Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The pilot stated he checked the fuel quantity in the inboard fuel tanks, but may have omitted the outboard tanks. He departed and climbed to 100 feet where the airplane yawed right. He believed it was a gust of wind which he attempted to correct. At 200 feet, the pilot stated the airplane rolled hard right and impacted trees in a 60 degree nose down attitude. There was no indication of a left engine discrepancy prior to impact. The right engine was examined with no fuel found in the fuel lines, and trace fuel was found in the fuel servo. According to the accident pilot, he regularly flew between Washington-Dulles and Southport, North Carolina using only the inboard tanks. Because of this, he did not check the location of the fuel selector, nor did he necessarily check the fuel quantity in the outboard fuel tanks. The cockpit fuel selector for the right engine was found in the outboard tank location. The right outboard tank on this airplane was not breached, and contained no fuel. The takeoff checklist states the fuel selector should be on the inboard fuel tank prior to takeoff.

During the takeoff roll, at a speed of 90 knots, the captain decided to abort. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest 270 metres further against an earth mound. All six occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The grassy runway used by the crew is 1,008 metres long and the last portion of 300 metres was waterlogged.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording indicated that the pilot was unable to start the right engine before takeoff, and elected to attempt takeoff with the right engine inoperative. Witnesses reported that the airplane's nose lifted off about 4,100 feet down the runway and that it then became airborne with its wings rocking, attaining a maximum altitude of 5 to 10 feet above the ground before settling back to the ground, departing the right side of the runway and entering an upright slide for about 1/2 mile. Investigators removed the right engine starter-generator from the engine after the accident and found the starter-generator drive shaft to be fractured. The aircraft has a minimum crew requirement of two, consisting of pilot and copilot; the copilot's seat occupant, a private pilot-rated passenger, did not hold a multiengine rating and thus was not qualified to act as second-in-command of the aircraft.

The pilot was cleared for a GPS approach. He stated that he was too high to make a good landing, so he opted for a circling approach to another runway. As he turned for the base leg, he lost visual contact and became disoriented. It was a dark night with no moon. The pilot realized that he was in a 70- to 80-degree left bank and returned the airplane to a level attitude, then noticed the ground directly in front of him. The aircraft ran through a barbed wire fence, collided with trees, and slid rearward to a stop in a high altitude meadow east of the airport. The FAA completed an evaluation of the circling approach procedures and night operations for that airport and did not find any problems.

During the takeoff roll at Mogadishu Airport, the crew lost control of the airplane that crashed in unknown circumstances. All four crew members were injured.

The four engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Mwanza to Ostend with intermediate stops in Mombasa and Cairo, carrying six crew members and a load of 34 tons of fish. After takeoff from runway 03, the aircraft collided with approach lights and an earth mound then crashed few hundred metres past the runway end, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all six occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the first portion of 2,600 feet of runway 03 which is 10,991 feet long were not available due to work in progress. It was reported that the total weight of the aircraft was 135 tons.

After takeoff from La Ceiba-Goloson Airport, while in initial climb, the right engine failed. The crew was cleared for an emergency landing and initiated a circuit to return. At low height, one of the wing struck the roof of a house and the airplane crashed on a road. All 17 occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On March 4, 1998, at 1350 hours Pacific standard time, a Learjet 23, N37BL, was substantially damaged when it landed gear up at the Oakdale, California, airport. The airline transport pilot and check pilot, the sole occupants, were not injured and no property damage occurred. The flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 on a familiarization and training flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The pilot stated in his report "the landing gear was never extended and the aircraft was landed with the gear retracted."

After takeoff from Hoskins Airport, the stewardess informed the pilots about an explosion in the rear of the cabin. The crew returned to the airport for an emergency landing. After touchdown, the aircraft deviated to the left, veered off runway and came to rest in a ravine. All 13 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was performing a night VOR/DME approach during which instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was equipped with VOR, LORAN, and RNAV receivers. There were two step-downs fixes on the approach. At 13 DME the minimum altitude was 1,800 feet. At 10 DME the minimum altitude was 1,040 feet. The missed approach point was at 6 DME, and the VOR/DME transmitter was located 5.5 miles beyond the airport. Radar data revealed a descent profile based upon distances from the end of the runway, rather than DME from the VOR. The airplane reached an altitude of 1,000 feet when it was 13.52 miles from the VOR, and 7.58 miles from the approach end of the runway. It subsequently impacted rising terrain at an altitude of about 900 feet, about 11.5 miles from the VOR, and 5.5 miles from the approach end of the runway. Impact damage and a post-crash fire precluded a check of the radio set up at the time of the accident. According to FAR 135 a pilot-in-command was required to have 1,200 hours total time. The investigation documented the pilot's total time as about 1,057 hours.