Crash of a Yakovlev Yak-40 in Dnipropetrovsk

Date & Time: Apr 28, 2003
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-87918
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
9 73 08 55
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On flare, the aircraft was unstable and rolled from right to left. When landing firmly on runway 09/27, the aircraft was not properly aligned and ran off runway to the right at a speed of 115 km/h. It eventually collided with a dike located 100 metres further. All 17 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in Beni

Date & Time: Apr 25, 2003
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kinshasa - Beni
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew attempted to land by night at Beni Airport which is not equipped for such operations. The aircraft landed too far down the runway, overran and collided with trees. All 10 occupants escaped with various injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Socata TBM-700 in Mobile: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 24, 2003 at 2012 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N705QD
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Lawrenceville – Mobile
MSN:
231
YOM:
2002
Flight number:
LBQ850
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
10000
Captain / Total hours on type:
408.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1222
Circumstances:
A review of communications between Mobile Downtown Control Tower, and the pilot revealed that while on approach the pilot reported having a problem. The Ground Controller reported that he had the airplane in sight and cleared the flight to land on runway 18. The pilot stated that he had a "run away engine", and elected to shut down the engine and continued the approach. The Controller then cleared the pilot again to runway 18. The pilot then stated that he did not think that he was going to "make it." The airplane collided with a utility pole and the ground and burst into flames short of the runway. The post-accident examination of the engine found that the fuel control unit arm to the fuel control unit interconnect rod end connection was separated from the rod end swivel ball assembly. The swivel ball assembly was found improperly attached to the inboard side of the arm, with the bolt head facing inboard, instead of outboard, and the washer and nut attached to the arm's outboard side instead of the inboard side. The rod separation would resulted in a loss of power lever control. The published emergency procedures for "Power Lever Control Lose," states; If minimum power obtained is excessive: 1) reduce airspeed by setting airplane in nose-up attitude at IAS < 178 KIAS. 2) "inert Sep" switch--On. 3) if ITT >800 C "Inert Sep"--Off. 4) Landing Gear Control--Down. 5) Flaps--Takeoff. 6) Establish a long final or an ILS approach respecting IAS < 178 KIAS. 7) When runway is assured: Condition Lever to --Cut Off. 8) Propeller Governor Lever to-- Feather. 9) Flaps --Landing as required (at IAS <122 KIAS). 10) Land Normally without reverse. 11) Braking as required. The pilot stated to Mobile Downtown Control Tower, Ground Control that he had a "run away engine" and that he "had to shut down the engine". As a result of the pilot not following the published emergency procedures, the airplane was unable to reach the runway during the emergency.
Probable cause:
The improper installation of the power control linkage on the engine fuel control unit by maintenance personnel which resulted in a loss of power lever control, and the pilot's failure to follow emergency procedures and his intentional engine shutdown which resulted in a forced landing and subsequent inflight collision with a light pole.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 99A Airliner in Prince Albert

Date & Time: Apr 23, 2003 at 1802 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FDYF
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saskatoon – Prince Albert
MSN:
U-110
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
TW602
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, to Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, with two pilots and four passengers on board. The aircraft was approximately 4000 feet above sea level when the crew selected the flaps for the approach to Prince Albert. A bang was heard from the rear of the fuselage. The aircraft commenced an uncommanded pitch-up to a near-vertical attitude, then stalled, nosed over, and began a spin to the left. The crew countered the spin but the aircraft continued to descend in a near-vertical dive. Through the application of full-up elevator and the manipulation of power settings, the pilots were able to bring the aircraft to a near-horizontal attitude. The crew extended the landing gear and issued a Mayday call, indicating that they were conducting a forced landing. The aircraft struck a knoll, tearing away the belly cargo pod and the landing gear. The aircraft bounced into the air and travelled approximately 180 metres, then contacted a barbed-wire fence and slid to a stop approximately 600 metres from the initial impact point. The crew and passengers suffered serious but non-life-threatening injuries. All of the occupants exited through the main cabin door at the rear of the aircraft. The accident occurred during daylight hours at 1802 central standard time.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. During flight, the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator worked free of the mounting structure, and as a result, the flight crew lost pitch control of the aircraft.
2. During replacement of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator, the upper attachment bolts were inserted through the airframe structure but did not pass through the upper mounting lugs of the
trim actuator.
3. The improperly installed bolts trapped the actuator mounting lug assemblies, suspending the weight of the actuator and giving the false impression that the bolts had been correctly installed.
4. Dual inspections, ground testing, and flight testing did not reveal the faulty attachment.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The nature of the installation presents a risk that qualified persons may inadvertently install Beech 99 and Beech 100 horizontal stabilizer trim actuators incorrectly. There are no published warnings to advise installers that there is a potential to install the actuator incorrectly.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226AC Metro II in Denver

Date & Time: Apr 15, 2003 at 2041 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N229AM
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Gunnison - Denver
MSN:
TC-305
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
HKA1813
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4565
Captain / Total hours on type:
2179.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2517
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1400
Aircraft flight hours:
31643
Circumstances:
The flight was following a heavy jet on landing approach. The crew agreed to fly the approach at a slightly higher altitude than normal to avoid any possible wake turbulence. The first officer, who was flying the airplane, called for the landing gear to be lowered. When the captain placed the gear handle in the DOWN position, he noted red IN-TRANSIT lights. He recycled the landing gear, but got the same result. He consulted the emergency checklist and thought he had manually extended the landing gear because he "heard the normal 'clunk feel' and airspeed started to decay." In addition, when power was reduced to FLIGHT IDLE, the GEAR UNSAFE warning horn did not sound. The first officer agreed, noting 2,000 pounds of hydraulic pressure. The airplane landed wheels up. Propeller blade fragments penetrated the fuselage, breaching the pressure vessel. Postaccident examination revealed the nose gear had been partially extended but the main landing gear was retracted. The crew said the GEAR UNSAFE indication had been a recurring problem with the airplane. The problem had previously been attributed to a frozen squat switch in the wheel well.
Probable cause:
The failure of the landing gear system and the flight crew's failure to ascertain that the landing ear was down and locked. A contributing factor was the inadequate maintenance inspections performed by maintenance personnel.
Final Report:

Crash of a Grumman G-64 Albatross in Chetumal: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 14, 2003 at 1830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N7026Y
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tulum - Chetumal
MSN:
G-394
YOM:
1954
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The seaplane departed Tulum on a flight to Chetumal with three people on board. On approach to Chetumal Airport in good weather conditions, the pilot was cleared to land on runway 10 and initiated a left turn when control was slot. The aircraft rolled to the left, lost height and crashed 6 km short of the runway, bursting into flames. All three occupants were killed.

Crash of an Antonov AN-12BP in Sredny Island

Date & Time: Apr 11, 2003 at 2152 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
RA-12981
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Salekhard - Sredny Island
MSN:
00 347 104
YOM:
1970
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed Moscow-Vnukovo on a cargo flight to Sredny Island with an intermediate stop in Salekhard, carrying six crew members, seven passengers and a load of 9,6 tons of various goods for the personnel of the drifting Polar Station "Severny Polyus 32" (North Pole 32). On final approach to the Sredny Ostrov Airfield, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. Too low, the aircraft struck the icy ground about 650 metres short of runway. It lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest 165 metres to the right of the extended centerline. All 13 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- Poor flight preparation,
- The crew did not receive a suitable weather briefing for the destination airport,
- Poor weather conditions at destination,
- The visibility was below minimums,
- The crew continued the approach without visual contact with the runway until the aircraft impacted ground,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure.

Crash of a Cessna 414 Chancellor in Canton: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 10, 2003 at 1700 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N822DB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Rome – Canton
MSN:
414-0813
YOM:
1975
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
4500
Captain / Total hours on type:
245.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5078
Circumstances:
The VFR repositioning flight departed Rome, Georgia en route to Canton, Georgia but never arrived. Late on the evening of April 10, 2003, the pilot's spouse contacted the local authorities when her husband did not arrive at home or call. The spouse stated that her husband flew out of Rome early Thursday morning headed to Augusta, Georgia to pick up an unknown number of passengers and fly them back to Rome, Georgia. The authorities confirmed that the passengers had arrived at their destination. The Civil Air patrol began a search and located the airplane on the side of "Bear Mountain" in Canton, Georgia, on April 11, 2003. The wreckage site was located 11.3 nautical miles west of Cherokee County Airport, Canton, Georgia, and 26 nautical miles east of Rome, Georgia on the west side of Bear Mountain. The mountains ridgeline runs northeast and southwest, near the town of Waleska, Georgia. The field elevation at the crash site was 1,750 feet above mean sea level (msl) and the peak of Bear Mountain was 2,268 feet msl. The upslope of the terrain at the site was estimated at 30-40 degrees. Examination of the airframe, flight controls, engine assembly and accessories revealed no anomalies.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 207 Skywagon in Grants Pass: 2 killed

Date & Time: Apr 9, 2003 at 0850 LT
Registration:
N9785M
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
North Bend – Grants Pass
MSN:
207-0729
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
34976
Aircraft flight hours:
4516
Circumstances:
During a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country flight from North Bend, Oregon, to Grants Pass, Oregon, the airplane collided with mountainous terrain approximately seven miles northwest of the pilot's planned destination. Weather data and witness reports outlined areas of low ceilings and low visibility throughout the area during the approximate time of the accident. Post-accident inspection of the aircraft and engine revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from mountainous terrain while in cruise flight. Factors include low ceilings and mountainous terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Short 330-200 in DuBois

Date & Time: Apr 9, 2003 at 0715 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N805SW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pittsburgh – DuBois
MSN:
3055
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
SKZ1170
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3470
Captain / Total hours on type:
2100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1347
Copilot / Total hours on type:
431
Aircraft flight hours:
24401
Circumstances:
The airplane was on an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in instrument meteorological conditions. The captain initially stated that the airplane was on the ILS approach with the engine power set at flight idle. About 300 feet above the ground, and 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the threshold, the captain made visual contact with the runway. The captain stated that the left engine then surged, which caused the airplane to yaw right and drift left. At the time, the airplane was in visual conditions, and on glideslope, with the airspeed decreasing through 106 knots. The captain aligned the airplane with the runway and attempted to go-around, but the throttles were difficult to move. The airplane began to stall and the captain lowered the nose. The airplane subsequently struck terrain about 500 feet prior to the runway. After the captain was informed that the engine power should not be at flight idle during the approach, he amended his statement to include the approach power setting at 1,000 lbs. of torque. The co-pilot initially reported that the engine anomaly occurred while at flight idle. However, the co-pilot later amended his statement and reported that the anomaly occurred as power was being reduced toward flight idle, but not at flight idle. Examination of the left engine did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. Examination of the airplane cockpit did not reveal any anomalies with the throttle levers. Review of a flight manual for the make and model accident airplane revealed that during a normal landing, 1,100 lbs of torque should be set prior to turning base leg. The manual further stated to reduce the power levers about 30 feet agl, and initiate a gentle flare. The reported weather at the airport about 5 minutes before the accident included a visibility 3/4 mile in mist, and an overcast ceiling at 100 feet. The reported weather at the airport about 7 minutes after the accident included visibility 1/4 mile in freezing fog and an overcast ceiling at 100 feet. Review of the terminal procedure for the respective ILS approach revealed that the decision height was 200 feet agl, and the required minimum visibility was 1/2 mile.
Probable cause:
The captain's failure to maintain the proper glidepath during the instrument approach, and his failure to perform a go-around. Factors were a low ceiling and reduced visibility due to mist.
Final Report: