Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The pilot had flown the airplane the day before the accident and after landing on the morning of the accident; she ordered fuel for the airplane. While exiting the airplane another pilot informed her that he had heard a "popping noise" coming from one of the engines. The pilot of the accident airplane elected to taxi to a run up area to conduct an engine run up. The fuel truck arrived at the run up area and the pilot elected not to refuel the airplane at that time and continued the run up. No anomalies were noted during the run up and the airplane was taxied back to the ramp and parked. The pilot arrived back at the airport later on the day of the accident and did not re-order fuel for the airplane nor did she recall checking the fuel tanks during the preflight inspection of the airplane. The pilot departed and was in cruise flight when she noticed the fuel light on the annunciator panel flickering. The pilot checked the fuel gauges and observed less than 100 pounds of fuel per-side indicated. The pilot declared low fuel with Columbia Approach Control controllers and requested to divert to the nearest airport, Orangeburg Municipal. The controller cleared the pilot for a visual approach to the airport and as she turned the airplane for final, the left engine lost power followed by the right engine. The pilot made a forced landing into the trees about 1/4 mile from the approach end of runway 36. The pilot exited the airplane and telephoned 911 emergency operators on her cell phone. The pilot stated she did not experience any mechanical problems with the airplane before the accident. Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed the fuel tanks were not ruptured and no fuel was present in the fuel tanks.

The airplane was on the final approach segment of an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross country flight that originated approximately 3 hours and 45 minutes prior to the accident when radio communications with the aircraft were lost. The aircraft wreckage was located the following day approximately 2.8 miles from the destination airport. The airplane impacted terrain in a vertical descent and flat attitude and came to rest upright on its fuselage and wings. The cockpit and cabin were intact and both wing assemblies remained attached to the fuselage. Evidence of forward velocity and/or leading edge deformation was not observed to the wings or fuselage. Mixed ice was noted along the leading edge of both wings. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were reported as low ceilings and low visibility due to snow and mist. The accident occurred during dark night conditions. Air traffic control (ATC) transcripts indicated that shortly after entering the holding pattern at 11,000 feet the pilot was issued an approach clearance for the ILS. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and approximately two minutes later ATC communications with the pilot were lost. Pilot logbook records showed that the pilot's total flight time was approximately 1,987 hours. In the six-month period preceding the accident, the pilot logged approximately 40 hours total time, 9 hours of actual instrument time and 7 instrument approaches in the accident airplane. The pilot's total night flying experience was approximately 51 hours. The pilot made no entries in his pilot logbook indicating that he had flown at night in the six-month time frame preceding the accident. Pilots flying the ILS approach prior to the accident aircraft reported mixed icing during the descent and final approach. Post accident examination of the aircraft revealed no evidence to indicate a mechanical malfunction or failure.

The crew took delivery of the aircraft in Farnborough and was supposed to transfer it in Abuja following fuel stop in Paris-Le Bourget, Oued Isara and Kaduna. Shortly after takeoff from Kaduna Airport runway 05, while in initial climb, one of the engine caught fire. The pilot-in-command lost control of the airplane that stalled and crashed, bursting into flames. Both occupants were killed.

On 21 November 2005, the day before the accident, the pilot had completed a day of aerial topdressing in ZK-DZG, a New Zealand Aerospace Industries Fletcher FU24-950, then flown the aircraft with his loader-driver as a passenger to Whangarei Aerodrome. That evening the pilot contacted his operator’s (the company’s) chief engineer in Hamilton and said that the airspeed indicator in ZK-DZG was stuck on 80 knots. The chief engineer told him the pitot-static line for the indicator was probably blocked and to have a local aircraft engineer blow out the line. Early the next morning, the day of the accident, the pilot flew ZK-DZG with his loader-driver on board to an airstrip 50 km north-west of Whangarei to spread fertiliser on a farm property. As the morning progressed, the weather conditions became unsuitable for aerial topdressing. At about 1020, the pilot used his mobile telephone to talk to another company pilot at Kerikeri, and told him that the wind was too strong for further work. The conversation included general work-related issues and ended about 1045, with the pilot saying that he was shortly going to return to Whangarei and go to his motel. Before leaving for Whangarei, the pilot spoke with a truck driver who had delivered fertiliser to the airstrip about 1100. The driver commented later that the pilot said the wind had picked up enough to preclude further topdressing. After they had covered the fertiliser, the pilot told the driver that he and the loader-driver would fly to Whangarei. The driver did not recall anything untoward, except that the pilot had casually mentioned there was some electrical fault causing an amber light in the cockpit to flicker and that it would only be a problem if a second light came on. He said the pilot did not appear to be concerned about the light. The driver then left and did not see the aircraft depart. The pilot used his mobile telephone to tell an aircraft engineer at Whangarei Aerodrome about the airspeed indicator problem and asked him if he could have a look at it and blow out the pitot-static system. The engineer believed the call was made from the ground at about 1130, but he could not be certain of the time. The engineer agreed to rectify the problem and the pilot said he would arrive at the Aerodrome about noon. The engineer said he did not know that the pilot had spent the previous night in Whangarei or that the aircraft had been parked at the Aerodrome overnight. ZK-DZG was equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) and its navigation data was downloaded for analysis. From the data it was established that the aircraft departed from the airstrip at 1131 and flew for about 39 km on a track slightly right of the direct track to Whangarei Aerodrome, before altering heading direct to the aerodrome and Pukenui Forest located 5 km west of Whangarei city. A witness who had some aeroplane pilot flying experience, and was on a property close to the track of ZK-DZG, said he saw the aircraft fly past shortly after about 1130 at an estimated height of 500 feet. He watched it fly in the direction of Pukenui Forest for about 40 seconds before turning his head away. A short time later he turned again to look at the aircraft, which by then was just above the horizon about 2 ridges away. He said there was a strong, constant wind blowing from the right (south) of the aircraft, which appeared to be drifting sideways and rocking its wings. He then saw the aircraft enter a steep descending turn that seemed to tighten before it disappeared from view. He estimated it to have turned about 270 degrees. Another witness near the aircraft track and accident site reported seeing the aircraft at about 1140 flying just above the tree line and thought it might have been “dusting” the forest. The aircraft then turned and disappeared behind some trees. Other witnesses who heard or saw the aircraft described the weather as squally throughout the morning with strong winds from the south, and said that near the time of the accident there was no rain. The witnesses noticed nothing untoward with the aircraft itself, and at the time none was concerned that the aircraft may have been involved in an accident. The local aircraft engineer said he was not concerned when ZK-DZG did not arrive at Whangarei, because from his experience it was not unusual for agricultural pilots to change their plans at the last minute and to not inform the engineers. He described his conversation with the pilot as being casual and said the pilot did not mention that he was finishing topdressing for the day because of the weather. He thought the pilot was just trying to fit in the maintenance work and that his plans had changed. The pilot had not asked him to provide any search and rescue watch, nor did the engineer expect him to because he could not recall any pilot having asked him to do so. There was no evidence that the pilot made any radio calls during the flight. The frequency to which the radio was selected and its serviceability could not be determined because of the accident damage. At about 2200 a member of the pilot’s family contacted the emergency services when she became concerned that there had been no contact from the pilot. An extensive aerial search began at first light the next morning, and at about 1120 the wreckage of ZK-DZG was located about 50 metres (m) below a ridge in a heavily wooded area of Pukenui Forest, at an elevation of 920 feet above sea level. Both occupants were fatally injured.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft struck the right side of the runway while landing at Ratanakiri Airport. Upon impact, the right main gear collapsed and out of control, the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest. All 65 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane was operated as an on-demand cargo flight that impacted trees and terrain about one mile from the destination airport during a non-precision approach. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The airplane was equipped with an "icing protection system" and a report by another airplane that flew the approach and landed without incident indicated that light rime icing was encountered during the approach. Radar data shows that the accident airplane flew the localizer course inbound and began a descent past the final approach fix. No mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation were noted with the airplane.

Following an uneventful flight from Manila, the crew started the approach to Catarman Airport. Weather conditions were marginal and the runway was wet due to rain falls. After landing on runway 04/22 which is 1,350 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest in a paddy field. All 38 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair. Aquaplaning may be a factor.

The twin-engine airplane was destroyed by impact with terrain about 2.5 miles northeast of the airport while returning to the airport with an engine problem. A witness reported that the FAR Part 135 on-demand passenger flight had been scheduled for a 0900 departure, but because the flight had not been confirmed, a pilot was not scheduled to fly the flight. The accident pilot arrived at the airport about 1005. A witness reported that the pilot was not in the office for more than two minutes when he "grabbed the status book," walked straight to the airplane, and boarded. A lineman serviced both engines at 0930 with oil, but failed to put the dipstick back in the right engine oil filler tube. Witnesses reported that they did not see the pilot perform a preflight. The pilot was unaware that the dipstick was left on the right wing of the airplane. The pilot taxied the airplane forward about 5 feet and abruptly stopped and shut down both engines. The pilot got out of the airplane. The lineman reported that he approached the pilot and asked what was wrong. The lineman reported that the pilot closed the oil flap door on the right engine, and said that the oil flap door had been left open. The pilot restarted the engines and departed about 1008. About three minutes after takeoff, the pilot informed departure control that he needed to return to the airport due to an oil leak. The pilot reported over the Unicom radio frequency that he was returning because he was having trouble with the right engine. Radar track data indicated that about 1013, the airplane's position was about 1.5 miles directly north of the airport about 1,800 feet msl, heading south at 126 knots calibrated airspeed (CAS). The airplane continued to fly south directly to the airport. The radar track data indicated that instead of landing on runway 18, the airplane flew over the airport, paralleling runway 18. About 1014, the airplane's position was over the airport at an altitude of about 1,460 feet msl (550 feet above ground level), heading south at about 97 knots CAS. The airplane continued to fly south past the airport, entered a left turn, and turned back to the north. The last radar return was recorded about 1016. The airplane's position was approximately 1.5 miles east of the approach end of runway 18 at an altitude of about 1,116 feet msl (344 feet agl), heading north at about 99 knots CAS. The impact site was located about 2.5 miles north of the last radar return. A witness, located about 1/4 mile from the accident site, observed the airplane flying "really low." He reported, "The motor on the plane wasn't cutting out or sputtering." Another witness reported, "The plane lifted up over power lines then went across a field about 50 to 80 ft off ground." The airplane impacted a harvested cornfield in a Page 2 of 11 CHI06FA026 steep nose-down attitude, and traveled 45 feet before stopping. The inspection of the airplane revealed that the landing gear was down, flaps were found in a 20-degree down position, and neither propeller was feathered. The post accident inspection of the airplane's engines and airframe revealed no preexisting anomalies that could be associated with a pre-impact condition.

The 4,100-hour commercial pilot lost directional control of the single-pilot twin-engine turbojet while taking off from runway 22 (7,602-feet long by 150-feet wide), and impacted the ground about 3,750 feet from the point of departure. Several witnesses reported that the airplane climbed to approximately 150 feet, rolled to the right, descended, and then struck the ground inverted. The weather was day VFR and the wind was reported from 170 degrees at 10 knots. Examination of the wreckage revealed that none of the main-entry door latching pins were in their fully locked position. The airplane's flight controls and engines did not disclose any mechanical discrepancies. The flaps were in the takeoff position and the control lock was unlocked. The pilot had not flown the airplane for over nine months because of extensive maintenance; the accident occurred on its first test flight out of maintenance. Since the pilots flight records were not found, it is unknown how much flight time the pilot had flown in the last nine months. The other airplane that the pilot owned was a Cessna 650, but witnesses stated that the pilot was only qualified as a co-pilot. Most of the maintenance records that were located were not completed; an approval for return-to-service was not found. Another airplane that had declared an emergency was on a 10-mile final when the tower cleared the accident airplane for takeoff, with no delay on the takeoff roll. No additional communication or distress calls were reported from the accident airplane. The airplane was not equipped with either a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder. No anomalies were found on either engine that could have prevented normal engine operation.

Upon landing at Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Airport, the nose gear collapsed and punctured the ground floor just behind the cockpit. The aircraft came to rest on the main runway following a course of few dozen metres. All occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.