Landing (descent or approach)

On March 3,1996, at a time not reported, a Cessna 421B, N69905, registered to Hi Tech Aviation in Scottsdale, Arizona, reportedly crashed into the sea while attempting to land at the airport at Vigan in the Philippine Islands. The weather at the time and the circumstances of the accident were not reported. It was reported that the pilot was the only occupant onboard. According to the Philippine Air Transportation Office, the aircraft arrived in Manila on March 2, 1996. It departed the next day for a flight to Vigan to pick up a passenger with a return to Manila. It was last seen flying over the airport in the traffic pattern for landing. It is presumed to have crashed into the sea. The FAA aircraft records section in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, indicated that they received a bill of sale from Hi Tech Aviation indicating the aircraft was sold to a company in Manila on 01/19/96.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a charter flight from Brasília to São Paulo, carrying seven members of the pop music group 'Mamonas Assassinas' and two pilots. On approach in limited visibility due to the night, absence of ground lights and clouds, the crew initiated a go-around as his position was erroneous (too high and the glide and excessive speed). The captain initiated a turn to the left when shortly later, at an altitude of 3,280 feet, the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located about 11 km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all nine occupants were killed.

The approach to Arequipa-Rodríguez Ballón Airport was completed by night and poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. On final approach, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck a hill and crashed 6,3 km from runway 09 threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 123 occupants were killed.

On approach to Lukapa Airport by night, at an altitude of about 1,800 metres, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located 16 km from the airport. All nine occupants were killed.

While descending to Khartoum Airport, the crew declared an emergency due to in-flight fire. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed 40 km from Khartoum Airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 91 occupants were killed.

After landing at Banlung Airport, the aircraft encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and eventually collided with a building. All 42 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is believed that the braking systems failed and at least one tyre burst after touchdown.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Moscow to Yakutsk with intermediate stops in Omsk and Bratsk, carrying three passengers, seven crew members and a load of 10,990 kilos of various goods (not declared before departure from Moscow). On approach to Omsk-Tsentralny Airport, at an altitude of 1,150 metres, all four engines failed simultaneously. The captain reduced his altitude and made a belly landing in a snow covered field located near Luzino, about 22 km west of the airport. After touchdown, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres, collided with a car and came to rest. All 10 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft, operated by the Romanian Civil Aviation Authority (Autoritatea Aeronautică Civilă Romănă) departed Bucharest-Băneasa Airport on a calibration flight to Satu Mare and Baia Mare Airports, carrying five passengers and three crew members. The goal of the operation was to calibrate the precision approach radar and the IFR equipment at both Satu Mare and Baia Mare Airports. The mission at Satu Mare was completed successfully and the crew continued to Baia Mare Airport located about 43 km to the east. Following three successful approaches, the crew initiated a fourth descent when he was informed by ATC about the deterioration of the weather conditions with snow falls and a reduced visibility to 3 km. On approach, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck trees and crashed onto a house located about 7,5 km short of runway 28. The aircraft and the house were destroyed. All eight occupants were killed as well as two people in the house. A third people on the ground was injured.

Following an uneventful charter flight from Berlin, the crew was cleared to descend from FL140 and started the approach to Salzburg-Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart Airport. After being established on the ILS, the crew was cleared to land when, on short final, the aircraft stalled and crashed in a wooded area located in Freilassing, about 5,5 km short of runway 16, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 10 occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, severe icing conditions were reported in the area.

The airplane landed wheels up and slid 6,850 feet before coming to rest in grass about 140 feet left of the runway centerline. The cabin began to fill with smoke, and the airplane was evacuated. Investigation showed that because the captain had omitted the 'Hydraulics' item on the in-range checklist and the first officer failed to detect the the error, hydraulic pressure was not available to lower the landing gear and deploy the flaps. Both the captain and the first officer recognized that the flaps had not extended after the flaps were selected to 15°. The pilots then failed to perform the landing checklist and to detect the numerous cues alerting them to the status of the landing gear because of their focus on coping with the flap extension problem and the high level of workload as a result of the rapid sequence of events in the final minute of flight. The first officer attempted to communicate his concern about the excessive speed of the approach to the captain. There were deficiencies in Continental Airlines' (COA) oversight of its pilots and the principal operations inspector's oversight of COA. COA was aware of inconsistencies in flightcrew adherence to standard operating procedures within the airline; however, corrective actions taken before the accident had not resolved this problem.