Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The Boeing 737 completed a flight from Lagos (LOS) through Abuja (ABV) to Kaduna (KAD) and was parked for over an hour. At 14:45 UTC, the Chief Pilot of Chanchangi Airline approached the Air Traffic Controller stating that he would like to fly around the circuit for a training flight. He was told that the visibility was 600 meters which was below the landing minima and was then advised against it. The pilot then suggested that he would carry out a "Rejected Takeoff" training. Additional persons boarded the flight to witness the exercise. At 15:37 UTC the pilot requested a take off clearance which was granted, and was directed to proceed to the holding point of runway 05. The prevailing visibility was 600 meters and the wind was 090 at 10 knots. Four rejected take off training runs were carried out within an interval of twelve minutes. In the conditions at Kaduna, a single exercise of a rejected take off would have required a cooling period of at least ten minutes. At the end of the fourth run, the left main landing gear number 2 brake unit had started to burn. The pilot steered the airplane off the runway into the last taxiway. Fifty meters from the runway 05 threshold the left inner wheel failed and leaving a molten rubber footprint on the taxiway and at the same time the hydraulic fluid of the brake units started to spill tracing an oily track along. Pieces of broken wheel rim were randomly shed for a distance of 150 meters when the rims appeared to undergo a major collapse. The footprint of the two left wheels became more pronounced for a distance of 120 meters when there was a positive turn to the left indicating a total failure in roll from the left wheel assembly. The zigzag motion continued for about 699 meters until the aircraft could no longer be easily moved and the pilot called for the fire trucks. The aircraft burnt to ashes on the spot.

After landing at Mogadishu Airport, the propeller on the right engine went into fine pitch. The crew lost control of the airplane that veered off runway to the right. While contacting soft ground, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and its tail before coming to rest, broken in two. All 23 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Few minutes after a night takeoff from Barcelona Airport, en route to Brussels, the copilot informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. After been cleared for an approach to runway 07, the crew descended to 6,000 feet and 3,000 feet successively. At 0000:15 seconds, the aircraft passed over the outer marker at an altitude of 1,500 feet and a speed of 170 knots. At a distance of six km from the runway threshold, the aircraft started to deviate from the approach path to the right and one minute later, it struck the ground at a speed of 130 knots, crashing in a palmgrove located 3,2 km short of runway and bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both pilots were killed.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) was administering a proficiency check flight to the first officer (FO) in a regional jet. One of the required check items was the loss of an engine at "V1" speed. While on takeoff roll with the FO at the controls, the PIC retarded the left engine throttle to idle when "V1" speed was attained. The FO called, "check max thrust," and then called, "positive rate gear up." As the PIC reached for the gear lever, he noticed the airplane roll to the left at a rate which he felt was "excessive and dangerous." He then reached for the flight controls and felt the left rudder "go all the way to the floor." As the PIC took control of the airplane, he applied full right rudder and right aileron. The airplane began recovering from the bank and impacted the ground. Flight recorder data revealed that the time interval between the throttle retarded to idle and ground impact was about 8 seconds. The data showed that the airplane became airborne about 2 seconds after the throttle was retarded, and that the airplane had rolled to a 71 degree left bank within 6 seconds from the throttle reduction. Ground scars and wreckage distribution revealed that the left wing had contacted the ground first and then the right wing prior to the airplane coming to rest. The FO had a total of 15 hours in the type aircraft in the last 90 days. Examinations of the airframe, engines, and flight control system did not reveal any anomalies that could have contributed to the accident. Company flight training policy stated that all check airmen should be ready to take control of the airplane while practicing these types of training maneuvers.

The three engine aircraft was completing a charter flight from Dübendorf to Samedan, carrying 17 passengers and three crew members. After touchdown on runway 03 at Samedan Airport, the aircraft deviated to the left. The crew elected to regain control but at a speed of 110 km/h, the aircraft struck a snow wall on a distance of 250 metres, causing severe damages to the left wing, left engine and left main gear. All 20 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

This final sector was flown at FL 50, with the aircraft in IMC conditions. The crew noted no indication of ice at this level and the use of the aircraft de-icing equipment was not required. Prior to their approach to Stornoway, the crew contacted ATC and noted the following information: Runway 36 in use, surface wind 260°/ 08 kt, visibility 15 km in light drizzle, cloud few at 800 feet and broken at 1,400 feet agl, temperature plus 7°C and QNH 1002 mb. The commander then briefed for a NDB/DME approach for Runway 36. With G-BLGB still at FL 50, the crew completed the 'Descent' checks and then, when cleared for the procedure completed the 'Approach' checks 'to the line'. The initial approach was normal and the crew were VMC at a range of approximately 8 nm from the airfield. At this stage the commander was certain of his geographical position and, with the agreement of his first officer, decided to continue visually. Although they were in sight of the surface, there appeared to be some patchy cloud in the direction of the airfield and neither pilot could see the runway. The crew completed the rest of the 'Approach' checks and then did the 'Final' checks down to 'Flaps'; Flap 15 had been selected. By now, the commander was level at his minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 430 feet amsl. Shortly afterwards, the crew acquired visual contact with the runway; the aircraft was to the right of the extended centreline and the crew could see the Precision Approach Path Indicators (PAPI) which were indicating 'four whites'; the commander estimated his range from the runway as one mile. He subsequently recalled that, at the time he considered 'going around' but, considering the length of Stornoway runway, decided to land. The commander called for "Full flap" and for "Props to max", and manoeuvred G-BLGB to the runway extended centreline. His subsequent approach was based on runway perspective with the intention of touching down beside the PAPIs. During this final approach, the first officer was monitoring the airspeed and initially called out "Plus 10"; this signified a speed of 113 kt based on a VAT of 103 kt. Thereafter, he called "Plus 5", "VAT" and then "Minus 5" before calling for "Power" on several occasions just before touchdown. Neither pilot could remember the PAPI lights during this final part of the approach and the commander did not think that he exceeded 1,000 feet per minute rate of descent. He was certain that the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) had not activated during the final approach. The commander remembers pulling back on the control wheel just before touchdown but that this had no effect on the rate of descent; he also advanced the power levers but the aircraft had landed before any increase in power was apparent. Touchdown was 'Firm' and beside the PAPIs. On landing, there was a 'bang' and the left side of the aircraft went down. G-BLGB slewed to the left and the commander used full right rudder and brake in an attempt to counter this movement. The aircraft came to rest at the left edge of the runway. With the aircraft stopped, the first officer shut both engines down and the commander switched off the 'Electrics'. The commander then opened the door to the cabin and, saw that the rear emergency door at the rear right side was open and the evacuation was in progress; the flight crew followed the passengers out of the door. Immediately following the landing, the first officer declared a 'problem' to ATC. The controller had been monitoring the approach and noted the apparent lack of a normal flare; following the call from the crew, he immediately activated the 'Crash Alarm'. Within 30 seconds, the AFS had manned their vehicles and had checked in with the controller; the AFS were cleared direct to the aircraft and arrived there within a minute of the initial call. There was no indication of fire but, with fluid leaking from the right gear, the AFS sprayed the area with foam.

On February 9, 1998, about 0954 central standard time (CST), a Boeing 727-223 (727), N845AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1340, impacted the ground short of the runway 14R threshold at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) while conducting a Category II (CAT II) instrument landing system (ILS) coupled approach. Twenty-two passengers and one flight attendant received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane, being operated by American Airlines as a scheduled domestic passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, with 116 passengers, 3 flight crewmembers, and 3 flight attendants on board, was destined for Chicago, Illinois, from Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Kansas City, Missouri. Daylight instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

After landing at Navegantes-Itajaí Airport, the crew encountered unknown difficulties. The aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a grassy area. All 25 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The certificated commercial pilot was departing on a 14 CFR 135 cargo flight. The airplane lifted off and climbed to about 200 feet. Instead of turning right toward the intended destination, the airplane began a left turn toward the runway. The angle of bank increased to about 45 degrees. The airplane then nosed down, and descended into snow covered terrain, about 200 yards north of the runway. Examination of the engine revealed the number six cylinder head was fractured, and slightly separated from the cylinder barrel. The area around the point of separation was blackened and oily. Similar discoloration was noted on the inside of the engine cowl. A metallurgical examination of the cylinder head revealed a fatigue fracture along a large segment of the thread root radius between the 5th and 6th threads. The engine's cylinder compression is part of the operator's approved airworthiness inspection program. The number six cylinder compression, recorded 121 hours before the accident, was noted as 60 PSI. The last engine inspection, 27 hours before the accident, did not include a record of the engine compression.

On February 3, 1998 at about 1200 eastern standard time, a Douglas DC3C, N200MF, registered to Missionary Flights International, as a 14 CFR Part 91 passenger flight experienced a total loss of engine power on both engines and made a forced landing 1 mile from the Greater Exuma Airport, Moss Town, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airline transport pilot-in-command (PIC), commercial pilot first officer, and 24 passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Moss Town about 1 hour 52 minutes before the accident.