Alaska

The pilot was attempting to transport by-pass mail from Nome to Gambell, Alaska. The pilot stated that the takeoff run was normal until he rotated the nose of the airplane to lift off. The pilot said the airplane pitched up and he had to apply full forward control yoke pressure while he adjusted the pitch trim to nose down. The airplane rolled to the left and the pilot used the rudders to level the wings prior to impact. The information provided by the company, the FAA, and the post office, indicate that the airplane weighed 10,114 pounds at the time of the takeoff. The certificated maximum gross weight was 10,100 pounds. A weight and balance calculation, based upon information obtained from the company and the placarded limits on the airplane, showed a center of gravity of 121.9 inches. The center of gravity limits shown in the airplane manual are 113 to 120.5 inches. The wreckage examination showed that the elevator trim indicator was indicating full nose up trim.

The aircraft was dispatched out from Elmendorf AFB on an AWACS survey mission under call sign Yukla 27, carrying 20 passengers and four crew members. Shortly after takeoff from runway 05, while in initial climb, the aircraft collided with a flock of Canada geese that struck both left engines n°1 and 2. The aircraft climbed to a maximum height of about 250 feet when the engine n°1 failed and the engine n°2 exploded. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled left roll, causing the left wing to struck trees. Out of control, it crashed in a huge explosion in a wooded area located about a mile from the runway end. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 24 occupants were killed. Numerous dead geese were found at the crash site.

The pilot had departed a remote airstrip on the return portion of a cargo flight. An instrument flight plan was on file with the ARTCC. After departure, the pilot attempted to contact ARTCC to open his flight plan but communications were not established. The airplane struck mountainous terrain about 6 miles south of the departure airport. Radar data showed that after departure, the airplane climbed westbound and then turned southbound toward higher terrain. It circled southwest of the airport and turned eastbound while climbing to 5,300 feet msl. The airplane then turned southbound again toward the accident site. The last recorded radar data was at 5,200 feet msl. The airplane struck a ridgeline about 4,800 feet msl. Airmets were in effect for IFR conditions, low ceilings, mountain obscurations, rain, fog, and icing in clouds and in precipitation. A witness reported that when the airplane arrived at the airport, the airframe had a coating of ice. When the airplane departed, snow was falling at the airport.

The flight departed Juneau, Alaska on a VFR flight to King Salmon, Alaska. When the flight was 50 miles southwest of the Yakutat VOR, the pilot requested an IFR clearance. He was cleared direct to Middleton Island VOR, then direct to King Salmon VOR. When the flight was 20 miles northwest of Middleton Island, the pilot contacted ARTCC and indicated his right engine had come apart. The pilot attempted to fly to and land at Middleton Island, Alaska. During the flight, the airplane consistently lost altitude. He flew past the island and was southeast of the island, when radar contact was lost. The airplane was not recovered. Flight crew of rescue aircraft stated they saw bubbles, an oil slick, and airplane debris in the ocean approximately 3 miles south of the Middleton Island Airport. The 1126 adt weather at the airport was in part: 600 feet broken, visibility 5 miles, wind from 117° at 17 gusting 25 knots.

The pilot received an instrument approach clearance to a non tower airport surrounded by mountainous terrain. Weather conditions on the ground were VFR, and the pilot descended through an overcast. The approach environment was not serviced by any atc radar facility. The pilot declared a missed approach to the appropriate faa flight service station, and was advised to contact ARTCC. ARTCC never received a radio transmission from the pilot. The airplane wreckage was located approximately 6 miles beyond the airport, slightly to the north of the extended runway centerline. Missed approach procedures were for an immediate climb, and then a climbing right turn to reverse direction away from the airport. The missed approach segment began 5.2 DME miles prior to the airport. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 4,320 feet msl (4,200 feet above the runway elevation); impact with mountainous terrain occurred at about the same altitude. All four occupants were killed.

The certificated airline transport pilot of N1348 and 3 passengers were northwest bound at 200 feet over a remote river. The business flight was en route to a fishing lodge after picking up lodge clients from a remote lake. The certificated commercial pilot and sole occupant of N7832H was southbound at 200 feet over the same area of the river. Witnesses observed the two airplanes collide and descend into the river. The witnesses did not observe either airplane take evasive action. The weather conditions were reported as scattered clouds at 3,500 feet and a visibility of 25 miles.

The pilot was informed by another company pilot that the higher passes were closed. He then attempted to fly through 'high pass' located near old harbor. The pilot described the weather as overcast with ceilings obscured, and flight visibility was 2 to 3 miles. The pass was snow covered. As he entered the pass he lost visual reference due to whiteout conditions and he initiated a left turn to exit the pass. Approx half way through the turn the left wing struck the mountain.

The four engine transport category airplane was carrying a load of fuel oil for distribution to the village of kivalina. The pilot reported he flew over the 3,000 feet long by 60 feet wide strip prior to landing, and noted in the center of the runway some gravel was visible through a layer of surrounding snow. He said he could not see any snow banks or deeper snow in the landing area, and available notices to airmen did not mention any snow banks or snow berms on the runway. The pilot said the airplane landed near the threshold and on the centerline, but, the left main landing gear soon encountered a snow berm and the airplane was pulled to the left. The airplane subsequently impacted other snow berms on the left side of the runway and the nose landing gear collapsed. The U.S. Government's supplement for Alaska airports, for the Kivalina Airport, states, in part: unattended. Caution: runway condition not monitored, recommend visual inspection prior to using.

After receiving a special VFR (SVFR) clearance, the pilot departed the airport with a passenger on a scheduled commuter flight to a remote airport. About 14 miles north of the airport, at 1,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the pilot encountered whiteout conditions and reversed course, descending to about 500 feet msl. The pilot requested a SVFR arrival back to the departure airport and began maneuvering to intercept the inbound course. While in instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane descended and collided with flat, snow covered terrain about 5 mile north of the airport. The pilot was unable to distinguish any terrain features until impact with the ground.

Prior to departing on a scheduled air taxi flight with two passengers, the pilot obtained a weather briefing that included airmets for mountain obscuration, IFR and icing conditions. VFR flight was not recommended. A company flight that departed before the accident flight, returned to the company base due to low ceilings, after the accident flight departed. The flight departed on a VFR flight plan and encountered low ceilings in the area of mountainous terrain. The pilot began maneuvering around the terrain and during a period of obscuration, collided with several trees. The company operations manual specifies that the pilot is responsible for the conduct of the flight; however, procedures are included that detail the dispatch responsibilities, dissemination of weather information, and the director of operations responsibility to monitor and cancel flights if necessary.