Marsh Harbour

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

6400

Aircraft flight hours:

13221

Circumstances:

After taking off from runway 9L at his home airport and making an easterly departure, the pilot, who was also the president, director of operations, and chief pilot for the on-demand passenger and cargo operation, advised the air traffic controller that he was turning downwind. According to witnesses, the airplane did not sound like it was developing full power. The airplane climbed to about 100 feet, banked to the left, began losing altitude, and impacted a tree, a fence, and two vehicles before coming to rest in a residential area. A postcrash fire ensued, which consumed the majority of the cabin area and left wing. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane had struck the tree with its left inboard wing about 20 feet above ground level. Multiple tree branches exhibiting propeller cuts were found near the base of the tree. Propeller strike marks on the ground also corresponded to the location of the No. 1 (left side) propeller. There were minimal propeller marks from the No. 2 (right side) propeller. Examination of the propellers revealed that the No. 1 propeller blades exhibited chordwise scratching and S-bending, consistent with operation at impact, but the No. 2 propeller blades did not exhibit any chordwise scratching or bending, which indicates that the No. 2 engine was not producing power at the time of impact. There was no evidence that the pilot attempted to perform the manufacturer’s published single engine procedure, which would have allowed him to maintain altitude. Contrary to the procedure, the left and right throttle control levers were in the full-throttle position, the mixture control levers were in the full-rich position, neither propeller was feathered, and the landing gear was down. Postaccident examination of the No. 1 engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure. However, the No. 2 engine's condition would have resulted in erratic and unreliable operation; the engine would not have been able to produce full rated horsepower as the compression on four of the nine cylinders was below specification and both magnetos were not functioning correctly. Moisture and corrosion were discovered inside the magneto cases; the left magneto sparked internally in a random pattern when tested and its point gap was in excess of the required tolerance. The right magneto's camshaft follower also exhibited excessive wear and its points would not open, rendering it incapable of providing electrical energy to its spark plugs. Additionally, the main fuel pump could not be rotated by hand; it exhibited play in the gear bearings, and corrosion was present internally. When the airplane was not flying, it was kept outdoors. Large amounts of rain had fallen during the week before the accident, which could have led to the moisture and corrosion in the magnetos. Although the pilot had been having problems with the No. 2 engine for months, he continued to fly the airplane, despite his responsibility, particularly as president, director of operations, and chief pilot of the company, to ensure that the airplane was airworthy. During this period, the pilot would take off with the engine shuddering and would circle the departure airport to gain altitude before heading to the destination. On the night before the accident, the director of maintenance (DOM) replaced the No. 1 cylinder on the No. 2 engine, which had developed a crack in the fin area and had oil seeping out of it. After the DOM performed the replacement, he did not do a compression check or check the magnetos; such checks would have likely revealed that four of the remaining cylinders were not producing specified compression, that the magnetos were not functioning correctly, and that further maintenance was necessary. Review of the airplane's maintenance records did not reveal an entry for installation of the cylinder. The last entry in the maintenance records for the airplane was an annual and a 100-hour inspection, which had occurred about 11 months before the accident.

Probable cause:

The pilot’s improper response to a loss of power in the No. 2 engine and his failure to ensure that the airplane was airworthy. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate engine maintenance by the operator's maintenance personnel.

Final Report:

Ground accident of a Saab 340A in Nassau

Date & Time: Jan 7, 2010 at 1145 LT

Type of aircraft:

Saab 340

Operator:

Registration:

C6-SBE

Flight Phase:

Parking

Flight Type:

Scheduled Revenue Flight

Survivors:

Site:

Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II

Schedule:

Nassau - Marsh Harbour

MSN:

YOM:

1987

Location:

Nassau-Lynden Pindling

New Providence

Country:

Bahamas

Region:

Central America

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

Two crew took place in the cockpit to prepare the aircraft for a scheduled commercial service to Marsh Harbour. In unknown circumstances, all three landing gear retracted, causing the aircraft to fall on the ground. Both occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is unknown if the retraction of the undercarriage was the consequence of a mechanical failure or a mishandling from the crew.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Greenhead: 5 killed

Date & Time: Dec 22, 2006 at 0849 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Island Times

Registration:

N70BC

Flight Phase:

Flight

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors:

Site:

Plain, Valley

Schedule:

Destin - Marsh Harbour

MSN:

421B-0813

YOM:

1974

Location:

Greenhead

Country:

Region:

Fort Lauderdale-Executive

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

15000

Aircraft flight hours:

6478

Circumstances:

Prior to takeoff, the pilot contacted Eglin Clearance Delivery for a weather briefing. He was informed of severe thunderstorms in the area and worked out a plan with the Clearance Delivery operator to avoid them. The flight originated from Destin Florida Airport, Destin, Florida about 0832 central standard time en route to Marsh Harbor, Bahamas. Eglin South Approach Control provided vectors to steer the flight around the weather. At 0841:30, the flight was handed off to Tyndall Approach Control. The flight was informed that it was entering "a line of weather that's going to continue for the next 15 miles." At 0844:10, Tyndall Approach Control alerted all aircraft of "hazardous weather." Tyndall Approach Control also informed the flight that their station was not equipped with the same detailed weather radar that Eglin had, and instructed the flight to continue on its current vector, which was provided by Eglin. About 4 minutes later, the pilot contacted ATC to request a block altitude clearance because he was "up and down here quite a bit." The controller provided a clearance for 4,000 through 6,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the clearance, and there were no further communications with the flight. The pilot and four passengers were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed after impacting the ground near Greenhead, Florida. According to the Sheriff, the property owner who initially located the wreckage, said that there was heavy rain, thunder, lightning and wind in the area at the time of the accident. The NTSB conducted a meteorological study and weather data along with the airplane's track and found it to be consistent with the airplane encountering a level 5 thunderstorm.

Probable cause:

The pilot-in-command's improper planning/decision and continued flight into known adverse weather which resulted in an encounter with a level 5 thunderstorm.

Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas R4D-8 in Fort Lauderdale

Date & Time: Jun 13, 2005 at 1550 LT

Type of aircraft:

Douglas DC-3

Operator:

Registration:

N3906J

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Fort Lauderdale – Marsh Harbour

MSN:

43344

YOM:

1943

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

18000

Copilot / Total flying hours:

8500

Aircraft flight hours:

19623

Circumstances:

The crew stated the airplane was hire by a private individual and had 220 gallons of fuel onboard, and was carrying 6 pieces of granite, weighing 3,200 lbs. The passenger was responsible for the granite during the flight. During takeoff, about 400 feet above the ground, a discrepancy with the left engine manifold pressure was noted, followed by a slight hesitation and mild backfire. Oil was seen leaking from the front nose section of the engine followed by an engine manifold pressure and rpm decrease. Smoke coming from the left engine was observed and reported by the airport controllers. The left engine's propeller failed to feather and the airplane wouldn't maintain altitude. The airplane impacted trees, vehicles, and the right wing struck a home before coming to a stop on the road. A fire ensued immediately after ground impact, all onboard exited without assistance. The fuselage from the cockpit to the tail section melted from the fire. The right wing was damaged by impact and fire, and the right engine remained intact on the wing. The left wing was separated 12 feet from the outboard and the engine separated from the firewall. Both engine's propellers were in the low pitch position. The flaps were full up and the landing gear were retracted. A weight and balance sheet was never furnished. The pieces of granite and limited cargo recovered from the wreckage weighed 3,140 lb. Examination of the airplane revealed all flight controls surface were present and flight control continuity was accounted for and established. No evidence of any pre-impact mechanical discrepancies with the airframe or its systems was found that wound have prevented normal operation of airplane. On December 09, 2004, the left engine's nose section assembly was found with six out of the ten retaining bolts broken. The section was inspected and all ten bolts were replaced with serviceable ones. The assembly of the dose dome section and installation to the engine was performed by the repair station mechanic. The remaining assembling of the engine was completed by the operator's mechanic/pilot. During the left engine post accident examination, the ten bolts securing the nose dome section flange to the stationary reduction gear were fractured with their respective safety wire still intact. The chamber for the propeller feathering oil system was not secured to the plate sections, producing a bypass of the oil for the propeller feathering process. Metal flakes and pieces were observed deposited in the oil breather screen, consistent with the master rod bearing in an advance stage of deterioration. The silver plated master rod bearing had a catastrophic failure. Silver like metal flakes and particles were observed throughout the nose section, reduction gear section, main oil screen, and oil filter housing of the engine. An indication of propeller shaft housing movement was evident. Metal flakes with carbon build up were observed in the propeller shaft support and sleeve assembly. A metallurgical examination of the ten bolts securing the nose dome assembly indicated all were fractured though the threaded section of the shanks. The fatigue zones propagated from the opposite sides toward the center of the bolts consistent with reversed bending of the bolt.

Probable cause:

The inadequate maintenance inspection by company maintenance personnel/pilot and other maintenance personnel of the left engine resulting in a total failure of the master rod bearing, and nose case partial separation, which prevented the left propeller from feathering. This resulted in the airplane not able to maintain altitude and a subsequent forced landing in a residential area.

Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Marsh Harbour: 9 killed

Date & Time: Aug 25, 2001 at 1845 LT

Type of aircraft:

Blackhwak International Airways

Operator:

Registration:

N8097W

Flight Phase:

Takeoff (climb)

Flight Type:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Marsh Harbour – Miami-Opa Locka

MSN:

402B-1014

YOM:

1975

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

The fatal aircraft, Registration N8097W was operated by Blackhawk International Airways and the listed owner was Skystream Inc; whose corporate address was the same as Mr. Gilbert Chacón’s Pembroke Pines, Florida home address. Blackhawk International Airways was owned by Gilbert Chacón and his son Erik, who founded the company in 1991. Blackhawk International Airways was authorized by the FAA as a part 135 Single Pilot Operation. Mr. Gilbert Chacon was the only pilot authorized by the FAA for Blackhawk International Airways. Once Morales acted as pilot- in-command of the Cessna 402B aircraft, this made Blackhawk International Airways a multi pilot operation. This was a clear violation of the FAA regulations. Mr. Morales was not signed off by the FAA to fly for Blackhawk International Airways, nor was Blackhawk International Airways signed off as a multi pilot operation. There were no FAA reports of any enforcement actions or service difficulty reports against the fatal aircraft. However, the FAA did report four administrative actions against Blackhawk International Airways, three for technical violations and the most recent for maintenance failures. The agency (FAA) issued a letter of correction on April 28, 2000, citing Blackhawk's failure to comply with manufacturer’s recommended maintenance programs and FAA programs for its aircraft's engines or other parts. Blackhawk failed to have a person in charge of maintenance with an appropriate certificate and used unsanctioned techniques and equipment for repairs. The Manager of the Palm Beach County Park Airport at Lantana, Florida stated that a last minute change resulted in the accident aircraft being dispatched to Marsh Harbour, Abaco, Bahamas. The Cessna 404 aircraft which was originally scheduled to conduct this flight, was fuelled, but subsequently changed to a Cessna 402B aircraft by the owner Mr. Gilbert Chacon. This charter flight from Lantana, Florida to the island of Marsh Harbour, Abaco, in the Bahamas, was operated under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).The accident occurred on August 25, 2001 shortly after the aircraft departed Marsh Harbour International Airport for the return trip to Opa Locka, Florida (USA). The flight number was not known. At the time of the accident, Blackhawk International Airways was not authorized by the Bahamas Aviation Authority to conduct commercial operations in the Bahamas. A determination could not be made as to whether or not the pilot filed a flight plan. No records existed to verify whether radio communications were established with Air Traffic Control (ATC) during the flight from Lantana, Florida to Marsh Harbour, Abaco, Bahamas. The flight was a 165 mile journey that was estimated to take one (1) hour to complete. The aircraft was not required to have a cockpit voice recorder. Witnesses reported the pilot and members of the group being transported, argued about the number of passengers and the amount of bags to be loaded on the aircraft. Witnesses also reported seeing eight (8) passengers board the aircraft. Two of the largest passengers (believed to be weighing approximately 300 pounds each,) were observed being seated in the rear of the aircraft. One witness reported that the pilot personally loaded the aircraft. Witnesses also reported that the pilot experienced problems starting the engines. Eye witness statements placed the time of departure of the flight for Opa Locka, Florida at approximately 1845 EDT. The aircraft became airborne from the 5,000 x 50 feet runway (Runway 27) between 2,500 to 2,800 feet. It climbed in a steep nose high attitude to approximately 40 feet above the runway, banked left, pitched nose down and impacted marshy terrain in a left wing, nose low attitude. The aircraft was destroyed and all nine occupants were killed, among them the US singer Aaliyah Dana Haughton.

Probable cause:

Findings and Probable Cause:
- Aircraft overweight. Pilot did not determine if the aircraft was within operating limitations. The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope).
- Pilot Unqualified. Pilot was not qualified under Part 135 for the aircraft in which he was flying.
- Documents Falsification. Pilot falsified logbook to reflect more flight time than he actually had accumulated. Review of pilot logbook revealed in several instances, pilot added as much as 1,000 hours to his total flight and multi engine times. Hundreds of day and night landings were falsified to meet qualification requirements. Pilot falsified aircraft information (types and registration numbers) reporting them to be Cessna C402 aircraft, when FAA database clearly lists the aircraft in question as aircraft other than Cessna C402. Pilot may not have completed a weight and balance report. (No evidence existed that showed he had completed a load manifest or weight and balance and performance calculations). Pilot failed to comply with prescribed Weight and Balance and Performance limitations in Pilot’s Operating Handbook. (The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope)). Pilot may not have followed “before takeoff” checklist in Pilot’s Operating Handbook.
- Fuel Selectors: “Left Engine – Left Main Tank, Right Engine – Right Main Tank”. Field investigation immediately following the accident revealed both fuel tank selectors were found selected to the right main tank. The left fuel valve was found in the left position, though the cable was separated from the valve. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable.
- Aircraft Flight Controls (secondary control surfaces – trim tabs) were found to be out of normal range required for takeoff. The aileron trim tab was found selected all the way to the right. The rudder trim tab was found selected to the left and the elevator trim tab was found in the full nose down position. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable.
- According to Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) normal takeoff is 0˚ flaps. (The flap selector handle was selected to 15˚with the indicator at approximately the 15˚position. The wing flap push rods were bent, indicating partial extension at impact).
- Blackhawk International Airways was not authorized to assign this pilot as a pilot in command because they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Blackhawk International Airways was authorized as a single pilot operation with Mr. Gilbert Chacon as the only authorized pilot.
- Blackhawk International Airways reportedly hired Mr Morales two days prior to the fatal accident, although they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Further, they did not exercise due diligence in ensuring pilot’s qualification prior to assigning duty as pilot in command.
- There were no FAA reports of any enforcement actions or service difficulty reports against the fatal aircraft. However, the FAA did report four administrative actions against Blackhawk, three for technical violations and the most recent for maintenance failures. The agency issued a correction letter April 28, 2000, citing Blackhawk's failure to comply with manufacturer recommended maintenance programs and FAA programs for its aircraft's engines or other parts, Blackhawk failed to have a person in charge of maintenance with an appropriate certificate and used unsanctioned techniques and equipment for repairs.
- Results of disassembly report confirms that no discrepancies existed that would have precluded normal operation of both left and right engines prior to impact.
- Forensic Report showed traces of benzoylegonine (a metabolite of cocaine) in the urine and traces of ethanol in the stomach contents of the pilot.
- On July 7, 2001, Morales was arrested by the Broward Sheriff's Office in an area of Pompano Beach known for drug sales. A deputy who pulled over Morales' 1993 Volkswagen Fox for running a stop sign said he found pieces of crack cocaine and other paraphernalia in the car. According to the deputy, Morales said he was in the area to buy powder cocaine for a friend.
- In November 2000, Morales was arrested by Fort Lauderdale police after he tried to "return'' $345 worth of stolen aviation parts to a local distributor. Instead of giving Morales cash, store employees called police, who were investigating a string of airplane burglaries. Mr. Morales was charged with dealing in stolen property after detectives found that a receipt in his bag belonged to the burglary victim who actually bought the parts. An additional charge of grand theft was tacked on when detectives recovered other stolen items.

Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in West Palm Beach

Date & Time: Apr 3, 1998 at 1705 LT

Type of aircraft:

Landing (descent or approach)

Operator:

Dove One

Registration:

N400AR

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Marsh Harbour - West Palm Beach

MSN:

402B-0338

YOM:

1972

Location:

West Palm Beach

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

6120

Captain / Total hours on type:

350.00

Circumstances:

According to the passengers, they departed about 30 or 40 minutes late because of the late arrival of the airplane. When the pilot arrived, he 'seemed to...be in a hurry...there was no safety instructions or any attempt to show us or the kids the operation of the door.' After takeoff, the flight climbed to an altitude of 6,700 feet. The pilot attempted to make radio contact with an unknown station, was unsuccessful in making radio contact, and according to a passenger, 'seemed agitated.' The passengers noticed that the left alternator light was illuminated, and questioned the pilot. The pilot told the passengers, '...it's nothing it always comes on.' About 15 minutes after departure, the flight descended to 3,000 feet and the pilot attempted to make radio contact with someone again. The flight continued at 3,000 feet until the pilot saw a ship in the ocean. He descended to around 1,000 feet over the ship, and was still working with the radio. The flight continued onto the coast. The passengers told EMS personnel that the airplane made an 'abrupt' left turn to line up with the runway, and when the airplane touched down, they felt the right side of the aircraft collapse. After touchdown on runway 27L, the airplane's right main landing gear collapsed, then the left gear collapsed. The airplane slid off the right side of the runway and struck RVR (runway visual range) equipment. According to the pilot's statement he, '...made [a] normal approach to runway 27 left. All system indicated normal. Upon touchdown and roll out all was ok for 3-4 hundred feet- [right] gear collapsed...unable to hold aircraft on runway...nose hit RVR antenna swinging aircraft more right to catch right wing and remove tip tank. Left gear collapsed as aircraft came to rest.' According to the FAA Inspector's statement, it was his opinion, on the day of the accident the aircraft was 'over gross weight on departure from Marsh Harbor...the pilot was experiencing radio problems... and I [FAA Inspector] believe he was flustered and annoyed...in the pattern he made an abrupt left turn to lineup with [runway] 27, and when he touched down on the runway the right gear immediately collapsed due to [side] overload.' In addition, both landing gear trunnions, where the retract mechanisms attached, were broken as if 'overloaded.'

Probable cause:

The pilot allowed the airplane to improperly touchdown on the right main landing gear, resulting in the gear collapsing, and subsequent impact with runway visual range equipment.

Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Marsh Harbour: 5 killed

Date & Time: Sep 13, 1995 at 2030 LT

Type of aircraft:

Landing (descent or approach)

Operator:

Bimini Air Charter

Registration:

N69303

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Bimini - Mores Cay

MSN:

402B-0423

YOM:

1973

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Circumstances:

On September 13, 1995, about 2030 eastern daylight time N69303, a Cessna 402B, registered to and operated by Bimini Air Charter Inc. crashed near Marsh Harbour, Bahamas while on a 14 CFR Part 129 on-demand, international, passenger flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed. The pilot and four passengers were fatally injured, and four passengers were seriously injured. the flight originated from Bimini, Bahamas, about 1935 the same day. The intended destination was Mores Cay, but one of the survivors stated the pilot could not find the island and diverted to Marsh Harbour.

Crash of a Cessna 402A in Miami

Date & Time: Jun 23, 1995 at 1054 LT

Type of aircraft:

Landing (descent or approach)

Operator:

Registration:

N7884J

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Positioning

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Marsh Harbor - Miami

MSN:

402A-0103

YOM:

1969

Location:

Miami-Intl

Country:

Region: