California

The crew was dispatched at Beale AFB to follow a training program. Following several touch-and-go maneuvers, the crew started a new approach when the aircraft became unstable on final. The instructor allowed the pilot-in-command to continue the approach when the engine n°1 struck the runway surface, caught fire and exploded. Out of control, the airplane banked left and crashed, bursting into flames. All seven crew members were killed.

During the takeoff roll at a speed of 140 knots on runway 32, the crew heard a loud bang followed by vibrations. Decision was taken to abandon the takeoff procedure and the crew was able to stop the aircraft before the end of the runway. All 19 occupants evacuated while the aircraft was quickly destroyed by fire.

The pilot, executing an ILS approach, observed a primary hydraulic pressure drop and declared his intent to land without the use of flaps, speed brakes, reversers or nose wheel steering. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway during landing, traveled approximately 1,300 feet and came to rest on a golf course after striking two vehicles and a chain link fence. Post accident investigation revealed 0.8 quarts of hydraulic fluid (skydrol) in the reservoir. Reservoir capacity is 1.28 u.s. gallon. The pilot stated he pumped the brakes on approach to build pressure in the emergency brake system. The pilot announced he had no braked after touchdown. The Jet Commander 1121 operator's manual cautions against this practice. A functional check of the thrust reversers by on-scene investigators produced two complete cycles of operation. Two persons located in a ground vehicle were injured during the overrun landing.

The aircraft's left engine caught fire during the takeoff roll. The pilot managed to stop the aircraft on the runway and all 31 skydivers and the two member crew evacuated without injury. The left engine propeller had lost one blade which was found several days later 3,000 feet west of the wreckage. There was no evidence found to substantiate compliance with a mandatory airworthiness directive on the propeller blade.

The aircraft landed hard and short of the runway. The impact collapsed the right main landing gear and the aircraft was destroyed by the post crash fire. The pilot reported that on short final a muffled 'pop' was heard and the aircraft yawed to the right. Directional control was regained and the aircraft landed hard. Post accident inspection failed to disclose any pre-impact failure/malfunction of the aircraft or engines. Right engine propeller slash marks in the runway indicate power was being produced on the engine at touchdown. Both pilots were uninjured.

The aircraft crashed into a residence 2 miles short of the runway after loss of power on the left engine. This engine was feathered, the gear was extended, but the flaps remained up as the aircraft continued the landing approach. Post accident investigation revealed no irregularities in the functioning of the aircraft. The pilot had radioed the report of power loss but had stated that he would not need the emergency equipment. The aircraft crashed in Sepulveda and was destroyed. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft took off from an airport whose runways had been closed for snow removal. A notam had been filed with the Fresno FSS by the Mammoth Lakes Airport Manager at 0900 hours for taxi and runway snow removal. The pilot was aware of the notam because the manager and a lineman both said they advised him of it. Several witnesses saw the pilot enter the aircraft after declining engine pre-heat or aircraft de-icing. When advised by the lineman that the 2 qts of oil that the pilot requested did not 'register on the dipstick.' The pilot ordered another qt to be 'thrown' in and 'hurry up.' No preflight or warm up or before takeoff check was noted by observers. Turning immediately onto the runway and rolling for takeoff the pilot passed a snow plow. The aircraft used 7,000 feet (all of the runway) and left the ground in a nose high attitude. The airport elevation is 7,128 feet msl. The aircraft first struck a dirt mound 3/4 of a mile after takeoff. After maintaining further flight for approximately 280 feet which crossed a small ravine the aircraft collided with the far side of the ravine and started to break apart, stopping 144 feet further east. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was used by the NASA to test fuel fire retardant and crashed upon landing without any passengers or crew on board. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

The aircraft, a Gates Learjet 24B, modified by a Howard/Raisebach Mark II conversion, was cleared for takeoff on runway 28L. Tower personnel estimated that the aircraft rotated for takeoff at 3,200 feet down the runway and was at approximately 200 feet agl when the pilot was instructed to contact departure control. Witnesses observed the aircraft climbing in a wings level attitude when it entered the broken cloud layer at about 600 feet agl. Moments later, the aircraft was observed descending out of the clouds at a steep angle and in a left wing low/nose down attitude. The aircraft impacted between runway 28L and 28R, approximately 10,000 feet from the approach ends. Witnesses reported that the engines sounded like they were operating at a high power setting. An exam of the engines revealed evidence that both were at or above 92% power at impact. No preimpact part failure/malfunction was found. Records revealed two autopilot discrepancies on 10/4/84; one induced the roll mode was sensitive; the other induced the autopilot intermittently rolled the aircraft into a standard rate left bank when engaged. Reportedly, the autopilot would not have been used for takeoff. All three occupants were killed.

The aircraft was on IFR departure in minimal weather conditions. On takeoff roll, a power loss occurred on the right engine and the aircraft veered to the right. The pilot-in-command (owner) in left seat initiated aborted takeoff, but right seat pilot took control, continued takeoff and feathered the right propeller. Both pilots observed smoke from the engines on their respective sides, both thought landing gear was retracted. (Investigation revealed landing gear was down.) Aircraft could not maintain altitude, pilots elected to ditch in ocean. Investigation revealed aircraft had been serviced with 147 gallons of Jet fuel instead of Avgas at 0445 hrs by a fbo lineman. The lineman had 3 weeks total experience, 1 1/2 hrs video tape training and was working 2 jobs 7 days per week. All three occupants escaped uninjured.