Kodiak

According to a passenger who was seated in the front, right seat, as the flight progressed toward the destination, the pilot decided to make an unscheduled landing at a lake that was surrounded by rising terrain. The passenger said that after making an easterly approach to the lake, before touching down, the pilot initiated a go-around. The passenger said they flew low over the surface of the lake toward a “V” shaped notch formed by a creek with hills on either side at the east end of the lake. He said that while flying through the notch, he thought the left wing of the airplane had hit the hillside. He said the pilot reacted by pulling back hard on the control yoke and rolling the airplane to the right. The airplane entered a steep climb, it began to shake, and stall warning horn sounded. The airplane then rolled left into a steep descent and impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude. The airplane’s left wing had impacted a tree on the creek bank prior to the crash. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicological tests detected the pilot’s recent use of over-the-counter medications used for relief of cold and flu symptoms. Two of these medications are sedating. The use of these sedating medications on the day of the accident or the underlying illness may have affected the pilot’s performance. Given the lack of mechanical deficiencies with the airplane, and the passenger's account of the accident, it is likely the pilot failed to maintain adequate clearance with a tree while performing a low altitude maneuver following a go-around.

The airline transport pilot was taking off on a passenger flight under Title 14, CFR Part 135, when the accident occurred. He reported that during takeoff the wind was reported from 290-300 degrees, at 15 knots, gusting to 27 knots. He chose to make an intersection takeoff on runway 25 at its intersection with runway 29, rather than use the full length of runway 29. He said his airspeed did not develop as quickly as he had anticipated, and that with his airspeed lagging and poor climb performance, he realized the airplane was not going to clear the ridge at the end of the runway. He said he initiated a right descending turn to maintain his airspeed, but impacted trees alongside the runway. He reported that the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage when it impacted trees. He said there were no mechanical problems with the airplane prior to the accident.

The airline transport pilot and nine passengers were departing in a twin-engine airplane on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight from a runway adjacent to an ocean bay. According to the air traffic control tower specialist on duty, the airplane became airborne about midway down the runway. As it approached the end of the runway, the pilot said he needed to return to the airport, but gave no reason. The specialist cleared the airplane to land on any runway. As the airplane began a right turn, it rolled sharply to the right and began a rapid, nose- and right-wing-low descent. The airplane crashed about 200 yards offshore and the fragmented wreckage sank in the 10-foot-deep water. Survivors were rescued by a private float plane. A passenger reported that the airplane's nose baggage door partially opened just after takeoff, and fully opened into a locked position when the pilot initiated a right turn towards the airport. The nose baggage door is mounted on the left side of the nose, just forward of the pilot's windscreen. When the door is opened, it swings upward, and is held open by a latching device. To lock the baggage door, the handle is placed in the closed position and the handle is then locked by rotating a key lock, engaging a locking cam. With the locking cam in the locked position, removal of the key prevents the locking cam from moving. The original equipment key lock is designed so the key can only be removed when the locking cam is engaged. Investigation revealed that the original key lock on the airplane's forward baggage door had been replaced with an unapproved thumb-latch device. A Safety Board materials engineer's examination revealed evidence that a plastic guard inside the baggage compartment, which is designed to protect the door's locking mechanism from baggage/cargo, appeared not to be installed at the time of the accident. The airplane manufacturer's only required inspection of the latching system was a visual inspection every 100 hours of service. Additionally, the mechanical components of the forward baggage door latch mechanism were considered "on condition" items, with no predetermined life-limit. On May 29, 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a safety alert for operators (SAFO 08013), recommending a visual inspection of the baggage door latches and locks, additional training of flight and ground crews, and the removal of unapproved lock devices. In July 2008, Piper Aircraft issued a mandatory service bulletin (SB 1194, later 1194A), requiring the installation of a key lock device, mandatory recurring inspection intervals, life-limits on safety-critical parts of forward baggage door components, and the installation of a placard on the forward baggage door with instructions for closing and locking the door to preclude an in-flight opening. Post accident inspection discovered no mechanical discrepancies with the airplane other than the baggage door latch. The airplane manufacturer's pilot operating handbook did not contain emergency procedures for an in-flight opening of the nose baggage door, nor did the operator's pilot training program include instruction on the proper operation of the nose baggage door or procedures to follow in case of an in-flight opening of the door. Absent findings of any other mechanical issues, it is likely the door locking mechanism was not fully engaged and/or the baggage shifted during takeoff, and contacted the exposed internal latching mechanism, allowing the cargo door to open. With the airplane operating at a low airspeed and altitude, the open baggage door would have incurred additional aerodynamic drag and further reduced the airspeed. The pilot's immediate turn towards the airport, with the now fully open baggage door, likely resulted in a sudden increase in drag, with a substantive decrease in airspeed, and an aerodynamic stall.

The airline transport pilot was departing to the north from a narrow stream in a float-equipped airplane with lodge guests aboard, on a Title 14, CFR Part 91 flight. Northerly winds between 25 and 35 knots, were reported at the time of the accident. The accident pilot reported that after departure, he turned left, and a strong downdraft "threw the airplane to the ground." The passengers said that the airplane started its takeoff run directly into the strong winds, but shortly after becoming airborne, the pilot made a steep turn to the left, about 150 feet above the ground. The passengers indicated that as the airplane continued to turn left, it began to shudder and buffet, then abruptly descended nose low into the marsh-covered terrain. During the impact, the right wing folded, and the airplane's fuselage came to rest on its right side. One of the occupants, seated next to the right main cabin door, was partially ejected during the impact sequence, and was pinned under the fuselage and covered by water. Rescue efforts by the pilot and passengers were unsuccessful. In the pilot's written statement to the NTSB, he reported that there were no pre accident mechanical anomalies with the airplane, and during the on-site examination of the wreckage by the NTSB investigator-in-charge, no pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered.

The aircraft departed Kodiak on a cargo flight to Saint Paul Island, carrying nine crew members and a 19,000 litres fuel truck. Upon landing on runway 36, the airplane fish tailed twice, causing the right wing to struck the runway surface. The wingtip was sheared off as well as the engine n°4 propeller. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overrun, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen metres further. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The commercial certificated pilot was departing a remote bay with five passengers in an amphibious float-equipped airplane on the return portion of a Title 14, CFR Part 135 sightseeing flight. The pilot began the takeoff run toward the north, with the wind from the north between 15 to 20 knots, and 4 to 6 foot sea swells. When the airplane had climbed to about 10 to 15 feet, the pilot said a windshear was encountered, which pushed the airplane down. The airplane's floats struck a wave, missed about 4 to 5 swells, and then struck another wave, which produced a loud "bang." The company guide, seated in the right front seat, told the pilot that the right float assembly was broken and displaced upward. The airplane cleared a few additional swells, and then collided with the water. Both float assemblies were crushed upward, and the left float began flooding. The guide exited the airplane onto the right float, and made a distress call via a satellite telephone. All occupants donned a life preserver as the airplane began sinking. The pilot said that after about 15 minutes, the rising water level in the airplane necessitated an evacuation, and all occupants exited into the water, and held onto the right float as the airplane rolled left. The airplane remained floating from the right float, and was being moved away from shore by wind and wave action. The pilot said that one passenger was washed away from the float within about 5 minutes, and two more passengers followed shortly thereafter. Within about 5 minutes after entering the water, the pilot said he lost his grip on the float, and does not remember anything further until regaining consciousness in a hospital. He was told by medical staff that he had been severely hypothermic. U.S. Coast Guard aircraft were already airborne on a training mission, and diverted to rescue the occupants. About 1320, a C-130 flew overhead, and began dropping inflatable rafts. The company guide was the only one able to climb into a raft. When the helicopters arrived, they completed the rescue using a hoist and a rescue swimmer. The passengers reported that they also were unable to hold onto the airplane after entering the water, became unconscious, and were severely hypothermic upon reaching a hospital. The airplane was not equipped with a life raft, and was not required to be so equipped.

The solo airline transport pilot departed on a commercial cargo flight in a twin-engine, turboprop airplane. As the flight approached the destination airport, visibility decreased below the 2 mile minimum required for the initiation of the approach. The pilot entered a holding pattern, and waited for the weather to improve. After holding for about 45 minutes, the ceiling and visibility had improved, and the flight was cleared for the ILS 25 instrument approach. After the pilot's initial contact with ATCT personnel, no further radio communications were received. When the flight did not reach the destination airport, it was reported overdue. A search in the area of an ELT signal located the accident airplane on a hilly, tree-covered island. A witness located to the north of the airport reported seeing a twin-engine turboprop airplane flying very low over the water, headed in an easterly direction, away from the airport. The witness added that the weather at the time consisted of very low clouds, fog, and rain, with zero-zero visibility. A local resident also stated that the weather conditions were often much lower over the water adjacent to the approach end of the airport than at the airport itself. The missed approach procedure for the ILS 25 approach is a climbing left turn to the south. About one minute after the accident, a special weather observation was reporting, in part: Wind, 060 degrees (true) at 11 knots; visibility, 2 statute miles in light rain and mist; clouds and sky condition, 500 feet broken, 900 feet broken, 1,500 feet overcast; temperature, 46 degrees F; dew point, 44 degrees F. According to FAA records, the company was not authorized to conduct single pilot IFR operations in the accident airplane, and that the accident pilot was the operator's chief pilot. Toxicology tests revealed cocaethylene and chlorpheniramine in the pilot's blood and urine.

During an on-demand air taxi flight, the airline transport certificated pilot was preparing to land an amphibious float-equipped airplane near a cabin that was located on the shore of a coastal bay. A 10 to 15 knot wind was blowing from the bay toward the land, and the pilot decided to approach over land. As the airplane descended over a small creek bed, adjacent to a hill, the airplane encountered a downdraft, and descended rapidly. The left wing collided with alder trees which spun the airplane 180 degrees. The right wing and float assembly were torn off the airplane. The closest official weather observation station, located 30 miles away, was reporting calm wind.

The pilot was informed by another company pilot that the higher passes were closed. He then attempted to fly through 'high pass' located near old harbor. The pilot described the weather as overcast with ceilings obscured, and flight visibility was 2 to 3 miles. The pass was snow covered. As he entered the pass he lost visual reference due to whiteout conditions and he initiated a left turn to exit the pass. Approx half way through the turn the left wing struck the mountain.

On August 2, 1993, at 1500 Alaska daylight time, an amphibious Cessna 208 airplane, N9526F, operated by MarkAir, Inc., nosed over after landing on the water with the wheels extended at Geographic Harbor, located about 75 miles west of Kodiak, Alaska. The commercial pilot, the sole occupant, sustained minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The unscheduled domestic cargo flight, operating under 14 CFR Part 135, departed King Salmon, Alaska at 1426. Visual meteorological conditions existed, and a company VFR flight plan was filed.
During a telephone conversation with the pilot shortly after the accident, he stated that he "just failed to use and comply with the airplanes checklist to ensure that the wheels were retracted for the water landing". He further stated that he was very distracted and preoccupied with several other mission related activities.