Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Controlled flight into terrain following the decision of the crew to continue the approach below the MDA without visual contact with the runway until the aircraft impacted ground.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Failure to apply the concepts of Crew Resource Management (CRM).
- Failure to use checklists.
- Failure to brief the maneuvers to be executed.
- Loss of situational awareness of the crew.
- Failure to keep a sterile cockpit during approach.
- Complacency and overconfidence of the pilots.
- Unstabilized instrument approach.
- Lack and/or non-use of equipment and systems to support the flight.

Loss of control after landing after the right hand bogie beam broke due to fatigue cracks.

A leaking parking brake valve, which allowed air to enter the left brake line and resulted in the eventual failure of the left wheel brake during the landing roll.

The pilot’s failure to establish the proper pitch attitude and airspeed during takeoff with the engine at maximum power, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane’s climb performance capability.

The pilot's failure to abort the takeoff during the ground roll after detecting the airplane's degraded performance. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to attempt a flight with a known problem with the left engine and the likely partial loss of left engine power for reasons that could not be determined during the postaccident examination of the engine.

It is believed that, following a wrong approach configuration, the aircraft landed too far down the runway, reducing the landing distance available. In such situation, the aircraft could not be brought to a safe halt. As the landing maneuver was obviously missed, the crew should initiate a go-around procedure. It was also reported that the aircraft CofA expired 31 May 2012 and that the aircraft was removed from the Armenian registered on 26 Oct 2012.

Loss of control after landing due to the failure of the nosewheel steering system.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. An accurate take-off weight and balance calculation was not completed prior to departure, resulting in an aircraft weight that exceeded its maximum certified takeoff weight.
2. The right engine number 1 cylinder failed during the take-off sequence due to a preexisting fatigue crack, resulting in an engine fire.
3. After the right propeller’s feathering mechanism was activated, the propeller never achieved a fully feathered condition likely due to a seized bearing in the feathering pump.
4. The windmilling right propeller caused an increase in drag which, combined with the overweight condition, contributed to the aircraft’s inability to maintain altitude, and the aircraft collided with terrain short of the runway.
5. The operator’s safety management system was ineffective at identifying and correcting unsafe operating practices.
6. Transport Canada’s surveillance activities did not identify the operator’s unsafe operating practices related to weight and balance and net take-off flight path calculations. Consequently, these unsafe practices persisted.
Findings as to risk:
1. If companies do not adhere to operational procedures in their operations manual, there is a risk that the safety of flight cannot be assured.
2. If Transport Canada does not adopt a balanced approach that combines inspections for compliance with audits of safety management processes, unsafe operating practices may not be identified, thereby increasing the risk of accidents.
3. If cockpit or data recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.
Other findings:
1. Current Canadian Aviation Regulations permit a transport category piston-powered aircraft to carry passengers without a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder.
2. The crew resource management component of the flight attendant’s training had not been completed.

The NTSB determined that the probable causes of the crash were:
- The crew continued an unstabilized approach into Birmingham Airport,
- The crew failed to monitor the altitude and inadvertently descended below the minimum descent altitude when the runway was not yet in sight.
Contributing factors were:
- The flight crew's failure to properly configure the on-board flight management computer,
- The first officer's failure to make required call-outs,
- The captain's decision to change the approach strategy without communicating his change to the first officer,
- Flight crew fatigue.