Ground accident of a Sud-Aviation SE-210 Caravelle 10B3 in Tehran: 15 killed

Date & Time: Mar 15, 1974 at 0809 LT
Operator:
Registration:
OY-STK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hong Kong – Bangkok – New Delhi – Tehran – Copenhagen
MSN:
266
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
NB901
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
92
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Captain / Total flying hours:
9600
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6000
Aircraft flight hours:
13773
Circumstances:
Preparing for takeoff on its flight back to Denmark, the crew completed a backtrack on runway 29L when he was instructed by ATC to expedite the procedure and to vacate due to traffic on approach. When the airplane reached the end of the runway, the crew initiated a turn to the left when the right main gear collapsed and punctured the right wing and the fuel tank. A fire ensued and the aircraft came to rest in flames. 15 passengers (7 Danish and 8 Swedish citizens) were killed while 81 other occupants escaped, some of them were seriously injured. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.
Probable cause:
The right main gear failed as a result of the propagation of fatigue cracks in the lower right hand candelabre of RIB 44.

Crash of a Grumman G-73 Mallard in Prince Rupert: 3 killed

Date & Time: Mar 5, 1974
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CF-HPA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Prince Rupert - Masset
MSN:
J-7
YOM:
1946
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
About two minutes after it took off from Prince Rupert seaplane base, the pilot initiated a turn when the airplane lost height and crashed onto a mountain slope located about 3 km southeast of Prince Rupert. The wreckage was found a day later and while seven occupants were rescued, three others, among them the pilot, were killed.

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-10 in Ermenonville: 346 killed

Date & Time: Mar 3, 1974 at 1141 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-JAV
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Ankara - Paris - London
MSN:
46704
YOM:
1972
Flight number:
TK981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
334
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
346
Captain / Total flying hours:
7003
Captain / Total hours on type:
438.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5589
Copilot / Total hours on type:
628
Aircraft flight hours:
2955
Circumstances:
On Sunday March 3, 1974 flight TK981 departed Istanbul for a flight to Paris and London. The DC-10 landed at Paris-Orly at 11:02 and taxied to stand A2. There were 167 passengers on board, of whom 50 disembarked. The aircraft was refueled and baggage was loaded onto the plane. The planned turnaround time of one hour was delayed by 30 minutes. An additional 216 passengers embarked. Most of the passengers were booked on this flight because of a strike at British Airways. The door of the aft cargo compartment on the left-hand side was closed at about 11:35. When all preparations were complete the flight received permission to taxi to runway 08 at 12:24. Four minutes later the crew were cleared to line up for departure and were cleared for departure route 181 and an initial climb to flight level 40. The aircraft took off at approximately 12:30 and was cleared by Orly Departure to climb to FL60, which was reached at 12:34. The North Area Control Centre then cleared TK981 further to FL230. Three or four seconds before 12:40:00 hours, the noise of decompression was heard and the co-pilot said: "the fuselage has burst" and the pressurization aural warning sounded. This was caused by the opening and separation of the aft left-hand cargo door. The pressure difference in the cargo bay and passenger cabin, the floor above the cargo door partly collapsed. Two occupied tripe seat units were ejected from the aircraft. All the horizontal stabilizer and elevator control cables routed beneath the floor of the DC-10 and were thus also severely disrupted. Also the no. 2 engine power was lost almost completely. The aircraft turned 9 deg to the left and pitched nose down. The nose-down attitude increased rapidly to -20 deg. Although the no. 1 and 3 engines were throttled back the speed increased to 360 kts. The pitch attitude then progressively increased to -4 degrees and the speed became steady at 430 kts (800 km/h). At a left bank of 17 degrees the DC-10 crashed into the forest of Ermenonville, 37 km NE of Paris. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 346 occupants were killed, among them 48 Japanese citizens and almost 250 British people.
Probable cause:
The accident was the result of the ejection in flight of the aft cargo door on the left-hand side: the sudden depressurization which followed led to the disruption of the floor structure, causing six passengers and parts of the aircraft to be ejected, rendering No.2 engine inoperative and impairing the flight controls (tail surfaces) so that it was impossible for the crew to regain control of the aircraft. The underlying factor in the sequence of events leading to the accident was the incorrect engagement of the door latching mechanism before take-off. The characteristics of the design of the mechanism made it possible for the vent door to be apparently closed and the cargo door apparently locked when in fact the latches were not fully closed and the lock pins were not in place. It should be noted, however that a view port was provided so that there could be a visual check of the engagement of the lock pins. This defective closing of the door resulted from a combination of various factors:
- Incomplete application of Service Bulletin 52-37;
- Incorrect modifications and adjustments which led, in particular, to insufficient protrusion of the lock pins and to the switching off of the flight deck visual warning light before the door was locked;
- The circumstances of the closure of the door during the stop at Orly, and, in particular, the absence of any visual inspection, through the viewport to verify that the lock pins were effectively engaged, although at the time of the accident inspection was rendered difficult by the inadequate diameter of the view port.
Finally, although there was apparent redundancy of the flight control systems, the fact that the pressure relief vents between the cargo compartment and the passenger cabin were inadequate and that all the flight control cables were routed beneath the floor placed the aircraft in grave danger in the case of any sudden depressurization causing substantial damage to that part of the structure. All these risks had already become evident, nineteen months earlier, at the time of the Windsor accident, but no efficacious corrective action had followed.
Final Report:

Ground explosion of a Douglas C-54A-5-DO Skymaster in Huê: 3 killed

Date & Time: Feb 20, 1974
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XV-NUM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Qui Nhơn – Đà Nẵng
MSN:
7469
YOM:
1944
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
46
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Qui Nhơn Airport for Đà Nẵng, a hijacker ordered the crew to divert to Đồng Hới. The captain stated that a fuel stop was necessary at Đông Hà Airport but he flew directly to Huê. When the hijacker realized he was tricked, he detonated explosives in the front part of the cabin. Three passengers were killed while several other occupants were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Partially destroyed by hand grenade after being hijacked.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R near Makhachkala

Date & Time: Feb 5, 1974
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-01579
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
MSN:
1G81-23
YOM:
1967
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a mission on behalf of the Makhachkalinski OAO. While cruising in below minima weather conditions, the single engine airplane struck a hill and crashed near Makhachkala. There were no casualties.

Crash of a BAc 111-520FN in São Paulo

Date & Time: Feb 2, 1974
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PP-SDQ
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
228
YOM:
1970
Country:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
82
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The landing at São Paulo-Congonhas Airport was completed in heavy rain falls. After touchdown on a contaminated runway, the airplane encountered difficulties to decelerate properly and as the end of the runway was imminent, the captain decided to veer off runway to the left. While contacting a waterlogged ground, the undercarriage were torn off and the airplane came to rest. All 88 occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The airplane suffered hydroplaning after landing on a wet runway. The braking coefficient was poor as there was an excessive accumulation of water on the runway surface.

Crash of a Boeing 707-321B in Pago Pago: 97 killed

Date & Time: Jan 30, 1974 at 2341 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N454PA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Auckland - Pago Pago - Honolulu - Los Angeles
MSN:
19376/661
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
PA806
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
91
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
97
Captain / Total flying hours:
17414
Captain / Total hours on type:
7416.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5107
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5107
Aircraft flight hours:
21625
Circumstances:
On January 30, 1974, Pan Am Flight 806, Boeing 707-321B 'Clipper Radiant' operated as a scheduled flight from Auckland, New Zealand, to Los Angeles, California. En route stops included Pago Pago, American Samoa, and Honolulu, Hawaii. Flight 806 departed Auckland at 2014. It was cleared to Pago Pago on an IFR flight plan. At 2311, Flight 806 contacted Pago Pago Approach Control and reported its position 160 miles south of the Pago Pago airport. Approach control responded, "Clipper eight zero six, roger, and Pago weather, estimated ceiling one thousand six hundred broken, four thousand broken, the visibility - correction, one thousand overcast. The visibility one zero, light rain shower, temperature seven eight, wind three five zero degrees, one five, and altimeter's two nine eight five." At 2313, Pago Pago Approach Control cleared the flight to the Pago Pago VORTAC. Flight 806 reported leaving FL330 three minutes later and leaving FL200 at 2324. Pago Pago Approach Control cleared the flight at 2324: "Clipper eight zero six, you're cleared-for the ILS DME runway five approach - via the two zero mile arc south-southwest. Report the arc, and leaving five thousand." At 2333, the flight requested the direction and velocity of the Pago Pago winds and was told that they were 360 degrees variable from 020 degrees at 10 to 15 knots. At 2334, the flight reported out of 5,500 feet and that they had intercepted the 226 degree radial of the Pago Pago VOR. The approach controller responded, "Eight oh six, right. Understand inbound on the localizer. Report about three out. No other reported traffic. Winds zero one zero degrees at one five gusting two zero." At 2338, approach control said, "Clipper eight oh six, appears that we've had power failure at the airport. " The first officer replied, "Eight oh six, we're still getting your VOR, the ILS and the lights are showing." Approach control then asked, "See the runway lights?" The flight responded, "That's Charlie." The approach controller then said, " ...we have a bad rain shower here. I can't see them from my position here." "We're five DME now and they still look bright," the first officer responded. Approach Control replied, "´kay, no other reported traffic. The wind is zero three zero degrees at two zero, gusting two five. Advise clear of the runway." At 23:39:41, the flight replied, "Eight zero six, wilco." This was the last radio transmission from the flight. On the flight deck the windshield wipers were turned on and the flaps were set at the 50° position, which completed the checklists for landing. At 23:40:22, the first officer stated, "You're a little high." The radio altimeter warning tone then sounded twice and the first officer said "You're at minimums." He reported the field in sight and said that they were at 140 kts. At 23:40:42, the aircraft crashed into trees at an elevation of 113 feet, and about 3,865 feet short of the runway threshold. The first impact with the ground was about 236 feet farther along the crash path. The aircraft continued through the jungle vegetation, struck a 3-foot-high lava rock wall, and stopped about 3,090 feet from the runway threshold. Of the 101 occupants of the aircraft, 9 passengers and 1 crew member survived the crash and fire. One passenger died the next day; the crew member and three passengers died 3 days after the accident. One passenger died of his injuries 9 days after the accident. Thus only four passengers survived the crash.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's late recognition, and failure to correct in a timely manner, an excessive descent rate which developed as a result of the aircraft's penetration through destabilizing wind changes. The winds consisted of horizontal and vertical components produced by a heavy rainstorm and influenced by uneven terrain close to the aircraft's approach path. The captain's recognition was hampered by restricted visibility, the illusory effects of a "black hole" approach, inadequate monitoring of flight instruments, and the failure of the crew to call out descent rate during the last 15 seconds of flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker F28 Fellowship 1000 in Izmir: 66 killed

Date & Time: Jan 26, 1974 at 0730 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-JAO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Izmir - Istanbul
MSN:
11057
YOM:
1972
Flight number:
TK301
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
68
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
66
Captain / Total flying hours:
2600
Captain / Total hours on type:
577.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2794
Copilot / Total hours on type:
395
Aircraft flight hours:
2269
Aircraft flight cycles:
3133
Circumstances:
Shortly after closing the doors and receiving tower permission the aircraft was taxied to the threshold of Runway 35 and began a rolling takeoff without delay. According to witnesses the aircraft had run approximately 3,200 feet before becoming airborne. When about 8 to 10 meters above the ground it yawed to the left and pitched nose-down. Contact with the ground was made in a nearly level attitude, first by the outboard fairing doors of the left wing flap, then by the left side of the fuselage belly, hitting the bank of a drainage ditch, which parallels the left (west) side of the runway at a distance of 28 meters from the runway. The aircraft then disintegrated and caught fire within 100 meters of travel. A crew member and six passengers survived while 66 other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The aircraft stalled on takeoff due to over-rotation and frost accretion on the wings. The aircraft remained overnight at Cumaovasi Airport in an open area. In the morning, 26 January at 0400 GMT, the temperature was 0° C and the relative humidity was 95%. When the takeoff was made the temperature had reached +3° C and the humidity 97%. In that weather condition some frost accretion existed on the upper wing surfaces and elevators. (The same kind of frost occurred on the wings of another F28 waiting at the apron at the same hours next day under almost the same meteorological conditions.) During the walk-around inspection prior to takeoff, frost formation was not noticed. It is quite possible that the temperature on the wings and tail of an aircraft parked overnight in the open could be even lower due to radiation. The length of Cumaovasi runway is 6,005 feet. According to the temperature and to the load of the aircraft a run of 2,800 feet is required to reach V1 and VR. Indications of the flight data recorder were that the aircraft became airborne when it reached 124 kt and a 3,200 feet run. The data recorder also showed that the speed of the aircraft reached 133 kt then dropped to 124 kt when it veered left. This indicates that the aircraft was rotated more than the normal angle of attack. It is believed that the frost accretion on the wings caused the aircraft to stall soon after takeoff, whereas it would have flown safely in normal conditions. Because of the low altitude after takeoff the pilot could not recover from the stall.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-3A-191 near Chigorodó: 12 killed

Date & Time: Jan 17, 1974 at 1315 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-1216
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Turbo – Chigorodó – Medellín
MSN:
1905
YOM:
1937
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Circumstances:
The airplane was completing a flight from Turbo to Medellín with an intermediate stop in Chigorodó. It departed Chigorodó Airport at 1255LT bound to the south and the crew was cleared to climb to 11,500 feet. About 20 minutes later, the pilot declared an emergency when control was lost. The wreckage was found in a mountainous terrain and all 12 occupants were killed.

Crash of a Boeing 707-131B in Los Angeles

Date & Time: Jan 16, 1974 at 0135 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N757TW
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York - Los Angeles
MSN:
18395/309
YOM:
1962
Flight number:
TW701
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
56
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15800
Captain / Total hours on type:
6750.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4335
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2040
Aircraft flight hours:
38876
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from New York-JFK, the crew started the descent to Los Angeles Airport runway 06R over the sea. Weather was clear but on short final, the crew encountered local patches of fog and visual control with the ground was lost. The airplane continued the approach and landed nose wheel first with a vertical g load of 4.6. This caused the nose wheel to collapse rearward and a fire started in the nose wheel well area. The fire in the nose wheel well was initiated by the burning nose gear tires. The fire was fed by hydraulic fluid that escaped from broken nose wheel steering hydraulic lines. Evacuation of the aircraft resulted in minor or serious injuries to eight passengers. Firefighting personnel were unable to extinguish the fire in the nose wheel well before it spread to the fuselage and destroyed the cockpit and the passenger cabin.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the probable cause of the accident was the continuation of a visual approach after the flight crew lost outside visual reference because of a low cloud and fog encounter. The following factors were reported:
- While executing a night visual approach over water to runway 06R at the Los Angeles International Airport, the flight encountered ground fog when the crew prepared to flare the aircraft for landing,
- The weather in the Los Angeles area was clear; however, the existing visibility at the approach end of runway 6R was considerably less than predicted by the National Weather Service because of fog.
Final Report: