Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

Following an uneventful flight from Nursultan Nazarbayev Airport on behalf of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the crew was approaching Almaty Airport runway 23R in marginal weather conditions with a ceiling at 300 feet and a visibility limited to 5 km in freezing drizzle. On short final, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed 600 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. Two crew members were rescued while four others were killed.
Those killed were:
Major Gabit Esimdaevich Barlykbayev,
Captain Doszhan Galymbekovich Baimuratov,
1st Lt Mukhtar Hadzhimukanovich Sagimbayev,
Sgt Vasilkov Evgeny Borisovich.

According to the pilot, during the takeoff roll from the 5,000-ft-long runway, after reaching an airspeed of 90 knots, the airplane’s acceleration slowed. The airplane reached a maximum airspeed of about 92 knots, which was below the planned rotation speed of 100 knots. The pilot elected to abort the takeoff with about 1,500 ft of remaining runway. He reduced the power to idle and initiated maximum braking. The pilot stated that he did not sense the airplane slowing down but observed tire marks on the runway postaccident that were consistent with braking. The airplane continued off the end of the runway and collided with a fence before coming to a stop. All of the occupants exited the airplane safely, and a post-crash fire ensued. Examination of the runway revealed tire skid marks that began 1,200 ft from the runway end and continued into the grass leading to the airplane. An examination of the airplane revealed that the entire cockpit and cabin areas were destroyed by fire. The engines did not display evidence of a catastrophic failure but were otherwise unable to be examined in more detail due to the degree of fire damage. The parking brake control was found in the off position. All hydraulic brake lines were destroyed by fire, and the main landing gear sustained fire and impact damage. Although the tire marks on the runway indicated that some braking action took place, the extensive fire damage precluded a detailed examination of the braking system, and there was insufficient evidence to determine the reason for the runway excursion.

The twin engine airplane departed Detroit-Willow Run (Ypsilanti) Airport at 2337LT on March 6 on a cargo service to Akron-Canton Airport, carrying two pilots and a load of various goods. After takeoff, the crew encountered technical problems and declared an emergency. He completed two low passes in front of the tower, apparently due to gear problems. Eventually, the aircraft belly landed at 0008LT and came to rest on runway 05R. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Coming from Juba, the twin engine airplane departed Pieri Airstrip on a short flight to Yuai (about 22 km southwest from Pieri) before returning to Juba, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft stalled and crashed in an open field. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces but there was no fire. All 10 occupants were killed.

The single engine aircraft departed Boralday Airport in the suburb of Almaty on an ambulance flight to Kegen with five people on board. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the engine suffered a loss of power. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft lost height and crashed in hilly terrain. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Operator reported as Asia Continental Airlines.

After takeoff from Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport, while climbing, the crew informed ATC about an engine failure and was cleared for an immediate return. On final approach to runway 22, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all 7 occupants were killed, among them two pilots, four ATOS specialists (Airborne Tactical Observation System) and one technician.

During the takeoff roll from runway 26 at Xalapa Airport, the aircraft was unable to rotate for unknown reasons. It struck a small berm located at the end of the concrete area, flew over trees and crashed in a field about 120 metres further, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all six occupants were killed.

The flight crew was conducting a flight with two passengers and one flight attendant onboard the multiengine jet airplane. The flight crew later stated that at rotation speed, the captain applied back pressure to the control yoke; however, the nose did not rotate to a takeoff attitude. The captain attempted to rotate the airplane once more by relaxing the yoke then pulling it back again, and, with no change in the airplane’s attitude, he made the decision to reject the takeoff by retarding the thrust levers and applying maximum braking. The airplane overran the end of the runway onto a gravel pad where the landing gear collapsed. Continuity was confirmed from the flight controls to the control surfaces. No mechanical anomalies with the engines or airplane systems were noted during the investigation that would have precluded normal operation. A review of performance data indicated that the flight crew attempted to takeoff with the airplane 2,975 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), a center of gravity (CG) close to the most forward limit, and an incorrect stabilizer trim setting. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data indicated that the captain attempted takeoff at a rotation speed 23 knots (kts) slower than the calculated rotation speed for the airplane at maximum weight. Takeoff performance showed the departure runway was 575 ft shorter than the distance required for takeoff at the airplane’s weight. The captain, who was the pilot flying, did not hold any valid pilot certificates at the time of the accident because they had been revoked 2 years prior due to his falsification of logbook entries and records. Additionally, he had never held a type rating for the accident airplane and had started, but not completed, training in the accident airplane model before the accident. The first officer had accumulated about 16 hours of flight experience in the make and model of the airplane and was not authorized to operate as pilot-in-command. The airplane’s flight management system (FMS) data were not recovered; therefore, it could not be determined what data the flight crew entered into the FMS that allowed the airspeed numbers to be generated. The investigation revealed that had the actual performance numbers been entered, a “FIELD LIMITED” amber message would have illuminated warning the crew that the MTOW was exceeded, and airspeed numbers would not have been generated. Therefore, it is likely that the crew entered incorrect data into the FMS either by manually entering a longer runway length and/or decreased the weight of the fuel, passengers, and/or cargo.

On final approach to Asunción-Silvio Pettirossi Airport, the twin engine aircraft crashed on a parking place and burst into flames. A passenger was seriously injured while seven other occupants were killed.

The pilot reported that, while descending through clouds and beginning the instrument approach, some ice accumulated on the wings and he actuated the deice boots twice. The pilot saw the deice boots functioning normally on the wings and could not see the tail; however, the elevator began to shake, and he lost elevator control. The pilot applied forward pressure on the yoke and had to trim nose-down to avoid a stall. There were no cockpit caution indications and the pilot had disengaged the autopilot before descent. The airplane descended through the clouds and impacted a tree before coming to rest upright in a grass area. Postaccident examination of the wreckage, including component testing of the deice system, did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The flap jackscrew position suggested that the flaps were likely in transit between 0° and 10° flap extension at the time of impact. Review of radar data revealed that, during the 2 minutes before the accident, the airplane’s groundspeed averaged about 82 knots; or an approximate average airspeed of 94 knots when accounting for the winds aloft. Current weather observations and forecast weather products indicated that the airplane was likely operating in an area where moderate and potentially greater structural icing conditions prevailed, and where there was the potential for the presence of supercooled liquid droplets. Review of the pilot operating handbook for the airplane revealed that the minimum speed for flight in icing conditions was 130 knots indicated airspeed. It is likely that the pilot’s failure to maintain an appropriate speed for flight in icing conditions resulted in insufficient airflow over the ice contaminated elevator and the subsequent loss of elevator control.