Scheduled Revenue Flight

The aircraft was operating British Island Airways flight UK 185, a scheduled night passenger service from Southampton (SOU) to Guernsey (GCI). It taxied out initially at 17:49 but during the takeoff run it was noticed that the starboard engine's rpm gauge indicated 14,550 rpm instead of 15,000 and that the torque reading on the same engine was below the datum appropriate to the use of water methanol injection. The commander, who was handling the aircraft, therefore decided to abandon the takeoff when the speed had reached about 60 knots and he returned the aircraft to the apron. A ground run carried out on the starboard engine produced normal full power indications and so the passengers were re-embarked and the flight departed for the second time at 18:21. The power output from the engines during this takeoff was satisfactory but when the aircraft had reached about 200 feet a rise in the torque indication of the starboard engine was observed. Climb power was set and the flight climbed to FL80 and continued on track to Guernsey. The descent into Guernsey was started when the aircraft was about 35 nm from the airport. Power was reduced on both engines but when the fuel flow was being trimmed back the starboard engine's turbine gas temperature (TGT), torque and fuel flow gauges showed an increase in their readings and because they continued to rise the engine was shut down and the propeller feathered. Guernsey Approach Control was informed of the situation and asked to have the emergency services standing by for the landing. The aircraft continued the descent but when it was about 5 nm from the runway it was advised by ATC that the airline had requested that it should land at Jersey airport instead of Guernsey. It was therefore decided to divert to Jersey and clearance was received from ATC to proceed on course at 1,500 feet above mean sea level (amsl). The aircraft changed to the Jersey Approach Control frequency and after ensuring that ATC was aware of the emergency the commander requested permission to make an ILS approach to runway 27 although the weather at the time was clear. The commander did not consider that it was necessary to brief the co-pilot about the approach and landing to Jersey as this had already been covered during a previous approach to the airport earlier in the day and he made no special reference to the single engine approach condition. Jersey radar positioned the aircraft on the ILS localiser and it became established at a range of about 5½ nm from the runway and commenced its descent shortly afterwards. In the vicinity of the outer marker the undercarriage was lowered followed by takeoff flap (5°). ATC cleared the aircraft to land and reported the wind as 270° at 10 knots. The aircraft continued its descent flying slightly above the ILS glide path with the airspeed increasing from about 120 knots to 137 knots. Power was reduced on the port engine to a very low value and the IAS began to decay at a rate of about one knot per second. When the aircraft was between 400 and 300 feet above the runway full landing flap (30°) was selected and both pilots considered that at this stage they were correctly positioned for the approach. The co-pilot noticed that the airspeed was about 105-110 knots when he selected full flap. (The recommended speed for the final approach was 99½ knots, ie 10 knots above VATI). The aircraft became displaced to the right of the runway centre line as it approached the threshold and the commander tried to realign it with the runway by making a sidestep manoeuvre to the left. The IAS had continued to decrease at a steady rate during the final stage of the descent and that at this point it was about 89 knots. When the commander realised that he was not going to be successful in his attempt to realign the aircraft with the runway centre line he called for full power. The aircraft was now alongside the runway threshold lights. The co-pilot advanced the throttle on the port engine and believing that the commander had also called 'overshooting' he selected the undercarriage to retract. The aircraft began to yaw and roll rapidly to the right resulting in the starboard wing tip and starboard main wheels almost simultaneously striking the ground well to the right of the runway edge. The aircraft subsided on to the grass as the undercarriage retracted, spun round to the right through approximately 180° and then slid backwards until it came to rest astride a small road on the northern perimeter of the airfield. All 53 occupants were evacuated safely, four of them were slightly injured.

Four minutes after takeoff from runway 05 at Maturín-Quiriquire Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 1,500 meters, the airplane went out of control, entered a dive and crashed in a field located about 20 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 75 occupants have been killed.

Crashed in unknown circumstances. No casualties.

18 seconds after it started the takeoff roll, after a distance of 360 meters, while at a speed of 150 km/h, the copilot pointed out a problem with the nose gear and asked if the rudder and elevators were unlocked. At this time, the captain realized that a takeoff was not possible and instructed to abandon the takeoff procedure. Engine power was reduced and an emergency braking procedure was initiated. At this time, the aircraft's was 300 meters from the runway end at a speed of 215 km/h. 18 additional seconds elapsed from the copilot's remark. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran, rolled for 540 meters then collided with an embankment and came to rest in flames against trees. 12 occupants were injured while seven passengers were killed. The aircraft was partially destroyed by a post crash fire.

Few minutes before its scheduled arrival in Kodiak, the seaplane went out of control and crashed into the Chiniak Bay. SAR operations were conducted but eventually suspended after few days as no trace of the aircraft nor the five occupants was found.

The takeoff procedure was completed with an aircraft being low on fuel. After takeoff, the airplane crashed near the airport. There were no injuries.

The crew was cleared to takeoff from runway 30 at Irkutsk-Intl Airport, bound for Kazachinskoye, carrying 11 passengers and a crew of two. While climbing to an altitude of 270 meters in limited visibility, the AN-2 collided with an Aeroflot AN-12B registered CCCP-12985 that was carrying seven crew members who were performing a local training flight. Following the collision, the AN-2 went out of control and crashed in flames 200 meters further. All 13 occupants were killed. The crew of the AN-12 elected to make an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in a prairie located 3,980 meters past the runway end. It slid on the ground for 220 meters before colliding with a concrete mast that cut the airplane in two. All seven crew members escaped uninjured.

Trans World Airlines Flight TW514 was a regularly scheduled flight from Indianapolis, IN (IND), to Washington-National Airport, DC (DCA), with an intermediate stop at Columbus-Port Columbus International Airport, OH (CMH). Flight 514 departed Indianapolis at 08:53 EST and arrived in Columbus at 09:32. The Boeing 727 departed Columbus at 10:24, eleven minutes late. There were 85 passengers and 7 flight crew members aboard the aircraft when it departed Columbus. At 10:36, the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) informed the crew of Flight 514 that no landings were being made at Washington National Airport because of high crosswinds, and that flights destined for that airport were either being held or being diverted to Dulles International Airport (IAD). At 10:38, the captain of Flight 514 communicated with the dispatcher in New York and advised him of the information he had received. The dispatcher, with the captain's concurrence, subsequently amended Flight 514's release to allow the flight to proceed to Dulles. At 10:42, Cleveland ARTCC cleared Flight 514 to Dulles Airport via the Front Royal VOR, and to maintain FL290. One minute later, the controller cleared the flight to descend to FL230 and to cross a point 40 miles west of Front Royal at that altitude. Control of the flight was then transferred to the Washington ARTCC and communications were established with that facility at 10:48. In the meantime, the flightcrew discussed the instrument approach to runway 12, the navigational aids, and the runways at Dulles, and the captain turned the flight controls over to the first officer. When radio communications were established with Washington ARTCC, the controller affirmed that he knew the flight was proceeding to Dulles. Following this contact, the crew discussed the various routings they might receive to conduct a VOR/DME approach to runway 12 at Dulles. At 10:51, the Washington ARTCC controller requested the flight's heading. After being told that the flight was on a heading of 100 degrees, the controller cleared the crew to change to a heading of 090°, to intercept the 300° radial of the Armel VOR, to cross a point 25 miles northwest of Armel to maintain 8,000 feet, "...and the 300° radial will be for a VOR approach to runway 12 at Dulles." He gave the crew an altimeter setting of 29.74 for Dulles. The crew acknowledged this clearance. The pilots again discussed the VOR/DME approach At 10:55, the landing preliminary checklist was read by the flight engineer and the other crewmembers responded to the calls. A reference speed of 127 kts was calculated and set on the airspeed indicator reference pointers. The altimeters were set at 29.74. The crew then again discussed items on the instrument approach chart including the Round Hill intersection, the final approach fix, the visual approach slope indicator and runway lights, and the airport diagram. At 10:59, the captain commented that the flight was descending from 11,000 feet to 8,000 feet. He then asked the controller if there were any weather obstructions between the flight and the airport. The controller replied that he did not see any significant weather along the route. The captain replied that the crew also did not see any weather on the aircraft weather radar. At 11:01, the controller cleared the flight to descend to and maintain 7,000 feet and to contact Dulles approach control. Twenty-six seconds later, the captain initiated a conversation with Dulles approach control and reported that the aircraft was descending from 10,000 feet to maintain 7,000 feet. He also reported having received the information "Charlie" transmitted on the ATIS broadcast. The controller replied with a clearance to proceed inbound to Armel and to expect a VOR/DME approach to runway 12. The controller then informed the crew that ATIS information Delta was current and read the data to them. The crew determined that the difference between information Charlie and Delta was the altimeter setting which was given in Delta as 29.70. There was no information on the CVR to indicate that the pilots reset their altimeters from 29.74. At 11:04, the flight reported it was level at 7,000 feet. Five seconds after receiving that report, the controller said, "TWA 514, you're cleared for a VOR/DME approach to runway 12." This clearance was acknowledged by the captain. The CVR recorded the sound of the landing gear warning horn followed by a comment from the captain that "Eighteen hundred is the bottom." The first officer then said, "Start down." The flight engineer said, "We're out here quite a ways. I better turn the heat down." At 11:05:06, the captain reviewed the field elevation, the minimum descent altitude, and the final approach fix and discussed the reason that no time to the missed approach point was published. At 11:06:15, the first officer commented that, "I hate the altitude jumping around. Then he commented that the instrument panel was bouncing around. At 11:06:15, the captain said, "We have a discrepancy in our VOR's, a little but not much." He continued, "Fly yours, not mine." At 11:06:27, the captain discussed the last reported ceiling and minimum descent altitude. concluded, "...should break out." At 11:06:42, the first officer said, "Gives you a headache after a while, watching this jumping around like that." At 11:07:27, he said, "...you can feel that wind down here now." A few seconds later, the captain said, "You know, according to this dumb sheet it says thirtyfour hundred to Round Hill --- is our minimum altitude." The flight engineer then asked where the captain saw that and the captain replied, "Well, here. Round Hill is eleven and a half DME." The first officer said, "Well, but ---" and the captain replied, "When he clears you, that means you can go to your ---" An unidentified voice said, "Initial approach, and another unidentified voice said, "Yeah!" Then the captain said "Initial approach altitude." The flight engineer then said, "We're out a --- twenty-eight for eighteen." An unidentified voice said, "Right, and someone said, "One to go." At 11:08:14, the flight engineer said, "Dark in here," and the first officer stated, "And bumpy too." At 11:08:25, the sound of an altitude alert horn was recorded. The captain said, "I had ground contact a minute ago," and the first officer replied, "Yeah, I did too." At 11:08:29, the first officer said, "...power on this.... " The captain said "Yeah --- you got a high sink rate." "Yeah," the first officer replied. An unidentified voice said, "We're going uphill, " and the flight engineer replied, "We're right there, we're on course." Two voices responded, "Yeah!" The captain then said, "You ought to see ground outside in just a minute -- Hang in there boy." The flight engineer said, "We're getting seasick." At 1108:57, the altitude alert sounded. Then the first officer said, "Boy, it was --- wanted to go right down through there, man," to which an unidentified voice replied, "Yeah!" Then the first officer said, "Must have had a # of a downdraft." At 1109:14, the radio altimeter warning horn sounded and stopped. The first officer said, "Boy!" At 11:09:20, the captain said, "Get some power on." The radio altimeter warning horn sounded again and stopped. At 11:09:22, the sound of impact was recorded. After the aircraft left 7,000 feet, the descent was continuous with little rate variation until the indicated altitude was about 1,750 feet. increased about 150 feet over a 15-second period and then decreased about 200 feet during a 20-second period. The recorded altitude remained about 1,750 feet until the airplane impacted the west slope of Mount Weather, Virginia, about 25 nmi from Dulles, at an elevation of about 1,670 feet (509 m). The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 92 occupants were killed.

On final approach to Belgrade-Surčin Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with patches of fog and a visibility limited to 2,500 meters with 7/8 of clouds at 1,500 meters. The pilot-in-command decided to continue the approach after he lost visual contact with the ground when the airplane struck the ground 2,570 meters short of runway threshold. On impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the airplane slid for several meters before coming to rest in flammes. All 50 occupants were able to evacuate the cabin and only four passengers were slightly injured while the aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

After takeoff from Soddo Airport, while climbing, the airplane stalled and crashed. 10 passengers were injured while 12 others were uninjured. Both pilots were killed.