South America

The following factors were identified:
- The utilization of an aircraft not included in the Operating Specifications and of a runway neither registered nor approved, with a pilot who did not have the amount of hours necessary nor specific training, disclose a culture based on informal practices, which led to operation below the minimum safety requirements.
- It is possible that the pilot forgot to verify the quantity of fuel in the tanks of the aircraft before takeoff.
- The lack of specific training for the pilot and for the coordinator who, possibly, assumed the function of instructor may have compromised their operational performance during the preparation and conduction of the flight, since they were not effectively prepared for the activity.
- It is possible that the pilot failed to comply with the prescriptions of the legislation relatively to the minimum amount of fuel required for the flight leg. The operation of the aircraft by a pilot with expired qualifications and without the required training goes against the prescriptions at the time, but it was not determined whether this pilot (coordinator) was in the aircraft controls at the moment of the accident. The transport of a cylinder onboard the aircraft also configures flight indiscipline, since it goes against the legislation which prohibits the transport of such material.
- The lack of training of the differences may have contributed to the forgetting to verify the fuel tanks, a procedure that is prescribed in the aircraft manual. Likewise, lack of training may have deprived the pilots from acquiring proficiency for the operation of the aircraft in a single engine condition.
- The fact of conducting a flight to provide assistance in an emergency situation may have contributed to the pilot having forgotten to check safety parameters, such as the amount of fuel necessary.
- The pilot’s intention to earn his operational promotion may have stimulated him excessively, to the point of disregarding the minimum safety requirements for the operation. In addition, the emergency nature of the flight request possibly added to the motivation of the pilot and the coordinator.
- It is possible that, due to having little total experience either both of flight and in the aircraft, the pilot lost control of the aircraft when faced with the situation of in-flight engine failure after the takeoff.
- It is possible that the pilot and the coordinator prioritized the emergency requirement of the situation, failing to evaluate other aspects relevant for the safety of the flight, such as planning, for example.
- The lack of control on the part of the company’s management in relation to the flights operating outside of the main base allowed the pilot and the base manager to conduct a flight without the operating sector authorization. The lack of supervision of the air transport service provision by the contracting organizations allowed the company to provide services without the minimum conditions required by the legislation. Such conditions exposed the passengers to the risks of an irregular operation.

Controlled flight into terrain following the decision of the crew to continue the approach below the MDA without visual contact with the runway until the aircraft impacted ground.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Failure to apply the concepts of Crew Resource Management (CRM).
- Failure to use checklists.
- Failure to brief the maneuvers to be executed.
- Loss of situational awareness of the crew.
- Failure to keep a sterile cockpit during approach.
- Complacency and overconfidence of the pilots.
- Unstabilized instrument approach.
- Lack and/or non-use of equipment and systems to support the flight.

Loss of control after landing due to the failure of the nosewheel steering system.

The following findings were identified:
- The pilot took the risks inherent to that flight when he accepted to be the only crewmember on a night-time flight with an aircraft in which he lacked enough experience. It is therefore considered that the pilot was complacent when he accepted to fly the aircraft under those circumstances, taking the risks associated with the operation.
- The fact that the pilot made a phone call to his father, to tell that he was feeling insecure for conducting the flight, may be considered an indication that he was not confident, and this condition may have influenced negatively his operational performance during the descent procedure.
- It is possible that the motivation of the pilot in making a fast progress in his career contributed to his acceptance of the challenge to operate the flight, even if he was not feeling fully confident.
- It is possible that the characteristics related to the type of flight, regions, time of the day, in addition to the fact that the pilot was flying the aircraft alone for the first time, contributed to an unclear perception of the relevant elements around him, leading him to a mistaken comprehension, which resulted in the deterioration of his ability to foresee the events.
- The operational progress of the pilot in the company was expedited and, therefore, it is possible that for this reason he did not gather the necessary experience for conducting that type of flight.
- It is possible that the way the work was organized within the company, with designation of pilots not readapted in the aircraft for night-time flights without artificial horizon, and for takeoffs with an aircraft weight above the one prescribed in the manual contributed to the event that resulted in the accident.
- It is possible that the prioritization of the financial sector, in detriment of operational safety, contributed to the designation of a single pilot with short experience for transporting nine passengers.
- It is probable that the pilot, during the preparation of the aircraft for landing, allowed the its speed and power to drop to a value below the minima required for maintenance of level flight on the downwind leg.
- It is possible that the location of the runway in an isolated area of the Amazonian jungle region, without visual references in a night-time flight, contributed to the pilot’s difficulty maintaining a sustained flight.
- It is possible that the training done by the pilot in a shortened manner deprived him from the knowledge and other technical abilities necessary for flying the aircraft.
- The decisions of the company operation sector to designate a short-experienced pilot without a copilot for a night flight destined for an aerodrome located in a jungle region without visual reference with the terrain increased the risk of the operation. Therefore, the risk management process was probably inappropriate.
- It was the first time the pilot was flying the aircraft on a night-time flight without a copilot. Since he had only little experience in the aircraft, it is possible that his operational performance was hindered in the management of tasks, weakening his situational awareness.
- It was not possible to determine whether the company chose to dispense with the copilot on account of the need to transport a ninth passenger and, thus, did not consider in a conservative manner the prescription contained in the aircraft airworthiness certificate by designating just one pilot for the flight.

Loss of control following the collision with high power cables after the crew lost visual references during an approach completed in poor weather conditions. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Inadequate meteorological information provided by the Pias Airport flight coordinator that did not reflect the actual weather condition in the area,
- Lack of a procedure card to carry out the descent, approach, landing and takeoff at Pias Airport, considering the visual and operational meteorological limitations in the area,
- The copilot training was limited and did not allow the crew to develop skills for an effective CRM in normal and emergency procedures.

The following findings were identified:
- The lack of a prompt identification of the aircraft stall by the captain may have deprived him of handling the controls in accordance with the prescriptions of the aircraft emergency procedures, contributing to the aircraft entry in an abnormal attitude.
- The captain’s attention was focused on the passengers sitting in the rear seats, in detriment of the flight conditions under which the aircraft was flying. This had a direct influence on the maintenance of a poor situational awareness, which may have made it difficult for the captain to immediately identify that the aircraft was stalling.
- There was complacency when the copilot functions were assumed by a person lacking due professional formation and qualification for such. Even under an adverse condition, the prescribed procedure was not performed, namely, the use of the aircraft checklist.
- The fact that the aircraft was flying under icing conditions was confirmed by a statement of the female passenger in the cockpit (CVR). The FL210 (selected and maintained by the captain) gave rise to conditions favorable to severe icing on the aircraft structure. If the prevailing weather conditions are correlated with reduction of speed (attested by the radar rerun), the connection between loss of control in flight and degraded aircraft performance is duly established.
- The rotation of the aircraft after stalling may have contributed to the loss of references of the captain’s balance organs (vestibular system), making it impossible for him to associate the side of the turn made by the aircraft with the necessary corrective actions.
- The non-adherence to the aircraft checklists on the part of the captain, in addition to the deliberate adoption of non-prescribed procedures (disarmament of the starter and “seven killers”) raised doubts on the quality of the instruction delivered by the captain.
- The captain made an inappropriate flight level selection for his flight destined for São Paulo. Even after a higher flight level was offered to him, he decided to maintain FL 210. Also, after being informed about icing on the aircraft, he did not activate the Ice Protection System, as is expressly determined by the flight manual.
- The captain had the habit of making use of a checklist not prescribed for the aircraft, and this may have influenced his actions in response to the situation he was experiencing in flight.
- His recently earned technical qualification in the aircraft type; his inattention and distraction in flight; his attitude of non-compliance with operations and procedures prescribed in manuals; all of this contributed to the captain’s poor situational awareness.
- The flight plan was submitted via telephone. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the captain’s level of awareness of the real conditions along the route, since he did not report to the AIS office in SBMG. In any event, the selection of a freezing level for the flight, considering that the front was moving along the same proposed route, was indication of inappropriate planning.
- The investigation could neither determine the whole experience of the aircraft captain, nor whether his IFR flight experience was sufficient for conducting the proposed flight, since he made decisions which went against the best practices, such as, for example, selecting a flight level with known icing.
- With a compromised situational awareness, the pilot failed to correctly interpret the information available in the aircraft, as well as the information provided by the female passenger sitting in the cockpit, and he chose to maintain the flight level under inadequate weather conditions.
- The lack of monitoring/supervision of the activities performed by the captain allowed that behaviors and attitudes contrary to flight safety could be adopted in flight, as can be observed in this occurrence.
- Apparently, there was lack of an effective managerial supervision on the part of the aircraft operator, with regard to both the actions performed by the captain and the correction of the aircraft problems.