Van Nuys

The commercial pilot and three passengers departed on an instrument flight rules crosscountry flight. While on approach to the destination airport, the pilot indicated to the air traffic controller that the airplane was passing through areas of moderate-to-extreme precipitation. After clearing the airplane for the approach, the controller noted that the airplane descended below its assigned altitude; the controller issued a low altitude alert, but no response was received from the pilot. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain in a level attitude about 12 miles from the airport. Examination of the airframe, engine, and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. An area of disturbed, flattened, tall grass was located about 450 ft southwest of the accident site. Based on the images of the grass, the National Weather Service estimated that it would take greater than 35 knots of wind to lay over tall grass as the images indicated, and that a downburst/microburst event could not be ruled out. A downburst is an intense downdraft that creates strong, often damaging winds. About 6 hours before the flight, the pilot obtained weather information through a mobile application. Review of weather data indicated the presence of strong winds, heavy precipitation, turbulence, and low-level wind shear (LLWS) in the area at the time of arrival, which was reflected in the information the pilot received. Given the weather conditions, it is likely that the airplane encountered an intense downdraft, or downburst, which would have resulted in a sudden, major change in wind velocity. The airplane was on approach for landing at the time and was particularly susceptible to this hazardous condition given its lower altitude and slower airspeed. The downburst likely exceeded the climb performance capabilities of the airplane and resulted in a subsequent descent into terrain. It is unknown if the accident pilot checked or received additional weather information before or during the accident flight. While the flight was en route, several PIREPs were issued for the area of the accident site, which also indicated the potential of LLWS near the destination airport; however, the controller did not provide this information to the pilot, nor did he solicit PIREP information from the pilot. Based on published Federal Aviation Administration guidance for controllers and the widespread adverse weather conditions in the vicinity of the accident site, the controller should have both solicited PIREP information from the pilot and disseminated information from previous PIREPs to him; this would have provided the pilot with more complete information about the conditions to expect during the approach and landing at the destination.

On September 19, 2008, about 2353 eastern daylight time, a Bombardier Learjet Model 60, N999LJ, owned by Inter Travel and Services, Inc., and operated by Global Exec Aviation, overran runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Columbia Metropolitan Airport, Columbia, South Carolina. The captain, the first officer, and two passengers were killed; two other passengers were seriously injured. Both pilots and two passengers were killed while two others were seriously injured. Both passengers who were admitted in a local hospital for high burns were DJ AM & Travis Barker of the Rock band called "Blink". They were travelling back to California after they gave a concert in South Carolina.

Line personnel reported that as the airplane was being fueled, the second pilot loaded more than one bag in the left front baggage compartment. With fueling complete, line personnel saw the second pilot pull the front left baggage door down, but not lock or latch it. Witnesses near midfield of the 8,001-foot long runway, reported that the airplane was airborne, and the front left baggage door was closed. Witnesses near the end of the runway, reported that the airplane was about 200 feet above ground level (agl) and they noted that the front left baggage door was open and standing straight up. All of the witnesses reported that the airplane turned slightly left, leveled off, and was slow. The airplane began to descend, and the wings were slightly rocking before it stalled, broke right, and collided with the terrain. Investigators found no anomalies with the airframe or engines that would have precluded normal operation. The forward baggage doors' design incorporates a key lock in the lower center of each door, and two latches in the left and right bottom section of the doors. There are two hinges in the upper left and right sections of the door. The handles latched the door to the door frame in the fuselage. The key would be in the horizontal position in an unlocked condition, and in the vertical position in a locked condition. The front left baggage door was found within the main wreckage debris field and had sustained mechanical and thermal damage. The key lock was in the horizontal position. Several instances of a baggage door opening in flight have been recorded in Cessna Citation airplanes. In some cases, the door separated, and in others it remained attached. The crews of these other airplanes returned to the airport and landed successfully.

The aircraft broke up in-flight during a high speed descent after encountering clouds and reduced visibilities aloft. The weather conditions included multiple cloud layers at 9,000, 12,000 and 16,000 feet, and reduced visibility aloft from smoke and haze from wilderness wild fires that were occurring over large portions of Southern California. The aircraft departed the airport toward a VORTAC to the west, approximately 30 nautical miles (nm) away. The first radar contact was at 1159, and the aircraft's Mode C transponder reported an altitude of 3,500 feet mean sea level (msl). By the time the aircraft reached the VORTAC, the altitude had increased to 4,900 feet msl. The aircraft continued to climb, passing through the VFR flight plan filed altitude of 8,500 feet msl, until it reached an altitude of 12,900 feet msl. The last 6 minutes of radar data reported the aircraft at various altitudes, starting at 11,000 feet msl and climbing to a maximum altitude of 12,700 feet msl. During the last 3 minutes of flight, radar data showed the aircraft made numerous left and right climbing and descending turns, eventually reversing course. The next to last radar return at 1221:24 indicated an altitude of 11,900 feet msl. Nineteen seconds later, the last radar return reported an altitude of 7,700 feet msl. The computed vertical speed between the last two radar returns was 13,263 feet per minute. The wreckage was distributed over a 0.2-nm distance, with the main wreckage approximately 0.5 miles northwest of the last radar return. The northern end of the debris path began with pieces of the left elevator, followed by sections of the right stabilizer and elevator, and more sections from both horizontal empennage surfaces. Pieces of the vertical stabilizer, rudder, and both ailerons were also found along the debris path. The southern 100 feet of the debris path contained the fuselage and both sets of wings, engines, and propellers. The aircraft impacted the ground inverted. The wings separated just outboard of the nacelles at the initial point of impact. Examination of the wreckage showed that all structural failures were the result of overload.

During an aborted nighttime takeoff, the airplane continued off the end of the 4,987-foot-long runway, vaulted an embankment, and impacted a guardrail on an airport service road 30 feet below. According to the manufacturer's pilot operating handbook, the takeoff distance required for the ambient conditions was 1,620 feet and the accelerate-stop distance was 2,945 feet. Several witnesses reported observing the airplane traveling along the runway at an unusually high speed, with normal engine sound, and without becoming airborne; followed by an abrupt reduction in engine power and the sound of screeching tires. Skid marks were present on the last 1,000 feet of the runway. In the wreckage, the gust lock/control lock was found engaged in the pilot's control column.

The flight was cleared for a loc runway 11 approach. About 3 minutes later, the 2nd-in-command (sic) reported '. . . We don't get the localizer can you see if we're on course.' The LAX ARTCC R-15 controller confirmed the flight was right of course and below the required altitude. The aircraft's mode C indicated an altitude of 1,400 feet; the controller advised the flight crew to maintain at least 2,300 feet until past the final approach fix (faf). The crew then replied that they were in VMC. Radar svc was terminated and a frequency change to tower was approved. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft hit a eucalyptus tree at about 90 feet agl, 2.05 miles from the approach end of the runway and about 195 feet right of the loc. Elevation of the crash site was 101 feet; minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 640 feet. The 0645 pdt weather was, in part: indefinite ceiling, 100 feet obscured, vis 1/8 mile with fog, wind from 220° at 4 kts. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of the aircraft was found. All four occupants were killed.

During the transition from a DME arc to the ILS final approach course, the pilot allowed the aircraft to prematurely descend into the ground. The reason for the descent could not be determined. However, no preimpact mechanical malfunction with the aircraft was found nor was there any evidence supporting pilot incapacitation. Dark night conditions in fog and low ceilings prevailed during the approach. All three occupants were injured, two seriously.

The pilot, executing an ILS approach, observed a primary hydraulic pressure drop and declared his intent to land without the use of flaps, speed brakes, reversers or nose wheel steering. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway during landing, traveled approximately 1,300 feet and came to rest on a golf course after striking two vehicles and a chain link fence. Post accident investigation revealed 0.8 quarts of hydraulic fluid (skydrol) in the reservoir. Reservoir capacity is 1.28 u.s. gallon. The pilot stated he pumped the brakes on approach to build pressure in the emergency brake system. The pilot announced he had no braked after touchdown. The Jet Commander 1121 operator's manual cautions against this practice. A functional check of the thrust reversers by on-scene investigators produced two complete cycles of operation. Two persons located in a ground vehicle were injured during the overrun landing.

During a cross country flight from WI to CA and return, the non instrument, low experienced private pilot, flew into IMC conditions. The aircraft impacted flat snow-covered ground, destroying the aircraft and fatally injuring his passenger. Examination of wreckage revealed no evidence of pre-accident malfunction of the aircraft or its powerplants. A passenger was killed while three other occupants were injured.

The aircraft crashed into a residence 2 miles short of the runway after loss of power on the left engine. This engine was feathered, the gear was extended, but the flaps remained up as the aircraft continued the landing approach. Post accident investigation revealed no irregularities in the functioning of the aircraft. The pilot had radioed the report of power loss but had stated that he would not need the emergency equipment. The aircraft crashed in Sepulveda and was destroyed. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.