Crash of an Antonov AN-12BP at Bagram AFB

Date & Time: Jun 29, 2006
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EK-12305
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
00 347 305
YOM:
1970
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
In unknown circumstances, the aircraft caught fire shortly after landing at Bagram AFB. It came to rest on the runway and the crew was able to evacuate safely. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Crash of a Lockheed HC-130H Hercules in Saint Paul Island

Date & Time: Jun 28, 2006
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
1710
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kodiak - Saint Paul Island
MSN:
5028
YOM:
1985
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Kodiak on a cargo flight to Saint Paul Island, carrying nine crew members and a 19,000 litres fuel truck. Upon landing on runway 36, the airplane fish tailed twice, causing the right wing to struck the runway surface. The wingtip was sheared off as well as the engine n°4 propeller. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overrun, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen metres further. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a BAe 125-3A in Barcelona

Date & Time: Jun 26, 2006 at 0958 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N125GK
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Caracas - Barcelona
MSN:
25127
YOM:
1967
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Caracas-Maíquetia-Simón Bolívar Airport, the crew complete the approach to Barcelona-General José Antonio Anzoátegui Airport. The airplane landed normally and after a course of about 100 metres, both main gears collapsed. The aircraft skidded on runway and eventually came to rest, bursting into flames. All 8 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Fort Pierce: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 25, 2006 at 1224 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N316PR
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Fort Pierce - Murfreesboro
MSN:
761
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
11000
Captain / Total hours on type:
2000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4073
Circumstances:
Witnesses stated that they observed the twin-engine airplane roll into a steep right bank and enter a spin at a low altitude (less than 700 feet) during the initial climb. The airplane then descended and impacted terrain about 1.5 miles from the end of the departure runway. Some witnesses reported hearing an unusual engine noise just before the airplane began to roll and spin. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Examination of the right engine revealed that the ring gear support of the engine/propeller gearbox had fractured in flight due to high cycle fatigue originating from the corner radii of the high-speed pinion cutout. The reason for the fatigue could not be determined. The ring gear support disengaged from the ring gear due to this failure, resulting in a disconnection in power being transferred from the engine power section to the propeller. In addition to the ability for a pilot to manually feather the propellers, and an automatic feathering feature, the engine (Honeywell TPE-331) design also includes a “Negative Torque Sensing” (NTS) system that would automatically respond to a typical failed engine condition involving a propeller that is driving the coupled engine. Feathering the propeller reduces drag and asymmetric yawing due to the failed engine. All Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification evaluations for one-engine inoperative handling qualities for the airplane type were conducted with the NTS system operational. According to the airplane manufacturer, the NTS system was designed to automatically reduce the drag on the affected engine to provide a margin of safety until the pilot is able to shut down the engine with the condition lever. However, if a drive train disconnect occurs at the ring gear support, the NTS system is inoperable, and the propeller can come out of feather on its own, if the disconnect is followed by a pilot action to retard the power lever on the affected engine. In this scenario, once the fuel flow setting is reduced below the point required to run the power section at 100% (takeoff) rpm, the propeller governor would sense an “underspeed” condition and would attempt to increase engine rpm by unloading the propeller, subsequently driving the propeller out of feather toward the low pitch stop. This flat pitch condition would cause an increase in aerodynamic drag on one side of the airplane, and unanticipated airplane control difficulty could result due to the asymmetry.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s loss of aircraft control during the initial climb which was precipitated by the sudden loss of thrust and increase in drag from the right engine, and the pilot’s failure to adhere to the published emergency procedures regarding the position of the failed engine power lever. Contributing to the accident was the fatigue failure of the right engine’s ring gear support for undetermined reasons, which rendered the propeller’s automatic drag reducing system inoperative.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 560 Citation Encore in Upland: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 24, 2006 at 2226 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N486SB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
San Diego - Upland
MSN:
560-0580
YOM:
2001
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2951
Captain / Total hours on type:
268.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2513
Circumstances:
The airplane touched down at night about 1,400 feet down the 3,864-foot runway and overran the runway surface, coming to rest about 851 feet beyond the departure end. The pilot was operating the airplane using a single-pilot waiver that he obtained two months prior to the accident. The airplane was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration with a flight crew of two. The pilot was returning from a personal event with his family, and landing at his home airport when the accident occurred. Witnesses stated that the pilot’s approach into the airport was not consistent with previous approaches in which the airplane would touch down directly on the runway numbers. They also stated that they heard the thrust reversers deploy, and then return to the stowed position. The airplane flight manual states that once the thrust reversers have been deployed, a pilot should not attempt to restow the thrust reversers and take off. Two sink rate warnings were issued during the approach to landing which should have alerted the pilot of the unstabilized approach. Performance calculations showed that the airplane would have required an additional 765 to 2,217 feet of runway for a full stop landing.
Probable cause:
The pilot's unstabilized approach to the runway and failure to obtain the proper touchdown point, which resulted in a runway overrun.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-12/47 in Big Timber: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jun 24, 2006 at 1420 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N768H
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Big Timber - Big Timber
MSN:
716
YOM:
2006
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
3200
Aircraft flight hours:
41
Circumstances:
The private pilot receiving instruction and his flight instructor departed on runway 06 with a headwind of 17 knots gusting to 23 knots. Witnesses said that the pilot had transmitted on Common Traffic Advisor Frequency the intention of practicing a loss of engine power after takeoff, and turning 180 degrees to return to the airport. Another witness said that the airplane pitched up 30 degrees while simultaneously banking hard to the right in an uncoordinated manner. He said that as the airplane rolled to the right, the nose of the airplane yawed down to nearly 45 degrees below the horizon. Subsequently, the airplane's wings rolled level, but the aircraft was still pitched nose down. He said the airplane appeared to be recovering from its dive. A witness said that the airplane appeared to be in a landing flare when he observed dirt and grass flying up behind the aircraft. He said the airplane's right wing tip and engine impacted terrain, and a fire ensued that consumed the airplane. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane's right wingtip hit a 10 inch in diameter rock and immediately impacted a wire fence 10 inches above the ground. Approximately 120 feet of triple wire fence continued with the airplane to the point of rest. No preimpact engine or airframe anomalies which might have affected the airplane's performance were identified. The weight and balance was computed for the accident airplane at the time of the accident and the center of gravity was determined to be approximately one inch forward of the forward limit.
Probable cause:
The flight instructor's failure to maintain an adequate airspeed while maneuvering, which led to an inadvertent stall.
Final Report:

Crash of an Excel Jet Sport Jet I in Colorado Springs

Date & Time: Jun 22, 2006 at 0953 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N350SJ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Colorado Springs - Colorado Springs
MSN:
001
YOM:
2006
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5307
Captain / Total hours on type:
11.00
Aircraft flight hours:
24
Circumstances:
According to the pilot, passenger, and several witnesses, during takeoff the light jet became airborne momentarily, and then banked aggressively to the left. It impacted the runway in a left wing low attitude and cartwheeled down the runway. An examination of the airplane's systems revealed no anomalies. Approximately 1.5 minutes before the airplane was cleared for takeoff, a De Havilland Dash 8 (DH-8) airplane departed. A wake turbulence study conducted by an NTSB aircraft performance engineer concluded that even slight movement in the atmosphere would have caused the circulation of the vortices near the accident site to decay to zero within two minutes, that is, before the time accident jet would have encountered the wake from the DH-8. The study states, in part: "Given the time of day of the accident, consistent reports of easterly surface wind speeds on the order of 6 to 7 knots, higher wind speeds aloft, and the mountainous terrain near Colorado Springs, it is unlikely that the atmosphere was quiescent enough to allow the wake vortices near the Sport-Jet to retain any significant circulation after two minutes. Furthermore, easterly surface winds would have blown the wake vortices well to the west of the runway by the time of the accident. Consequently, while in smooth air the wake vortices from the DH-8 that preceded Sport-Jet off of the runway may have retained enough circulation after two minutes to produce rolling moments on Sport-Jet on the order of the rolling moment available from the Sport-Jet's ailerons, it is most likely that the wake vortices were neither strong enough nor close enough to the Sport-Jet to cause the violent roll to the left reported by the pilot and witnesses to the accident."
Probable cause:
A loss of control for an undetermined reason during takeoff-initial climb that resulted in an in-flight collision with terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Jumla: 9 killed

Date & Time: Jun 21, 2006 at 1203 LT
Operator:
Registration:
9N-AEQ
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Nepālganj – Surkhet – Jumla
MSN:
708
YOM:
1980
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Aircraft flight hours:
23392
Aircraft flight cycles:
36092
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Nepālganj Airport on a domestic service to Jumla with an intermediate stop in Surkhet, carrying six passengers, three crew members and a load consisting of bags containing grains for a total of 941 kilos. While approaching Jumla Airport, the crew was informed that runway 27 was in use with a wind from 240 at 4 knots. For unknown reasons, the captain started the approach to runway 09 at 1201LT. At an excessive speed, he missed the runway, initiated a go-around procedure and passed to the right of the tower. Then, he started a steep turn to the left when the aircraft lost height and speed and crashed in a field located 500 meters east of the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 9 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The crew's attempt to make a sudden go-around while close to runway 09 threshold with a very low circuit altitude and subsequent attempt to turn in a tight circuit with excessive angle of bank that led to a stall. The aircraft subsequently contacted terrain due to insufficient clearance available for effective stall recovery. The quick decisions to change runway added to the crew workload at a critical period which was aggravated by the breakdown of cockpit discipline. The other contributory factors leading to the accident were:
- Violation of company Standard Operating Procedures by flight crew,
- Insufficient monitoring of its flight training program and line operations by Yeti management,
- Inadequate oversight of Yeti Airlines by CAAN.

Crash of a Boeing 737-301F in East Midlands

Date & Time: Jun 15, 2006 at 0502 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OO-TND
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Liège - Stansted
MSN:
23515/1355
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
TAY325N
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8325
Captain / Total hours on type:
4100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1674
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1377
Aircraft flight hours:
45832
Aircraft flight cycles:
34088
Circumstances:
On a scheduled cargo flight from Liège Airport to London Stansted Airport the crew diverted to Nottingham East Midlands Airport due to unexpectedly poor weather conditions at Stansted. The weather conditions at EMA required a CAT IIIA approach and landing. On approach, at approximately 500 feet agl, the crew were passed a message by ATC advising them of a company request to divert to Liverpool Airport. The commander inadvertently disconnected both autopilots whilst attempting to reply to ATC. He then attempted to re-engage the autopilot in order to continue the approach. The aircraft diverged to the left of the runway centreline and developed a high rate of descent. The commander commenced a go-around but was too late to prevent the aircraft contacting the grass some 90 m to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft became airborne again but, during contact with the ground, the right main landing gear had broken off. The crew subsequently made an emergency landing at Birmingham Airport (BHX).
Probable cause:
Causal factors:
1. ATC inappropriately transmitted a company R/T message when the aircraft was at a late stage of a CAT III automatic approach.
2. The commander inadvertently disconnected the autopilots in attempting to respond to the R/T message.
3. The crew did not make a decision to go-around when it was required after the disconnection of both autopilots below 500 ft during a CAT III approach.
4. The commander lost situational awareness in the latter stages of the approach, following his inadvertent disconnection of the autopilots.
5. The co-pilot did not call ‘go-around’ until after the aircraft had contacted the ground.
Contributory factors:
1. The weather forecast gave no indication that mist and fog might occur.
2. The commander re-engaged one of the autopilots during a CAT III approach, following the inadvertent disconnection of both autopilots at 400 feet aal.
3. The training of the co-pilot was ineffective in respect of his understanding that he could call for a go-around during an approach.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft A90 King Air in Tampa: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 12, 2006 at 1235 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7043G
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sarasota - Tampa
MSN:
LM-37
YOM:
1967
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2120
Captain / Total hours on type:
457.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1208
Copilot / Total hours on type:
44
Aircraft flight hours:
15671
Circumstances:
The first officer reported that during cruise flight, both propeller secondary low pitch stop (SLPS) lights illuminated, indicating the SLPS system prevented both propellers from going below the low pitch hydraulic mechanical stop. The right occurred first, then the left approximately 1 minute later. Emergency procedures to correct the condition were ineffective. The right propeller feathered at some point during the flight, and the first officer reported that while operating single engine, they experienced a problem with the propeller governor. The flight proceeded direct to an airport with short runways approximately 3.2 nautical miles (nm) northwest of their present position, rather than to an air carrier airport located 8.5 nm away. The captain entered a close-in right base to runway 35 (2,688 feet long runway), while flying at 155 knots (51 knots above single engine reference speed). He turned onto final approach with the landing gear and flaps retracted, but overshot the runway. The airplane contacted a taxiway near the departure end of intended runway, and then collided with several obstacles before coming to rest at a house located past the departure end of runway 35. A post crash fire consumed the cockpit, cabin, and sections of both wings. Post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. No determination was made as to the reason for the annunciation of both SLPS lights.
Probable cause:
The poor in-flight planning decision by the captain for his failure to establish the airplane on a stabilized approach for a forced landing, resulting in the airplane landing on a taxiway near the departure end of the runway. Contributing to the accident were the failure or malfunction of the primary hydraulic low pitch stop of both propellers for undetermined reasons, the excessive approach airspeed and the failure of the captain to align the airplane with the runway for the forced landing.
Final Report: