Plain, Valley

The pilot departed from an off-airport site in marginal visual flight rules conditions. Shortly after departure, the weather worsened, and flight visibility dropped to near zero in heavy snow. He attempted to follow the shoreline at a low altitude but was unable to maintain visual contact with the ground. He stated that he saw trees immediately in front of the airplane and attempted a right turn toward what he thought was an open bay. During the turn, the right float contacted a rock outcrop, and the airplane impacted the water. The pilot did not report any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

For unknown reasons, the twin engine aircraft was flying low when it impacted tree tops and crashed in a wooded area located in Plan de La Laguna, in the Comayagua National Park. Both occupants were killed.

While in cruising altitude, the twin engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in El Refugio, some 50 km west of Guadalajara, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three occupants were killed. The aircraft was completing a flight from Cabo San Lucas (Los Cabos) to Mexico City on behalf of the Federal Secretary's for Public Security. The aircraft was also registered PF-507.

The twin engine aircraft departed Rosario-Islas Malvinas Airport at 2215LT on a return trip to Córdoba, carrying two pilots. Bound to the northwest at an altitude of 8,000 feet, the crew was cleared to descend to 6,000 feet few minutes after takeoff. At 2242LT, the crew reported his position over Ubrel. Twenty minutes later, at 2300LT, while cruising in poor weather conditions, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located 6 km from Las Varillas. The wreckage was found the following morning. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Nairobi-Wilson Airport in the morning for a flight to Marsabit and Lodwar, carrying exam documents. While returning to Wilson Airport in the afternoon, the airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located about 15 km west of Wilson Airport. The pilot and a passenger were killed while the second passenger was seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

On the afternoon of 13 October 2011, an Airlines PNG Bombardier DHC-8-103, registered P2-MCJ (MCJ), was conducting a regular public transport flight from Nadzab, Morobe Province, to Madang, Madang Province under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). On board the aircraft were two flight crew, a flight attendant, and 29 passengers. Earlier in the afternoon, the same crew had flown MCJ from Port Moresby to Nadzab. The autopilot could not be used because the yaw damper was unserviceable so the aircraft had to be hand-flown by the pilots. At Nadzab, the aircraft was refuelled with sufficient fuel for the flight to Madang and a planned subsequent flight from Madang to Port Moresby. MCJ departed Nadzab at 1647 LMT with the Pilot-in-Command as the handling pilot. The aircraft climbed to 16,000 ft with an estimated arrival time at Madang of 1717. Once in the cruise, the flight crew diverted right of the flight planned track to avoid thunderstorms and cloud. The Pilot-in-Command reported that communications between Madang Tower and an aircraft in the vicinity of Madang indicated a storm was approaching the aerodrome. He recalled that he had intended to descend below the cloud in order to be able to see across the sea to Madang and had been concentrating on manoeuvring the aircraft to remain clear of thunderstorms and cloud, so he had been looking mainly outside the cockpit. Because of the storm in the vicinity of the airport, he said there had been „some urgency‟ to descend beneath the cloud base to position for a right base for runway 07 at Madang, the anticipated approach. On this route, the descent to Madang was steep (because of the need to remain above the Finisterre Ranges until close to Madang) and, although the aircraft was descending steeply, the propellers were at their cruise setting of 900 revolutions per minute (RPM). Neither pilot noticed the airspeed increasing towards the maximum operating speed (VMO); the Pilot-in-Command reported afterwards that he had been „distracted‟ by the weather. When the aircraft reached VMO as it passed through 10,500 ft, with a rate of descent between 3,500 and 4,200 ft per minute, and the propellers set at 900 RPM, the VMO overspeed warning sounded. The Pilot-in-command reported that he had been about to ask the First Officer to increase the propeller speed to 1,050 RPM to slow the aircraft when this occurred. He raised the nose of the aircraft in response to the warning and this reduced the rate of descent to about 2,000 ft per minute, however, the VMO overspeed warning continued. The First Officer recalled the Pilot-in-Command moved the power levers back „quite quickly‟. Shortly after the power levers had been moved back, both propellers oversped simultaneously, exceeding their maximum permitted speed of 1,200 RPM by over 60 % and seriously damaging the left hand engine and rendering both engines unusable. Villagers on the ground reported hearing a loud „bang‟ as the aircraft passed overhead. The noise in the cockpit was deafening, rendering communication between the pilots extremely difficult, and internal damage to the engines caused smoke to enter the cockpit and cabin through the bleed air and air conditioning systems. The emergency caught both pilots by surprise. There was confusion and shock on the flight deck, a situation compounded by the extremely loud noise from the overspeeding propellers. About four seconds after the double propeller overspeed began, the beta warning horn started to sound intermittently, although the pilots stated afterwards they did not hear it. The left propeller RPM reduced to 900 RPM (in the governing range) after about 10 seconds. It remained in the governing range for about 5 seconds before overspeeding again for about 15 seconds, then returned to the governing range. During this second overspeed of the left propeller, the left engine high speed compressor increased above 110 % NH, becoming severely damaged in the process. About 3 seconds after the left propeller began overspeeding for the second time, the right propeller went into uncommanded feather due to a propeller control unit (PCU) beta switch malfunction, while the right engine was still running at flight idle (75% NH). Nine seconds after the double propeller overspeed event began, the Pilot-in-command shouted to the First Officer „what have we done?‟ The First Officer replied there had been a double propeller overspeed. The Pilot-in-command then shouted a second and third time „what have we done?‟. The First Officer repeated that there was a double propeller overspeed and said that the right engine had shut down. The Pilot-in-Command shouted that he could not hear the First Officer, who – just as the left propeller began governing again and the overspeed noise subsided – repeated that the right engine had shut down and asked if the left engine was still working. The Pilot-in-command replied that it was not working. Both pilots then agreed that they had „nothing‟. At this point, about 40 seconds after the propeller overspeed event began, the left propeller was windmilling and the left engine was no longer producing any power because of the damage caused to it by the overspeed. The right engine was operating at flight idle, although the propeller could not be unfeathered and therefore could not produce any thrust. On the order of the Pilot-in-Command, the First Officer made a mayday call to Madang Tower and gave the aircraft's GPS position; he remained in a radio exchange with Madang Tower for 63 seconds. The flight crew did not conduct emergency checklists and procedures. Instead, their attention turned to where they were going to make a forced landing. The aircraft descended at a high rate of descent, with the windmilling left propeller creating extra drag. The asymmetry between the windmilling left propeller and the feathered right propeller made the aircraft difficult to control. The average rate of descent between the onset of the emergency and arrival at the crash site was 2,500 ft per minute and at one point exceeded 6,000 ft per minute, and the VMO overspeed warning sounded again. During his long radio exchange with Madang Tower, the First Officer had said that they would ditch the aircraft, although, after a brief discussion, the Pilot-in-command subsequently decided to make a forced landing in the mouth of the Guabe River. The First Officer asked the Pilot-in-command if he should shut both engines down and the Pilot-in-command replied that he should shut „everything‟ down. Approximately 800 feet above ground level and 72 seconds before impact, the left propeller was feathered and both engines were shut down. The Pilot-in-Command reported afterwards that he ultimately decided to land beside the river instead of in the river bed because the river bed contained large boulders. The area chosen beside the river bed also contained boulders beneath the vegetation, but they were not readily visible from the air. He recalled afterwards that he overshot the area he had originally been aiming for. The aircraft impacted terrain at 114 knots with the flaps and the landing gear retracted. The Flight Attendant, who was facing the rear of the aircraft, reported that the tail impacted first. During the impact sequence, the left wing and tail became detached. The wreckage came to rest 300 metres from the initial impact point and was consumed by a fuel-fed fire. The front of the aircraft fractured behind the cockpit and rotated through 180 degrees, so that it was inverted when it came to rest. Of the 32 occupants of the aircraft only the two pilots, the flight attendant, and one passenger survived by escaping from the wreckage before it was destroyed by fire.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a spraying mission on sunflower plantations in Zasovskaya. While flying at a height of about 20 metres, preparing for a new low pass, the single engine aircraft collided with power cables, stalled and crashed upside down in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was seriously injured.

The Air Tindi Ltd. Cessna 208B Caravan departed Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, at 1103 Mountain Daylight Time under visual flight rules as regularly scheduled flight Air Tindi 200 (8T200) to Lutsel K'e, Northwest Territories. When the aircraft did not arrive at its scheduled time, a search was initiated, and the aircraft was found 26 nautical miles west of Lutsel K'e, near the crest of Pehtei Peninsula. The pilot and one passenger were fatally injured, and two passengers were seriously injured. There was no post-impact fire, and no emergency locator transmitter signal was received by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre or search aircraft.

While descending to Cap-Haïtien Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. On approach, the twin engine aircraft crashed in a field located near Milot, about 12 km south of the airport. All three occupants were killed. Both pilots were citizens from Dominica and Mexico while the passenger was a Vietnamese citizen working for a local telecommunication company.

Sole on board, the pilot was completing a crop spraying mission between the villages of Sasha and Kostyukivka. While manoeuvring at low height, the single engine aircraft hit tree tops, stalled and crashed, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post impact fire and the pilot was killed.