rather than DME from the VOR. The airplane reached an altitude of 1,000 feet when it was 13.52 miles from the VOR, and 7.58 miles from the approach end of the runway. It subsequently impacted rising terrain at an altitude of about 900 feet, about 11.5 miles from the VOR, and 5.5 miles from the approach end of the runway. Impact damage and a post-crash fire precluded a check of the radio set up at the time of the accident. According to FAR 135 a pilot-in-command was required to have 1,200 hours total time. The investigation documented the pilot's total time as about 1,057 hours.

The pilot took off on runway 07 and was cleared direct to the Wiscasset NDB, east of the airport. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane began turning to the left. The pilot then asked the controller, '. . . can you tell if I'm in a turn? I have a problem here.' Soon thereafter, the airplane collided with terrain in an uncontrolled descent, about 1.6 miles north of the airport. Investigation revealed that three days before the accident, a refueler had fueled the airplane's left wing with 840 pounds of fuel, then the fuel farm ran out of fuel. No further fueling was accomplished, and the pilot was not advised of the uneven fuel load. Procedures in the Beech E90 Pilot's Operating Manual (POM) included a check of the fuel tanks during preflight. The Beech C90 POM specified a maximum fuel imbalance of 200 pounds, but the E90 POM did not specify a maximum fuel imbalance. During examination of the wreckage, no preimpact malfunction or failure was found.

The pilot tried to activate the radio-controlled runway boundary lights about 10 miles away, and also while he was in the traffic pattern, but he was unsuccessful. He continued his descent to approximately 500 feet above the ground using the vasi (visual approach slope indicator) lights. The pilot stated that he had the airport in sight and' felt well enough in sight to complete landing.' The airplane touched down in approximately 18 inches of snow 60 feet off the right side of the runway. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction. He said as he got closer to the ground he realized it was snow-mobile tracks and not the runway. He tried to go-around but the airplane impacted the ground collapsing the nose gear.

Diverted to Augusta after encountering deteriorating weather. Lost inverters, compass system during ILS, executed go-around. Second approach made visual to landing. Props would not enter fine pitch, braking not effective. Pilot steered airplane off runway down embankment. All three occupants escaped uninjured.

Flight 1808 took off from Boston runway 04L at 21:30 for a flight to Auburn. Clearance was received of 7000 feet and to contact Portland Approach Control. Portland Approach cleared Flight 1808 at 21:58 for a runway 04 ILS approach. Three minutes later the controller noticed that Flight 1808 was east of course and asked if the it was receiving the Lewiston localizer. The captain replied that they hadn't and were given instructions to turn left heading 340. A left turn to 354° started and the aircraft passed Lewie Outer Marker (LOM) at 165 knots, 2,600 feet (30 knots too fast and 600 feet too high). At 22:02 the aircraft exited the left side of the localizer, still at a 354° heading. The crew then tried to capture the glide slope and enter the localizer again until it entered the left side of the localizer (22:04:08) and descended through the bottom boundary of the glide slope. At ca 22:04:16 the aircraft struck trees 4,007 feet short of the runway and 440 feet right of the extended centreline, continued 737 feet and struck level ground in nearly an inverted attitude. One of the passengers killed in the crash was American schoolgirl, peace activist and child actress Samantha Smith. She was returning to Auburn with her father after taking part to a TV movie in Boston.

During preflight preparation for departure from a short field the pilot failed to remove the Pitot tube covers. On takeoff roll, the stall warning light began to flicker. Pilot noted airspeed was not registering but did not consider this unusual in the early part of a takeoff roll. Pilot turned left stall warning switch off, then back on, warning light remained on. Pilot then initiated abort procedures, using full reverse thrust and brakes. The aircraft overran runway by about 100 feet and down a rough embankment which separated the landing gear.

Pilot lost control of his aircraft during low altitude maneuvers to align the aircraft for landing. The low ceiling and rising terrain around the airport influenced the pilots decisions to make tight turns at low altitude. The aircraft was stalled and rolled inverted onto the runway during a turn.