Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

A Cirrus SR22 and a Swearingen AS226TC were approaching to land on parallel runways and being controlled by different controllers on different control tower frequencies. The pilot of the Swearingen was established on an extended final approach for the left runway, while the pilot of the Cirrus was flying a right traffic pattern for the right runway. Data from an on-board recording device showed that the Cirrus’ airspeed on the base leg of the approach was more than 50 kts above the manufacturer’s recommended speed of 90 to 95 kts. As the Cirrus made the right turn from the base leg to the final approach, its flight path carried it through the extended centerline for the assigned runway (right), and into the extended centerline for the left runway where the collision occurred. At the time of the collision, the Cirrus had completed about ½ of the 90° turn from base to final and its trajectory would have taken it even further left of the final approach course for the left runway. The pilot of the Swearingen landed uneventfully; the pilot of the Cirrus deployed the airframe parachute system, and the airplane came to rest upright about 3 nautical miles from the airport. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage to their fuselage. During the approach sequence the controller working the Swearingen did not issue a traffic advisory to the pilot regarding the location of the Cirrus and the potential conflict. The issuance of traffic information during simultaneous parallel runway operations was required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65Y, which details air traffic control procedures and phraseology for use by persons providing air traffic control services. The controller working the Cirrus did issue a traffic advisory to the Cirrus pilot regarding the Swearingen on the parallel approach. Based on the available information, the pilot of the Cirrus utilized a much higher than recommended approach speed which increased the airplane’s radius of turn. The pilot then misjudged the airplane’s flight path, which resulted in the airplane flying through the assigned final approach course and into the path of the parallel runway. The controller did not issue a traffic advisory to the pilot of Swearingen regarding the location of the Cirrus. The two airplanes were on different tower frequencies and had the controller issued an advisory, the pilot of the Swearingen may have been able to identify the conflict and maneuver his airplane to avoid the collision.

The twin engine aircraft departed Indore on an ambulance flight to Gwalior, carrying one passenger, two pilots and a load of boxes containing Covid vaccines. On final approach by night, the airplane collided with an aircraft arrester barrier system located about 80 metres short of runway 06R threshold. On impact, the aircraft nosed down, causing the nose gear to be torn off and the nose to be destroyed. Both propellers detached and both main gear collapsed. The fuselage was bent near the tail. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries.

The pilot in command (PIC) and second-in-command (SIC) completed an uneventful positioning flight to pick up passengers and then continued to the destination airport. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information revealed that, while en route, the PIC expressed a desire to complete the flight as quickly as possible and arrive at the destination before another airplane that was also enroute to the destination airport, presumably to please the passengers. The PIC compared the flight with an automobile race, and the airplane’s overspeed warning annunciated multiple times during the descent. The flight crew elected to conduct a straight-in visual approach to land. Throughout the final approach, the airplane was high and fast, as evidenced by the SIC’s airspeed callouts. When the SIC asked whether s-turns should be made, and the PIC responded that such turns were not necessary. An electronic voice recorded by the CVR repeatedly provided “sink rate” and “pull up” warnings while the airplane was on final approach, providing indications to the crewmembers that the approach was unstable, but they continued the landing. The airplane touched down about 1,000 ft down the 4,200-ft-long runway. The PIC described that the airplane’s wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and ground air brakes did not function after touchdown, but witness and video evidence showed that the thrust reversers deployed shortly after touchdown. In addition, tire skid marks indicated that wheel braking occurred throughout the ground roll and increased heavily during the final 1,500 ft of the runway when the antiskid system activated. The ground air brakes did not deploy. The airplane overran the runway and came to rest about 400 ft past the departure end of the runway in marshy terrain. The fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage. The switch that controlled the automatic deployment of the ground air brake system was found in a position that should have allowed for their automatic deployment upon landing. There was no evidence to indicate a preaccident mechanical malfunction or failure with the hydraulic system, wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and weight-on-wheel switches, or electrical issues with either air brake switches. The airplane’s ground air brake deployment system logic required that both throttle levers be below 18° (throttle lever angle) in order to activate. The accident airplane’s throttle lever position microswitches were tested after the accident. The left throttle microswitch tested normal, but the right throttle microswitch produced an abnormal electrical current/resistance during initial testing. When the throttle was touched and then further manipulated by hand, the electrical resistance tested normal. The investigation was unable to determine whether the intermittent right throttle microswitch resistance prevented the ground air brakes from deploying because the testing was inconclusive. Landing performance calculations showed that, without ground air brakes, the landing ground roll exceeded the runway that was available from the airplane’s touchdown point about 1,000 ft down the runway. Mobile phone video evidence revealed that a quartering tailwind of about 10 to 15 knots persisted during the landing, which exceeded the manufacturer’s tailwind landing limitation of 10 knots for the airplane, and thus would have further increased the actual ground roll distance beyond that calculated. Throughout the final approach, the flight crew received several indications that the approach was unstable. The flight crew was aware that the airplane was approaching the runway high, fast, and at an abnormal sink rate. Both pilots had an opportunity to call for a go-around, which would have been the appropriate action. However, it is likely that the external pressures that the PIC and SIC accepted to complete the flight as quickly as possible influenced their decision-making in continuing the approach.

On the morning of the accident flight, G-HYZA was flown for approximately 16 minutes on test flight 85. The flight test team debriefed the results and prepared the aircraft for flight 86. The plan for this flight was for the HV battery to be switched off at the end of the downwind leg then, if able, to fly three or more circuits at 1,000 ft aal using the HFC only to provide electrical power. The flight test team discussed experimenting with combinations of higher airspeeds and propeller rpm that would reduce the aircraft angle of attack and improve the mass flow of air through the radiator which provided cooling for the HFC. This was considered as a potential strategy to manage a slow rise in temperature in the HFC which they had observed in previous flights when flying on that power source alone. The test card for flight 86 was not amended to reflect this intention. At 1406 hrs, following a normal start using both the HV battery and HFC to provide electrical power, the HV was switched off to preserve its electrical capacity. The aircraft taxied to the holding point and was cleared to line up on Runway 03. The weather was fair with good visibility and light winds from 010°. The aircraft entered the runway and backtracked to the threshold where the pilot commenced a run-up of the propulsion system to ensure the HFC could achieve thermal stability within the flight test parameters. Once the temperatures in the HFC were stable, the pilot switched on the HV battery to bring both power sources online and commenced the takeoff run. As the aircraft accelerated and the power lever was advanced, the observer operated the high temperature override switch to maintain the temperature of the HFC within the operating limits. After takeoff, the pilot turned onto the crosswind leg and climbed to the circuit height of 1,000 ft agl. During the downwind leg of the right-hand circuit, the pilot stated the power was set to 95 kW, the propeller to 2,500 rpm and the airspeed to 100 kt. Once stabilized at these parameters, which were at variance with the flight test card conditions, the observer confirmed that the HFC operating temperatures were within limits. He then instructed the pilot to reduce power to 90 kW to assess the effect on the airspeed, which reduced to approximately 95 kt. The pilot increased the power to 95 kW to regain the target speed. The pilot set the power by reference to his display unit which was located below the throttle quadrant. When he looked up from this task, he recognized that the aircraft was in a late downwind position. He turned onto base leg and commented that they were losing speed in the turn. The observer suggested that they could increase power to 120 kW to regain the lost airspeed, then reduce power before turning off the HV battery to re-establish the test conditions. He also suggested a reduction in propeller rpm. The pilot increased power to 120 kW but did not reduce the propeller rpm. As he started to turn onto final, the pilot briefed that once he had established straight and level flight he would reduce the power slightly and turn off the HV battery leaving the electrical motors powered by the HFC. He called final on the radio and was cleared by ATC to fly through at circuit height. Approaching the runway threshold at approximately 940 ft agl, the pilot reduced power to 90 kW, set the airspeed to 90 kt then selected the HV battery to off. Immediately, all electrical drive to the propeller was lost. The pilot and observer made several unsuccessful attempts to reset the system to restore power from the HFC with the observer stating the action to be taken and the pilot making the switch selection. The observer instructed the pilot to select the HV battery to on to reconnect the alternative power source. HV power was not restored so the observer instructed the pilot to attempt a system reset with the HFC in the off position. Electrical power was still not restored and at 440 ft agl the observer declared “the voltage is too high”, to which the pilot replied, “we’ve got to do something quick”. The observer called for a further reset attempt and adjusted the power lever. The aircraft had now travelled the length of the runway and was at approximately 320 ft aal when the observer reported that power could not be restored. The pilot transmitted a MAYDAY call and initiated a turn to the left to position for a landing on Runway 21. Almost immediately he recognized that he did not have sufficient height to complete the manoeuvre so lowered the landing gear and selected full flap for a forced landing in a field that was now directly ahead on a north-westerly heading. The aircraft touched down at approximately 87 kt ground speed on a level grass field. The pilot applied the brakes, and the aircraft continued its movement until it struck, and passed through, a hedge during which the left wing broke away. The nosewheel and left main wheel entered a ditch and the aircraft came to an abrupt stop. The pilot and observer were uninjured and exited the aircraft through the upper half of the cabin door. The airport fire service arrived quickly at the scene. The observer returned to the aircraft and vented the hydrogen tank to atmosphere and disconnected the HV battery to make the aircraft safe.

The crew departed Belo Horizonte-Pampulha Airport for a local test flight. After landing on runway 13, the crew encountered difficulties and the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through the perimeter fence (striking concrete poles) and came to rest against trees, broken in two. The copilot aged 76 was killed while both other occupants were injured.

Following an uneventful flight from Cancún, the crew encountered technical problems with the undercarriage while on approach to Toluca-Licenciado Adolfo López Mateos. Decision was taken to complete a belly landing on runway 15/33. The airplane slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All 9 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft departed Bhopal-Raja Bhoj Airport on a flight to Guna, carrying three pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the crew reported technical problems and elected to make an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in an open field located in Bishan Khedi, about 5 km northeast of the airport. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

After departing runway 23 at Hermosillo-General Ignacio Pesqueira Garcia Airport, the twin engine aircraft entered a slight turn to the right but encountered difficulties to gain height. It struck power cables and crashed in a field located about 7 km west of the airport, bursting into flames. Three passengers were seriously injured while four other occupants including the pilot were killed. Few hours later, two of the three survivors died from their injuries. The undersecretary of Economic Development of Sonora Leonardo Ciscomani seems to be the only survivor.

The aircraft, registered 5Y-NJS operated by Westwind Aviation Ltd crashed at Ngong Racecourse. The flight with two onboard was on a private mission to Kisumu, Eldoret and back to Nairobi. The aircraft departed Wilson Airport (HKNW) at 0420Z and landed at Kisumu Airport (HKKI) at 0502Z. It then departed HKKI to HKEL at 1142Z and landed at 1200Z where it picked one passenger. The flight then departed HKEL to HKNW with three onboard at 1247Z with an estimated flight time of 40 minutes. According to the preliminary information obtained from the Captain, the aircraft attained flight level 250 42NM from Eldoret VOR. The flight was then cleared to fly direct to GV VOR by Nairobi Area Control Centre. During descend to flight level 100 they encountered bad weather whereby the wings developed heavy icing. The Captain deployed deicing systems on the wings but the problem persisted. The situation prompted the Captain to request Wilson Control to descend to “Monstry fix” for landing at HKNW which was approved. As the flight continued descending the left engine went off. The Captain requested Wilson Tower for assistance. After 30 seconds, the right engine also went off. The Captain elected to make an emergency landing at Ngong Racecourse. On landing along, the left wing collided with trees and broke-off and separated together with the left engine and the left main landing gear. The turned clockwise through 180° and faced the opposite direction. All three onboard escaped unhurt but the aircraft was destroyed.

On 20 March 2021, a Boeing 737-400F, registered PK-YSF, was being operated by Trigana Air Service on a non-schedule cargo flight from Halim Perdanakusuma International Airport (WIHH), Jakarta, Indonesia with intended destination of Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport (WAAA), South Sulawesi, Indonesia. On board in this flight was two pilots, one engineer and one Flight Operation Officer (FOO). According to the weight and balance sheet, the flight carried 16,672 kgs of general cargo, takeoff fuel of 11,100 kg and the takeoff weight was 60,695 kg (133,835 lbs). The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF) and the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM). At 0328 UTC (1028 LT), the PM requested clearance to Halim Tower controller (the controller) to pushback and start the engines. At 1031 LT, the PM requested to the controller for taxi clearance. There was no report of aircraft system abnormality prior to the aircraft departure. At 1047 LT, the controller issued clearance to the PK-YSF pilot to enter and to backtrack Runway 24. At 1051 LT, the PM reported ready for departure to the controller. The controller issued takeoff clearance with additional departure clearance that after takeoff, turn left to heading 180° and initially climb to altitude of 3,000 feet. The PM acknowledged the clearance. The takeoff was conducted with reduced takeoff thrust by assumed temperature of 40°C and the aircraft became airborne at 10:52:57 LT. At 1055 LT, the controller advised the pilot to report when established on heading 180°. The PM reported that they were experiencing right engine failure and requested to fly to AL NDB . The controller advised the PM to turn left heading 060° and to climb to 2,500 feet. Furthermore, the controller asked the pilot intention whether to hold over AL NDB or direct for landing approach. The PM replied that they would hold over AL NDB and added the information that no fire was detected. The controller issued clearance to fly to AL NDB at altitude of 2,500 feet. The controller assumed that PK-YSF would return to Halim and advised the Airport Rescue and Fire-Fighting (ARFF) personnel that PK-YSF experienced right engine failure and would return to Halim. At 1058 LT, the controller requested the information of time required for holding over AL NDB and was replied by the PM that holding would require about 15 minutes. Furthermore, the controller requested whether the pilot able to hold at a point about 15 to 20 Nm from AL NDB and was replied by the PM that they did not objection to the proposal. The controller instructed the pilot to maintain outbound heading up to 15 Nm, at altitude of 2,500 feet. This was intended by the controller to manage the departure and arrival aircraft to and from Halim. At 1116 LT, the PM reported that they were ready to turn left for approach. The controller advised the pilot to turn left and to intercept localizer of the Instrument Landing System (ILS) Runway 24. At 1125 LT, the PM reported to the controller that the Runway was in sight. The controller advised that the wind was from 060° at velocity of 6 knots, QNH 1,007 mbs and issued landing clearance. The aircraft touched down on the touchdown zone and shortly after, both wheels of the right main landing gear detached. The controller noticed spark appeared from the aircraft and pressed the crash bell. At 1127 LT, the controller informed pilots of the other aircraft that the runway blocked by the landing aircraft and identified fire on one of the engines. Few seconds later, the PM called the controller whether any fire and was replied by the controller that fire was visible on the left side of the aircraft.