Alaska

According to the passenger, he and the pilot had just taken off, and as they were climbing out over an open water portion of a bay, the pilot said, 'here comes a gust.' Reportedly, the pilot added engine power, and the airplane began descending. The right wing started to dip, and the nose started to drop. The pilot had the control yoke turned all the way to the left, then yelled that they were going in. The airplane crashed in the water, and the passenger exited the airplane through the windshield. He did not see the pilot. The deceased pilot was found still strapped in his seat several days later, when a portion of the wreckage was recovered.

The pilot was departing on a cargo flight. Just after takeoff, a company dispatcher attempted to contact the pilot by radio. The pilot replied, 'stand by.' No further communication was received from the pilot. The airplane was observed by ATC personnel in a left turn back toward the airport at an estimated altitude of 200 feet above the ground. The angle of bank during the turn increased, and the nose of the airplane suddenly dropped toward the ground. The airplane struck the ground in a nose and left wing low attitude about 1 mile west of the airport. The terrain around the airport was relatively flat, snow covered tundra. The airplane was destroyed. A postaccident examination of the engine did not reveal any mechanical malfunction. Power signatures in the engine indicated it was developing power. A postaccident examination of the propeller assembly revealed one of three composite blades had rotated in its blade clamp 17/32 inch; however, the propeller manufacturer indicated blade contact with the ground would try to drive the propeller from a high blade angle toward a low blade angle. Movement toward a low blade angle would compress the propeller feathering springs, while movement toward a high blade angle would result in a hydraulic lock condition as oil in the system is compressed. The propeller manufacturer indicated they had no reports of composite blade slippage in the blade clamps.

The pilot and two passengers departed for a remote area on an on-demand charter flight in a float-equipped airplane. An emergency locator transmitter signal was heard in the area of the intended destination about 55 minutes after departure. The flight was reported overdue and search personnel located the wreckage at an elevation of about 2,850 feet in mountainous terrain about 2 and 1/2 hours after departure. The airplane collided with terrain below the top of a steep ridge. Search personnel reported the weather conditions in the area included low ceilings. The conditions deteriorated during subsequent rescue operations. The area forecast included an AIRMET for marginal VFR conditions with mountain obscuration due to clouds and precipitation.

The pilot and three passengers were departing a remote lake in a float equipped airplane. The pilot positioned the hydraulic actuated flaps to 20 degrees. After takeoff, about 150 ft above the water, the pilot positioned the flap lever to the 'UP' position in preparation of pumping the flaps up, but said he did not move the pump handle. Turbulence was present during the takeoff, and during a left turn, the pilot encountered a severe gust at the time he positioned the flap lever. The airplane stalled in a left turn that steepened to almost a 90 degree bank. The airplane descended and the left wing contacted the surface of the lake. The left wing was torn off the fuselage, and the floats were crushed upward. Both flaps are activated by a common torque tube connected to a double-acting flap actuating cylinder. At the accident scene, the right wing flap and right aileron were observed to be extended to an intermediate position. The weather conditions included 20 kts of wind, turbulence, and rain. The pilot expressed a concern that the flaps may have retracted without being pumped to the up position. An examination of the flap system and the ratchet valve assembly was conducted after the airplane was recovered and the wings were removed. Leakage of hydraulic fluid and air was observed through the ratchet valve. Additional testing of the ratchet valve at an overhaul facility did not reveal any leakage.

On August 11, 1996, about 1615 Alaska daylight time, an amphibious Grumman G21-G, N660PA, is presumed to have been involved in a fatal accident about 20 miles south of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country on demand passenger flight under Title 14 CFR Part 135 when the accident occurred. The airplane, registered to and operated by Peninsula Airways Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, is presumed to have been destroyed. The certificated airline transport pilot, and the sole passenger are presumed to have received fatal injuries. Low ceilings were reported in the area of departure by the operator. VFR company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight originated from Anderson Bay, on the Island of Unalaska, about 1610.

The airplane's nose gear collapsed during a landing roll on a gravel airstrip. Subsequent examination of the nose gear locking mechanism disclosed a failed hydraulic drag strut locking actuator.

The cargo flight was en route, when a fire erupted in or near the #3 engine. During subsequent emergency procedures, the flight crew pulled the fire handle first. Later, they feathered the #3 engine. The fire did not extinguish. During an attempt to land at a rural, intermediate airstrip, while the airplane was in the traffic pattern, witnesses saw fire coming from the area of the #3 engine. They stated the right wing buckled upward, and the airplane crashed. Examination of the wreckage revealed a failure of the master rod in the front bank of cylinders of the #3 engine. Metallurgical tests revealed a crack in the top of the master rod head, which had resulted from corrosion pits. The side of the master rod head was measured and found to be out of round. The master rod shank also fractured due to fatigue. The operator's training procedures and the Douglas Aircraft emergency checklist procedures, required that the engine's propeller be feathered first, and then the fire extinguishing system to be activated. According to information derived from the airplane's cockpit voice recorder, the flight crew reversed that order. The effectiveness of the fire suppression system is diminished if the propeller is not feathered first.

The pilot of the air taxi cargo flight departed his base of operations in Juneau, Alaska for a series of flights in southeast Alaska that would ultimately return him to Juneau. On the accident leg of the intended round robin, the pilot was en route from Hoonah to Elfin Cove. The flight would originate and end at sea level, and traverse a mountain pass, with minimum obstruction clearance in the pass estimated at 500 feet msl. The airplane collided with steeply rising terrain at the 1,250-foot level about one mile south of the proposed flight path. The airplane was partially consumed by a post impact fire. The operator initiated a helicopter search within two hours of the time of the accident. The helicopter pilot and his passenger both reported that the area where the accident airplane was eventually located was obscured in low clouds, and that many of the other valleys and mountain sides were covered in clouds. Low clouds persisted in the area of the crash site for the following two days.

According to passenger's accounts, the airplane was flying low and approached the runway at an angle. The airplane made a right turn and dragged the right wing on the runway's surface. The airplane landed hard and sheared off the right main landing gear and the nose gear. The weather reported by AWOS was 300 foot overcast with a visibility of 2.5 miles with fog. The Captain stated the airplane drifted to the left side of the runway due to the crosswind, and he executed a right turn to realign with the runway. The cockpit voice recorder indicated that the stall warning horn sounded as the First Officer called for the application of power.

The pilot was departing a remote airport to begin a VFR cargo flight. The departure path took the airplane over ice covered terrain. The airport was considered to be below basic VFR conditions with light snow and fog, and the visual conditions in the area were considered to be 'flat' with the visibility from 2 to 3 miles. The pilot received a special VFR clearance out of the control zone by a flight service station specialist. After departure, witnesses observed the airplane climb to an estimated 500 feet above the ground and turn to the right. Shortly thereafter, the airplane banked to the right about 90 degrees, then descended to the ground in a wing and nose low attitude. A postaccident inspection of the airframe and engine did not reveal any mechanical malfunction.