Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight with various equipments on behalf of the Conader, the Commission Nationale de Désarmement et de Réinsertion. Following an uneventful flight, the crew started the approach in heavy rain falls. After landing on a wet runway, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance and overran. It lost its undercarriage and came to rest in marshy field. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Aquaplaning suspected.

The twin engine aircraft departed Bergamo-Orio al Serio Airport on a night cargo service to Zagreb, carrying one passenger (the captain's wife), two pilots and a load of 1,600 kilos of small packages. After takeoff from runway 28, while climbing in foggy conditions, the aircraft entered a left turn then descended, collided with a powerline and crashed in an open field located one km north of the airfield. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed.

The crew landed with the landing gear in the retracted position. While the airplane was on the base leg of the traffic pattern, the pilot heard a helicopter pilot make a transmission over the common radio frequency. As he completed the before landing checklist the pilot searched for the helicopter that he heard over the radio. During the landing flare he realized something was amiss and looked down at the instrument panel. He noticed that the landing gear lights were illuminated red. Just prior to contacting the runway surface he reached for the landing gear handle and manipulated it in the down position. The airplane made a smooth touchdown with the landing gear in the retracted position. The pilot stated that he did not make the proper check for the gear extension due to the timing of the helicopter distraction. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane or engine, stating that the accident was the result of pilot error.

Following an uneventful flight from Calcutta, the aircraft landed at Mumbai-Chhatrapati Shivaji Airport runway 27. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest few dozen metres further. All 117 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Empuriabrava Airfield, the aircraft was too low, causing the undercarriage to collide with the perimeter fence. Decision was taken to divert to Gerona-Costa Brava Airport. The aircraft landed on a foamed runway and came to rest. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On the day before the occurrence, the accident aircraft arrived in Winnipeg, Manitoba, on a flight from Thunder Bay, Ontario. The aircraft was parked in a heated hangar overnight and was pulled outside at about 0410 central daylight time. The pilot reviewed the weather information and completed planning for the flight, which was estimated to take two hours and six minutes. The aircraft was refuelled and taxied to Apron V at the Winnipeg International Airport, where it was loaded with cargo. After loading was complete, the pilot obtained an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance for the flight to Thunder Bay, taxied to Runway 36, received take-off clearance, and departed. The aircraft climbed on runway heading for about one minute to an altitude of 1300 feet above sea level (asl), 500 feet above ground level (agl). The flight was cleared to 9000 feet asl direct to Thunder Bay, and the pilot turned on course. The aircraft continued to climb, reaching a maximum altitude of 2400 feet asl about 2.5 minutes after take-off. The aircraft then started a gradual descent averaging about 400 feet per minute (fpm) until it descended below radar coverage. The accident occurred during hours of darkness at 0543. The Winnipeg Fire Paramedic Service were notified and responded from a nearby station.

The aircraft departed Kisangani on a flight to Bunia, carrying 96 soldiers and four crew members on behalf of the Congolese Army Forces. Upon landing at Aru Airstrip, the right main gear collapsed and the aircraft veered to the left and came to rest on the left side of the runway. Two soldiers were killed while walking into the still running propellers. Eleven people were injured.

The airline transport certificated pilot with 10 skydiving passengers began a takeoff in a tailwheel-equipped and turboprop powered airplane on a CFR Part 91 skydiving flight. As the airplane started its climb, the pitch angle of the nose of the airplane increased until the airplane appeared to stall about 50 to 100 feet agl. It descended and impacted the runway in a left wing, nose low attitude. Several FAA inspectors responded to the accident site and documented the accident scene and the airplane systems. The inspectors reported that flight control continuity was established, and they noted that the stabilizer appeared to be in a nose up trim position. Measurement of the stabilizer trim position equated to a 56.5 percent nose up trim condition. The airplane's horizontal stabilizer trim system is electrical. An electric trim indicator, and a trim warning light were installed in the upper left portion of the instrument panel. The light will illuminate if "full-up" trim is set, and the engine is producing over 80 percent power. A placard stating, "Set Correct Trim for Takeoff," was installed on the lower instrument panel in front of the pilot position. The airplane's flight manual contains a "Before Takeoff" warning, which states, in part: "Warning - An extreme out-of-trim stabilizer can, in combination with loading, flaps position and power influence, result in an uncontrollable aircraft after the aircraft leaves the ground." In addition, a caution states, in part: "Caution - Failure to set correct trim settings will result in large control forces and/or unrequested pitching/yawing." Pilot actions listed in the "Before Takeoff" checklist include stabilizer trim settings. The airplane contained seat belts for all passengers, but the pilot's shoulder harness was not used, as it was folded and tie-wrapped near its upper attach point.

Northrepps Airfield has a single grass runway, orientated 18/36, and 1617 ft (493 m) long, with a down slope of 1.8% on Runway 18. On the day of the accident, the short grass was wet and an aftercast indicated that the wind at Northrepps was from approximately 210º at 10 to 13 kt. The pilot first flew an approach to Runway 18 and touched down close to the threshold; he subsequently reported that, looking at the slope of the runway ahead of him, he decided to go around and re‑position for a landing on Runway 36, to take advantage of the up-slope on that runway. The pilot stated that, during the approach to Runway 18, he had assessed that the braking effect of the wind would be insignificant in comparison to the braking effect that would be afforded by the uphill slope when landing on Runway 36. The pilot recalled seeing a “shortened” and “non‑standard” windsock mounted on a caravan adjacent to the Runway 18 threshold, but he did not believe that it could be relied upon for an accurate wind strength determination. He did not recall having seen the airfield’s other, larger, windsock. The approach for a short field landing on Runway 36 was normal and the pilot closed the throttles just before the threshold. The aircraft touched down close to the threshold, and the pilot immediately retracted the flaps. The pilot reported that he had lost two thirds of his touchdown speed by about the mid-point of the runway, and that the braking was within his expectations. He subsequently stated that he “seemed to get to a point… when I realised that I was effectively getting no braking at all from the wheels and the uphill slope had petered away”; he then experienced a sensation which he described as being similar to aquaplaning, with all braking authority seemingly lost. The aircraft continued along the runway, crossed the grassed overshoot area, ran over an earth bank beyond the end of the runway and came to rest on a public road just north of this bank. The pilot shut the aircraft down and all three occupants vacated the aircraft without difficulty.

The twin-engine airplane was destroyed when it impacted an earthmoving scraper and terrain in a field about 2.5 miles north of the departure airport in night visual meteorological conditions. Witnesses reported that the pilot had aborted an earlier flight when he returned to the airport and told the mechanic that he had a right engine fire warning light. The discrepancy could not be duplicated during maintenance, and the airplane departed. About 23 minutes after departure, the pilot reported to air traffic control that he needed to return to the airport to have something checked out. The pilot did not report to anyone why he decided to return to the departure airport, and he flew over four airports when he returned to the departure airport. Radar track data indicated that the airplane flew over the departure end of runway 35 at an altitude of about 1,600 feet agl, and made a descending left turn. The airplane's altitude was about 800 feet agl when it crossed the final approach course for runway 35. The airplane continued the descending left turn, but instead of landing on runway 35, the airplane flew a course that paralleled the runway, about 0.8 nm to the right of runway 35. The airplane continued to fly a northerly heading and continued to descend. The radar track data indicated that the airplane's airspeed was decreasing from about 130 kts to about 110 kts during the last one minute and fifty seconds of flight. The last reinforced beacon return indicated that the airplane's altitude was about 200 feet agl, and the airspeed was about 107 kts. The airplane impacted terrain about 0.75 nm from the last radar contact on a 338-degree magnetic heading. A witness reported that the airplane was going slow and was "extremely low." He reported that the airplane disappeared, and then there was an explosion and a fireball that went up about 1,000 feet. Inspection of the airplane revealed that it impacted the earthmover in about a wings level attitude. The landing gear handle was found to be in the landing gear UP position. The inspection of the left engine and propeller revealed damage indicative of engine operation at the time of impact. Inspection of the right engine revealed damage indicative of the engine not operating at the time of impact, consistent with an engine shutdown and a feathered propeller. No pre-existing conditions were found in either engine that would have interfered with normal operation. The inspection of the right engine fire detection loop revealed that the connector had surface contamination. When tested, an intermittent signal was produced which could give a fire alarm indication to the pilot. After the surface contamination was removed, the fire warning detection loop operated normally.