Landing (descent or approach)

At 08:17 Ansett New Zealand Flight 703 departed Auckland (AKL) as scheduled bound for Palmerston North (PMR). To the north of Palmerston North the pilots briefed themselves for a VOR/DME approach to runway 07 which was the approach they preferred. Subsequently Air Traffic Control specified the VOR/DME approach for runway 25, due to departing traffic, and the pilots re-briefed for that instrument approach. The IMC involved flying in and out of stratiform cloud, but continuous cloud prevailed during most of the approach. The aircraft was flown accurately to join the 14 nm DME arc and thence turned right and intercepted the final approach track of 250° M to the Palmerston North VOR. During the right turn, to intercept the inbound approach track, the aircraft’s power levers were retarded to 'flight idle' and shortly afterwards the first officer advised the captain ".... 12 DME looking for 4000 (feet)". The final approach track was intercepted at approximately 13 DME and 4700 feet, and the first officer advised Ohakea Control "Ansett 703" was "established inbound". Just prior to 12 miles DME the captain called "Gear down". The first officer asked him to repeat what he had said and then responded "OK selected and on profile, ten - sorry hang on 10 DME we’re looking for four thousand aren’t we so - a fraction low". The captain responded, "Check, and Flap 15". This was not acknowledged but the first officer said, "Actually no, we’re not, ten DME we’re..... (The captain whistled at this point) look at that". The captain had noticed that the right hand main gear had not locked down: "I don’t want that." and the first officer responded, "No, that’s not good is it, so she’s not locked, so Alternate Landing Gear...?" The captain acknowledged, "Alternate extension, you want to grab the QRH?" After the First Officer’s "Yes", the captain continued, "You want to whip through that one, see if we can get it out of the way before it’s too late." The captain then stated, "I’ll keep an eye on the airplane while you’re doing that." The first officer located the appropriate "Landing Gear Malfunction Alternate Gear Extension" checklist in Ansett New Zealand’s Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and began reading it. He started with the first check on the list but the captain told him to skip through some checks. The first officer responded to this instruction and resumed reading and carrying out the necessary actions. It was the operator’s policy that all items on the QRH checklists be actioned, or proceeded through, as directed by the captain. The first officer started carrying out the checklist. The captain in between advised him to pull the Main Gear Release Handle. Then the GPWS’s audio alarm sounded. Almost five seconds later the aircraft collided with terrain. The Dash 8 collided with the upper slope of a low range of hills.

After takeoff from Buenos Aires-Aeroparque-Jorge Newbury Airport runway 13, while climbing, the crew declared an emergency following an engine failure and was cleared to return. While completing a 180 turn, the crew lost control of the aircraft that crashed in the sea about 2,700 metres short of runway 31, three minutes after departure. A passenger survived while six other occupants were killed, all members of the corporate of LAER.

Following an uneventful flight from Lae, the crew started the approach to Madang Airport runway 25. The visibility was limited by night and poor weather conditions. In heavy rain falls, the captain realized that all conditions were not met to land and decided to initiate a go-around. Following a short holding pattern, he started the approach to runway 07. The aircraft landed 300 metres past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in a ravine. Due to torrential rain, all 39 occupants preferred to stay in the aircraft and were evacuated few dozen minutes later only. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Forty minutes into the flight from Dakar to Mbour, the crew informed ATC that an engine failed and was cleared to descent to 4,000 feet. Shortly later, the crew lost control of the airplane that crashed in shallow water about 500 metres off Mbour. Four passengers were rescued while six others occupants, including both pilots, were killed.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Villavicencio, carrying livestock, nine passengers and four crew members. The approach to Miraflores Airport was completed in poor weather conditions. On short final, the left engine failed. The aircraft lost height, collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area. Three passengers and both pilots were killed while eight other occupants were injured.

On the morning of 24 May 1995 the aircraft had returned to its base at Leeds/Bradford from Aberdeen, U.K. on a scheduled passenger flight landing at 09:44 local time. The crew, which was not the one later involved in the accident, stated that all of the aircraft's systems and equipment had been serviceable during the flight. Some routine maintenance was performed on the aircraft which was later prepared for a scheduled passenger flight, NE816, to Aberdeen. It was positioned at the passenger terminal where it was taken over by the crew which was to operate the service, comprising the commander, who occupied the left hand seat, the first officer and a flight attendant. Nine passengers were boarded. The weather at Leeds/Bradford Airport was poor with Runway Visual Range (RVR) reported as 1,100 metres; scattered cloud at 400 feet above the aerodrome elevation of 682 feet and a light south-easterly wind. It was raining and the airfield had recently been affected by a thunderstorm. The freezing level was at 8,000 feet and warnings of strong winds and thunderstorms were in force for the Leeds/Bradford area. The crew called ATC for permission to start the engines at 17:41 hrs. Having backtracked the runway to line up, the aircraft took-off from runway 14 at 17:47 hrs and the crew was instructed by ATC to maintain the runway heading (143°M). The aircraft began to turn to the left shortly after becoming airborne. One minute and fifty seconds after the start of the take-off roll and as the aircraft was turning through a heading of 050° and climbing through 1,740 feet amsl, the first officer transmitted to Leeds/Bradford aerodrome control: "Knightway 816 we've got a problem with the artificial horizon sir and we'd like to come back." The aerodrome controller passed instructions for a radar heading of 360° and cleared the aircraft to 3,000 feet QNH. These instructions were read back correctly but the aircraft continued its left turn onto 300° before rolling into a right hand turn with about 30° of bank. About 20 seconds before this turn reversal, the aircraft had been instructed to call the Leeds/Bradford approach controller. The aircraft was now climbing through an altitude of 2,800 feet in a steep turn to the right and the approach controller transmitted: "I see you carrying out an orbit just tell me what i can do to help". The first officer replied: "Are we going straight at the moment sir" The controller informed him that the aircraft was at that time in a right hand turn but after observing further radar returns he said that it was then going straight on a south-easterly heading. The first officer's response to this transmission was: "Radar vectors slowly back to one four then sir please". The controller then ordered a right turn onto a heading of 340°. This instruction was correctly acknowledged by the first officer but the aircraft began a left hand turn with an initial angle of bank between 30° and 40°. This turn continued onto a heading of 360° when the first officer again asked "Are we going straight at the moment sir" to which the controller replied that the aircraft looked to be going straight. Seconds later the first officer asked: "Any report of the tops sir". This was the last recorded transmission from the aircraft, although at 17:52 hrs a brief carrier wave signal was recorded but it was obliterated by the controller's request to another departing aircraft to see if its pilot could help with information on the cloud tops. At this point, the aircraft had reached an altitude of 3,600 feet, having maintained a fairly constant rate of climb and airspeed. The ATC clearance to 3000 feet had not been amended. After the controller had confirmed that the aircraft appeared to be on a steady northerly heading, the aircraft immediately resumed its turn to the left and began to descend. The angle of bank increased to about 45° while the altitude reduced to 2,900 feet in about 25 seconds. As the aircraft passed a heading of 230° it ceased to appear on the secondary radar. There were four further primary radar returns before the aircraft finally disappeared from radar. There had been a recent thunderstorm in the area and it was raining intermittently with a cloud base of about 400 feet and a visibility of about 1,100 metres. Residents in the vicinity of the accident site reported dark and stormy conditions. Several witnesses described the engine noise as pulsating or surging and then fading just prior to impact. Other witnesses saw a fireball descending rapidly out of the low cloud base and one witness saw the aircraft in flames before it stuck the ground. All of the occupants died at impact. From subsequent examination it was apparent that, at a late stage in the descent, the aircraft had broken up, losing a large part of the right wing outboard of the engine, and the right horizontal stabiliser. There was some disruption of the fuselage before it struck the ground. The airborne structural failure that had occurred was the result of flight characteristics which were beyond the design limits of the aircraft following the loss of control shortly before impact.

The crew was completing a local training mission at Vitoria Airport. In good weather conditions, the crew was approaching the airport in a flapless configuration when an alarm sounded in the cockpit. The crew turned off the circuit breaker so the alarm stopped. The aircraft landed on its belly and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All four occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Ponta Pelada AFB, Manaus. Upon landing, the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest few dozen metres further. There were no casualties while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The single engine aircraft was completing a local skydiving flight at Saransk-Lyambir Airport. After all skydivers jumped out, the crew returned to the airport. In unclear circumstances, the aircraft landed hard, bounced and came to rest upside down. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to Villavicencio-La Vanguardia Airport runway 04, the crew encountered poor weather conditions (heavy rain falls) and a visibility limited to 1,000 metres. After passing the missed approach point, the crew was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and initiated a go-around procedure. Shortly later, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located in the San Jeronimo Mountain Range, about 5 km north of runway 22 threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 9 occupants were killed.