Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

On 19 October 2013, an Avions de Transport Régional ATR42-320 freighter, registered P2-PXY (PXY) and operated by Air Niugini, was scheduled to fly from Madang to Tabubil, Western Province, as flight PX2900 carrying a load tobacco for a client company. There were three persons on board; the pilot in command (PIC), a copilot, and a PNG experienced DHC-8 captain whose function was to provide guidance during the approach into Tabubil. The PIC was the handling pilot and the copilot was the support monitoring pilot. The flight crew taxied to the threshold end of runway 25 intending to use the full length of the runway. The take-off roll was normal until the PIC tried to rotate at VR (speed for rotation, which the flight crew had calculated to be 102 knots). He subsequently reported that the controls felt very heavy in pitch and he could not pull the control column back in the normal manner. Flight data recorder (FDR) information indicated that approximately 2 sec later the PIC aborted the takeoff and selected full reverse thrust. He reported later that he had applied full braking. It was not possible to stop the aircraft before the end of the runway and it continued over the embankment at the end of the runway and the right wing struck the perimeter fence. The aircraft was substantially damaged during the accident by the impact, the post-impact fire and partial immersion in salt water. The right outboard wing section was completely burned, and the extensively damaged and burnt right engine fell off the wing into the water. Both propellers were torn from the engine shafts and destroyed by the impact forces.

The single engine aircraft was engaged in a charter flight from Likawage to Dar es Salaam, carrying one passenger and two pilots. Ready for takeoff at threshold, the crew applied full power and maintained brakes. Despite the engine did not reach the takeoff power, the captain released brakes and initiated the takeoff roll. The aircraft rolled for about three-quarters of the runway when the engine reached the takeoff power. But the aircraft failed to rotate, continued, overran and eventually collided with trees, bursting into flames. All three occupants were slightly injured and the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.

A de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter 310, operated by MASwings, sustained substantial damage in an accident at Kudat Airport (KUD), Malaysia. The copilot and one passenger died, four others were injured. MASwings flight MH3002 operated on a domestic flight from Kota Kinabalu Airport (BKI) to Kudat. The captain was the pilot flying for this sector and the first officer was pilot monitoring. As the aircraft was approaching Kudat Airfield, Kudat Tower reported the weather conditions to be: wind at 270 degrees at 17 kts gusting 31 kts. The aircraft continued the approach on runway 04 and leveled off at 500 feet with flaps set at 10°. At this point the crew noticed that the approach for runway 04 had a strong tail wind. This was evident from the indicated airspeed observed by the crew which indicated 100 kts where the airspeed for flaps 10° should be 65kts. The windsock also indicated a tail wind. Noticing the approach for runway 04 was a tail wind condition, the crew decided to go around at a height of 500ft. Maintaining runway heading, the crew initiated a go around climbing to 1,000ft making a left tear drop and reposition for runway 22. On the approach for runway 22 the captain informed the first officer that if they could not land they would return to Kota Kinabalu. The aircraft was aligned with the centerline of runway 22 and 20° flaps was set. The aircraft continued to descend to 300ft. At this point the wind appeared to be calm as the aircraft did not experience any turbulence and the captain told the first officer that he was committed to land. Upon reaching 200ft the captain called for the flaps to be lowered to full down. As they were about to flare the aircraft to land, approximately 20ft above the runway, the aircraft was suddenly hit by a gust of wind which caused the aircraft to veer to the right with the right wing low and left wing high and the nose was pointing 45° to the right of runway 22. The crew decided to go around by applying maximum power; however the aircraft did not manage to climb successfully. The flaps were not raised and were still in the full flaps down position as the crew thought the aircraft was still low hence the flaps were not raised. The aircraft continued to veer to the right with right wing low and managed to only climb at a shallow rate. The aircraft failed to clear the approaching trees ahead and was unable to continue its climb because the airspeed was reducing. The presence of a full flaps configuration made it more difficult for the aircraft to climb. As the aircraft was on full power on both the engines, it continued to fly almost perpendicularly in relation to the runway and at a low height above the ground. The aircraft hit a tree top at the airfield perimeter fencing, disappeared behind the row of trees, hit another tree behind a house. It hit the right rear roof of the house, ploughed through the roof top of the kitchen, toilet and dining area, hit the solid concrete pillars of the car garage and finally hit the lamp post just outside the house fence. It swung back onto the direction of the runway and came to rest on the ground with its left engine still running. A woman and her 11-year old son who were in the living room at the time escaped unhurt.

The instrument-rated pilot was on a cross-country flight. According to air traffic control records, an air traffic controller provided the pilot vectors to an intersection to fly a GPS approach. Federal Aviation Administration radar data showed that the airplane tracked off course of the assigned intersection by 6 nautical miles and descended 800 ft below its assigned altitude before correcting toward the initial approach fix. The airplane then crossed the final approach fix 400 ft below the minimum crossing altitude and then continued to descend to the minimum descent altitude, at which point, the pilot performed a missed approach. The missed approach procedure would have required the airplane to make a climbing right turn to 2,500 ft mean sea level (msl) while navigating southwest back to the intersection; however, radar data showed that the airplane flew southeast and ascended and descended several times before leveling off at 2,800 ft msl. The airplane then entered a right 360-degree turn and almost completed another circle before it descended into terrain. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. During the altitude and heading deviations just before impact, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller that adverse weather was causing the airplane to lose "tremendous" amounts of altitude; however, weather radar did not indicate any convective activity or heavy rain at the airplane's location. The recorded weather at the destination airport about the time of the accident included a cloud ceiling of 400 ft above ground level and visibility of 3 miles. Although the pilot reported over 4,000 total hours on his most recent medical application, the investigation could not corroborate those reported hours or document any recent or overall actual instrument experience. In addition, it could not be determined whether the pilot had experience using the onboard GPS system, which had been installed on the airplane about 6 months before the accident; however, the accident flight track is indicative of the pilot not using the GPS effectively, possibly due to a lack of proficiency or familiarity with the equipment. The restricted visibility and precipitation and maneuvering during the missed approach would have been conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the variable flightpath off the intended course was consistent with the pilot losing airplane control due to spatial disorientation. Toxicological tests detected ethanol and other volatiles in the pilot's muscle indicative of postmortem production.

Following an uneventful flight from Chiang Mai, the crew completed the landing on runway 30 at Udon Thani Airport. The aircraft vacated runway and was taxiing when control was lost. The airplane veered to the right, entered a soft grassy area, lost its nose gear and came to rest. All 28 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew discussed some concerns about the aircraft prior to departure but at this time we are not prepared to elaborate on those concerns as there remains a lot of work to complete on the CVR analysis in order to determine the specific nature of the crew’s concerns. Associated 361 was cleared for take-off on runway one eight left at Lagos international airport. The wind was calm and weather is not considered a factor in this accident. Approximately 4 seconds after engine power was advanced to commence the take-off roll, the crew received an automated warning from the onboard computer voice which consisted of three chimes followed by “Take-off Flaps…Take-off Flaps”. This is a configuration warning that suggests that the flaps were not in the correct position for take-off and there is some evidence that the crew may have chosen not to use flaps for the take-off. The warning did not appear to come as any surprise to the crew and they continued normally with the take-off. This warning continues throughout the take-off roll. As we are in the process of verifying the accuracy of the flight data, we have not yet been able to confirm the actual flap setting however we expect to determine this in the fullness of time. It was determined from the CVR that the pilot flying was the Captain and the pilot monitoring and assisting was the First Officer. The ‘set power‘ call was made by the Captain and the ‘power is set’ call was confirmed by the First Officer as expected in normal operations. Approximately 3 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the First Officer noted that the aircraft was moving slowly. Approximately 7 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the internal Aircraft Voice warning system could be heard stating ‘Take off Flaps, Auto Feather’. Auto feather refers to the pitch of the propeller blades. In the feather position, the propeller does not produce any thrust. The FDR contains several engine related parameters which the AIB is studying. At this time, we can state that the Right engine appears to be producing considerably less thrust than the Left engine. The left engine appeared to be working normally. The aircraft automated voice continued to repeat ‘Take-off Flaps, Auto Feather’. The physical examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the engine fire handle was pulled/activated. The standard ‘eighty knots’ call was made by the First Officer. The first evidence that the crew indicated that there was a problem with the take-off roll was immediately following the ‘eighty knots’ call. The First Officer asked if the take- off should be aborted approximately 12 seconds after the ‘eighty knots’ callout. Our investigation team estimates the airspeed to be approximately 95 knots. Airspeed was one of the parameters that, while working in the cockpit, appeared not to be working on the Flight Data Recorder. We were able to estimate the speed based on the radar data that we synchronized to the FDR and CVR but it is very approximate because of this. In response to the First Officer’s question to abort, the Captain indicated that they should continue and they continued the take-off roll. The crew did not make a ‘V1’ call or a Vr’ call. V1 is the speed at which a decision to abort or continue a take-off is made. Vr is the speed at which it is planned to rotate the aircraft. Normally the non-flying pilot calls both the V1 and the Vr speeds. When Vr is called the flying pilot pulls back on the control column and the aircraft is rotated (pitched up) to climb away from the runway. During the rotation, the First Officer stated ‘gently’, which we believe reflects concern that the aircraft is not performing normally and therefore needs to be rotated very gently so as not to aerodynamically stall the aircraft. The First Officer indicated that the aircraft was not climbing and advised the Captain who was flying not to stall the aircraft. Higher climb angles can cause an aerodynamic stall. If the aircraft is not producing enough overall thrust, it is difficult or impossible to climb without the risk of an aerodynamic stall. Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft slowly veered off the runway heading to the right and was not climbing properly. This aircraft behavior appears to have resulted in the Air Traffic Controller asking Flight 361 if operation was normal. Flight 361 never responded. Less than 10 seconds after rotation of the aircraft to climb away from the runway, the stall warning sounded in the cockpit and continued to the end of the recording. The flight data shows characteristics consistent with an aerodynamic stall. 31 seconds after the stall warning was heard, the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down near 90° right bank.

The private pilot was returning to his home airport; the approach was normal, and the airplane landed within the runway touchdown zone markings and on the runway centerline. About midfield, the airplane started to drift to the right side of the runway, and during the landing roll, the nose pitched up suddenly and dropped back down. The airplane veered off the runway and impacted the 1,000-ft runway distance remaining sign and continued to travel in a righthand turn until it impacted a hangar. The airplane came to rest inside the hangar, and the damage to the structure caused the roof to collapse onto the airplane. A postaccident fire quickly ensued. The subsequent wreckage examination did not reveal any mechanical anomalies with the airplane's engines, flight controls, steering, or braking system. A video study was conducted using security surveillance video from a fixed-base operator located midfield, and the study established that the airplane was not decelerating as it passed through midfield. Deceleration was detected after the airplane had veered off the runway and onto the parking apron in front of the rows of hangars it eventually impacted. Additionally, video images could not definitively establish that the flaps were deployed during the landing roll. However, the flaps were deployed as the airplane veered off the runway and into the hangar, but it could not be determined to what degree. To obtain maximum braking performance, the flaps should be placed in the ”ground flap” position immediately after touchdown. The wreckage examination determined that the flaps were in the ”ground flap” position at the time the airplane impacted the hangar. Numerous personal electronic devices that had been onboard the airplane provided images of the passengers and unrestrained pets, including a large dog, with access to the cockpit during the accident flight. Although the unrestrained animals had the potential to create a distraction during the landing roll, there was insufficient information to determine their role in the accident sequence or what caused the delay in the pilot’s application of the brakes.

After takeoff from runway 34 at Lyon-Bron Airport, while in initial climb at a height of 200 feet, the twin engine airplane deviated to the left, rolled to the left and then veered to the left with a low rate of climb. Shortly after passing the end of the runway, the airplane lost height then struck the ground and caught fire. The airplane was destroyed by a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed. For unknown reasons, the pilot-in-command was seating in the right seat.

The airplane was equipped with two main fuel tanks (132 usable gallons each) and two nacelle fuel tanks (60 usable gallons each). In normal operation, fuel from each nacelle tank is supplied to its respective engine, and fuel is automatically transferred from each main tank to its respective nacelle tank. While at the airplane's home airport, the pilot noted that the cockpit fuel quantity gauges indicated that the nacelle tanks were full, and he believed that the main tanks had fuel sufficient for 30 minutes of flight. The pilot did not verify by any other means the actual fuel quantity in any of the tanks. Thirty gallons of fuel were added to each main tank; they were not topped off. The airplane, with two passengers, then flew to an interim stop about 45 miles away, where a third passenger boarded. The airplane then flew to its destination, another 165 miles away. The pilot reported that, at the destination airport, he noted that the cockpit fuel quantity gauges indicated that the nacelle tanks were full; he surmised that the main fuel tanks were not empty but did not note the actual quantity of fuel. Forty gallons of fuel were added to each main tank. Again, the main tanks were not topped off, and the pilot did not verify by any other means the actual fuel quantity in any of the tanks. The return flight to the interim stop was uneventful. The third passenger deplaned there, and the airplane departed for its home airport. While on final approach to the home airport, both engines stopped developing power, and the pilot conducted a forced landing to a field about 1.2 miles short of the runway. The pilot later reported that, at the time of the power loss, the fuel quantity gauges indicated that there was still fuel remaining in the airplane. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that all four fuel tanks were devoid of fuel. The examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies, including fuel leaks, that would have precluded continued flight. The airplane manufacturer conducted fuel-consumption calculations for each of the two city pairs. Because the pilot did not provide any information regarding flight routes, altitudes, speeds, or times for any of the flight segments, the manufacturer's calculations were based on direct routing in zero-wind conditions, nominal airplane and engine performance, and assumed cruise altitudes and speeds. Although the results are valid for these input parameters, variations in any of the input parameters can significantly affect the calculated fuel requirements. As a result, although the manufacturer's calculations indicated that the round trip would have burned less fuel than the total available fuel quantity that was derived from the pilot-provided information, the lack of any definitive information regarding the actual flight parameters limited the utility of the calculated value and the comparison. The manufacturer's calculations indicated that the accident flight leg (from the interim airport to the home airport) would have consumed about 28.5 gallons total. Given that the airplane was devoid of fuel at the accident site, the pilot likely departed the interim airport with significantly less than the manufacturer's minimum allowable departure fuel quantity of about 39.5 gallons per side. The lack of any observed preimpact mechanical problems with the airplane, combined with the lack of objective or independently substantiated fuel quantity information, indicates that the airplane's fuel exhaustion was due to the pilot's inadequate and improper pre- and inflight fuel planning and procedures.

Following an uneventful flight from Tshikapa, the pilot initiated the approach to Kamako Airfield in relative good conditions. On final, the wind component suddenly changed. The aircraft lost height and impacted ground 16 metres short of runway 12. Upon impact, the undercarriage were partially torn off and the aircraft slid before coming to rest 37 metres past the runway threshold. All six occupants, one pilot and five passengers, escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.