Central America

The pilot continued visual flight flight into instrument flight conditions resulting in an in-flight collision with terrain. Low clouds were a factor.

Collision with terrain after the captain failed to ensure that the vertical, horizontal and lateral separation was sufficient to fly over the mountains while descending under VMC conditions. Also the crew failed to take appropriate corrective actions to prevent the aircraft to continue the descent until it impacted ground, resulting in a controlled flight into terrain. The following contributin factors were identified:
- Momentary loss of situational awareness on the part of the flight crew,
- Inadequate supervision by the pilot-in-command,
- Non-compliance with standard operating procedures published by the operator,
- Use of flight procedures neither written down in manuals nor approved by the authority,
- Violation of safety rules,
- Non-application of visual flight rules by the flight crew,
- Shortcomings in the crew resources management,
- Adverse weather conditions.

Double engine failure in flight for undetermined reasons.

It was determined that the aircraft stalled during initial climb because the passengers seats were not properly allocated, causing the center of gravity to be outside the permissible limit. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The Atlantic Airlines company, at the date of the accident, did not have sufficiently trained administrative and operational personnel for a safe operation.
- The poor allocation of the passengers inside the cabin affected lift, causing the aircraft to stall. Due to its low height, it was impossible to expect a stall recovery. This shows that the aircraft collapsed completely without move on the ground and being destroyed by the weight of the engines and their wings that were full of fuel.
- Lack of crew training, especially the copilot who was not rated on this type of aircraft. Thus, he was not able to assist the captain in an emergency situation but only reading the checklist.
- The engines were operating normal at the time of impact and they were running in normal takeoff conditions.
- No evidence of mechanical failure was found.
- The accident shows that the aircraft was operating normally, but that due to aerodynamic circumstances, it entered a stall and crashed on the ground abruptly and uncontrollably.

It was determined that the aircraft rolled through 2,100 of the 2,800 metres of runway 28 and that the right engine failed while its propeller autofeathered. Investigations were unable to determine the exact cause of the right engine failure. Nevertheless, appropriate flight techniques were not applied by the crew.

Double engine failure in flight for unknown reasons.

Findings and Probable Cause:
- Aircraft overweight. Pilot did not determine if the aircraft was within operating limitations. The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope).
- Pilot Unqualified. Pilot was not qualified under Part 135 for the aircraft in which he was flying.
- Documents Falsification. Pilot falsified logbook to reflect more flight time than he actually had accumulated. Review of pilot logbook revealed in several instances, pilot added as much as 1,000 hours to his total flight and multi engine times. Hundreds of day and night landings were falsified to meet qualification requirements. Pilot falsified aircraft information (types and registration numbers) reporting them to be Cessna C402 aircraft, when FAA database clearly lists the aircraft in question as aircraft other than Cessna C402. Pilot may not have completed a weight and balance report. (No evidence existed that showed he had completed a load manifest or weight and balance and performance calculations). Pilot failed to comply with prescribed Weight and Balance and Performance limitations in Pilot’s Operating Handbook. (The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope)). Pilot may not have followed “before takeoff” checklist in Pilot’s Operating Handbook.
- Fuel Selectors: “Left Engine – Left Main Tank, Right Engine – Right Main Tank”. Field investigation immediately following the accident revealed both fuel tank selectors were found selected to the right main tank. The left fuel valve was found in the left position, though the cable was separated from the valve. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable.
- Aircraft Flight Controls (secondary control surfaces – trim tabs) were found to be out of normal range required for takeoff. The aileron trim tab was found selected all the way to the right. The rudder trim tab was found selected to the left and the elevator trim tab was found in the full nose down position. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable.
- According to Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) normal takeoff is 0˚ flaps. (The flap selector handle was selected to 15˚with the indicator at approximately the 15˚position. The wing flap push rods were bent, indicating partial extension at impact).
- Blackhawk International Airways was not authorized to assign this pilot as a pilot in command because they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Blackhawk International Airways was authorized as a single pilot operation with Mr. Gilbert Chacon as the only authorized pilot.
- Blackhawk International Airways reportedly hired Mr Morales two days prior to the fatal accident, although they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Further, they did not exercise due diligence in ensuring pilot’s qualification prior to assigning duty as pilot in command.
- There were no FAA reports of any enforcement actions or service difficulty reports against the fatal aircraft. However, the FAA did report four administrative actions against Blackhawk, three for technical violations and the most recent for maintenance failures. The agency issued a correction letter April 28, 2000, citing Blackhawk's failure to comply with manufacturer recommended maintenance programs and FAA programs for its aircraft's engines or other parts, Blackhawk failed to have a person in charge of maintenance with an appropriate certificate and used unsanctioned techniques and equipment for repairs.
- Results of disassembly report confirms that no discrepancies existed that would have precluded normal operation of both left and right engines prior to impact.
- Forensic Report showed traces of benzoylegonine (a metabolite of cocaine) in the urine and traces of ethanol in the stomach contents of the pilot.
- On July 7, 2001, Morales was arrested by the Broward Sheriff's Office in an area of Pompano Beach known for drug sales. A deputy who pulled over Morales' 1993 Volkswagen Fox for running a stop sign said he found pieces of crack cocaine and other paraphernalia in the car. According to the deputy, Morales said he was in the area to buy powder cocaine for a friend.
- In November 2000, Morales was arrested by Fort Lauderdale police after he tried to "return'' $345 worth of stolen aviation parts to a local distributor. Instead of giving Morales cash, store employees called police, who were investigating a string of airplane burglaries. Mr. Morales was charged with dealing in stolen property after detectives found that a receipt in his bag belonged to the burglary victim who actually bought the parts. An additional charge of grand theft was tacked on when detectives recovered other stolen items.

Failure of the pilot-in-command to maintain altitude/clearance, resulting in an in-flight collision with rising terrain.