Carlsbad

The airport is on a plateau, and the surrounding terrain is lower than the runway. After departing runway 24, the airplane collided with the top conductor of a telephone line an estimated 2,500 feet from the departure end of the runway. The airport elevation was 331 feet msl and the estimated elevation of the line was 245 feet. The debris path was along a magnetic bearing of 270 degrees. Both left and right engines displayed contact signatures to their internal components that were characteristic of the engines producing power at the time of impact. Fire consumed the cabin and cockpit precluding a meaningful examination of instruments and systems. An aviation routine weather report (METAR) issued about 13 minutes before the accident stated that the winds were calm, visibility was 1/4 mile in fog; and skies were 100 feet obscured. An examination of the pilot's logbook indicated that the pilot had a total instrument flight time of 268 hours as of June 21, 2007. In the 90 prior days he had flown 11 hours in actual instrument conditions and logged 20 instrument approaches.

The Hawker and the glider collided in flight at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above mean sea level about 42 nautical miles south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada, which was the Hawker's destination. The collision occurred in visual meteorological conditions in an area that is frequently traversed by air carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also popular for glider operations because of the thermal and mountain wave gliding opportunities there. Before the collision, the Hawker had been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for several miles, and the glider was in a 30-degree, left-banked, spiraling climb. According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the glider pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or less before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine and other systems; however, the flight crew was able to land the airplane. The damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and parachuted to the ground. Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not possible to determine at which points each aircraft may have been within the other's available field of view. Although Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights operated under instrument flight rules, when visibility permits), a number of factors that can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were evident in this accident. For example, the high closure rate of the Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider pilot only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the closure rate would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to detect the glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made it difficult for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of cockpit tasks, such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to adversely affect scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the flying pilot, and the first officer reported that they were looking out the window before the collision. However, the captain saw the glider only a moment before it filled the windshield, and the first officer never saw it at all.

Air traffic control cleared the flightcrew for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 24, which was 4,897 feet long. The flightcrew then reported that they had the runway in sight, cancelled their instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance, and executed a visual flight rules (VFR) approach in VFR conditions to the airport. The reported winds favored a landing toward the east, onto the opposite runway (runway 6). During the approach, after a query from the first officer, the captain indicated to the first officer that he was going to "...land to the east," consistent with the reported winds. However, the final approach and subsequent landing were made to runway 24, which produced a six-knot tailwind. During the approach sequence the captain maintained an airspeed that was approximately 30 knots higher than the correct airspeed for the aircraft's weight, resulting in the aircraft touching down about 1,500 feet further down the runway than normal, and much faster than normal. The captain then delayed the initiation of a go-around until the first officer asked if they were going around. Although the aircraft lifted off the runway surface prior to departing the paved overrun during the delayed go-around it impacted a localizer antenna platform, whose highest non-frangible structure was located approximately 304 feet past the end of the runway, and approximately two feet lower than the terrain at the departure end of the runway. The aircraft continued airborne as it flew over downsloping terrain for about 400 more feet before colliding with the terrain and a commercial storage building that was located at an elevation approximately 80 feet lower than the terrain at the end of the runway. The localizer antenna platform was located outside of the designated runway safety area, and met all applicable FAA siting requirements. The captain had type 2 diabetes, for which he took oral medication and monitored blood sugar levels. He did not reveal his history of diabetes to the FAA. The captain's post-accident toxicology testing was consistent with an elevated average blood sugar level over the previous several months; however, no medical records of the captain's treatment were available, and the investigation could not determine if the captain's diabetes or treatment were potentially factors in the accident. The captain of the accident flight was the sole owner of a corporation that was asked by the two owners of the accident airplane to manage the airplane for them under a Part 91 business flight operation. The two owners were not pilots and had no professional aviation experience, but they desired to be flown to major domestic airports so that they could transfer and travel internationally via commercial airlines. One of the two owners stated that the purpose of the accident flight was to fly a businessman to a meeting, and to also transport one of the owner's wives to visit family at the same destination. According to one of the owners, the businessman was interested in being a third owner in the accident airplane, so the owner permitted the businessman to fly. The owner also stated that the accident pilot told him that the passenger would pay for expenses directly related to the operation of the airplane for the flight (permitted under FAA Part 91 rules), and an "hourly fee" (prohibited under FAA Part 91 rules); however, no documentation was found to corroborate this statement for the accident flight or previous flights.

The pilot reported that the aircraft landed normally and during the landing roll a loud 'bang' was heard and the right main landing gear collapsed. An investigation was conducted by an FAA airworthiness inspector. During this investigation, it was noted that a washer in the right main landing gear assembly failed. Subsequent investigation, including a review of the aircraft maintenance records, revealed that cessna aircraft service information letter number ME83-37, dated november 23, 1983 had not been complied with. This service letter recommended replacement of the original washers with a new washer, Cessna part number S1450-5H12-063. (Old part number 5045018-2)

Witnesses heard the airplane circling in the vicinity of the NDB. Other witnesses saw the airplane exit the cloud base in a near-vertical dive and impact the ground approximately one mile east and 1/2 mile north of the NDB. Both occupants were killed.

The purpose of the flight was to provide airborne intercept training for the US Navy. The mission had just been completed and the accident aircraft, FNT701, and another aircraft, FNT492, were returning home when the accident occurred. Radar data showed FNT701 was at 22,700 feet when it descended slightly to 22,500 feet. FNT701 remained at this altitude for approximately 2 minutes 37 seconds, then began a descent which resulted in impact with the ocean. This final descent rate initially was about 5,000 fpm and increased to 19,000 fpm. No distress calls were made; however, two transmissions were recorded which totaled approximately 30 seconds. There was no voice communication during these transmissions, only an open mike and the sound of prop(s). During the 1st transmission, the word 'oh' could be heard. FNT492 observed FNT701 descend below the clouds and did not detect any distress signals. Little wreckage was recovered during search and rescue operations. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The airplane was refueled before it departed on the accident flight; the pilot did not supervise the fueling. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot advised the Ontario departure controller that both engines were experiencing a power loss and that he suspected jet fuel contamination. The airplane collided with a berm during the ensuing forced landing. The investigation revealed that the FBO fueled the airplane with 131.3 gallons of Jet A fuel. Investigators did not locate any witnesses who saw the pilot preflight the airplane. The pilot sustained severe head injuries and could not recall if he had preflighted the airplane - the right front seat passenger was not present when the pilot boarded the aircraft.

The aircraft was on IFR departure in minimal weather conditions. On takeoff roll, a power loss occurred on the right engine and the aircraft veered to the right. The pilot-in-command (owner) in left seat initiated aborted takeoff, but right seat pilot took control, continued takeoff and feathered the right propeller. Both pilots observed smoke from the engines on their respective sides, both thought landing gear was retracted. (Investigation revealed landing gear was down.) Aircraft could not maintain altitude, pilots elected to ditch in ocean. Investigation revealed aircraft had been serviced with 147 gallons of Jet fuel instead of Avgas at 0445 hrs by a fbo lineman. The lineman had 3 weeks total experience, 1 1/2 hrs video tape training and was working 2 jobs 7 days per week. All three occupants escaped uninjured.

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Pueblo to Carlsbad on behalf of Air Resort Airlines. While cruising at an altitude of 11,700 feet over a mountainous area under VFR mode, weather conditions deteriorated. Shortly later, the airplane struck trees and crashed. Both pilots were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft crashed about half a mile southwest of the departure end of runway 32L. The runway had been illuminated at the time of takeoff with the aircraft making a left turn into an area that was not illuminated toward the mountains. It was a very dark night with an indistiguishable horizon southwestward toward the higher mountains. There were two brightly lit softball complexes located to the north toward the city. A weather study indicated probable moderate to severe turbulence and up and down drafts below 7,000 feet msl, and light to moderate wind shear from the surface up to 300 feet agl. A witness who saw the fireball stated she had lost control of her car because a gust of wind pushed her car into the other lane of traffic. Both occupants were killed.