Santa Monica

The private pilot was returning to his home airport; the approach was normal, and the airplane landed within the runway touchdown zone markings and on the runway centerline. About midfield, the airplane started to drift to the right side of the runway, and during the landing roll, the nose pitched up suddenly and dropped back down. The airplane veered off the runway and impacted the 1,000-ft runway distance remaining sign and continued to travel in a righthand turn until it impacted a hangar. The airplane came to rest inside the hangar, and the damage to the structure caused the roof to collapse onto the airplane. A postaccident fire quickly ensued. The subsequent wreckage examination did not reveal any mechanical anomalies with the airplane's engines, flight controls, steering, or braking system. A video study was conducted using security surveillance video from a fixed-base operator located midfield, and the study established that the airplane was not decelerating as it passed through midfield. Deceleration was detected after the airplane had veered off the runway and onto the parking apron in front of the rows of hangars it eventually impacted. Additionally, video images could not definitively establish that the flaps were deployed during the landing roll. However, the flaps were deployed as the airplane veered off the runway and into the hangar, but it could not be determined to what degree. To obtain maximum braking performance, the flaps should be placed in the ”ground flap” position immediately after touchdown. The wreckage examination determined that the flaps were in the ”ground flap” position at the time the airplane impacted the hangar. Numerous personal electronic devices that had been onboard the airplane provided images of the passengers and unrestrained pets, including a large dog, with access to the cockpit during the accident flight. Although the unrestrained animals had the potential to create a distraction during the landing roll, there was insufficient information to determine their role in the accident sequence or what caused the delay in the pilot’s application of the brakes.

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight with a certified flight instructor (CFI). During the climb-to-cruise phase of the flight, as the airplane was ascending through 16,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the pilot noticed a reduction in manifold pressure. He advanced the throttle and observed an increase of one or two inches of manifold pressure. Shortly thereafter, the pilot heard a loud bang originate from the engine followed by an immediate loss of engine power. The pilot and CFI attempted to troubleshoot the engine anomalies and noted that it seemed to respond with the low boost "on", however it began to run rough whenever the throttle was advanced more than half way. They diverted to a nearby airport and conducted an emergency descent. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot descended through an overcast cloud layer and attempted to enter the airport traffic pattern. While on final approach to the airport, the pilot thought the airplane was high and extended the landing gear and applied flaps. Shortly thereafter, the airspeed and altitude decreased drastically and the pilot realized he was too low. The pilot applied throttle and noticed no change in engine performance. The airplane subsequently struck a fence and landed hard in an open field just short of the airport, which resulted in structural damage to the fuselage and wings. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the induction elbow for cylinders 1-3-5 (right side) was displaced from the throttle and metering assembly where the elbow couples with the throttle and metering assembly by an induction hose and clamp. The clamp was secure to the induction hose, however, the portion of the clamp that should have been installed
beyond the retention bead on the throttle and control assembly was observed on the inboard side of the bead on the induction elbow. Review of the aircraft maintenance logbooks revealed that cylinders 4 and 5 were recently replaced prior to the accident flight due to low compression. The replacement of these cylinders required removal of the induction system to allow for cylinder removal and installation. In addition, a manufacturer service bulletin stated that during the reinstallation of the induction system, one must slide the induction hose and clamp(s) onto one of the tubes to be joined and that the connection joint and both tube beads are to be positioned in the center of the induction hose. The clamps should be installed in a position centered between the tubing bead and end of the induction hose.

The pilot lost control of his twin engine airplane and collided with terrain while returning to the departure airport after reporting an engine problem. Shortly after takeoff, about 4,000 feet msl, the pilot reported to ATC that he had an engine problem and would return to the airport. The radar plot reveals a steady descent of the airplane from 4,000 feet msl to the accident site, approximately 2 miles from the designated airport. Ground witnesses reported that they saw the airplane flying very low, about 500 feet agl, seconds prior to the accident apparently heading toward the departure airport. The witnesses reported consistent observations of the airplane "wobbling," then going into a steep knife-edge left bank before it dove into the ground. Witnesses at the airport said that the pilot sought out help in getting his radios operating prior to takeoff, telling the witness, "it's been four and a half months since I've been in an airplane, I can't even figure out how to put the radios back in." No fueling records were found for the airplane at the departure airport. The last documented fueling of the airplane was on October 31, 2002, with the addition of 56.2 gallons. Witnesses reported that the airplane did not take on any fuel immediately prior to the flight on May 4th. The flight was the first flight since the airplane received its annual inspection 2 months prior to the accident, and, it was the pilot's first flight after 4 months of inactivity. It is a common practice for maintenance personnel to pull the landing light circuit breakers during maintenance to prevent the fuel transfer pumps, which are wired through the landing light system, from operating continuously. The fuel transfer pumps move fuel from the forward part of the main fuel tank to the center baffle area where it is picked up and routed to the engine. It is conceivable that these circuit breakers were not reset by the pilot for this flight. Wreckage examination revealed a post accident fire on the right wing of the airplane and no fire on the left wing. Additionally, only a small amount of fuel was identified around the left wing tanks after the accident, and no hydraulic deformation was observed to the left main tank or the internal baffles. The landing gear bellcrank indicates that the landing gear was in the down position. The engine and propeller post impact signatures indicate that the left engine was operating at a low power setting (wind milling), while the right engine and propeller indicate a high power setting. Disassembly and inspection of the internal propeller hub components showed that the left propeller was not feathered. The left engine is the critical engine and loss of power in that engine would make directional control more difficult at slower speeds. The airplane owners manual states that "climb or continued level flight at a moderate altitude is improbable with the landing gear extended or the propeller windmilling." The single engine flight procedure delineated in the manual dictates a higher than normal altitude for a successful single engine landing approach.

During an aborted nighttime takeoff, the airplane continued off the end of the 4,987-foot-long runway, vaulted an embankment, and impacted a guardrail on an airport service road 30 feet below. According to the manufacturer's pilot operating handbook, the takeoff distance required for the ambient conditions was 1,620 feet and the accelerate-stop distance was 2,945 feet. Several witnesses reported observing the airplane traveling along the runway at an unusually high speed, with normal engine sound, and without becoming airborne; followed by an abrupt reduction in engine power and the sound of screeching tires. Skid marks were present on the last 1,000 feet of the runway. In the wreckage, the gust lock/control lock was found engaged in the pilot's control column.

The airplane was fueled to capacity and placed in a heated hangar about one hour before departure. The instrument rated pilot obtained a weather briefing, filed an IFR flight plan, and obtained an IFR clearance. Low ceiling, reduced visibility, and ice fog prevented control tower personnel from observing the takeoff. Radar (NTAP) and on-board GPS data indicated the airplane began drifting to the left of runway centerline almost immediately after takeoff. The airplane made a climbing left turn, achieving a maximum altitude of 7,072 feet and completing 217 degrees of turn, before beginning a descending left turn. The airplane impacted terrain on airport property. Autopsy/toxicology protocols were unremarkable. There was no evidence of preimpact failure/malfunction of the airframe, powerplant, propeller, or flight controls. The autopilot and servos, pitot-static system, and flight instruments were tested and all functioned satisfactorily. The pilot's shoulder harness was found attached to the seatbelt, but the male end of the seatbelt buckle was broken.

During the final approach, while executing a VOR-A instrument approach, the airplane landed hard, collided with the runway VASI display, and caught fire. The airplane had received radar vectors for the approach and was turned to a 20-degree intercept for the final approach course when 2.5 miles from the initial approach fix. Radar track data showed the airplane continued inbound to the field slightly left of course with a ground speed varying between 135 and 125 knots and a descent rate of approximately 700 feet per minute. The pilot said he descended through the clouds about 850 feet above ground level and saw the airport approximately 1 to 2 miles ahead. He noticed that he was left of the runway centerline and corrected to the right. He realized that he had overcorrected and turned back to the left. The pilot reported that he felt that the approach was stabilized although the descent rate was greater than usual. The airplane impacted the ground about 1,000 feet from the approach end of the runway abeam the air traffic control tower on an approximate heading of 185 degrees. The impact collapsed the landing gear and the airplane slid forward another 1,000 feet down the runway and came to rest approximately midfield on the runway. The pilot stated that he had not experienced any mechanical problems with the aircraft or the navigation equipment prior to the accident. A Special Weather Observation taken at the time of the accident contained the following: sky condition overcast at 500 feet; winds from 230 degrees at 3 knots; visibility 2 miles.

After departing Santa Monica at night, Mitsubishi MU-2 pilot contacted tracon for clearance thru TCA at 6,500 feet. Tracon tried to get automated VFR handoff to ARTCC, but was unable. Radar service was terminated and pilot contacted (non-radar equipped) Santa Barbara FSS (home airport). He was advised weather was 500 feet scattered, 2,700 feet broken, 4,000 feet overcast, visibility 6 miles with fog. Pilot had not filed flight plan and began a VOR runway 25 approach without obtaining clearance. As he continued inbound, MU-2 descended thru clouds and converged with Fairchild SA227 that was on IFR approach to airport. ARTCC controller, who had been controlling SA227, advised FSS specialist of situation. Pilots of both aircraft were advised of other aircraft's position. MU-2 pilot did not respond when asked if he was in IMC. MU-2 plt reported 7 or 8 miles out on VOR approach. He was told again of SA227 on final approach and to phone ARTCC after landing. No further radio calls were received from MU-2 pilot. Radar data showed MU-2 converged with 400 feet of SA227. Pilot began left turn over shoreline as if to circle for spacing, but MU-2 entered descent and crashed in ocean. Examination of light bulbs indicated master caution and battery over temp lights were illuminated during impact. All four occupants were killed.

A Piper PA-46-310P loss engine power and collided with a telephone pole during the forced landing. The pilot contacted the tracon and informed the facility he had a partial power loss. The airplane was about two miles east of the airport at about 3,500 feet msl heading in a southwesterly direction. The tracon instructed the pilot to turn 150° for radar vectors to runway 33. The pilot did not turn to the 150° heading, but continued on a southwesterly course. The airplane flew past the approach ends of two runways. The airplane continued westbound and crashed 2.5 miles west of the airport. The pilot indicated the airplane had 300 pounds (about 50 gallons) of fuel on board at takeoff. The pilot operating handbook for the Piper PA-34-310P is about 16 gallons per hour. The duration of the flight was about one hour. There was no evidence of fuel in the airplane's fuel system or any evidence of fuel spillage from either of the wings after the accident.

Before the flight, the pilots of 2 Beech 200 aircraft evaluated weather reports at a fixed base operation and made a computer weather inquiry. They departed Santa Monica, CA, on a positioning flight to Farmington, NM, without filing a flight plan. While en route, the lead aircraft was about 1 to 3 minutes ahead of the 2nd aircraft. The 2nd pilot reported they were at about 4,500 feet msl as they neared mountains and the clouds were about 1,000 feet above. As they continued eastward in a valley, the 2nd pilot heard the lead pilot report he was 'going up.' This was the last known transmission from the lead aircraft. The 2nd pilot continued his flight in VMC. Two days later, the lead aircraft was found, where it had crashed about 100 feet below the top of a 7,400 feet mountain ridge. Impact occurred on a heading of about 030°. The mountain ridge was oriented on headings of 060° 240°.

The aircraft collided with trees during a forced landing following a loss of power. The student pilot stated the flight was normal until a 'violent right yaw' developed when the throttles were advanced to recover from a practice stall. As the cfi took over the controls and attempted recovery a 'substantial loss of power' occurred on both engines. A forced landing was made in a field during which the left wing contacted trees and the aircraft was engulfed in flames. Post accident examination of the left engine failed to disclose any discrepancies. Discrepancies were noted on the right engine.
1) The fuel controller fuel line 'tee' fitting was cracked around 50% of its circumference. (ductile overload).
2) The turbocharger gasket on the inlet side of the turbine showed leakage around 70% of the gasket are. The aircraft had a history of symptoms of fuel vaporization which subsided with use of the aux fuel pump as the engine manufacturer suggests. It is unknown if the aux pump was used during this accident.