Landing (descent or approach)

The aircraft was the third in a stream of five company aircraft departing the Tangalooma Resort airstrip at two-minute intervals on a clear moonlit evening. Following a routine departure at 2105 EST, the aircraft was climbed to 3,000 ft for the flight back to Coolangatta. Early in the cruise phase of the flight, the pilot found that the fourth aircraft was catching up to his and he elected to descend to 2,000 ft to ensure continued separation. At 2127 EST, the pilot reported to Coolangatta Approach Control that the aircraft had severe problems, but did not inform the controller of the nature of his emergency. However, the controller activated the airport emergency procedures when he observed on his radar display that the aircraft was losing altitude. The pilot had his second VHF radio transceiver tuned to his company frequency, and was answering transmissions received from other company pilots on this frequency while transmitting on the Coolangatta Approach frequency. The pilot later said that after the aircraft passed the seaway at Southport, the right engine surged, which resulted in the aircraft yawing. After he switch the electric fuel pump to "on", the symptoms disappeared. About a minute later he switched the pump off, then on again. He said that when the engine began surging again, he shut the engine down, feathering the propeller. Left engine power was increased and the aircraft maintained 1,500 ft in level flight. He switched the left engine's fuel supply to the right main tank, believing that this action would ensure supply from both main fuel tanks. The pilot said that after the aircraft passed Burleigh Heads, many things appeared to go wrong at once. The left engine began to splutter and did not respond to the throttle. He recalled attempting to restart the right engine. This proved to be unsuccessful. As the descent continued he planned to land on a beach. The pilot selected a stretch of beach for a forced landing. During late final approach, aided by bright moonlight, he noticed that any overrun would take the aircraft into a crowded car park. He changed his aim point to the stretch of beach south of the Currumbin Lifesavers Clubhouse. Following the flare for landing, the right wing struck a low rocky outcrop and the aircraft crashed into the surf. The entire wing assembly separated from the fuselage, which came to rest on its left side. Some of the nine passengers, and the pilot, escaped from the semi-submerged fuselage while bystanders rescued others.

The pilot reported that loss of power occurred in both engines after he entered the traffic pattern for a full stop landing. The airplane collided with trees during an emergency landing in a cotton field near the airport. Subsequent review of the aircraft maintenance logs disclosed that Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin (SB) 130A had not been accomplished on this airplane. According to the manufacturer, an inadvertent failure or the improper installation of a filler cap after refueling may cause an air pressure differential between the center and outboard portions of the main integral fuel tank. Air leakage from the filler cap may result in failure of the fuel transfer system to move fuel from the outboard tank section to the center tank section. To eliminate this possible malfunction, the operator was to remove vent check valves from the bulkhead between the tanks in accordance with SB 130A. The operator's maintenance policies required that, company jet and turbo propeller aircraft be maintained under a maintenance program in accordance with FAR Parts 135.415, 135.417, 135.423, 135.443, and a corporate flight management approved aircraft inspection program (AAIP). The maintenance inspection program also included compliance with manufacturers' service bulletins and service letters.

On approach to Matsu Nangan Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with reduced visibility due to fog. The descent was completed under VFR mode in IMC conditions. On final, the copilot who was the pilot-in-command continued the approach despite he did not establish any visual contact with the runway, and failed to monitor the instruments. Eventually, the crew attempted to make a go-around but this decision was taken too late. The aircraft struck the water surface and crashed in the sea about 1,600 metres offshore. Six passengers were killed while 11 other occupants were injured.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Novosibirsk to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, carrying 11 passengers, nine crew members and a load of 57 tons of meat and detergent powder. Upon takeoff from Novosibirsk-Yeltsovka Airport, the total weight of the aircraft was 17 tons above MTOW. While descending to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky Airport in limited visibility due to low clouds, at an altitude of 900 metres, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens after it struck the slope of a mountain located about 40 km from runway 34R threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 20 occupants were killed. The wreckage was found 300 metres below the summit.

On final approach to Ushuaia Airport, following an uneventful cargo flight from Río Grande, the twin engine aircraft collided with a flock of birds. The windshield was broken and the left engine lost power. The crew was able to continue the approach and landing. After touchdown, the aircraft went out of control and collided with a snow wall. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

A United States Air Force Boeing T-43A (USAF designation for the Boeing 737-200) was destroyed after impacting a hillside during an NDB approach to Dubrovnik Airport, Croatia. All 35 on board were killed. The aircraft was engaged in a mission to fly United States Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and a delegation of industry executives around the region for visits. The party was to be flown from Zagreb to Tuzla and Dubrovnik before returning to Zagreb. Operating with a call sign of IFO21, the accident aircraft departed Zagreb at 06:24 hours. The crew landed at Tuzla at 07:15 after an uneventful flight. The passengers deplaned, and the aircraft was then repositioned to Split because of insufficient ramp space at Tuzla to park the aircraft for the duration of the visit. At 12:47, the aircraft landed at Tuzla, where the passengers reboarded. The accident flight departed Tuzla for Dubrovnik at 13:55. After crossing Split at 14:34 the flight was cleared to descend from FL210 to FL140. Further descent clearance was given to FL100. After the aircraft reached FL100 at 14:45, south of Split VOR, Zagreb Center transferred control to Dubrovnik Approach/Tower. The controller cleared IFO21 direct to the Kolocep (KLP) NDB. After opposite-direction traffic had been cleared, IFO21 was cleared to descend to 5000 feet. At 14:52, the crew told Dubrovnik Approach/Tower that they were 16 NM from the airport. They were cleared to descend to 4,000 feet and told to report crossing the KLP beacon. At 14:53, the aircraft crossed KLP, which was the Final Approach Fix (FAF), at 4100 feet and began the approach without approach clearance from Dubrovnik Tower. At that point the aircraft was slightly high and fast and not completely configured for the approach, as it should have been. At 14:54, the copilot of IFO21 called Dubrovnik Approach/Tower and said, "We’re inside the locator, inbound." IFO21 was then cleared for the NDB approach to runway 12. The aircraft tracked a course of 110 degrees after crossing KLP, instead of tracking the published course of 119 degrees. The aircraft maintained this track from KLP to the point of impact. The accident aircraft descended to 2200 feet which was consistent with the published minimum descent altitude of 2,150 feet. At 14:57, the aircraft impacted a rocky mountainside approximately 1.7 NM to the left (northeast) of the extended runway centerline and 1.8 NM north of the approach end of runway 12 at Dubrovnik Airport.

After takeoff from Villavicencio-La Vanguardia Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 1,900 feet, the captain reported severe vibrations with the left engine and was cleared to return. The crew shut down the left engine and started the approach to runway 22. But on final, he realized he could reach the airport so he completed a belly landing one km short of runway threshold. The aircraft came to rest in a field and was damaged beyond repair. All 20 occupants escaped uninjured.

The two crew members had reported at Stansted at 1130 hrs to catch a passenger flight to Belfast where they were rostered for a training detail; immediately prior to this duty day, they both had two days off. The first officer had completed a command course on the simulator the previous week and this training detail was part of his conversion to the left hand seat; the training captain had also been involved in the simulator the previous week. The detail was planned to involve two flights; the first would cover the mandatory items for the type rating test (1179) and the second would complete the first officer's base check and initial line check. On arrival at Belfast, the crew checked in to the airport hotel,changed into uniform and went to the meteorological office at approximately 1600 hrs for a weather briefing. This briefing indicated that the weather was close to the limits required for the completion of the type rating test items but, with a forecast of a suitable area to the north of the airfield, the crew decided to carry on with the detail. For the first flight, G-OPFE left the stand at 1815 hrs and took off at 1827 hrs. All the necessary items were completed successfully, albeit with some difficulty because of the variable cloud base, and the crew landed at 2010 hrs. By 2015 hrs, G-OPFE was back on stand and the crew kept the engines running while they had a short brief for the second flight. At 2025 hrs,they taxied off stand and positioned for a departure off Runway 07. On this second flight, following a take off at 2031 hrs, the training captain initiated an outboard engine failure just after VR by retarding the associated throttle. The appropriate remedial actions were simulated andthe first officer carried out a 3 engine ILS approach and go-around to Runway 17; there had been no abnormal switch positions required because of the simulated engine failure. The go-around was followed by a 3 engine VOR approach to landon Runway 07. The different runways were used because there is no ILS on Runway 07, the runway in use. After landing,the first officer repositioned G-OPFE and made a full power take-off from Runway 07, commencing his roll at the intersection with Runway 17. The aircraft was climbed to 4,000 feet amsl and established in the cruise at 200 kt IAS. During this cruise, there were no unserviceabilities noted with G-OPFE. The crew continued in a north-westerly direction until approximately 5 nm from Eglinton Airport when they requested, and were given, permission to turn back towards Belfast International Airport. For the subsequent approach, the surface wind was 090°/15 kt,visibility was 2,500 metres and the cloud was scattered at 1,000 feet and overcast at 4,200 feet agl. After establishing contact with Aldergrove radar, the crew were cleared to commence a VOR/DME approach to Runway 07 for afinal landing. It was confirmed from the CVR that the 'Initial Approach' checks were completed 'down to the line'. However,although the first officer at one stage commented that it was a bit early to complete the rest of the 'Initial Approach' checks,there was no evidence that these or the 'Finals' checks were subsequently requested or actioned. The landing gear would normally be selected down during the 'Initial Approach, below the line' checks and confirmed during the 'Finals' checks. The final approach profile was closely monitored by the commander and, from comments on the CVR, the approach appeared very stable. In the later stages of approach, the first officer was heard asking for 85% flap andthe training captain was heard confirming this selection. These were the only comments heard referring to flap selection or position,although it is acceptable company practice for crews to request flap changes by visual means. The final flap position (100%)is used to decrease ground roll and is selected during the flare or after touchdown. Other relevant comments which were heardon the CVR included a reference to landing lights; this is the last item on the "Finals" checks. As the throttles were retarded in the flare, the gear warning horn was heard on the CVR, followed within 23 seconds by sounds of the propellers contacting the runway surface. After coming to a stop on the runway, the crew secured and evacuated the aircraft. The airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Service were on the scene inless than one minute.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a delivery flight from Europe to the US via Iceland and Greenland. Eight minutes after her departure from Reykjavik Airport, outbound to Narsarsuaq, the pilot informed ATC that her portable GPS fell on the ground and was not able to locate it. It such conditions, she decided to divert to Keflavik Airport when less than five minutes later, while descending, the right engine failed. For unknown reasons, she did not feather the propeller and did not elected to restart the engine. Due to drag and a loss of speed, the aircraft lost altitude and crashed near the village of Njarðvík, about 5 km east of Keflavik Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was seriously injured.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a charter flight from Oranjestad to Punto Fijo with seven passengers and one pilot on board. While descending to Punto Fijo-Josefa Camejo Airport, the pilot informed ATC about the failure of the left engine. Shortly later, the left engine caught fire and detached, causing a part of the left wing to be torn off. Out of control, the aircraft crashed in the sea about 29,5 km north of Punto Fijo Airport. All eight occupants were killed.