Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The four engine aircraft departed Dire Dawa on a special flight to Mogadishu, carrying 6 crew members and a load consisting of weapons and ammunition intended for the AMISOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia. After landing, the aircraft skidded on runway, overran and crashed against a perimeter wall, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post impact fire fed by ammunition which caused multiple explosions. Four crew were killed while two others were seriously injured.

On 8 August 2013 at 1914 hrs the airplane, arriving from Stockholm, Sweden, landed at Leipzig/Halle Airport. After the landing it taxied to apron 2 to stand 207. On board the airplane were the Pilot in Command (PIC), the co-pilot, one flight engineer, one navigator, one radio operator, and two flight mechanics. The driver of the fueling vehicle stated that the airplane was refuelled between 0058 and 0121 hrs with 22,809 l fuel. The flight engineer stated that approximately at the same time the loading had occurred and was completed at about 0140 hrs. Between 2330 and 0100 hrs the airplane was loaded with 48,960 one-day-old chickens. They had a total mass of 3,061 kg. Take-off for the flight to Mineralye Vody, Russia, was planned for 0215 hrs. At 0201 hrs the engine start-up clearance was issued and the APU started. After the APU was running, engine No 1, outer left, was started. Once engine No 1 had reached idle speed the start-up for engine No 4, outer right, was begun. During engine start-up of engine No 4 the crew noticed a dull bang and the airplane jerked. The co-pilot, who monitored the APU instruments during engine start-up, had observed rotary speed oscillations and a temperature rise. A short time later the APU fire warning indication illuminated. The crew shut off the two already running engines and triggered the APU fire extinguisher system. One photo (see Appendix) shows a glaring light on the left fuselage side. At this time propellers 1 and 4 were turning; propellers 2 and 3 stood still. Video recordings show fire in the area of the left main landing gear. The co-pilot stated that the PIC had then opened the cockpit door. Flames were already visible in the cargo compartment. The PIC stated that he sent one of the flight mechanics outside for a check. He left the aircraft through the emergency exit located in the floor of the cockpit. After he had left the airplane, he immediately reported that the APU was burning. Subsequently, the three fire extinguishers located in the cockpit were handed down. In addition, the flight engineer and the second flight mechanic left the airplane; they confirmed the fire. Together the three men tried to extinguish the fire with on-board fire extinguishers. The PIC instructed the radio operator to report the situation to the tower. At 0207:45 hrs the radio operator reported the fire and requested the fire brigade. Around 0208 hrs the fire was noticed by other witnesses. They stated that the area of the left main landing gear was burning and that in this area on the left side below the fuselage some liquid leaked on to the ground. At 0208:01 hrs the tower alerted the fire station east. Half a minute later the fire station west was alerted. At 0209:00 hrs the tower announced the location of the fire. At 0212:06 hrs the first fire truck reached the airplane and undertook the first extinguishing attempt with foaming agent. The crew members evacuated the airplane through the front emergency exit located in the floor of the cockpit. Then they left the danger zone and retreated to a grassy area about 50 m in front of the airplane.

On an ILS Z approach to Clermont-Ferrand-Auvergne Airport Runway 26 in IMC conditions, the pilot was instructed by ATC to climb to 6,000 feet to TIS VOR via a right turn because he failed to follow the published missed approach procedures. The single engine aircraft departed the approach path and control was lost after it completed several turns on climb and descent. It entered a high nose-down attitude and struck the ground at high speed about 6 km short of runway. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants aged respectively 70, 73 and 76 years old were killed. They were completing an intermediate stop at Clermont-Ferrand Airport to pick up two additional passengers before continuing to Biarritz.

On 4th of August 2013 the air ambulance operator Mýflug, received a request for an ambulance flight from Höfn (BIHN) to Reykjavík Airport (BIRK). This was a F4 priority request and the operator, in co-operation with the emergency services, planned the flight the next morning. The plan was for the flight crew and the paramedic to meet at the airport at 09:30 AM on the 5th of August. A flight plan was filed from Akureyri (BIAR) to BIHN (positioning flight), then from BIHN to BIRK (ambulance flight) and from BIRK back to BIAR (positioning flight). The planned departure from BIAR was at 10:20. The flight crew consisted of a commander and a co-pilot. In addition to the flight crew was a paramedic, who was listed as a passenger. Around 09:50 on the 5th of August, the flight crew and the paramedic met at the operator’s home base at BIAR. The flight crew prepared the flight and performed a standard pre-flight inspection. There were no findings to the aircraft during the pre-flight inspection. The pre-flight inspection was finished at approximately 10:10. The departure from BIAR was at 10:21 and the flight to BIHN was uneventful. The aircraft landed at BIHN at 11:01. The commander was the pilot flying from BIAR to BIHN. The operator’s common procedure is that the commander and the co-pilot switch every other flight, as the pilot flying. The co-pilot was the pilot flying from BIHN to BIRK and the commander was the pilot flying from BIRK to BIAR, i.e. during the accident flight. The aircraft departed BIHN at 11:18, for the ambulance flight and landed at BIRK at 12:12. At BIRK the aircraft was refueled and departed at 12:44. According to flight radar, the flight from BIRK to BIAR was flown at FL 170. Figure 4 shows the radar track of the aircraft as recorded by Reykjavík Control. There is no radar coverage by Reykjavík Control below 5000 feet, in the area around BIAR. During cruise, the flight crew discussed the commander’s wish to deviate from the planned route to BIAR, in order to fly over a racetrack area near the airport. At the racetrack, a race was about to start at that time. The commander had planned to visit the racetrack area after landing. The aircraft approached BIAR from the south and at 10.5 DME the flight crew cancelled IFR. When passing KN locator (KRISTNES), see Figure 6, the flight crew made a request to BIAR tower to overfly the town of Akureyri, before landing. The request was approved by the tower and the flight crew was informed that a Fokker 50 was ready for departure on RWY 01. The flight crew of TF-MYX responded and informed that they would keep west of the airfield. After passing KN, the altitude was approximately 800’ (MSL), according to the co-pilot’s statement. The co-pilot mentioned to the commander that they were a bit low and recommended a higher altitude. The altitude was then momentarily increased to 1000’. When approaching the racetrack area, the aircraft entered a steep left turn. During the turn, the altitude dropped until the aircraft hit the racetrack.

Following an uneventful flight from Herzliya, the pilot started the approach to Eilat Airport in excellent weather conditions. During the last segment, at a height of about 10 feet, the pilot initiated a go-around procedure following a misunderstanding about an ATC transmission that was given to another crew. The pilot mistakenly closed to fuel valve coupled to the right engine while trying to switch fuel tanks, causing the right engine to stop. Due to an asymmetric thrust, the pilot lost control of the airplane that veered to the right and crashed in a drainage ditch, coming to rest upside down. While both passengers were seriously injured, the pilot was killed.

Shortly after takeoff from Shakhty Airport, Rostov oblast, the pilot encountered engine problem. He elected to make an emergency landing in an open field located 500 metres from the airport. On touchdown, the aircraft lost its undercarriage, wings and tail before coming to rest in bushes. The pilot, uninjured, fled the scene but was arrested by police few hours later. Technician by a Plant at the Shakhty Airport, he was the owner of this aircraft since seven months and was performing a local test flight despite he was not in possession of any valid pilot licence according to Russian authorities.

As the airplane was on final approach, the captain, who was the pilot monitoring (PM), realized that the flaps were not configured as had been briefed, with a setting of 40 degrees for the landing. Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) indicate that the captain set the flaps to 40 degrees as the airplane was descending through about 500 ft altitude, which was about 51 seconds from touchdown. When the airplane was between 100 to 200 ft altitude, it was above the glideslope. Concerned that the airplane was too high, the captain exclaimed repeatedly "get down" to the first officer about 9 seconds from touchdown. About 3 seconds from touchdown when the airplane was about 27 ft altitude, the captain announced "I got it," indicating that she was taking control of the airplane, and the first officer replied, "ok, you got it." According to FDR data, after the captain took control, the control column was relaxed to a neutral position and the throttles were not advanced until about 1 second before touchdown. The airplane touched down at a descent rate of 960 ft per minute and a nose-down pitch attitude of -3.1 degrees, resulting in the nose gear contacting the runway first and a hard landing. The airplane came to a stop on the right side of the runway centerline about 2,500 ft from its initial touchdown. The operator's stabilized approach criteria require an immediate go-around if the airplane flaps or landing gear were not in the final landing configuration by 1,000 ft above the touchdown zone; in this case, the flaps were not correctly configured until the airplane was passing through 500 ft. Further, the airplane's deviation about the glideslope at 100 to 200 ft would have been another opportunity for the captain, as the PM at this point during the flight, to call for a go-around, as indicated in the Southwest Airlines Flight Operations Manual (FOM). Accident data suggest that pilots often fail to perform a go-around or missed approach when stabilized approach criteria are not met. A review of NTSB investigated accidents by human factors researchers found that about 75% of accidents were the result of plan continuation errors in which the crew continued an approach despite cues that suggested it should not be continued. Additionally, line operations safety audit data presented at the International Air Safety Summit in 2011 suggested that 97% of unstabilized approaches were continued to landing even though doing so was in violation of companies' standard operating procedures (SOPs). The Southwest FOM also states that the captain can take control of the airplane for safety reasons; however, the captain's decision to take control of the airplane at 27 ft above the ground did not allow her adequate time to correct the airplane's deteriorating energy state and prevent the nose landing gear from striking the runway. The late transfer of control resulted in neither pilot being able to effectively monitor the airplane's altitude and attitude. The first officer reported that, after the captain took control of the airplane, he scanned the altimeter and airspeed to gain situational awareness but that he became distracted by the runway "rushing" up to them and "there was no time to say anything." The captain should have called for a go-around when it was apparent that the approach was unstabilized well before the point that she attempted to salvage the landing by taking control of the airplane at a very low altitude. In addition, the captain did not follow SOPs at several points during the flight. As PM, she should have made the standard callout per the Southwest FOM when the airplane was above glideslope, stating "glideslope" and adding a descriptive word or words to the callout (for example, "one dot high"). Rather than make this callout, however, the captain repeatedly said "get down" to the first officer before stating "I got it." The way she handled the transfer of airplane control was also contrary to the FOM, which indicates that the PM should say "I have the aircraft." The flight crew's performance was indicative of poor crew resource management.

Before picking up the nine passengers, the pilot loaded the accident airplane at the operator's base in Nikiski with cargo (food and supplies for the lodge). The operator of the lodge where the passengers were headed estimated the cargo weighed about 300 pounds (lbs) and that the passengers' baggage weighed about 80 lbs. Estimates of the passengers' weights were provided to the lodge operator in preparation for the trip, which totaled 1,350 lbs. The load manifest listed each of these weight estimates for a total weight of 1,730 lbs and did not contain any balance data. The cargo was not weighed, and the pilot did not document any weight and balance calculations nor was he required to do so. The airplane operator did not keep fueling records for each flight. A witness who was present during the fueling operations at the operator's base reported that he saw the pilot top off the front tank then begin fueling the center tank. The first leg of the trip from the operator's base to pick up the passengers was completed uneventfully. According to witnesses at Soldotna Airport, after loading the passengers and their baggage, the pilot taxied for departure. There were no witnesses to the accident. The airplane impacted the ground about 2,320 feet from the threshold of the departure runway and about 154 feet right of the runway centerline. An extensive postcrash fire consumed most of the airplane's cockpit and cabin area, including an unknown quantity of the baggage and cargo. Impact signatures were consistent with a nose- and right-wing-low attitude at impact. The entire airplane was accounted for at the wreckage site. Disassembly and examination of the engine and propeller revealed that both were operating during impact. Examination of the structure and flight control systems found no preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable federal regulations. Toxicological testing of specimens from the pilot was negative for any carbon monoxide, alcohol, or drugs. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with any type of crashresistant recorder. A video recovered from a passenger's smartphone showed the accident sequence looking out of the row 4 left seat window; the left wing and flaps are in view for most of the sequence and the flap position does not change. The investigation found that the flaps were set to the full-down (or landing) position during takeoff, contrary to recommended procedures in the airplane flight manual (AFM). The recovered video was used to estimate the airplane speed, altitude, and orientation for the portion of the flight where ground references were visible, about 22.5 seconds after the start of the takeoff roll. For the first 12 seconds, the airplane accelerated linearly from the beginning of the takeoff roll through liftoff. The pitch angle decreased slightly in the first 8 seconds as the tail lifted, remained essentially constant for about 4 seconds, and began to slightly increase as the airplane lifted off. Beginning about 14 seconds after the start of the takeoff roll, the speed began decreasing and the pitch angle began increasing. The pitch angle increased at a constant rate (about 2.8 degrees/second), reaching a maximum value of about 30 degrees, and the ground speed decreased from its maximum of about 68 mph to about 44 mph at the end of the analyzed time. The ground references disappeared from the video frame as the airplane experienced a sharp right roll before impacting the ground several seconds later. The low speed, rapid right roll, and pitch down of the airplane is consistent with an aerodynamic stall. The constant pitch rate before the stall is consistent with an aft center of gravity (CG) condition of sufficient magnitude that the elevator pitch down authority was insufficient to overcome the pitching moment generated by the aft CG. Additionally, the flaps setting at the full-down (or landing) position, contrary to procedures contained in the AFM, would have exacerbated the nose-up pitching moment due to the increased downwash on the tail and aft shift of the center of pressure; the additional aerodynamic drag from the fully extended flaps would have altered the airplane's acceleration. Using the data available, the airplane was within weight and balance limitations for the first leg of the trip. However, the cargo loaded was about 2.4 times the weight indicated on the load manifest. Further, the total weight of cargo and baggage in the cargo area, as estimated during the investigation, exceeded the installed cargo net's load limit of 750 lbs by more than 50 lbs. Although the loaded cargo actual weight was higher than indicated on the load manifest, the flight from Nikiski to Soldotna was completed without any concerns noted by the pilot, indicating that even with the higher cargo load, the airplane was within the normal CG range for that leg of the flight. Thus, based on the investigation's best estimate and a calculation of the airplane's weight and balance using the recovered passenger weights, weights and location of the luggage recovered on scene, weight of the cargo recovered on scene, and weights accounting for the liquid cargo destroyed in the postimpact fire, once the passengers were loaded, the airplane weight would have exceeded the maximum gross weight of 8,000 lbs by about 21 lbs and the CG would have been at least 5.5 inches aft of the 152.2-inch limit (a more definitive calculation could not be performed because the exact location of the cargo was not known). Additionally, the kinematics study of the accident airplane's weight and motion during initial climb and up to the point of stall found that with the pilot applying full pitch-down control input, the CG required to produce the motion observed in the video was likely just past 161 inches. Thus, the only way for the airplane motion to match the motion observed in the video was for the CG to be considerably aft of the 152.2-inch limit, which provides additional support to the results from the weight and balance study. Based on the video study, the weight and balance study constructed from available weight and balance information, and the kinematics study, the airplane exceeded the aft CG limit at takeoff, which resulted in an uncontrollable nose-up pitch leading to an aerodynamic stall. The CG was so far aft of the limit that the airplane likely would have stalled even with the flaps in the correct position. Neither 14 CFR Part 135 nor the operator's operations specifications (OpSpec) require that the aircraft weight and balance be physically documented for any flights. However, according to Section A096 of the OpSpec, when determining aircraft weight and balance, the operator should use either the actual measured weights for all passengers, baggage, and cargo or the solicited weights for passengers plus 10 lbs and actual measured weights for baggage and cargo. The operator did not comply with federal regulations that require adherence to the weighing requirements or the takeoff weight limitations in the AFM. Additionally, although the inaccurate estimate of 300 lbs for the cargo resulted in a calculated CG that was within limits for both legs of the flight, the actual weight of the cargo was significantly higher. Once loaded in Soldotna, the combination of the passengers, their baggage, and the actual cargo weight and its location resulted in the CG for the accident flight being significantly aft of the limit. With the CG so far aft, even with full nose-down input from the pilot, the nose continued to pitch up until the airplane stalled. For each flight in multiengine operations, 14 CFR 135.63(c) requires the preparation of a load manifest that includes, among other items the number of passengers, total weight of the loaded aircraft, the maximum allowable takeoff weight, and the CG location of the loaded aircraft; one copy of the load manifest should be carried in the airplane and the operator is required to keep the records for at least 30 days. Single-engine operations are excluded from this requirement. The NTSB attempted to address this exclusion with the issuance of Safety Recommendations A-89-135 and A-99-61, which asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to amend the record-keeping requirements of 14 [CFR] 135.63(c) to apply to single-engine as well as multiengine aircraft. The FAA did not take the recommended action in either instance, and the NTSB classified Safety Recommendations A-89-135 and A-99-61 "Closed—Unacceptable Action" in 1990 and 2014, respectively.

On July 6, 2013, about 1128 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 777-200ER, Korean registration HL7742, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California. Three of the 291 passengers were fatally injured; 40 passengers, 8 of the 12 flight attendants, and 1 of the 4 flight crewmembers received serious injuries. The other 248 passengers, 4 flight attendants, and 3 flight crewmembers received minor injuries or were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 214 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Incheon International Airport, Seoul, Korea, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight was vectored for a visual approach to runway 28L and intercepted the final approach course about 14 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold at an altitude slightly above the desired 3° glidepath. This set the flight crew up for a straight-in visual approach; however, after the flight crew accepted an air traffic control instruction to maintain 180 knots to 5 nm from the runway, the flight crew mismanaged the airplane’s descent, which resulted in the airplane being well above the desired 3° glidepath when it reached the 5 nm point. The flight crew’s difficulty in managing the airplane’s descent continued as the approach continued. In an attempt to increase the airplane’s descent rate and capture the desired glidepath, the pilot flying (PF) selected an autopilot (A/P) mode (flight level change speed [FLCH SPD]) that instead resulted in the autoflight system initiating a climb because the airplane was below the selected altitude. The PF disconnected the A/P and moved the thrust levers to idle, which caused the autothrottle (A/T) to change to the HOLD mode, a mode in which the A/T does not control airspeed. The PF then pitched the airplane down and increased the descent rate. Neither the PF, the pilot monitoring (PM), nor the observer noted the change in A/T mode to HOLD. As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain the desired glidepath; these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. When the main landing gear and the aft fuselage struck the seawall, the tail of the airplane broke off at the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane slid along the runway, lifted partially into the air, spun about 330°, and impacted the ground a final time. The impact forces, which exceeded certification limits, resulted in the inflation of two slide/rafts within the cabin, injuring and temporarily trapping two flight attendants. Six occupants were ejected from the airplane during the impact sequence: two of the three fatally injured passengers and four of the seriously injured flight attendants. The four flight attendants were wearing their restraints but were ejected due to the destruction of the aft galley where they were seated. The two ejected passengers (one of whom was later rolled over by two firefighting vehicles) were not wearing their seatbelts and would likely have remained in the cabin and survived if they had been wearing their seatbelts. After the airplane came to a stop, a fire initiated within the separated right engine, which came to rest adjacent to the right side of the fuselage. When one of the flight attendants became aware of the fire, he initiated an evacuation, and 98% of the passengers successfully self-evacuated. As the fire spread into the fuselage, firefighters entered the airplane and extricated five passengers (one of whom later died) who were injured and unable to evacuate. Overall, 99% of the airplane’s occupants survived.

The pilots reported that, during the approach, the main hydraulic system lost pressure. They selected the auxiliary hydraulic system "on," continued the approach, and extended the landing gear using the emergency landing gear extension procedures. During the landing roll, about two-thirds down the runway, the pilots noticed that the brakes were not working normally and then turned onto a taxiway to clear the runway. The captain reported that, once on the taxiway, he was unable to stop or steer the airplane as it proceeded across a parallel runway and into an adjacent field where it subsequently struck a metal beam. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed brake system continuity with the cockpit controls. The tires, brake assemblies, and brake pads were intact and undamaged. The hydraulic lines from the hydraulic pump to the wheel brakes were intact. No hydraulic fluid was observed leaking on the exterior or interior portions of the airplane. The hydraulic fluid reservoir was found about 1/4 full. Further, testing of the two hydraulic pumps revealed that they were both functional, and no mechanical failures or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation were noted. The airplane's hydraulic system failure emergency procedures state that, if hydraulic pressure is lost, the electrically driven hydraulic pump should be reset and that, if the hydraulic pressure was not restored, that the primary hydraulic system should be disengaged and the landing gear should be lowered using the emergency landing gear extension procedures. After the gear is extended, the auxiliary hydraulic system should be selected "on" for landing. However, the pilots stated that they did not attempt to reset the electric hydraulic pump and that they performed the emergency landing gear extension procedures with the auxiliary hydraulic pump engaged. It is likely that the pilots' failure to select the auxiliary hydraulic system "off" before extending the landing gear caused the hydraulic pressure in the auxiliary system to dissipate, which left only the emergency brake accumulator available for braking during the landing. The number of emergency brake applications that can be made by the pilots depends on the accumulator charge, which may be depleted in a very short time. The airplane's emergency braking procedures state that, as soon as the airplane is safely stopped, the pilots should request towing assistance. However, the pilots did not stop the airplane on the runway despite having about 3,900 ft of runway remaining; instead, they turned off the runway at an intersection, which resulted in a loss of directional control.