Flight

The twin engine airplane departed Guarantã do Norte on a flight to a remote area located on km 180 on the Transamazonica Road. En route, both passengers started to fight in the cabin and one of them was killed. The pilot was apparently able to kill the assassin and later decided to attempt an emergency landing. He ditched the airplane in the Rio Novo near Jardim do Ouro. The pilot was later arrested but no drugs, no weapons, no ammunition as well a both passengers bodies were not found. Apparently, the goal of the flight was illegal but Brazilian Authorities were unable to prove it.

The twin engine airplane was carrying two technicians and two pilots bound for a mine field located near Lero, Kankan. It made an intermediate stop at Conakry on a flight from Sal, Cape Verde. En route, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with low clouds and fog when the airplane struck the slope of a mountain and disintegrated on impact. All four occupants were killed.

Two wheel-equipped, high-wing airplanes, a Cessna 207 and a Cessna 175, collided midair while in cruise flight in day visual meteorological conditions. Both airplanes were operating under visual flight rules, and neither airplane was in communication with an air traffic control facility. The Cessna 175 pilot stated that he was making position reports during cruise flight about 1,000ft above mean sea level when he established contact with the pilot of another airplane, which was passing in the opposite direction. As he watched that airplane pass well below him, he noticed the shadow of a second airplane converging with the shadow of his airplane from the opposite direction. He looked forward and saw the spinner of the converging airplane in his windscreen and immediately pulled aft on the control yoke; the airplanes subsequently collided. The Cessna 207 descended uncontrolled into the river. Although damaged, the Cessna 175 continued to fly, and the pilot proceeded to an airport and landed safely. An examination of both airplanes revealed impact signatures consistent with the two airplanes colliding nearly head-on. About 4 years before the accident, following a series of midair collisions in the Matanuska Susitna (MatSu) Valley (the area where the accident occurred), the FAA made significant changes to the common traffic advisory frequencies (CTAF) assigned north and west of Anchorage, Alaska. The FAA established geographic CTAF areas based, in part, on flight patterns, traffic flow, private and public airports, and off-airport landing sites. The CTAF for the area where the accident occurred was at a frequency changeover point with westbound Cook Inlet traffic communicating on 122.70 and eastbound traffic on 122.90 Mhz. The pilot of the Cessna 175, which was traveling on an eastbound heading at the time of the accident, reported that he had a primary active radio frequency of 122.90 Mhz, and a nonactive secondary frequency 135.25 Mhz in his transceiver at the time of the collision. The transceivers from the other airplane were not recovered, and it could not be determined whether the pilot of the Cessna 207 was monitoring the CTAF or making position reports.

The crew was completing a crop spraying flight in Băleni and was spraying insecticides on fields. While passing from a field to an other, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when, passing over a road, the airplane struck the roof of a truck. Out of control, the airplane crash landed in a field and came to rest, bursting into flames. Both pilots were injured and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

The aircraft took-off from Kitale Airstrip (HKKT) at 16.05 hours and set course to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK) after climbing to FL 110 with ten onboard. Once established, there were slight peripheral variations in groundspeed and track. The aircraft Flight Level was sustained at 110 with some occasional deviations. Aircraft height above ground level (AGL) varied between 1,102 feet and 4,187 feet. One minute before its impact with the cliff, the aircraft was at 11,100 feet or 3,000 feet AGL, 159 knots ground speed, and tracking radial 338 NV. Immediately before radar signal was lost, the elevation of the highest ground level was 12,876 feet, the aircraft altitude was 11,200 feet, the ground speed was 156 knots, and track was radial 339 NV. Information retrieved from the Radar transcript recorded various parameters of the aircraft from 1605hrs up to 1702hrs, the time radar signal was lost. This information was consistent with information extracted from the on-board equipment the ST3400 and the aera GPS. The radar system transmits information including aircraft position in relation to NV VOR, Flight Level or altitude, ground speed, vertical speed and heading. Information retrieved from the GPS captured the last recorded time, date and location as 14:00:52, on 06/05/2018 and elevation 3,555.57 metres. The aircraft impacted the bamboo-covered terrain at an elevation of 3,645 metres at 0.36’56’’S 36 42’44’’ where the wreckage was sited. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all 10 occupants were killed.

The airplane manufacturer was conducting spin flight testing for the installation of a cargo pod when the airplane exhibited aberrant behavior and the testing was halted. The chief design engineer (CDE) was consulted, and, to provide a margin of safety for further flights, a forward center of gravity position was authorized for flaps up and flaps takeoff entries to gain more insight into the airplane's behavior on the previous flight. At the final briefing, before the next flight, the flight crew added spins with flaps in the landing configuration (flaps landing) into the test plan without the CDE's consultation or authorization. According to the pilot flying, after two wings-level, power on, flaps landing spins with left rudder and right aileron, a third spin entry was flown in the same configuration except that the entry was from a 30° left-bank turn. The airplane entered a normal spin, and, at one turn, flight controls were inputted for a normal recovery; however, the airplane settled into a fully developed spin. When recovery attempts failed, the decision was made to deploy the anti-spin parachute. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to deploy the anti-spin parachute, and when the airplane's altitude reached about 500 ft above the briefed minimum bailout altitude, both pilots called for and executed a bailout. The airplane impacted the ground and was destroyed. A postaccident examination of the anti-spin parachute system revealed that half of the connector hook had opened, which allowed the activation pin lanyard for the anti-spin parachute to become disengaged. Based on the airplane's previous aberrant behavior and the conservative parameters that the CDE had previously set, it is not likely that the CDE would have authorized abused spin entries without a prior testing buildup to those entries. Thus, the flight crew made an inappropriate decision to introduce flaps landing entry spin testing, and the failure of the anti-spin parachute contributed to the accident.

The twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in an open field located near Génova. The aircraft came to rest upside down and both occupants were killed. It is understood that the registration was false as N113FT is officially attributed to a Piper PA-46 according to the FAA. Thus, it is believed that the flight was illegal.

The single engine aircraft departed Surkhet Airport at 0612LT on a cargo flight to Simikot. At 0627LT, the crew made his last radio transmission with Nepalgunj Tower. About 18 minutes later, while cruising by night at an altitude of 12,800 feet, the airplane struck the slope of a mountain located near the Simikot Pass, some 12 km from Simikot Airport. The airplane disintegrated on impact and both crew members were killed.

The single engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a wooded and hilly terrain located near Tuzantán. The airplane was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and all three occupants were killed. According to Mexican Authorities, the crew was completing an illegal flight.

Before the air taxi flight, the commercial pilot obtained a weather briefing via the company computer system and reviewed the weather information with the company chief pilot. The pilot stated that based on the computer briefing, which did not include icing conditions, he was aware of the forecasted weather conditions along the route of flight and at the intended destination. However, the briefing was incomplete as it did not contain any in-flight weather advisories, which would have alerted the pilot of moderate icing conditions expected over the flight route in the form of AIRMET Zulu. After takeoff and during the climb to 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the airplane encountered light rime ice, and the pilot activated the de-ice equipment with no issues noted. After hearing reports of better weather at a lower altitude, the pilot requested a descent to between 5,000 and 6,000 ft. During the descent to 6,000 ft msl and with the airplane clear of ice, the airplane encountered light to moderate icing conditions. The pilot considered turning back to another airport but could not get clearance until the airplane was closer to his destination. Shortly thereafter, the pilot stated that it felt “like a sheet of ice fell on us” as the airplane encountered severe icing conditions. The pilot applied full engine power in an attempt to maintain altitude. The airplane exited the overcast cloud layer about 500 ft above ground level. The pilot chose to execute an off-airport emergency landing because the airplane could not maintain altitude. During the landing, the landing gear separated; the airplane came to rest upright and sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and that the airplane was within its maximum gross weight. Structural icing was observed on the airframe after the landing. Based on the weather information, which indicated the probability of icing between 5,000 and 9,000 ft over the region and a high threat of supercooled large droplets between 5,000 and 7,000 ft, it is likely that the airplane, which was equipped for flight in icing conditions, inadvertently encountered severe icing conditions consistent with supercooled large droplets, which resulted in structural icing that exceeded the airplane’s capabilities to maintain altitude.