Saskatoon

Conclusions
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The right engine lost power when the intermediate spur gear on the torque sensor shaft failed. This resulted in loss of drive to the high-pressure engine-driven pump, fuel starvation, and immediate engine stoppage.
2. The ability of the left-hand No. 2 ejector pump to deliver fuel to the collector tank was compromised by foreign object debris (FOD) in the ejector pump nozzle.
3. When the fuel level in the left collector tank decreased, the left fuel level warning light likely illuminated but was not noticed by the crew.
4. The pilots did not execute the fuel level warning checklist because they did not perceive the illumination of the fuel level left tank warning light. Consequently, the fuel crossfeed valve remained closed and fuel from only the left wing was being supplied to the left engine.
5. The left engine flamed out as a result of depletion of the collector tank and fuel starvation, and the crew had to make a forced landing resulting in an impact with a concrete noise abatement wall.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Depending on the combination of fuel level and bank angle in single-engine uncoordinated flight, the ejector pump system may not have the delivery capacity, when the No. 1 ejector inlet is exposed, to prevent eventual depletion of the collector tank when the engine is operated at full power. Depletion of the collector tank will result in engine power loss.
2. The master caution annunciator does not flash; this leads to a risk that the the crew may not notice the illumination of an annunciator panel segment, in turn increasing the risk of them not taking action to correct the condition which activated the master caution.
3. When cockpit voice and flight data recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.
4. Because the inlets of the ejector pumps are unscreened, there is a risk that FOD in the fuel tank may become lodged in an ejector nozzle and result in a decrease in the fuel delivery rate to the collector tank.
Other Findings:
1. The crew’s decision not to recover or jettison the birds immediately resulted in operation for an extended period with minimal climb performance.
2. The composition and origin of the FOD, as well as how or when it had been introduced into the fuel tank, could not be determined.
3. The SkyTrac system provided timely position information that would have assisted search and rescue personnel if position data had been required.
4. Saskatoon police, firefighters, and paramedics responded rapidly to the accident and provided effective assistance to the survivors.

Finding as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot was unable to maintain aircraft control after takeoff for undetermined reasons and the aircraft rolled to the left and collided with terrain.
Finding as to Risk:
1. The manufacturer issued a service bulletin to regularly inspect and lubricate the stainless steel cables. Due to the fact that the bulletin was not part of an airworthiness directive and was not considered mandatory, it was not carried out on an ongoing basis. It is likely that the recommended maintenance action has not been carried out on other affected aircraft at the 100-hour or annual frequency recommended in FAA SAIB CE-01-30.
Other Findings:
1. Due to the complete destruction of the surrounding structure, restriction to aileron cable movement prior to impact could not be determined.
2. The use of the available three-point restraint systems likely prevented the two survivors from being incapacitated, enabling them to evacuate from the burning wreckage.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. During flight, the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator worked free of the mounting structure, and as a result, the flight crew lost pitch control of the aircraft.
2. During replacement of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator, the upper attachment bolts were inserted through the airframe structure but did not pass through the upper mounting lugs of the
trim actuator.
3. The improperly installed bolts trapped the actuator mounting lug assemblies, suspending the weight of the actuator and giving the false impression that the bolts had been correctly installed.
4. Dual inspections, ground testing, and flight testing did not reveal the faulty attachment.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The nature of the installation presents a risk that qualified persons may inadvertently install Beech 99 and Beech 100 horizontal stabilizer trim actuators incorrectly. There are no published warnings to advise installers that there is a potential to install the actuator incorrectly.

Bought by Athabaska Airways four days prior to the accident, the aircraft was checked by the company's mechanics. It was determined that the loss of control was the consequence of an issue with the elevator control cables that were not installed in a properly manner by the people in charge of the maintenance.

Inexperienced pilot's neglect to watch instruments while changing flaps fuse in flight, causing the aircraft to fly into ground.

Loss of control in initial climb after fabric peeled off from the right wing. The accident was due to a structural failure caused by overstressing as a result of a rapidly executed manoeuvre made by the pilot during unauthorized aerobatics.

Obscure. Extensive disintegration makes it unable to obtain any material evidence from wreckage. Nature of final dive shows structural failure of the elevator controls.