Landing (descent or approach)

On March 28, 1997, about 0803 eastern standard time, a Beech E-90, N90DA, registered to a private individual, landed short of the runway at Huaypetue Airport, Choque, Peru, while on a foreign air taxi flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed. The aircraft received substantial damage and the airline transport-rated pilot and six passengers were not injured. The flight originated from Cuzco, Peru, the same day, about 0700. Civil Aviation Authorities stated that while on approach to land the pilot misjudged the distance from the runway and touched down short of the runway. Postcrash examination of the aircraft showed no evidence of precrash mechanical failure or malfunction.

All positions at LaGuardia Tower were combined to the local control position from 0011 EST until after the accident. At about 0430 EST, ground personnel in 'Vehicle 1277' (communicating on ground control frequency), were cleared on runway 13/31 to perform 'lighting maintenance.' Later, during repair of centerline lights and while N117FJ was inbound to the airport, Vehicle 1277 stalled on runway 13/31. Personnel of Vehicle 1277 attempted to restart the vehicle, but were unable, so they shut off all vehicle lights to reduce electrical load, and again attempted to restart the vehicle, but to no avail. At 0507 (during darkness), N117FJ made initial call to the tower for landing. The controller acknowledged the call, scanned runway 13/31, did not see Vehicle 1277, and cleared N117FJ to land on runway 31. At 0510, personnel of Vehicle 1277 observed N117FJ in the approach/landing phase and radioed ground controller that they were stuck on the runway. The controller then radioed, 'go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, aircraft on the runway go-around, seven fox juliet go-around.' Moments later, N117FJ impacted Vehicle 1277. The FAA ATC Handbook stated, 'Ensure that the runway to be used is clear of all known ground vehicles, equipment, and personnel before a departing aircraft starts takeoff or a landing aircraft crosses the runway threshold.'

While approaching Juba Airport, the crew reported engine problems and elected to make an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances. All four crew members were killed. SPLA rebels reported they had shot down the Antonov while it was attacking the village of Yei located about 40 miles from Juba.

The twin engine airplane had been cleared for a night instrument approach to Galveston, Texas, after flying non-stop from San Diego, California, when the pilot reported that he had lost the right engine and did not have much fuel left. The controller vectored the airplane toward the closest airport, and the airplane was approximately 1 mile northeast of that airport when radar contact was lost. A witness observed the airplane enter a spin, descend in a nose down attitude, and impact near the center of a lake. When the pilot filed his flight plan for the cross country flight, he indicated the airplane carried enough fuel to fly for 7 hours and 30 minutes. At the time radar contact was lost, 7 hours and 32 minutes had elapsed since the airplane departed San Diego. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical discrepancies. The landing gear was down, the flaps were extended to about 15 degrees, and neither propeller was feathered. The single engine approach procedure in the airplane owner's manual indicated that the landing gear should be extended when within gliding distance of the field and the flaps placed down only after landing is assured.

The aircraft was completing a flight from Dezful to Mashhad, carrying 80 passengers and eigh crew members, most of them soldiers, officers and family members. While descending to Mashhad Airport, the crew informed ATC about the failure of an engine. Shortly later, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located in the Mashhad-Neyshabur Mountain Range. The wreckage was found about 24 km west of the airport. All 88 occupants were killed.

After landing on wet runway 35 at Houston-Sugar Land Airport, the crew encountered nil braking action. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest in a ditch. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Lucapa in heavy fog, the captain was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and decided to make a go-around. A second approach was abandoned few minutes later. During a third attempt to land, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the four engine aircraft hit obstacles some 200 metres to the right of the runway, crashed and burst into flames. All 15 occupants were killed.

En route from Campo Grande to Vilhena, while in cruising altitude, the crew received the last weather bulletin about Vilhena with conditions below minimums. The copilot (under line check on this flight) suggested to divert to the alternate airport but the captain/instructor preferred to attempt an approach via Echo 1 and the NDB for runway 03. If visual contact would not be established at decision height, the crew would divert to the alternate airport. Then the copilot set the decision height at 2,500 feet which was wrong as the correct decision height was fixed at 2,560 feet. Nor the copilot nor the captain realized this mistake prior to start the descent to Vilhena Airport. On approach, the copilot was told by captain to monitor the horizon. He focused his attention on the horizon and failed to monitor the altimer. On his side, the captain elected to establish a visual contact with the ground and the runway light but is was later confirmed that the city of Vilhena suffered a general blackout. On final, the aircraft descended below MDA then struck trees and crashed less than one km from the runway threshold, bursting into flames. All 16 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

While approaching Ardabil Airport in poor weather conditions, the aircraft struck the ground few km short of runway. All four crew members were killed. They were completing a humanitarian flight from Tehran.

The flight was on a coupled instrument landing system (ILS) approach with 1/2 mile visibility in snow showers. Three successive fixes on the localizer are defined by distance measuring equipment (DME) paired with the ILS; prior to the ILS DME commissioning 6 months before the accident, the DME fixes were defined by a VORTAC 4.7 nautical miles past the ILS DME. The aircraft was 800 feet high at the first fix and 1,500 feet high at the second, but approximately on altitude 4.7 nautical miles past the first and second fixes, respectively. It passed the outer marker 900 feet high and captured the glide slope from above about 1.8 nautical miles from the threshold, 500 feet above decision height (DH) and 700 feet above touchdown. The aircraft was on glide slope for 28 seconds, during which time its speed decayed to stall speed; it then dropped below glide slope and crashed 1.3 nautical miles short of the threshold. The pilot's FLT DIR DME-1/ DME-2 switch, which control the DME display on the pilot's horizontal situation indicator (HSI), was found set to DME-2; the NAV-2 radio was set to the VORTAC frequency. Up to 800 feet may be required for stall recovery.