Leipzig-Halle

The airplane departed Leipzig-Halle Airport at 0308LT on a cargo service (flight BCS18D) to Vilnius on behalf of DHL Airways, carrying two passengers and two crew members. On final approach to Vilnius Airport at night and marginal weather conditions, the airplane descended too low and crashed into houses, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 1,400 metres short of runway 19. A pilot was killed and three other occupants were injured. The airplane was totally destroyed.

Following an uneventful flight from Leipzig, the crew started the descent to Paris-Roissy-CDG Airport runway 27R. At an altitude of 400 feet on approach, the automatic pilot system was deactivated. At an altitude of 200 feet, the decision height, the crew decided to continue the approach as the runway was in sight and the aircraft was stable. During the last segment, at a height of 50 feet, power levers were reduced to flight idle and the aircraft went into a nose up attitude (maximum value of 11°). Both main gears touched down at a speed of 120 knots but the aircraft bounced twice and went into a pitch down attitude, causing the nose gear to land first during the third touchdown. On impact, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid for dozen yards before coming to rest. All 19 occupants were evacuated safely and the aircraft was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

On 8 August 2013 at 1914 hrs the airplane, arriving from Stockholm, Sweden, landed at Leipzig/Halle Airport. After the landing it taxied to apron 2 to stand 207. On board the airplane were the Pilot in Command (PIC), the co-pilot, one flight engineer, one navigator, one radio operator, and two flight mechanics. The driver of the fueling vehicle stated that the airplane was refuelled between 0058 and 0121 hrs with 22,809 l fuel. The flight engineer stated that approximately at the same time the loading had occurred and was completed at about 0140 hrs. Between 2330 and 0100 hrs the airplane was loaded with 48,960 one-day-old chickens. They had a total mass of 3,061 kg. Take-off for the flight to Mineralye Vody, Russia, was planned for 0215 hrs. At 0201 hrs the engine start-up clearance was issued and the APU started. After the APU was running, engine No 1, outer left, was started. Once engine No 1 had reached idle speed the start-up for engine No 4, outer right, was begun. During engine start-up of engine No 4 the crew noticed a dull bang and the airplane jerked. The co-pilot, who monitored the APU instruments during engine start-up, had observed rotary speed oscillations and a temperature rise. A short time later the APU fire warning indication illuminated. The crew shut off the two already running engines and triggered the APU fire extinguisher system. One photo (see Appendix) shows a glaring light on the left fuselage side. At this time propellers 1 and 4 were turning; propellers 2 and 3 stood still. Video recordings show fire in the area of the left main landing gear. The co-pilot stated that the PIC had then opened the cockpit door. Flames were already visible in the cargo compartment. The PIC stated that he sent one of the flight mechanics outside for a check. He left the aircraft through the emergency exit located in the floor of the cockpit. After he had left the airplane, he immediately reported that the APU was burning. Subsequently, the three fire extinguishers located in the cockpit were handed down. In addition, the flight engineer and the second flight mechanic left the airplane; they confirmed the fire. Together the three men tried to extinguish the fire with on-board fire extinguishers. The PIC instructed the radio operator to report the situation to the tower. At 0207:45 hrs the radio operator reported the fire and requested the fire brigade. Around 0208 hrs the fire was noticed by other witnesses. They stated that the area of the left main landing gear was burning and that in this area on the left side below the fuselage some liquid leaked on to the ground. At 0208:01 hrs the tower alerted the fire station east. Half a minute later the fire station west was alerted. At 0209:00 hrs the tower announced the location of the fire. At 0212:06 hrs the first fire truck reached the airplane and undertook the first extinguishing attempt with foaming agent. The crew members evacuated the airplane through the front emergency exit located in the floor of the cockpit. Then they left the danger zone and retreated to a grassy area about 50 m in front of the airplane.

The crew took off from Leipzig Airport at 0438LT bound for Bratislava Airport (Slovakia). The approximately forty-five minutes flight took place without incident and the crew was cleared for the ILS approach to runway 22. The Captain was PF. During the descent, the controller informed the crew that the wind was from  120° at  7  kt. The crew selected the slats and flaps at 25°. The antiskid and the autobrake were armed in MED mode. The ILS 22 approach was stable until the wheels touched down. The main landing gear touched the runway about 700 m from the threshold of runway  22. The crew deployed the thrust reversers. About six seconds after the nose gear touched, the crew felt strong vibrations that increased as the speed dropped. At 85 kt, the thrust reversers were retracted. The aeroplane veered towards the left. The PF explained that he applied energetic braking and tried in vain to counter the rocking by using the rudder pedals then the nose gear steering control. He  added that the sequence occurred so quickly that he did not think to use differential braking to try to keep the aeroplane on the runway. The aeroplane exited the runway to the left at a speed of about 45 kt. Its nose gear struck a concrete inspection pit and collapsed. The aeroplane skidded for a few dozen metres before coming to a stop. The crew evacuated the aeroplane. Between the start of the vibrations and the aeroplane stopping, it had rolled about 400 metres.

The flight was conducting a straight-in approach during visual meteorological conditions. The approach was backed up by an ILS and was stable at 500 feet above touchdown. The initial touchdown was firm and main landing gear rebounded, possibly bouncing slightly off the runway. Control column input and possibly momentum from the touchdown resulted in a rapid pitch down and hard nose gear impact with the runway. Wing spoilers likely did not deploy due to the main gear bounce and/or throttle position. Following the nose gear impact, the airplane pitched up as expected and the column was held in a slightly forward position. Airspeed rapidly decayed, and engine power began to increase as the airplane pitch reversed to a downward motion for a second time. One of the crew, likely the FO, called “flare flare” and the column recorded a rapid nose up input, followed by a rapid nose down input, and the nose gear again struck the runway very hard, likely causing the majority of the damage at that point. Following the second nose gear impact, column inputs stabilized at a slightly nose up command, power was set on all three engines, and the go-around was successfully executed. A slight lag in the power increase on engine number 3 may have contributed to the nose down motion leading to the second nose gear impact, although the large forward (airplane nose down) column movement appears to be a much more significant contributor. It is unclear why the engine was slower to increase. Throttle lever angle was not recorded, but the engine operated as expected for all other phases of the flight, including after the impact, therefore it is possible the pilot did not advance the number 3 throttle concurrently with the others. The captain’s flight and duty schedule complied with Federal Aviation regulations, but he experienced a demanding 10-day trip schedule prior to the incident involving multiple time zone crossings and several long duty periods, and reported difficulties sleeping prior to the accident leg. The captain was likely further affected by a digestive system upset during the accident flight. It is likely that the captain’s performance was degraded by fatigue and some degree of physical discomfort brought on by a short-term illness. The captain had recently completed upgrade training to DC-10, having previously been flying as an MD-11 first officer. The training program was fragmented over approximately ten months, and while in accordance with FAA regulations, may have adversely affected his consolidation of skills and experience.

The crew was completing a positioning flight (RUS1050) from Leipzig to Zurich on behalf of FSH Luftfahrtunternehmen but under contract of Cirrus Aviation. On final approach to Zurich-Kloten Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions. Despite the RVR for runway 14 was estimated to be 275 metres (below minimums of 400 metres for a CAT II approach if aircraft and crew are qualified), the crew decided to continue the approach, descended below the MDA until the aircraft struck the ground between both runways 14 and 16. The aircraft rolled for few dozen metres then lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a frosty field. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the vertical visibility was 300 feet, the horizontal visibility was 200 metres with freezing fog, an OAT of -3° C and a dew point of -4° C.

The approach to Leipzig-Halle Airport was completed in marginal weather conditions. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when, at a height of 3 meters, the airplane struck the localizer antenna. The left engine and a part of the left wing were torn off. Out of control, the airplane crashed in flames 300 meters short of runway threshold. Three crew members and four passengers were injured while 27 other occupants were killed.

The three engine aircraft named 'Leeuwerik' departed Leipzig-Halle Airport at 1314LT, carrying two passengers and five crew members. At 1435LT, the radio navigator informed ground about his position some 10 km north of Kassel. Five minutes later, while cruising at a height of 1,000 metres, he reported poor weather conditions and low visibility due to heavy snow falls. He also requested a weather bulletin for Essen, the next stop before Amsterdam. The captain reduced his altitude to 450 metres and completed two successive turns when the aircraft impacted the side of a hilly terrain located some 15 km east of Brilon. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. All seven occupants were killed.
Crew:
P. Soer, pilot,
E. A. J. Prillwitz, copilot,
P. Welman,
H. Wingelaar.
Th. J. van den Klein, engineer.
Passengers:
H. L. A. Briel,
W. de Vlugt.

The single engine airplane departed Munich-Oberschleissheim Airport on a regular service to Leipzig with three passengers and one pilot on board. While flying over Bavaria, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity. He attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in an open field located in Kulmbach. All four occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.