Country

Crash of an ATR42-320 in Fond-du-Lac: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 13, 2017 at 1812 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GWEA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saskatoon – Prince Albert – Fond-du-Lac – Stony Rapids
MSN:
240
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
WEW280
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
22
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5990
Captain / Total hours on type:
1500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
15769
Copilot / Total hours on type:
7930
Aircraft flight hours:
26481
Aircraft flight cycles:
32051
Circumstances:
On 13 December 2017, an Avions de Transport Régional ATR 42-320 aircraft (registration C-GWEA, serial number 240), operated by West Wind Aviation L.P. (West Wind), was scheduled for a series of instrument flight rules flights from Saskatoon through northern Saskatchewan as flight WEW282. When the flight crew and dispatcher held a briefing for the day’s flights, they became aware of forecast icing along the route of flight. Although both the flight crew and the dispatcher were aware of the forecast ground icing, the decision was made to continue with the day’s planned route to several remote airports that had insufficient de-icing facilities. The aircraft flew from Saskatoon/John G. Diefenbaker International (CYXE) to Prince Albert (Glass Field) Airport (CYPA) without difficulty, and, after a stop of about 1 hour, proceeded on toward Fond-du-Lac Airport (CZFD). On approach to Fond-du-Lac Airport, the aircraft encountered some in-flight icing, and the crew activated the aircraft’s anti-icing and de-icing systems. Although the aircraft’s ice protection systems were activated, the aircraft’s de-icing boots were not designed to shed all of the ice that can accumulate, and the anti-icing systems did not prevent ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces. As a result, some residual ice began to accumulate on the aircraft. The flight crew were aware of the ice; however, there were no handling anomalies noted during the approach. Consequently, they likely did not assess that the residual ice was severe enough to have a significant effect on aircraft performance. The crew continued the approach and landed at Fond-du-Lac Airport at 1724 Central Standard Time. According to post-accident analysis of the data from the flight data recorder, the aircraft’s drag and lift performance was degraded by 28% and 10%, respectively, shortly before landing at Fond-du-Lac Airport. This indicated that the aircraft had significant residual ice adhering to its structure upon arrival. However, this data was not available to the flight crew at the time of landing. The aircraft was on the ground at Fond-du-Lac Airport for approximately 48 minutes. The next flight was destined for Stony Rapids Airport (CYSF), Saskatchewan, with 3 crew members (2 pilots and 1 flight attendant) and 22 passengers on board. Although there was no observable precipitation or fog while the aircraft was on the ground, weather conditions were conducive to ice or frost formation. This, combined with the residual mixed ice on the aircraft, which acted as nucleation sites that allowed the formation of ice crystals, resulted in the formation of additional ice or frost on the aircraft’s critical surfaces. Once the passengers had boarded the aircraft, the first officer completed an external inspection of the aircraft. However, because the available inspection equipment was inadequate, the first officer’s ice inspection consisted only of walking around the aircraft and looking at the left wing from the top of the stairs at the left rear door, without the use of a flashlight on the dimly lit apron. Although he was unaware of the full extent of the ice and the ongoing accretion, the first officer did inform the captain that there was some ice on the aircraft. The captain did not inspect the aircraft himself, nor did he attempt to have it de-iced; rather, he and the first officer continued with departure preparations. Company departures from remote airports, such as Fond-du-Lac, with some amount of surface contamination on the aircraft’s critical surfaces had become common practice, in part due to the inadequacy of de-icing equipment or services at these locations. The past success of these adaptations resulted in this unsafe practice becoming normalized and this normalization influenced the flight crew’s decision to depart. Although the flight crew were aware of icing on the aircraft’s critical surfaces, they decided that the occurrence departure could be accomplished safely. Their decision to continue with the original plan to depart was influenced by continuation bias, as they perceived the initial and sustained cues that supported their plan as more compelling than the later cues that suggested another course of action. At 1812 Central Standard Time, in the hours of darkness, the aircraft began its take-off roll on Runway 28, and, 30 seconds later, it was airborne. As a result of the ice that remained on the aircraft following the approach and the additional ice that had accreted during the ground stop, the aircraft’s drag was increased by 58% and its lift was decreased by 25% during the takeoff. Despite this degraded performance, the aircraft initially climbed; however, immediately after liftoff, the aircraft began to roll to the left without any pilot input. This roll was as a result of asymmetric lift distribution due to uneven ice contamination on the aircraft. Following the uncommanded roll, the captain reacted as if the aircraft was an uncontaminated ATR 42, with the expectation of normal handling qualities and dynamic response characteristics; however, due to the contamination, the aircraft had diminished roll damping resulting in unexpected handling qualities and dynamic response. Although the investigation determined that the ailerons had sufficient roll control authority to counteract the asymmetric lift, due to the unexpected handling qualities and dynamic response, the roll disturbance developed into an oscillation with growing magnitude and control in the roll axis was lost. This loss of control in the roll axis, which corresponds with the known risks associated with taking off with ice contamination, ultimately led to the aircraft colliding with terrain 17 seconds after takeoff. The aircraft collided with the ground in a relatively level pitch, with a bank angle of 30° left. As a result of the sudden vertical deceleration upon contact with the ground, the aircraft suffered significant damage, which varied in severity at different locations on the aircraft due to impact angle and variability in structural design. The design standards for transport category aircraft in effect at the time the ATR 42 was certified did not specify minimum loads that a fuselage structure must be able to tolerate and remain survivable, or minimum loads for fuselage impact energy absorption. As a result, the ATR 42 was not designed with these crashworthy principles in mind. The main landing gear at the bottom of the centre fuselage section was rigid, and, on impact, did not absorb or attenuate much of the load. The impact-induced acceleration was not attenuated because the landing gear housing did not deform. This unattenuated acceleration resulted in a large inertial load from the wing, causing the wing support structure to fail and the wing to collapse into the cabin. The reduced survivable space between the floor above the main landing gear and the collapsed upper fuselage caused crushing injuries, such as major head, body, and leg trauma, to passengers in the middle-forward left section of the aircraft. Of the 3 passengers in this area, 2 experienced, serious life-changing injuries, and 1 passenger subsequently died. The collapse of part of the floor structure compromised the restraint systems, limiting the protection afforded to the aircraft occupants when they were experiencing vertical, longitudinal, and lateral forces. This resulted in serious velocity-related injuries and impeded their ability to take post-crash survival actions in a timely manner. Unaware of the danger, most passengers in this occurrence did not brace for impact. Because their torsos were unrestrained, they received injuries consistent with jackknifing and flailing, such as hitting the seat in front of them. As a result of unapproved repairs, the flight attendant seat failed on impact, resulting in injuries that impeded her ability to perform evacuation and survival actions in a timely manner. Although the TSB has previously recommended the development and use of child restraints aboard commercial aircraft, planned regulations have yet to be implemented by Transport Canada. As a result, the occurrence aircraft was not equipped with these devices, and an infant passenger who was unrestrained received flailing and crushing injuries during the accident sequence. By the time the aircraft came to a rest, all occupants had received injuries. Passengers began to call for help within minutes of the impact, using their cell phones. Numerous people from the nearby community received the messages and quickly set out to help. The passengers and crew began to evacuate, but they experienced significant difficulties as a result of the aircraft damage. It took approximately 20 minutes for the first 17 passengers to evacuate, and the remaining passengers much longer; it took as long as 3 hours to extricate 1 passenger, who required rescuer assistance. As a result of the accident, 9 passengers and 1 crew member received serious injuries, and the remaining 13 passengers and 2 crew members received minor injuries. One of the passengers who had received serious injuries died 12 days after the accident. There was no post-impact fire, and the emergency locator activated on impact.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence.
1. When West Wind commenced operations into Fond-du-Lac Airport (CZFD) in 2014, no effective risk controls were in place to mitigate the potential hazard of ground icing at CZFD.
2. Although both the flight crew and the dispatcher were aware of the forecast ground icing, the decision was made to continue with the day’s planned route to several remote airports that had insufficient de-icing facilities.
3. Although the aircraft’s ice-protection systems were activated on the approach to CZFD, the aircraft’s de-icing boots were not designed to shed all of the ice that can accumulate, and the anti-icing systems did not prevent ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces. As a result, some residual ice began to accumulate on the aircraft.
4. Although the flight crew were aware of the ice, there were no handling anomalies noted on the approach. Consequently, the crew likely did not assess that the residual ice was severe enough to have a significant effect on aircraft performance. Subsequently, without any further discussion about the icing, the crew continued the approach and landed at CZFD.
5. Weather conditions on the ground were conducive to ice or frost formation, and this, combined with the nucleation sites provided by the residual mixed ice on the aircraft, resulted in the formation of additional ice or frost on the aircraft’s critical surfaces.
6. Because the available inspection equipment was inadequate, the first officer’s ice inspection consisted only of walking around the aircraft on a dimly lit apron, without a flashlight, and looking at the left wing from the top of the stairs at the left rear entry door (L2). As a result, the full extent of the residual ice and ongoing accretion was unknown to the flight crew.
7. Departing from remote airports, such as CZFD, with some amount of surface contamination on the aircraft’s critical surfaces, had become common practice, in part due to the inadequacy of de-icing equipment or services at these locations. The past success of these adaptations resulted in the unsafe practice becoming normalized and this normalization influenced the flight crew’s decision to depart.
8. Although the flight crew were aware of icing on the aircraft’s critical surfaces, they decided that the occurrence departure could be accomplished safely. Their decision to continue with the original plan to depart was influenced by continuation bias, as they perceived the initial and sustained cues that supported their plan as more compelling than the later cues that suggested another course of action.
9. As a result of the ice that remained on the aircraft following the approach and the additional ice that had accreted during the ground stop, the aircraft’s drag was
increased by 58% and its lift was decreased by 25% during the takeoff.
10. During the takeoff, despite the degraded performance, the aircraft initially climbed; however, immediately after lift off, the aircraft began to roll to the left without any pilot input. This roll was as a result of asymmetric lift distribution due to uneven ice contamination on the aircraft.
11. Following the uncommanded roll, the captain reacted as if the aircraft was an uncontaminated ATR 42, with the expectation of normal handling qualities and dynamic response characteristics; however, due to the contamination, the aircraft had diminished roll damping resulting in unexpected handling qualities and dynamic response.
12. Although the investigation determined the ailerons had sufficient roll control authority to counteract the asymmetric lift, due to the unexpected handling qualities and dynamic response, the roll disturbance developed into an oscillation with growing magnitude and control in the roll axis was lost.
13. This loss of control in the roll axis, which corresponds with the known risks associated with taking off with ice contamination, ultimately led to the aircraft colliding with terrain.
14. The aircraft collided with the ground in relatively level pitch, with a bank angle of 30° left. As a result of the sudden vertical deceleration upon contact with the ground, the aircraft suffered significant damage, which varied in severity at different locations on the aircraft because of the impact angle and the variability in structural design.
15. The design standards for transport category aircraft in effect at the time the ATR 42 was certified did not specify minimum loads that a fuselage structure must be able to tolerate and remain survivable, or minimum loads for fuselage impact energy absorption. As a result, the ATR 42 was not designed with these crashworthy principles in mind.
16. On impact, the induced acceleration was not attenuated because the landing gear housing did not deform. This unattenuated acceleration resulted in a large inertial load from the wing, causing the wing support structure to fail and the wing to collapse into the cabin.
17. The reduced survivable space between the floor above the main landing gear and the collapsed upper fuselage caused crushing injuries, such as major head, body, and leg trauma, to passengers in the middle-forward left section of the aircraft. Of the 3 passengers in this area, 2 experienced serious life-changing injuries, and 1 passenger died.
18. The collapse of part of the floor structure compromised the restraint systems, limiting the protection afforded to the occupants when they were experiencing vertical, longitudinal, and lateral forces. This resulted in serious velocity-related injuries and impeded their ability to take post-impact survival actions in a timely manner.
19. Most passengers in this occurrence did not brace before impact. Because their torsos were unrestrained, they received injuries consistent with jackknifing and flailing, such as hitting the seat in front of them.
20. Given that regulations requiring the use of child-restraint systems have yet to be implemented, the aircraft was not equipped with these devices. As a result, the infant passenger was unrestrained and received flail and crushing injuries. 21. As a result of unapproved repairs, the flight attendant seat failed on impact, resulting in injuries that impeded her ability to perform evacuation and survival actions in a timely manner.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Buss Lakes: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jun 30, 2011 at 1111 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GUJX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Buss Lakes - Southend
MSN:
1132
YOM:
1958
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
4023
Captain / Total hours on type:
3664.00
Aircraft flight hours:
12746
Circumstances:
The Lawrence Bay Airways Ltd. float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (registration C-GUJX, serial number 1132) departed from a lake adjacent to a remote fishing cabin near Buss Lakes for a day visual flight rules flight to Southend, Saskatchewan, about 37 nautical miles (nm) southeast. There were 4 passengers and 1 pilot onboard. The aircraft crashed along the shoreline of another lake located about 2 nm southeast of its point of departure. The impact was severe and the 5 occupants were killed on impact. The emergency locator transmitter activated, and the aircraft was found partially submerged in shallow water with the right wing tip resting on the shore. There was no post-crash fire. The accident occurred during daylight hours at about 1111 Central Standard Time.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
While manoeuvring at low level, the aircraft's critical angle of attack was likely exceeded and the aircraft stalled. The stall occurred at an altitude from which recovery was not possible.
Other Findings:
The separation of the propeller blade tip likely resulted from impact forces.
The investigation could not determine whether the fuel pressure warning light was illuminated prior to the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Casa 212 Aviocar in Saskatoon: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 1, 2011 at 1830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FDKM
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Saskatoon - Saskatoon
MSN:
196
YOM:
1981
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
7400
Captain / Total hours on type:
75.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7800
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1800
Aircraft flight hours:
21292
Circumstances:
At 1503 Central Standard Time, the Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA) C-212-CC40 (registration C-FDKM, serial number 196) operated by Fugro Aviation Canada Ltd., departed from Saskatoon/Diefenbaker International Airport, Saskatchewan, under visual flight rules for a geophysical survey flight to the east of Saskatoon. On board were 2 pilots and a survey equipment operator. At about 1814, the right engine lost power. The crew shut it down, carried out checklist procedures, and commenced an approach for Runway 27. When the flight was 3.5 nautical miles from the runway on final approach, the left engine lost power. The crew carried out a forced landing adjacent to Wanuskewin Road in Saskatoon. The aircraft impacted a concrete roadway noise abatement wall and was destroyed. The survey equipment operator sustained fatal injuries, the first officer sustained serious injuries, and the captain sustained minor injuries. No ELT signal was received.
Probable cause:
Conclusions
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The right engine lost power when the intermediate spur gear on the torque sensor shaft failed. This resulted in loss of drive to the high-pressure engine-driven pump, fuel starvation, and immediate engine stoppage.
2. The ability of the left-hand No. 2 ejector pump to deliver fuel to the collector tank was compromised by foreign object debris (FOD) in the ejector pump nozzle.
3. When the fuel level in the left collector tank decreased, the left fuel level warning light likely illuminated but was not noticed by the crew.
4. The pilots did not execute the fuel level warning checklist because they did not perceive the illumination of the fuel level left tank warning light. Consequently, the fuel crossfeed valve remained closed and fuel from only the left wing was being supplied to the left engine.
5. The left engine flamed out as a result of depletion of the collector tank and fuel starvation, and the crew had to make a forced landing resulting in an impact with a concrete noise abatement wall.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Depending on the combination of fuel level and bank angle in single-engine uncoordinated flight, the ejector pump system may not have the delivery capacity, when the No. 1 ejector inlet is exposed, to prevent eventual depletion of the collector tank when the engine is operated at full power. Depletion of the collector tank will result in engine power loss.
2. The master caution annunciator does not flash; this leads to a risk that the the crew may not notice the illumination of an annunciator panel segment, in turn increasing the risk of them not taking action to correct the condition which activated the master caution.
3. When cockpit voice and flight data recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.
4. Because the inlets of the ejector pumps are unscreened, there is a risk that FOD in the fuel tank may become lodged in an ejector nozzle and result in a decrease in the fuel delivery rate to the collector tank.
Other Findings:
1. The crew’s decision not to recover or jettison the birds immediately resulted in operation for an extended period with minimal climb performance.
2. The composition and origin of the FOD, as well as how or when it had been introduced into the fuel tank, could not be determined.
3. The SkyTrac system provided timely position information that would have assisted search and rescue personnel if position data had been required.
4. Saskatoon police, firefighters, and paramedics responded rapidly to the accident and provided effective assistance to the survivors.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-310P Malibu in Kamsack: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 19, 2009 at 2124 LT
Registration:
C-GUZZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kamsack – Saskatoon
MSN:
46-8508108
YOM:
1985
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1000
Captain / Total hours on type:
300.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Kamsack, on an instrument flight rules flight to Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The pilot and three passengers were on board. At takeoff from runway 34, the aircraft began rolling to the left. The aircraft initially climbed, then descended in a steep left bank and collided with terrain 200 feet to the left of the runway. A post-impact fire ignited immediately. Two passengers survived the impact with serious injuries and evacuated from the burning wreckage. The pilot and third passenger were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and the post-impact fire. The accident occurred during evening civil twilight at 2124 Central Standard Time.
Probable cause:
Finding as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot was unable to maintain aircraft control after takeoff for undetermined reasons and the aircraft rolled to the left and collided with terrain.
Finding as to Risk:
1. The manufacturer issued a service bulletin to regularly inspect and lubricate the stainless steel cables. Due to the fact that the bulletin was not part of an airworthiness directive and was not considered mandatory, it was not carried out on an ongoing basis. It is likely that the recommended maintenance action has not been carried out on other affected aircraft at the 100-hour or annual frequency recommended in FAA SAIB CE-01-30.
Other Findings:
1. Due to the complete destruction of the surrounding structure, restriction to aileron cable movement prior to impact could not be determined.
2. The use of the available three-point restraint systems likely prevented the two survivors from being incapacitated, enabling them to evacuate from the burning wreckage.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 100 in La Ronge

Date & Time: Feb 4, 2009 at 0915 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FCCE
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
La Ronge – Deschambeault Lake
MSN:
8
YOM:
1966
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14000
Captain / Total hours on type:
11000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
625
Copilot / Total hours on type:
425
Circumstances:
The aircraft was taking off from a ski strip east of and parallel to Runway 36 at La Ronge. After the nose ski cleared the snow, the left wing rose and the aircraft veered to the right and the captain, who was the pilot flying, continued the take-off. The right ski, however, was still in contact with the snow. The aircraft became airborne briefly as it cleared a deep gully to the right of the runway. The aircraft remained in a steep right bank and the right wing contacted the snow-covered ground. The aircraft flew through a chain link fence and crashed into trees surrounding the airport. The five passengers and two crewmembers evacuated the aircraft with minor injuries. There was a small fire near the right engine exhaust that was immediately extinguished by the crew.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. Contamination on the wings of the aircraft was not fully removed before take-off. It is likely that asymmetric contamination of the wings created a lift differential and a loss of lateral control.
2. Although the operator was not authorized for short take-off and landing (STOL) take-off on this aircraft, the crew conducted a STOL take-off, which reduced the aircraft’s safety margin relative to its stalling speed and minimum control speed.
3. As a result of the loss of lateral control, the slow STOL take-off speed, and the manipulation of the flaps, the aircraft did not remain airborne and veered right, colliding with obstacles beside the ski strip.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The out of phase task requirements regarding the engine vibration isolator assembly, as listed in the operator’s maintenance schedule approval, results in a less than thorough inspection requirement, increasing the likelihood of fatigue cracks remaining undetected.
2. The right engine inboard and top engine mounts had pre-existing fatigue cracks, increasing the risk of catastrophic failure.
Other Findings:
1. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contained audio of a previous flight and was not in operation during the occurrence flight. Minimum equipment list (MEL) procedures for logbook entries and placarding were not followed.
2. The Transwest Air Limited safety management system (SMS) did not identify deviations from standard operating procedures.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 100 King Air in Stony Rapids

Date & Time: Nov 11, 2008 at 1817 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GWWQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Uranium City – Stony Rapids
MSN:
B-76
YOM:
1971
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
For unknown reasons, the aircraft made a wheels up landing and skidded on runway at Stony Rapids Airport before coming to rest. Both pilots were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Gear up landing for undetermined reason.

Crash of a Beechcraft A100 King Air in Sandy Bay: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jan 7, 2007 at 2002 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GFFN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
La Ronge – Sandy Bay
MSN:
B-190
YOM:
1974
Flight number:
TW350
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
8814
Captain / Total hours on type:
449.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
672
Copilot / Total hours on type:
439
Aircraft flight hours:
17066
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed La Ronge, Saskatchewan, at 1930 central standard time under instrument flight rules to Sandy Bay, with two flight crew members and two emergency medical technicians aboard. TW350 was operating under Part VII, Subpart 3, Air Taxi Operations, of the Canadian Aviation Regulations. At 1948, air traffic control cleared TW350 out of controlled airspace via the Sandy Bay Runway 05 non-directional beacon approach. The crew flew the approach straight-in to Runway 05 and initiated a go-around from the landing flare. The aircraft did not maintain a positive rate of climb during the go-around and collided with trees just beyond the departure end of the runway. All four occupants survived the impact and evacuated the aircraft. The captain died of his injuries before rescuers arrived. Both emergency medical technicians were seriously injured, and the first officer received minor injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage from impact forces and was subsequently destroyed by a post-impact fire. The accident occurred at 2002 during the hours of darkness.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Risk:
1. Some Canadian Air Regulations (CARs) subpart 703 air taxi and subpart 704 commuter operators are unlikely to provide initial or recurrent CRM training to pilots in the absence of a regulatory requirement to do so. Consequently, these commercial pilots may be unprepared to avoid, trap, or mitigate crew errors encountered during flight.
2. Transport Canada (TC) Prairie and Northern Region (PNR) management practices regarding the June 2006 replacement of the regional combined audit program, in order to manage safety management system (SMS) workload, did not conform to TC’s risk management decision-making policies. Reallocation of resources without assessment of risk could result in undetected regulatory non-compliance.
3. Although TC safety oversight processes identified the existence of supervisory deficiencies within TWA, the extent of the deficiencies was not fully appreciated by the PNR managers because of the limitations of the oversight system in place at that time.
4. It is likely that the National Aviation Company Information System (NACIS) records for other audits include inaccurate information resulting from data entry errors and wide use of the problematic audit tracking form, reducing the effectiveness of the NACIS as a management tracking system.
5. Self-dispatch systems rely on correct assessment of operational hazards by pilots, particularly in the case of unscheduled commercial service into uncertified aerodromes. Unless pilots are provided with adequate decision support tools, flights may be dispatched with defences that are less than adequate.
6. TWA King Air crews did not use any standard practice in applying cold temperature altitude corrections. Inconsistent application of temperature corrections by flight crews can result in reduction of obstacle clearance to less than the minimum required and reduced safety margins.
7. The practice of not visually verifying wind/runway conditions at aerodromes where this information is otherwise unavailable increases the risk of post-touchdown problems.
8. The company dispatched flights to Sandy Bay without a standard means for crews to deal with non-current altimeter settings. Use of non-current or inappropriate altimeter settings can reduce minimum obstacle clearance and safety margins.
9. The crew was likely unaware of their ¼ nautical mile (nm) error in the aircraft position in relation to the runway threshold resulting from use of the global positioning system (GPS). Unauthorized and informal use of the GPS by untrained crews during instrument flight rules (IFR) approaches can introduce rather than mitigate risk.
10. Widespread adaptations by the King Air pilots resulted in significant deviations from the company’s SOPs, notwithstanding the company’s disciplinary policy.
11. In a SMS environment, inappropriate use of punitive actions can result in a decrease in the number of hazards and occurrences reported, thereby reducing effectiveness of the SMS.
12. Pilot workload is increased and decision making becomes more complicated where limited visual cues are available for assessing aircraft orientation relative to runway and surrounding terrain.
13. Aerodromes with limited visual cues and navigational aids are not explicitly identified in flight information publications as hazardous for night/IFR approaches. Passengers and crews will continue to be exposed to this hazard unless aircraft and aerodrome operators carry out risk assessments to identify them and take mitigating action.
14. To properly assess applicants for pilot positions, operators need access to information on experience and performance that is factual, objective, and (preferably) standardized. Because some employers are unprepared to provide this information—fearing legal action—this may lead to the appointment of pilots to positions for which they are unsuited, thereby compromising safety.
Other Findings:
1. TWA’s safety management system was not yet capable or expected to be capable of detecting, analyzing, and mitigating the risks presented by the hazards underlying this occurrence.
2. The first officer and captain met competency standards on the completion of their initial flight training before they began employment as line pilots.
3. It is very likely that the captain became the pilot flying for the remaining 20 seconds of the flight. The scenario that neither pilot was controlling the aircraft at that time is considered very unlikely.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-580 in La Ronge: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 14, 2006 at 1245 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GSKJ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
La Ronge - La Ronge
MSN:
202
YOM:
1954
Flight number:
TKR472
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
9500
Captain / Total hours on type:
750.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
13000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
25
Circumstances:
The aircraft was conducting stop-and-go landings on Runway 36 at the airport in La Ronge, Saskatchewan. On short final approach for the third landing, the aircraft developed a high sink rate, nearly striking the ground short of the runway. As the crew applied power to arrest the descent, the autofeather system feathered the left propeller and shut down the left engine. On touchdown, the aircraft bounced, the landing was rejected, and a go-around was attempted, but the aircraft did not attain the airspeed required to climb or maintain directional control. The aircraft subsequently entered a descending left-hand turn and crashed into a wooded area approximately one mile northwest of the airport. The first officer was killed and two other crew members sustained serious injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage. The accident occurred during daylight hours at 1245 central standard time.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The flight crew attempted a low-energy go-around after briefly touching down on the runway. The aircraft’s low-energy state contributed to its inability to accelerate to the airspeed required to accomplish a successful go-around procedure.
2. The rapid power lever advancement caused an inadvertent shutdown of the left engine, which exacerbated the aircraft’s low-energy status and contributed to the eventual loss of control.
3. The inadvertent activation of the autofeather system contributed to the crew’s loss of situational awareness, which adversely influenced the decision to go around, at a time when it may have been possible for the aircraft to safely stop and remain on the runway.
4. The shortage and ambiguity of information available on rejected landings contributed to confusion between the pilots, which resulted in a delayed retraction of the flaps. This departure from procedure prevented the aircraft from accelerating adequately.
5. Retarding the power levers after the first officer had exceeded maximum power setting resulted in an inadequate power setting on the right engine and contributed to a breakdown of crew coordination. This prevented the crew from effectively identifying and responding to the emergencies they encountered.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The design of the autofeather system is such that, when armed, the risk of an inadvertent engine shutdown is increased.
2. Rapid power movement may increase the risk of inadvertent activation of the negative torque sensing system during critical flight regimes.
Other Findings:
1. There were inconsistencies between sections of the Conair aircraft operating manual (AOM), the standard operating procedures (SOPs), and the copied AOM that the operator possessed. These inconsistencies likely created confusion between the training captain and the operator’s pilots.
2. The operator’s CV-580A checklists do not contain a specified section for circuit training. The lack of such checklist information likely increased pilot workload.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft A100 King Air in La Ronge

Date & Time: Dec 30, 2005 at 1500 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GAPK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pinehouse Lake – La Ronge
MSN:
B-198
YOM:
1974
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
A Beechcraft A100 King Air, C-GAPK was inbound to La Ronge Airport, SK (YVC), from Pinehouse Lake on a medevac flight. On descent into La Ronge the crew noticed ice building on the wing leading edges. At approximately 6 miles back on final the crew operated the wing de-ice boots, however a substantial amount of residual ice remained after application of the boots. It was reported that in the landing flare at about 100 knots, the aircraft experienced an ice-induced stall from an altitude of about 20 feet followed by a hard landing. The right wing and nacelle buckled forward and downward from the landing impact forces to the extent that the right propeller struck the runway surface while the aircraft was taxiing off the runway.

Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III in La Ronge

Date & Time: Sep 21, 2004 at 1410 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FIPW
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Stony Rapids - La Ronge
MSN:
AC-524
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
KA1501
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
A Northern Dene Airways Ltd. Metro III (registration C-FIPW, serial number AC524), operating as Norcanair Flight KA1051, departed Stony Rapids, Saskatchewan, with two crew members and nine passengers on a day, visual flight rules flight to La Ronge, Saskatchewan. On arrival in La Ronge, at approximately 1410 central standard time, the crew completed the approach and landing checklists and confirmed the gear-down indication. The aircraft was landed in a crosswind on Runway 18 and touched down firmly, approximately 1000 feet from the threshold. On touchdown, the left wing dropped and the propeller made contact with the runway. The aircraft veered to the left side of the runway, despite full rudder and aileron deflection. The crew applied maximum right braking and shut down both engines. The aircraft departed the runway and travelled approximately 200 feet through the infield before the nose and right main gear were torn rearwards; the left gear collapsed into the wheel well. The aircraft slid on its belly before coming to rest approximately 300 feet off the side of the runway. Three of the passengers suffered minor injuries from the sudden stop associated with the final collapsing of the landing gear; the other passengers and the pilots were not injured.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. An incorrect roller of a smaller diameter and type was installed on the left main landing gear outboard bellcrank assembly, contrary to company and industry practice.
2. The smaller diameter roller reduced the required rigging tolerances for the bellcrank-to-cam assembly in the down-and-locked position and allowed the roller to eventually move beyond the cam cutout position, resulting in the collapse of the left landing gear.
3. A rigging check was not carried out after the replacement of the bellcrank roller. Such a check should have revealed that neither the inboard nor outboard bellcrank assembly met the minimum rigging requirements for proper engagement with the positioning cam.
Final Report: