Crash of a Partenavia P.68B Victor near Adelaide: 2 killed

Date & Time: Nov 9, 1985
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-YIH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
134
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances in an open field located about 80 km south of Adelaide and burnt. Both occupants were killed.

Crash of an IAI 1124 Westwind off Sydney: 2 killed

Date & Time: Oct 10, 1985 at 0059 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-IWJ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sydney – Brisbane – Cairns
MSN:
371
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
QH474
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
9881
Captain / Total hours on type:
3101.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8091
Copilot / Total hours on type:
500
Aircraft flight hours:
3105
Circumstances:
IAI 1124 Westwind aircraft, registered VH-IWJ, was operating under a current Certificate of Registration, the holder of which was Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd (Pe1-Air). The aircraft was operated by Pel-Air and, at the time of the accident, it was engaged on a regularly scheduled cargo service. This service was operated under the terms of a current Charter and Aerial Work Licence, and was flown on behalf of Ansett Air Freight, a subsidiary of Ansett Transport Industries Pty Ltd. The particular flight, designated Flight 474, was operated on 4 nights each week from Sydney to Brisbane and Cairns, Queensland. The aircraft had departed Cairns earlier in the evening and had flown via Brisbane to Sydney, arriving at 2336 hours. The arriving crew reported that the aircraft was performing normally. A total of 1,350 litres of fuel was added to the aircraft tanks and loading of general cargo was carried out by Ansett Air Freight personnel. The flight plan submitted to Air Traffic Control (ATC) indicated that the flight would follow the normal Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) procedures. The estimated time interval to Brisbane was 70 minutes at planned Flight Level 370 (approximate altitude of 37,000 feet). The aircraft carried sufficient fuel for 164 minutes of flight, and refuelling was planned to take place at Brisbane prior to departure for Cairns. Pel-Air intended to use the flight to assess the performance of the rostered co-pilot, who was being considered for upgrading to command status. He was to occupy the left hand control seat, while the right hand seat occupant was the Chief Pilot of the company. At 0033 hours the crew established radio contact on the Sydney ATC Clearance Delivery frequency, and were given a "16 West Maitland One" Standard Instrument Departure (SID). The flight pattern associated with this clearance requires the aircraft to maintain heading after take-off on Runway 16 until reaching a height of 500 feet, when a left turn is made to intercept the 126 radial of the Sydney VOR (Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range). At a position of 6 nautical miles by Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) from the aerodrome, a left turn onto 357 degrees is made in order to continue tracking with reference to the West Haiti and VOR. A copy of the applicable SID chart is shown at Appendix A. Shortly before 0049 hours the crew contacted Sydney Control Tower, and the aircraft was directed to taxi for a departure from Runway 16. At the time the wind was light and variable. After receiving the appropriate clearance, an evidently normal take-off was made, and at 0056 hours contact was established with Sydney Departures Control. The pilot in command advised that the aircraft was on climb to Flight Level 370 , and requested the direct track to Brisbane. This was a standard request, to allow the aircraft to proceed directly to the destination rather than follow the various radio navigation aids along the route. Such a request was normally granted by ATC if the general traffic situation permitted use of the direct track, and provided the aircraft was equipped with a suitable navigation system. VH-IWJ was fitted with a VLF/Omega navigation system which was capable of direct tracking. After ascertaining this, the Departures controller advised the aircraft that the direct track to Brisbane would probably be available. The acknowledgment of this comment was the last recorded transmission from the aircraft. Shortly before 0059 hours the Departures controller broadcast the clearance for the aircraft to track direct to Brisbane at the planned cruising level. No response was received from the aircraft, although the controller noted that radar returns were still visible on his screen. Shortly afterwards, these returns faded, and the Distress Phase of Search and Rescue procedures was Instituted at 0100 hours. At about this time, a number of persons observed what appeared to be the lights of an aircraft descending rapidly towards the sea. The lights maintained their position relative to each other, indicating that the aircraft was not rotating as it descended. The aircraft had faded from the radar screen at a point about 11 kilometres south-east of Sydney Airport. A search of the area was commenced using helicopters and boats. Wreckage Identified as being from the aircraft was sighted by a helicopter at 0245 hours. Recovery of pieces of the aircraft structure, freight and human remains was effected by Police and Department of Aviation launches. The degree of destruction indicated that the aircraft had struck the water while travelling at high speed. The bulk of the wreckage was presumed to be lying in about 85 metres of water about 5 kilometres out to sea from Botany Bay. An Intensive search was carried out by vessels from the Royal Australian Navy, later assisted by a vessel from the NSW Department of Fisheries and Agriculture. Use was made of various underwater detection devices. Search efforts were hampered by persistent unfavourable sea conditions and no trace was found of the wreckage. Operations were finally suspended towards the end of November 1985. An Internationally recognised underwater location and salvage expert was then employed, and the wreckage was ultimately located and identified in 92 metres of water on 20 January 1986. Recovery of the Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders, the major portions of both engines, and sundry other pieces of the aircraft structure, was effected the following month.
Probable cause:
The following findings were reported:
1.There was a known malfunction of the rate of turn indicator.
2. The pilot in command possibly simulated simultaneous failures of all three flight attitude indicators.
3. There were no external references by which the crew could assess the attitude of the aircraft.
4. A loss of control of the aircraft occurred at a height of about 5000 feet.
5. The crew did not recover control of the aircraft prior to impact with the sea.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402 in New Zealand: 8 killed

Date & Time: Oct 4, 1985 at 1223 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZK-EHT
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nelson - Wellington
MSN:
402B-0340
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
While cruising in good weather conditions on a flight from Nelson to Wellington, the pilot failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the twin engine airplane struck power cables and crashed in the Tory Channel. A passenger was rescued while eight other occupants were killed.

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A Islander in Kilifas: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 26, 1985
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P2-DNI
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
28
YOM:
1968
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
While in cruising altitude, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located in the region of Kilifas, northwest of PNG. All four occupants were killed.

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A Islander near Kokoda: 3 killed

Date & Time: Aug 30, 1985 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P2-DNW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Port Moresby – Kokoda
MSN:
67
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
WW701
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
While cruising under VFR mode in marginal weather conditions, the pilot failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the airplane struck a wooded mountain. The wreckage was found 17 km south of Kokoda. The pilot and two female passengers were killed. Two other passengers, including the photos author, were evacuated to local hospital. One was seriously injured while the photo author was uninjured.

Crash of a Beechcraft 65-A80 Queen Air near Biloela: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 7, 1985 at 0350 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-FDR
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Brisbane - Rockhampton
MSN:
LD-234
YOM:
1965
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
This aircraft had only recently been acquired by the company. It had a fuel system different to other aircraft of the same type in the fleet. On the other aircraft there were three detents for each fuel selector, On, Off, Crossfeed. On this aircraft there were four detents, Off, Outboard, Inboard, Crossfeed. The pilot had not previously flown this aircraft. After a flight time of about 110 minutes the pilot reported that both engines had stopped and he was unable to access fuel from the outboard tanks. When the wreckage was located no evidence of fuel was found in the inboard tanks. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
An inspection of the wreckage did not reveal any fault with the engines or fuel system which may have contributed to the occurrence. It was evident that the engines had stopped when the fuel from the inboard tanks was exhausted. A quantity of fuel remained in the outboard tanks. The day prior to this flight the pilot was briefed on the fuel system of VH-FDR by the company check pilot. The briefing was carried out with the use of the Pilots Operating Manual for the aircraft. Because VH-FDR was not available at the time, the pilot was not able to study the fuel management panel in daylight hours. It is not known if the pilot familiarised himself with the panel before commencing the flight. The aircraft is normally operated with the inboard tanks selected for takeoff. Evidence was obtained from flight documentation found in the wreckage which indicated that the pilot had changed the fuel selections from Inboard, about 30 minutes before he reported that the engines had stopped. However, the exhaustion of the fuel contained in the inboard tanks indicates that the selectors could not have been correctly positioned in the detents for the outboard tanks. Tests carried out found that if the selectors were positioned between the inboard and outboard detents, sufficient fuel, to allow the engines to be operated, would still be drawn from the inboard tanks. The reason the pilot was unable to access fuel from the outboard tanks could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fletcher FU-24-950M in Gisborne

Date & Time: May 10, 1985
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZK-BVU
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
10
YOM:
1954
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances. The pilot, sole on board, was injured.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Port Macquarie

Date & Time: Apr 13, 1985 at 1550 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-AOX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Port Macquarie – Coffs Harbour
MSN:
31-7852049
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that shortly after the aircraft became airborne, he noted a substantial change in propeller pitch noise and an associated loss of performance. Insufficient runway remained to permit a landing straight ahead. The pilot raised the landing gear and flap, however the aircraft failed to climb and the airspeed decayed to below the safe single engine speed. The take-off attempt was abandoned and a forced landing was carried out off the end of the runway. The rear fuselage impacted heavily on a dirt bank 78 metres beyond the runway threshold, following which the aircraft passed through a fence and slid for a further 78 metres before coming to rest. All nine occupants escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
No fault was subsequently found with the engines or systems of the aircraft which might have explained the reported loss of performance. Calculations indicated that the weight of the aircraft at the time of take-off was close to the maximum allowable, but the centre of gravity was aft of the rear limit. Several of the passengers indicated that the aircraft rotated sharply to an unusually high nose attitude as it became airborne. The pilot's action in raising the flap when he perceived the power loss was contrary to the emergency procedures for the type, and probably resulted in sink and a further reduction in airspeed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 500 in Goulburn

Date & Time: Dec 1, 1984 at 1051 LT
Registration:
VH-AGA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Canberra – Goulburn
MSN:
500-1253-77
YOM:
1962
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was being used to transport equipment for members of an Aero Club, who were to carry out training at Goulburn. As the pilot was undergoing formation flying training, it was decided that he would lead a formation of two aircraft for the flight. A briefing on the procedures to be followed was carried out. During the flight the pilot of the second aircraft began to suspect the accuracy of his aircraft's airspeed indicator and requested that it be checked against that of the lead aircraft as the aircraft joined the circuit. The pilot of the lead aircraft extended the landing gear and flew the initial leg of the circuit at an indicated airspeed of 96 knots. At the end of this leg the pilot turned the aircraft steeply to the left, the nose dropped slightly and the aircraft flicked into a steep right turn. The aircraft then assumed a steep nose down attitude, however, the pilot was able to level the wings and raise the nose to the level attitude before impact. The impact occurred at a very high rate of sink. The pilot had not previously practiced steep turns at relatively slow airspeed and was not aware of the stalling speed in the given configuration and attitude. The pilot was subsequently unable to recall the reason for attempting a steeper than normal turn. When the aircraft stalled the pilot was unable to effect a full recovery in the height available before impact with the ground.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A-21 Islander in Wilton

Date & Time: Nov 25, 1984 at 1248 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-ISI
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wilton - Wilton
MSN:
329
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
At a height of about 200 feet after take-off the right engine lost power. The pilot feathered the propeller and commenced a gentle left turn in order to return to the strip. He later advised that the aircraft began to sink towards some large trees and he was forced to increase the angle of bank in an effort to avoid them. Shortly afterwards the aircraft struck the ground heavily in an adjacent paddock about 1 kilometre from the strip.
Probable cause:
The engine failure was caused by jamming of accessory drive gearing as a result of the effects of excessive wear within a magneto. It was probable that a mandatory inspection of the magneto which fell due 84 flying hours before the accident, was not conducted. On take-off the aircraft weight exceeded the authorised limit, however following the engine failure the pilot was able to maintain straight and level flight. A cleared area of ground lay ahead and just to the left of the flight path but the pilot had considered the aircraft had sufficient performance capability to permit a return to the trip.
Final Report: